Ending gender-based violence:

A call for global action to involve men

A summary of research prepared by:
Harry Ferguson, Jeff Hearn, Øystein Gullvåg Holter, Lars Jalmert,
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Costs of male violence

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Foreword

Men's violence against women is one of the most serious problems in our society, in Sweden and in the rest of the world. Violence against women – whether abuse, rape or prostitution – is the ultimate expression of the patriarchal social system that subordinates women to men. Men's violence against women is never just an individual problem concerning only a man and woman. It is a societal problem that is ultimately about power. Women who are threatened, harassed and beaten by men they know and love experience the male-dominated society in its cruellest form.

When men are confronted with violence against women they often dismiss it with a "Don't look at me! I don't do that kind of thing!" This attitude towards men's violence against women is hardly constructive. Men and women alike must acknowledge and react to the violence against women that occurs around them. They must see it as their duty to demolish the patriarchal structures they themselves live in.

In this context, research on masculinity has a major role to play: which socially constructed gender roles make some men violent and how can they be demolished? In this report, seven masculinity researchers write about masculinity in different parts of the world and about how masculinity is often linked to violence. These acts of violence are committed not only against women and children, but also against other men. The writers

suggest a number of ways in which men can be involved in working to combat men's violence.

I hope that this report will promote a deeper and more widespread insight into the subject and the work to reduce gender-based violence. It is time to put an end to the continual violation of women, which is not worthy of a society that is built on the conviction that all human beings are of equal worth.

Mona Sahlin

Minister for Democracy, Integration
and Gender Equality

Ending gender-based violence – a prerequisite for an equitable global development

Violence is a major human rights abuse that is prevalent in different forms worldwide. It is also an obstacle to reaching many development goals. It is among the worlds´s greatest threats to public health, as well as an obstacle to improved early childhood care and development, quality education for both boys and girls, and a safe and secure environment for the population as a whole.

Violence may thus comprise the single largest outlay of public and private funds in any society – for legal adjudication, punishment, health related costs – as well as indirect costs through reduced productivity, increased absenteeism, and the many and long-term effects on children exposed to violence.

The overwhelming majority of violent acts are committed by men, at every level – between individuals, within and among groups, and within social institutions. These acts of violence are committed not only against women and children, but also against other men.

Men in most parts of the world are themselves seeking ways to change stereotypic models of masculinity, and to engage other men in reducing gender-based violence. A number of organisations and groups have increased their attention to the importance of "new masculinities" and "men as partners against gender violence".

Four UN conferences on improving the conditions of women have taken place since 1975.

On the initiative of the well-known Swedish writer Eva Moberg, already in 1994 a group of committed individuals, mostly men, gathered with the aim of mobilising public support and placing the need for a new male gender role on the agenda of the United Nations.

The group realized that the key-link in the process is to search for, collect and identify the interrelations between violence in the world and gender issues, specifically in relation to male behaviour.

Seven experienced and prominent researchers, having done critical studies on men (all men themselves), were invited – and accepted to compile this report on gender based violence and the mechanisms behind it.

Nine other professionals from various parts of the world, researchers and persons with a vast experience from the field, have read and commented on the draft report. Their points of view have been considered in this final version.

The report is supported by an analysis of the alarming costs linked to violence in the world we all have in common.

We hope that this report will promote a deeper and more widespread insight into the subject and the work to reduce gender-based violence.

Thank you all who have contributed!

Maria Norrfalk
Director General, Sida

Preamble

Men's violence is a worldwide problem. From battlefields to playgrounds, from our streets to our schools, and within our homes, men's violence brings uncountable anguish and pain; indeed it is among the world's greatest threats to public health. Men's violence is evident at every level of our world – between individuals, within and among groups, and in the actions of social institutions.

Men's violence demands urgent action – from the perspective of women, of children, and of men themselves:

First, men's violence is a problem for women. Stopping violence against women has been increasingly recognised as an international priority – in the UN, by the EU, by UNICEF, and by many national governments.

Second, men's violence undermines children's rights. Progress on the mandate of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the work of UNICEF involves ending men's violence to children, and to women and men, which directly and indirectly violates children.

Third, men's violence is a problem for men. From childhood, boys and men are exposed to violence, are its victims, its witnesses, and expected to be its perpetrators. There is increasing recognition that men have the responsibility to end men's violence, and, indeed, have much to gain thereby. Stopping men's violence is a clear and fundamental part of the international Human Rights agenda.

The global context makes action to prevent men's violence increasingly urgent. Globalisation has increased global poverty and inequality, and with them, violence of all kinds – interpersonal, intra- and inter-national – as well as the recognition of its urgency. The HIV/AIDS pandemic continues to grow. Wars, armed conflicts, new nationalisms and terrorism all appear to be on the increase. These global conditions shape men's violence in the contemporary world.

In addressing violence against women, children's rights, women's rights and human rights, we need to bring men clearly into the picture, *to name men*. To this end, we propose a new approach. Instead of speaking about "violence" generically, we propose to identify its major actors, and one of the chief victims of violence. Thus we speak of "gender-based" violence as the violence of ***men***. And we seek to integrate ***children*** into the center of the discourse about violence as well, as children's welfare is among the primary motivations for intervention, reduction and prevention.

The development of gender consciousness among men and increased involvement in the care of children may provide fruitful strategies in reducing gender-based violence.

The Argument Summarized

1. Violence is a global problem, manifest at every level of society.

2. Violence is among every society's most costly and most urgent problem.

3. Much violence is gender-based, and much gender-based violence is men's violence to children, women and other men.

4. Gender inequalities create gender-based violence.

5. Men's violence is socially cultivated and promoted.

6. Transforming gender relations to create greater gender equality can help end gender-based violence.

7. Ending men's silence can reduce gender-based violence.

8. Men can engage in various ways in the efforts to end gender-based violence.

9. We can learn from others societies how to engage men to reduce gender-based violence.

10. Much important work is happening around the world to enable men to commit themselves to reduce gender-based violence.

11. These initiatives demonstrate the best practices of engagement for men in the effort to reduce gender-based violence.

12. Ending gender-based violence will benefit women, children and men.

13. Men's awareness of gender-based violence will promote children's rights and enhance children's lives.

1. Violence is a global problem, manifest at every level of society.

Violence is perhaps the greatest problem facing society today. In many countries the very fabric of society has been torn by the experience of war. In other societies, violence that takes more hidden forms (such as domestic violence/spousal abuse, or economic exploitation and starvation) damages lives. And in most societies, there are some forms of violence that are accepted as unavoidable, despite being regrettable, damaging, and important to contain. Everywhere, violence hinders the solutions to other problems such as economic development or social progress.

Whatever form violence/ takes, it affects those who had no part in initiating it and nothing to gain from it – most especially children. Despite the universality of violence and its destructive impact, much of the world's efforts concerning violence are aimed at dealing with its consequences, rather than trying to build a culture of peace in which violence is both less acceptable and less common.

Children are the ultimate victims of a violent society. In wartime they are uprooted, separated from families and loved ones and become vulnerable to all kinds of cruelty and abuse. In settled societies they are vulnerable to forms of direct violence (beatings, sexual assaults) as well as to the effects of indirect violence (for example, the trauma associated with watching a parent being assaulted by her partner).

The experiences of children vary greatly according to context. In well-resourced, stable societies, children experience a range of violent experiences from domestic violence to violence in schools and other public places.

In third world environments, the plight of children is of significant concern. Lack of access to resources by all members of a family unit heightens the risk of violence. The AIDS epidemic, among other diseases, exacerbates these problems. Children are left without parents and thus are increasingly vulnerable.

The vulnerability of children is an effect of gender inequality. Today, there is a need to highlight the existence of violent masculinities as a key factor regarding all violence. Violent masculinities are involved in the conversion of vulnerability (among children, women, other men) into actual experiences of violence. Versions of masculinity that normalize and render acceptable violent actions are a major threat to peace and safety. As men are often the victims of violence; thus, men themselves have an interest in working against violent masculinities and working for the construction of new masculinities that validate peace and promote safety.

2. Violence is among every society's most costly and most urgent problems.

Society, broadly, is adversely affected by violence. Violence – as well as its consequences, including legal adjudication, punishment, health-related costs, and efforts at prevention, may comprise the single largest outlay of public and private funds in any society.

In the United States, alone, $5 billion to $10 billion are spent in direct service related costs to violence; the human costs are incalculable. A 1993 World Bank study estimated that women aged 15 to 44 in industrialized countries lost about 20% disability-adjusted healthy life years to domestic violence and rape; in developing countries, these forms of violence account for about 15% of all healthy years lost to women, largely because rates of infectious diseases are greater and claim more lives.

There are huge economic and social costs of violence against women: Direct costs include medical, police, prisons, the criminal justice system, housing and social services. Non-monetary costs include increased morbidity, increased mortality via homicide and suicide, abuse of alcohol and drugs, depression and other psychiatric disorders.

Add to these the economic multiplier effects of decreased labor market participation, reduced productivity, lower earnings, increased absenteeism, decreased investment and savings

and capital flight – all of which also contribute to lower educational attainment among children as well. One must also calculate the social multiplier effects such as the intergenerational transmission of violence, the reduced quality of life, erosion of social capital and reduced civic participation.

At the institutional and international level, men's violence consumes a huge amount of resources. The costs of war alone are calamitous; the costs of care – for the injured, the bereaved, and the abandoned – are nearly as enormous. The continuing health-related costs drain resources further.

In some countries, states initiate and support violence, and then must bear the costs of ameliorating its effects. In other countries, the failure of the state to build effective institutions results in a "culture of impunity" in which individuals, tribal leaders and warlords can act violently with little fear of reprisal.

Poverty is also a form of violence, perhaps, as Mahatma Gandhi said, "the worst form of violence." Poverty tragically ruptures life from hope, and replaces one's life with despair and fear. Ministering to the consequences of poverty – illness, starvation, homelessness and illiteracy – are also enormously costly.

Interpersonally, violence tears at the fabric of society, rending apart families, couples, damaging children -- often beyond hope. And culturally, violence taints the national psyche, reducing the quality of life, and people's general sense of well being.

3. Much violence is gender-based, and much gender-based violence is men's violence to children, women and other men.

Much violence is "gender-based" – both because it is perpetrated "in the name of gender and the gender order, and because its targets are selected because of their gender. Gender-based violence is predominately men's violence towards women and children but is also often directed towards other men. Men are primarily the ones who use violence, and men are also most often implicated in other types of violence as well – both as victims and as perpetrators.

In talking of gender-based violence we are not referring to "violence against women" in some general or gender-neutral way, but primarily men's violence against women and children, and against men. This includes physical, sexual, financial/economic, militarized, bodily/reproductive, medical/welfare, bodily/nutritional, verbal, emotional, psychological, cognitive, social/friendship, spatial, temporal, representational. Gender-based violence includes and encompasses wars by states and non-states (terrorism). WHO (1997) lists more than 30 examples of different kinds of violence against women (and girls) throughout the life cycle. Among them are trafficking in women, forced prostitution, rape, sexual harassment, sexual abuse, FGM, and many more.

The fact that men are the perpetrators of most gender-based

violence does not mean that the violence is caused by male biology or some predetermined personality constellation. The cause of gender–based violence is gender inequality. In that sense, *gender-based violence is any form of violence used to establish, enforce or perpetuate gender inequality*. Even though gender-based violence is found in virtually all societies and cuts across religion, ethnicity, culture, education, age and class, it varies dramatically in extent and degree, according to the level of gender inequality in society. Thus, any effort to reduce gender-based violence must address the gender inequality that is its chief cause.

The relationship among patterns of masculinity, gender-based violence, and other forms of violence developed to sustain inequalities based on, for example, race, class, ethnicity, age, sexuality are complex. As we will show, the multiple definitions of "masculinities" positions men within different social hierarchies, with differential access to the means of violence and its legitimation. Yet the intimate link among men's violence, privilege and inequality is universal.

According to UNICEF, domestic violence is the most prevalent form of violence against women and girls worldwide. Domestic violence includes female infanticide, child marriage, female genital mutilation, child prostitution, child sexual abuse, marital rape, forced "suicide" or homicide of widows for economic reasons, partner violence and many more. Children are also affected by violence directed towards one (or both) of their parents. Violence against one parent is an immediate experience of violence against the child.

Men's violence also includes violence against other men – from street fights to warfare. Contemporary military conflict is evidently gendered, and intricately linked to gender ideologies. Often one gender is singled out, as in mass rape of "subjected" women, or the extermination of all battle-aged males: "gendercide" often precedes genocide.

Male rape and anti-gay harassment are also forms of gender-based violence as is the significant amount of violence that takes place in schools – bullying, gay baiting, and general "gender policing." It makes sure that men act like "real" men, and thus maintains the system of men's domination over women.

In the past, schools have generally functioned to produce boys infused with a sense of their own importance vis à vis girls. Schools have also incubated violent masculinities. In the regimes of schools, toughness has been an esteemed quality, often cultivated through competitive sport and fostered by punitive disciplinary procedures. Schools are frequently the place where rites of passage are undergone. This initiation all over the world inducts young boys into a world of male power.

The worlds of the military, all-male fraternities, and hyper-competitive male sports is one where violence is expressed both physically and symbolically, as well as by excluding those who do not perform like "real" men.

Gender-based violence is also a part of the AIDS problem. Constructions of masculinity that privilege heterosexual performance with multiple partners over parental responsibility are a major contributing cause for the rapid spread of AIDS in the

developing world. Other, rival, interpretations of masculinity (which, for example, hold out gravitas, social and familial responsibility and wisdom as desirable attributes) are marginalized. Driven by the need for affirmation, men often related in an exploitative and abusive way to women. Sexual intercourse is not negotiated and when opposition is encountered, violence is often used. When male sexual entitlement is pronounced, men's sense of responsibility and efforts to encourage safety and risk-reduction are seen as contradictory of masculine prowess.

AIDS also affects children, both directly and indirectly. For example, the global HIV epidemic will generate an enormous number of orphans; in South Africa, alone, the number of AIDS orphans has already reached 200,000.

Men's violence restricts and restrains, distorts and damages the lives of women, children and men.

4. Gender inequalities create gender-based violence.

The gendered nature of violence can be understood by examining three different features: gender identity, gender settings and gender relations. Each of these features is inextricably intertwined with the others and each must be addressed if gender-based violence is to be reduced and ultimately ended.

Every individual has a gender identity. These identities are developed through life and are influenced by a myriad of forces. When people commit violent acts they are invariably mobilizing aspects of their identity which either normalize violence or which prompt violence as a defensive/aggressive response to situations that are interpreted as threatening. The 'threat' may not just be to one's physical safety and integrity. In fact, a great many acts of violence are explained as defending such abstract ideals as 'a person's dignity'. The way in which a person's identity is constructed is thus critical to the propensity for violence. If, woven into one's identity, is the idea that one's very being is threatened when another person (woman, child, outsider) does not show respect, then it becomes very important to examine how identities are constructed and to attempt to intervene to defuse or dilute those elements which might give rise to violence.

Many gender organizations today recognize the role of identity in the precipitating violent acts by working with men to come

to terms with their own violence. This frequently involves an introspective process in which the source of the anger (often the trigger for violence) is sought and therapeutic processes inaugurated to heal the loss or trauma that lies behind the anger. Studies of recidivism in prison populations suggest that such approaches, which ultimately allow men to respect themselves and take responsibility for their actions, are successful in reducing violence.

Research has been undertaken on the gendered settings of violence. Findings conclude that men are more at risk in public spaces while women are more at risk in the private space, the home. These findings have informed the increasing focus by governments and agencies on domestic violence, spousal abuse and marital rape. Although community safety has become of increasing interest to urban policy makers, there is still a need to develop more public spaces where women and children not only feel safe, but are safe. We need to learn from such initiatives as global campaigns for women to "take back the night," and local initiatives to make schools safer.

Gender-based violence in organisations is relatively common, and has enormous consequences in the public arena. Sexual harassment – both individual and in the creation of a "hostile environment" – undermines confidence and threatens women who do not stay in "their place." According to the International Labor Organization, 1.1 million people are killed every year at work. In more local studies, one in ten Finnish government workers report having experienced 'psychological molestation' (bul-

lied at least once a week for at least six months); one in four knew someone 'being molested' in their own workplace; and one-fourth of Swedish health care workers were afflicted by physical violence or threats at least twice a month. There is some evidence to suggest an increase in gender-based violence in workplaces.

The private domestic sphere is not necessarily a refuge from violence; often it is its location. Men's material advantages and cultural ideals often make the home another site of men's power over women. Women's dependency may lead them to tolerate abusive and violent relationships as a fearful trade-off for access to shelter. Or they may see men's violence and women's dependency as part of the natural order of things. In many countries, masculinity is vested in ownership and control of a home. Financial and political institutions, such as governments and banks, often perpetuate this investment of masculinity by making it difficult for women to own houses, assume mortgages, or raise bonds.

It is not just space (private and public) that provides the setting for gendered relations. Organizations (from educational institutions to the business and industrial corporations) are profoundly gendered, and we must pay attention to organizational cultures. Many initiatives are concerned solely with improving productivity, while others seek to ameliorate the dilemmas of choosing work or family; thus, transforming workplace culture to validate family commitments. In schools, gender hierarchies amongst staff are being overhauled to enable women to have

more influence in school decision-making. Highly competitive, masculinist school cultures are being converted to encourage more collegial relations among learners. Such changes provide new role models and opportunities for changing relationships.

5. Men's violence is socially cultivated and promoted.

There are many ways to explain the problem of men's violence. A simple but useful framework is to distinguish first the biological explanations from the social, and then to further explore the social explanations that focus on the individual and their psychology; those that focus on socialization and learning within the family (whether the family of origin or the current family); and those that focus on broader socio-cultural relations of power, for example, structural theories of patriarchal society. These different theories start from very different assumptions about the nature of violence. There is not one complete explanation of men's violence, and explanations need not compete with each other. We believe that we can draw from all traditions to explain men's violence.

While there is much scientific research and political debate about the causes of men's aggression and violence, we must be cautious about thinking in terms of origins, roots and first or final causes. Whatever ancient first cause there might have been is certainly long lost in history; moreover, the operation of men's violence is different in different parts of the world and it would therefore be inappropriate to assume that an explanation in one place will work in all other places. However, all approaches revolve around the question of gender, of masculinity, and we must examine how gender and sexuality operate at the level of individuals, families, social structures and cultural patterns.

In that light, we believe that the causes of gender-based violence are social. We assert this because most research has found enormous variation among women and among men on most traits, attitudes and behaviors, but research has found no categorical differences on any behavioral or attitudinal measures between males and females. There are some cultures, for example, in which males are far less violent, and some in which females are far more violent. If males are different, then we must search for the social origins of those differences.

Those differences can be traced to cultural definitions of masculinity. What it means to be a man varies in four significant ways:

First, masculinity varies from one society to another. The meaning of masculinity is probably very different among aboriginal peoples in the Australian outback or the Yukon territories than in urban Sweden or Ireland. It has been the task of anthropologists to specify those differences, to explore the different meanings of gender in different cultures. In some cultures men are encouraged to be stoic to prove their masculinity. Men in other cultures seem even more preoccupied with demonstrating sexual prowess. In some cultures a more relaxed definition of masculinity operates, based on civic participation, emotional responsiveness and collective provision for community needs. It is also true that in some cultures women are encouraged to be decisive and competitive, while in others women are seen as naturally passive, helpless and dependent.

Second, the meanings of masculinity vary within any particu-

lar culture over time. What it might have meant to be a man or a woman in one country in the 17th century is likely very different from today. Historical research has charted the ways in which definitions of masculinity have changed.

Third, the meaning of masculinity varies among different groups of men within any particular culture at any particular time. Simply put, not all American, or Swedish, or British men are the same. Our experiences are also structured by class, race, ethnicity, age, sexuality, religion and region of the country. Each of these factors influences the others. Sociologists have examined the different definitions of masculinity for different groups of men in specific cultures.

Finally, the meaning of masculinity will change over the life-course. Psychologists have examined the ways in which the meanings of masculinity change through the course of a man's life. The issues confronting a younger man, to prove himself and succeed, will be different from those issues for an older man, facing retirement.

If the meanings of masculinity are multiple, and vary across cultures, over time, among men within any one culture, and over the life cycle, then we cannot really speak of masculinity as a constant, universal essence, common to all men. We recognize different definitions of masculinity, and acknowledge that masculinity means different things to different groups of people at different times. We must speak of ***masculinities***. In so doing, we acknowledge the specificity of men's experiences as well as the ties that bind them together.

The relations between women and men also vary. Gender-based violence seems to be highest when gender equality is lowest, when men are over-valued in relation to women, and where men are taught to feel superior to women. Thus, societies and cultures vary enormously in their support for gender-based violence. While gender-based violence is invariably sustained by social, political, economic and ideological structures, the extent, expression and amount of that violence varies greatly.

6. Transforming gender relations can help end gender-based violence.

Gender relations have changed dramatically in recent decades. In industrial and developing countries alike, the women's movement, access to safe and effective birth control, together with increased opportunities – in education, the labor force, the professions - have meant that relations are much more equitable than before. This has led to some men re-examining their roles in domestic labour and child-rearing. In many instances (particularly in Europe) this has resulted in improved quality of life for all members of the household. In other contexts, however, backlash responses have seen rising divorce rates and domestic violence as men try and restore their private powers.

Transforming gender relations has to involve changing the social relations of power and inequality that exist between and among men, as well as between men and women. While there are multiple definitions of masculinities, some constructions are more highly valued than others. For example, gay men are devalued as "unmasculine." Research indicates that the performance of exaggerated aggressive forms of masculinity may be driven by a fear of being seen as "feminine" or "gay." Homophobia refers not just to violent attitudes and behaviors against gay men, but to men's fears in general about having close intimate contact with men.

Homophobia and stereotypes of gay men as effeminate also

separate men from a deeper and more intimate relationship with themselves – that nurturing and loving part that is culturally defined as "feminine." And it maintains men's distance from each other in ways that contribute to the dehumanization necessary for the expression of violence against women and children as well.

The relationship between men and their children is a potential source of joy and affirmation. Frequently, however, fathers avoid their responsibilities, both materially following a divorce, and emotionally during the marriage. Others are prevented from doing so by economic policies that virtually demand labor migration. When fathers avoid engaging with their children as parents, they deny themselves opportunity as well as their children. In recent years, men have shown a greater willingness to be fathers and to embrace fatherhood as an important part of their identities. Connecting fathers and children without violence or abuse is both a means to reduce violence, and also among its major consequences.

Violence between men is often excused on the grounds that it is 'natural' for men to fight. But it is no more natural for men to fight than it is for women. The naturalization of violence and its association with men are attempts to rationalize the problem. Are the bullying of one boy by another in school, the assault of one man by another, perhaps even the murder of one man by another less serious because there is no difference in the sex of the victim and perpetrator? Men's violence towards one another is part of the problem of global violence. In line with this, cour-

ses in rage management are now popular and, in different settings, mediatory processes and institutions (like tribal councils) exist to defuse and re-direct destructive expressions of rage.

The focus on gender relations when tackling issues of violence allows for interventions to be far-reaching and effective. Addressing gender identities, contexts and relations have already made a significant contribution to the reduction of violence. The challenge remains as pressing as ever as globalization fuels competition and undermines some of the supports (autonomy and earning capacity) that men in the third world have had to affirm their masculinity.

7. Ending men's silence can reduce gender-based violence.

It is possible to reduce and prevent violence. But it must be understood at every level at which it operates.

To this end, we follow those who no longer speak of "violence" generically, but clearly identify its major actors, as well as one of the chief victims of violence. Thus we speak of "gender-based" violence as primarily the violence of men . As children's welfare is among the primary motivations for intervention, reduction and prevention, we seek to integrate children into the center of the discourse about violence.

First, we seek to introduce men as responsible actors in a field where most of the attention has been towards the negative consequences for both "gender-less" victims and violators. By addressing men, the main perpetrators of violence, we can also shift the attention from consequences to prevention of violence; we can find ways to take action.

Second, we seek to view this violence "through the eyes of a child." This strategy rests on two premises. First, while violence harms women and men, it ultimately hurts children and possibilities for development. Children's futures depend on the reduction of violence. Second, we believe that men can help reduce violence and that men's relation to children is one important place to start.

One reason that gender-based violence remains so tragically

high is men's silence. Men are silent, and are silenced, about their participation in and their experience of gender-based violence. Contrary to those who believe that men are programmed towards predatory violence, we believe men can learn, develop, and create better ways of resolving conflicts. Dramatic changes witnessed in some countries around men's care-giving with children should be used as best-practice examples for other programs.

This leads to a third component of this project: a belief in men's competence, especially, in terms of learning, creativity and leadership. Men are capable of change, and with sufficient motivation, can work to curtail gender-based violence. Indeed, men must do so – our future hangs in the balance.

8. Men can engage in various ways in the efforts to end gender-based violence.

Developing analytical frameworks for understanding gender and violence and policies that engage men are crucial. The central challenge concerns how to implement these in practice and engage men in ending men's violence. This has to mean not just the violent 'bad men' but engaging all men. Distinct strategies are called for which to be effective need to be sensitive to the social location and degrees of accountability of boys and men to violence. In addition to supporting larger scale social movements that would reduce gender inequality and promote alternative masculinities – anti-war, anti-conscription, civil rights and peace movements – as well as the further economic integration of marginalized men, we here suggest a framework that engages both violent men and engaging all men and boys as well, with public campaigns to raise awareness, and ultimately to change the social relations of power and complicity among men, relations that sustain violence.

Engaging men who use violence: An accountability model

Across the developed and developing world programmes have been developed to work with men who abuse their partners, sex offenders and child abusers. Research and 'clinical' evidence suggests that an 'accountability model' is required that will

engage such men initially through criminal justice systems. The most effective and safest methods engage violent men as a sanction mandated by the courts. True engagement with personal change comes through the adoption of a confrontational approach which gets men to take responsibility for their violence and challenges them to change by going well beyond addressing their 'anger' and/or 'pain' to change their belief systems about gender relations and their need to use violence as a means to control. Programmes need to work together with, and seek to be accountable to, women's advocates. Engaging men who use violence solely through self-help or other kinds of voluntary initiatives is dangerous because it provides no means to keeping the man under state control if, as so often happens, he decides to drop out when emotional issues emerge. The most effective programmes integrate the efforts of all the health, social and criminal justice agencies involved in protecting victims. Communicating the message globally about the positive outcomes of such integrated mandated intervention programmes is central to any strategy to end men's violence.

Engagement through rehabilitation

Violence is of course not only perpetrated by individuals on women, children and other men, but by groups of men, and includes: gang rapes, group perpetrated homophobic and racist attacks, football hooliganism and violence, street gangs and anti-social violence, and street riots. Again, we believe that accountability and the use of sanctions through the criminal justice sys-

tem is the key approach to stopping such men's violence. It symbolizes the key message socially that such violence will not be tolerated. The aim, however, should be rehabilitation, rather than simply retribution and containment. Locking such men up serves the important immediate purpose of promoting child and adult protection, but this must be supplemented by efforts to work with incarcerated violent men to end their need to use violence. Outcome studies show that programs can enable some men to become non-violent and 'safe' and that in this context prison can 'work' to rehabilitate, if backed up by adequate community supports for the offender once released.

The use of the death penalty as a means to dealing with even the most violent offenders is contrary to the principles of human rights endorsed by UNICEF. Some offenders need to be contained for life, but this, as does all such institutionalization, needs to happen according to the humane standards as laid down by UNICEF and other international agencies.

Engagement of boys and men in general: Development and interest-based models

Around the world, boys and men are now engaged *as* boys and men in different types of contexts, from gender awareness and equality programmes in schools to varieties of 'men's groups' oriented to assess men's lives, masculinities and men's place in the world. The key to effective engagement is to enable boys and men to see the centrality of violence in their lives, as a shadow lurking behind everything they do and to appeal to their

self-interest in ending it. The challenge is to promote responsibility for sexism but to do so in a respectful way without labelling all men as violent and blame-worthy. Supporting and challenging teachers and other mentors of young men is crucial to successful outcomes, enabling them to deal with their own fears and ambivalence about confronting violence and that of the institutions within which they are located.

Engaging socially excluded men/communities

All men do not have equal access to power. The challenge in engaging men who are marginalized or excluded is that they must constantly confront survival issues before they can take responsibility for violence. Men will take responsibility for ending violence only if they do not feel responsible for the sins of the perpetrators; if they do not feel blamed. Men need to feel respected, supported and their own adversity and suffering affirmed. Development work with socially excluded men suggests that intervention strategies need to address the men's sense of powerlessness and affirm their struggles. Accessing the men's own lived experience of material insecurity and vulnerability is an important way into mobilising action against violence and inequality on behalf of the self and others. Men can then make explicit their interests to create safer communities and homes free from the threat of violence. As their awareness and self-esteem grows they become ready to reflect more critically on their own lives, their possible use of and complicit support for violence and promote personal and social change. The most

effective development models are those that develop leadership from within their own marginalized communities. (We believe that single-sex programs are effective only as supplements to mixed-gender groups.) Boys and men are able to respond positively to witnessing their peers taking responsibility for ending violence and creating better lives for women, children and men. Men who have access to power in economic, civic, or political life must also see their interests in creating safer communities.

9. We can learn from other societies how to engage men to reduce violence.

In a path-breaking book, *Societies at Peace*, Norwegian social anthropologists Signe Howell and Roy Willis posed the question: what can we learn from peaceful societies? They found that the definition of masculinity had a significant impact on the propensity towards violence. In those societies in which men were permitted to acknowledge fear, levels of violence were low. In those societies, however, where masculine bravado, the repression and denial of fear, was a defining feature of masculinity, violence was likely to be high. It turns out that those societies in which such bravado is prescribed for men are also those in which the definitions of masculinity and femininity are very highly differentiated.

These are a few of the themes that anthropologists have isolated as historically contributing to both interpersonal violence and inter-societal violence: The ideal for manhood is the fierce and handsome warrior; Public leadership is associated with male dominance, both of men over other men and of men over women; Women are prohibited from public and political participation; Most public interaction is between men, not between men and women or among women; Boys and girls are systematically separated from an early age; Initiation of boys is focused on lengthy constraint of boys, during which time the boys are sepa-

rated from women, taught male solidarity, bellicosity, and endurance, and trained to accept the dominance of older groups of men; Emotional displays of male virility, ferocity, and sexuality are highly elaborated; The ritual celebration of fertility focuses on male generative ability, not female ones; Male economic activities and the products of male labor are prized over female.

Taken together, these items provide a series of possible policy-oriented goals towards which we might look if we are to reduce the amount of gender-based violence in society. First, it seems clear that the less gender differentiation between women and men, the less likely there will be gendered violence. This means the more men are nurturing and caring, and the more women are seen as capable, rational, and competent in the public sphere, the more likely that aggression will take other routes besides gender-based violence.

To diminish men's violence against women and children, and to reduce the violent confrontations that take place in the name of nation, people, religion, blood, or tribe, we must confront the separation of symbolic and structural spheres. Women's involvement in public life is equally important as men's involvement in domestic life. The definition of masculinity must be able to acknowledge a far wider range of emotions, including fear, without having that identity as a man threatened.

10. Much important work is being done around the world to engage men to reduce gender-based violence

Men's roles in and responsibilities for ending violence range across a spectrum, from men changing their relationships with their intimate partners through to male-dominated institutions changing the way they function in order to better confront issues of gender and power. Some members of the European Parliament wear white ribbons to mark the International Day for the Eradication of Violence Against Women. CANTERA, a Nicaraguan NGO, works with men in rural communities to end gender-based violence through popular education workshops. African men such as ADAPT in South Africa are mobilising for anti-violence marches as partners with women's groups.

Over the last few decades, in many parts of the world, enormous strides have been made towards reducing gender-based violence and curbing its effects. There are local, national and international laws, conventions and agreements that define gender-based violence and legislate against those who use it. There is more public education, awareness and acceptance of the problem and better institutions to act in accordance of the laws. There are more shelters and trained service providers to care for victims of violence, and services to counsel those who use violence.

For the most part this work has been driven by and focused on women, and the investment in global efforts to end violence requires this. Women must remain central to all intervention efforts. Yet men must play a much greater role in violence prevention.

There are many examples of the different ways in which men can become part of the process of overcoming gender-based violence. These exemplify the different kinds of partnerships that ending gender-based violence requires, men's roles and responsibilities within these, and how we can nurture such partnerships through better laws, institutions, programmes and support.

Different countries and cultural contexts have different starting points and opportunities for work towards reducing gender-based violence; what might work in one context will not in another at any particular point in time. In addition, how men are thought about and engaged as partners in "gender equality" work also varies widely. One way to help map these starting points across regions is to identify projects and potential interventions by the different levels of work such as at the policy, practice/public awareness, and the personal level.

Examples of policy work include advocating more adequate legislation around gender-based violence and ensuring that the legislation recognises the roles and responsibilities of men. But policy work is much more than appropriate legislation on violence against women or reporting on CEDAW or other international conventions. Policy around gender-based violence is also concerned with working to reduce inequality; ending violence is

not a stand-alone issue. For example, policy initiatives in the health, education, finance and labour market are also part of a cohesive national violence prevention effort.

- More and more, gender-based violence is being understood as a public issue, not a private/silent matter – and thus it is seen as public health policy issue. As with HIV/AIDS, the public costs of what were once seen as "private" matters is increasingly evident.

- NGOs in Azerbaijan are working with the Ministry of Education to devise a core curriculum for gender studies – one that includes men as well as women. In other countries gender education policies use schools to reach young men and women is an important strategy for better reproductive and sexual health and curbing gender violence. (OXFAM, Great Britain)

- In New Zealand, the Ministry for Women undertook a national cost/benefit analysis – measuring the costs of gender violence incurred by the government – finding that the cost of violence was greater than the revenue earned from the country's largest export – wool. Economic arguments such as this can be compelling for some policy makers, especially when gender-based violence is understood as a major block to development and poverty reduction. (UNDP)

- Another set of policy examples encourage more gender equitable behaviours in men such as caring for children and sharing of household responsibilities. In Scandinavia and other parts of Europe, parental leave policies encourage men to take time off for child-care. In her cross cultural study of rape, anthropologist Peggy Sanday found that the more time men spend in child-rearing activities, the less likely they will commit acts of family violence. Men must develop an ethic of caring – not just "caring for" but also caring *about* others.

Laws and polices mean little, however, if the institutions and cultural contexts are not conducive to their implementation. At the level of practice and public awareness there are examples of work with and through institutions, the media, and service providers. Police, health workers and media trainers, as well as public awareness campaigners who engage men offer examples of working with institutions and within the public domain. Overall these groups are making gender-based violence accepted as a public issue, building the capacity of institutions to more effectively deal with the problem, and ensuring men play a role in speaking out against violence and working for better, more equitable institutions.

- The White Ribbon Campaign aims to mobilize men to speak out against violence against women and, in doing so, to examine their own attitudes and behaviours. The WRC began modestly eleven years ago; today there are forms of white rib-

bon activities in at least 25 countries. In Canada thousands of schools and workplaces participate in the annual White Ribbon Days from November 25 to December 6.

- The Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action is currently conducting Training targeted at all members of the Barbados Police Force to increase the capacity of the force to respond positively to calls of domestic violence, to understand the cycle of violence and abuse, and to develop an appropriate protocol for officers who respond. (INSTRAW)

- The Public Education Program in Romania broadcasts regular local radio and TV shows, public lectures and newspaper columns, some by men, some by women. All are designed to challenge deeply rooted patriarchal attitudes. (INSTRAW)

- In Pakistan, male lawyers, police and judges have formed informal networks to protect victims of violence and those threatened with honour killing, and together these men guide individuals through the legal system. (UNICEF)

- In Norway, an NGO network for research on men promotes gender-equal and anti-violence perspectives on men in research. The network arranges seminars, connects other organizations and groups, and supports Alternatives to Violence centers and the Reform Centre for Men.

Improvement in laws and institutions is necessary for ending violence, but positive change is also needed in the ways that individuals perceive of and behave towards one another and themselves. The personal level includes relations, perceptions and beliefs within households and among individuals. Projects that deal with men who use violence have traditionally been seen as the space to work towards personal transformation. But in effect, any time that individuals, families or community groups are gathered is an opportunity for discussing personal perceptions and beliefs. Other examples include peer counselling and public awareness campaigns through other entry points such as health and community development projects.

- PROMUNDO in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil coordinates a peer outreach programme, the Guy-to-Guy Project, which trains 20 young men from low-income communities to work with other young men to promote sexual and reproductive health and to prevent gender-based violence. (Barker)

- Anakultur organizes 8th of March celebrations in remote parts of southeast Turkey. During the celebration the group talks to fathers, husbands, brothers and to the local authorities about honour killings, attempting to engage men in the effort to end this practice. (INSTRAW)

- In Guyana, some church groups have started men's discussions – about health, mental health, family life, which raise issues of violence in that context.

11. These initiatives demonstrate how to engage men in the effort to reduce gender-based violence

There are two key issues that frame our efforts to engage men to end gender-based violence.

First, there must be integration and cohesion among different levels of analysis and different levels of policy response. Strategies to overcome gender–based violence aim towards transformations of the social, political and economic, of institutions and policies, and of individual perceptions and behaviour. To work towards these transformations, not only are stronger partnerships that include men essential, but also more cohesion is needed across these levels of work. Ministries should coordinate their efforts, to establish consistent messages policy goals. In many countries, NGOs have formed national coalitions for violence prevention to coordinate efforts and share resources. These groups can play a key role in educating policy makers and providing strategies to address priority issues in the country. At the community level, services providers and civil leaders coordinate their efforts to give more effective service with a consistent message of basic rights, peace and equality.

Such connections are essential also at a personal level. For example, a police officer attending a gender sensitisation workshop in the Philippines makes the connections between gender roles in his own family and the police force's failure to effective-

ly address men's violence against women. U.S Marines who attend a gender-based violence workshop by the Mentors in Violence Program (MVP) may make the connection between their military training and the dehumanization of others that leads to gender-based violence. Connecting issues and experiences is critical if men are to become more effective partners in changing the attitudes, behaviours and conditions that create gender-based violence.

Second, the guiding principles from these efforts can be articulated, shared and adapted. Some work has also been on going for many years, and we have much to learn from their lessons of experience, good practices and impact assessments. We need a conceptual framework of gender-based violence that makes the connections between men, masculinist cultures, gender and violence, and brings men firmly into the prevention equation. Such a conceptual framework includes the ideas that dominant models of masculinity (those that encourage violence and use violence to keep them in place) restrict men's choices and behaviours. Thus, ending gender-based violence presents benefits for men as well as for women and children.

Ending gender-based violence must be connected to other social development goals such as public health, social justice and poverty reduction. This requires a wider vision of anti-violence work that is connected to social development in the community overall. And we must understand the unique positions, needs and motivations of boys and men. Instead of categorically blaming and shaming men, or using normative language not con-

nected to men's experience of both power and vulnerability, we must find effective strategies to engage with men's subjective experiences. Not all men use violence, and those who do not have much to offer in this learning process.

12. Ending gender-based violence will benefit women, children and men.

The benefits of ending gender-based violence are universal. Life expectancies and the quality of life would improve markedly and rapidly.

Working to end gender-based violence will expose the structural violence of male-domination. Acknowledging and embracing difference among women and men, among people of different races, ethnicities, sexualities, and ages will also reduce violence and improve the quality of life.

Reducing gender-based violence will free up resources to tackle other pressing social problems. Addressing the consequences of violences strains public health, public safety, legal and police apparatuses beyond measure. Violence also inhibits human capability, creativity, productivity and growth. It displaces, scars and orphans children. Gender-based violence destroys people's potential to achieve a better quality of life. The question is not how much it will cost to reduce gender-based violence, but how much it will cost if we do not.

Men also have a lot to gain from reducing gender-based violence. Violence is one of men's most intractable health-risks – from workplace and driving accidents, to disproportionate rates of homicide and suicide, to casualties of war. Men's risk-taking also partly drives the AIDS epidemic – from lack of concern for

other's bodily integrity to taking risks in drug use or sexual behavior. Men, also, will have more choices in how to behave, relate to others and form more productive relationships within families and the community.

Perhaps the most important effect of this work is that we know that a violent upbringing for a child tends to start a cycle of violence for many children, although this is truer of boys than it is of girls. We must ask why it is that boys repeat the cycle of violence, but girls do not. The best predictor for violent behavior in adulthood is that the boy has encountered violent behavior as a child. Reducing gender-based violence among adults may be the best way to avoid violent futures for our children.

Equally important are efforts designed to strengthen the interdependence of men and women so that physical or material power is not readily used to resolve differences. Mutual reliance of men and women in creating and sustaining a safe, comfortable and loving home environment benefits all parties, particularly children. Work that supports the development of masculinities which are vested in home life, instead of mere possession of a physical structure of a house, assists men to lead fuller lives with their partners and children.

13. Men's development will promote children's rights and enhance children's lives.

We believe that actively promoting men's involvement in the direct care of children, both in the private world of the family and in communities and public institutions is a central element of strategies to end gender-based violence. While opinion varies about the importance of men in promoting children's healthy development, and surely children without fathers or resident male role models can grow up to be healthy individuals, there is also evidence that the more positive and nurturing contact children have with men, especially in households and child care services where men share roles and tasks with women in non-traditional ways, the more likely children are to develop open and flexible orientations to gender roles and identities. Boys raised in this way will be less likely to use violence – against women, against other men, or against themselves. Girls raised in this way will be less likely to accept violence in their lives.

Debates about men's involvement with children have also tended to be based on arguments about 'domestic democracy', that in the interests of fairness men need to take equal responsibility with women in the work of rearing children. The debate and policy formation needs to go further and also explore the positive effects children have on men. There is growing empirical evidence that men are both becoming more engaged in

childcare and that they benefit enormously from that engagement. An important component of ending gender-based violence is to engage men more fully and actively in family life.

There are discernible links between traditional defintions of masculinity, men's neglect of their health and propensity for violence and men's absence from child care and domestic responsibilities. Caring for children draws the man into a different relationship to himself and the environment. Men are called upon to develop a new narrative of self-identity based around direct experience of nurture and reproducing the next generation. Research suggests that nurturing others leads to greater emotional literacy and a more intimate relationship to the self. The direct benefits to men in caring directly for children include physical health and longer life-expectancy, better mental health, more balanced and contented relationships with partners, and the pleasures of deep relationships with children. A new ethic of care can emerge which can be acknowledged and developed in public policy and celebrated as part of the construction of non-violent masculinities.

It is also important to engage men in childcare activities in public. While men are becoming more engaged with children at home, working with children continues to be defined as 'women's work' and is devalued and underpaid. The lives of children are thus under-valued. Increasing the involvement of men in public child care provision is crucial to the development of gender equality, as part of a strategy to increase the social value of children and child care work.

While traditionally, men's absence from public child care has to do with stereotypes about the work itself, pay and prestige, it is also the case that in some countries, men's absence is also prompted by concern about child abuse, especially sexual abuse of children and the association of masculinity with 'danger'. Parents, child care organisations and the state fear men in general and men fear being publicly associated with other people's children and falsely accused of abuse. This is a compelling example of how the association of masculinity and violence at a public level and stereotypes of non-nurturing men need to be broken. Yes, some men do represent a danger to children and that initiatives to get more men involved in child care need to be accompanied by effective child protection procedures. However, such initiatives need to emphasise first and foremost what men and society in general have to gain from the greater involvement of men in children's lives, and the potential contribution of this to the creation of masculinities built not on violence and control, but on love and active care.

Presentation of the researchers

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Lars Jalmert is Associate Professor at the Department of Education, Stockholm University, Sweden and is a qualified child psychologist. He has been engaged in research, lecturing and policy work on gender equality issues since the middle of the 1970s and published a number of reports in Swedish. At the beginning of the 1980s he conducted a large empirical study on Swedish men – one of the first studies on modern man. He has been the member of a number of the Swedish governmental investigations on gender equality and attended many international meetings.

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Men and Masculinities, an interdisciplinary scholarly journal, a book series on Men and Masculinity at the University of California Press, and the Sage Series on Men and Masculinities. He is the Spokesperson for the National Organization for Men Against Sexism (NOMAS) and lectures extensively on campuses in the U.S. and abroad.

James L. Lang is an independent consultant working on issues of gender-based violence and men as partners for gender equality. He has worked with Oxfam GB on their gender equality and men project, served as the research coordinator for the United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW), and as a programme officer for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). He is currently working with the Family Violence Prevention Fund (San Francisco, USA), on an on-line tool kit for involving more men and boys in violence prevention www.endabuse.org/bpi

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– recommended by the authors

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Costs of male violence

Stefan de Vylder

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On Poverty, Wealth and Justice in the World" (2002, in
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Introduction

The human, social and economic costs of violence are enormous. Violence has been called "a global public health problem" by the World Health Organisation (WHO), and in Latin America, where violent crime is particularly widespread, violence has been identified as a "major obstacle to development" by the Inter-American Development Bank. In other parts of the world political, ethnic, social and religious conflicts have escalated to civil war or war-like situations. A large number of both developed and developing countries are witnessing a pronounced increase in violent crime, and issues related to crime reduction have become important topics on national political agendas.

While the victims of violence include all ages of both sexes, acts of violence are primarily committed by men. Although female juvenile delinquency involving the use of violence has been reported to be increasing in several countries, as has the participation of women in wars and in acts of terrorism, boys and men constitute the overwhelming majority – well above 90 per cent - of all perpetrators of violence. It is therefore legitimate to treat violence as a phenomenon which is largely, albeit not exclusively, a problem of male violence and of prevailing male gender roles and role models.

War represents an extreme case of violence. An assessment of total costs of war should include the costs of defense expenditures – which globally amount to close to 1,000 billion USD per

year, which could be compared with total official development assistance to alleviate poverty of approximately 50 billion USD per year – as well as the costs of human and material destruction when the soldiers and their equipment are actually being used.

The purpose of the present paper is to discuss a methodology for an analysis of the costs of male violence and to illustrate, with the help of concrete examples from different parts of the world, how social and economic costs of violence can be quantified.

The first chapter is a brief conceptual discussion of different forms of violence and categories of costs. The second chapter consists of a review of various attempts to assess social and economic costs of violence in different countries, followed by a final chapter on a special, and extreme, form of violence: war.

Chapter 1. Definitions and Methodological Issues

Defining violence[1]

There is no single, universally accepted definition of violence. With a very broad definition, violence could cover a wide range of acts of violation of human rights recognised by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and which include the right to economic and social rights such as food, shelter, work and access to health and education and other basic social services.

Thus, while poverty and deprivation can be regarded as forms of violence, a more narrow interpretation of violence will be used in this paper. The definition that comes closest is the one used by the World Health Organisation (WHO 2002), and which defines violence as

> *"The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation."*

The key word "intentional" distinguishes the concept of violence from poverty and deprivation which are not the result of

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[1] The discussion in this section is largely based on WHO (2002).

intentional acts. For example, people in a drought-stricken area who die from hunger are, in this interpretation, victims of violence only under certain circumstances – that is, when someone (e.g. the government, local political leaders or thieves) intentionally deprive certain individuals or groups of people from getting access to drought relief.

The use of the word "power", in addition to the phrase "use of force", broadens the understanding of violence to cover acts which result from a power relationship, including threats, intimidation and intentional neglect. The outome need not be physical harm but covers a broad range of psychological harm, loss of dignity and social esteem and many others.

The present paper will largely adhere to the WHO definition above, but with a slightly more narrow focus on various forms of physical violence. Self-directed violence (such as suicide or self-mutilation) will be discussed only incidentally. It can, however, be assumed that a rather significant number of individuals who commit suicide have a previous experience of violence directed against them by others, usually by men.

We may also distinguish between different categories of violent acts. *Collective violence* includes war and related violent conflicts, state violence and violence committed by larger groups of individuals (terrorist acts, mob violence, hate crimes against particular groups, etc.) who may, or may not, be driven by a particular political, social, ethnic of religious belief. *Interpersonal violence* covers violent crime against unrelated individuals as well as family and intimate partner violence, including child abuse and neglect.

We may also distinguish between different expressions and consequences of violent acts, such as

– physical violence, including sexual abuse;
– psychological violence;
– acts involving deprivation or neglect

or, as is often the case, a combination of the above.

In this paper, the main emphasis is on social and economic consequences of violence. Special attention will therefore be paid to those forms of violence which are likely to have the largest negative impact, namely war, violent crime and violence against women. Naturally, these and other forms of violence tend to be interrelated and mutually reinforcing; for example, a high prevalence of violent crime is strongly associated with a particular society's past and present experience of war or violent social conflicts, and the same is true for many expressions of men's violence against women.

Defining costs

To begin with, we could make a distinction between *direct costs* and *indirect costs*. Direct costs should include the value of all goods and services devoted to prevention of violence, treatment of victims and prosecuting and punishing perpetrators.

The most serious form of violence, war, has its own special characteristics and costs and will be discussed later, under a separate heading.

Indirect costs are of many different kinds, such as loss of inco-

mes and health-related impacts that do not necessarily entail the provision of healthcare services: increased mortality and morbidity rates due to psychological suffering, drug abuse, suicide, depression, fear and anxiety, etc. Some of these costs can be measured and given a tentative monetary value – loss of productive work, for example – while others, which may be called *intangible costs*, are difficult or impossible to quantify.

We could also identify so-called *multiplier costs*, i.e. long-term consequences such as an erosion of social capital (with potentially great but unquantifiable effects on future economic and social developments), a negative impact on foreign and domestic investment, direct and substantial harm to certain economic sectors (such as tourism) and others.

One very important multiplier effect is the inter-generational transmission of violence; individuals who were victims or witnesses of violence as children are strongly overrepresented among school dropouts, drug addicts, criminals, perpetrators of sexual abuse, etc. For example, studies from the US indicate that the spousal abuse rate is around ten times higher among men who had had a violent childhood than among those who had not.

Summarising the above, we get the following categories of costs:

Category of cost	Examples of impacts/types of costs
Direct costs	Police and private security, costs of trials, prisons, healthcare costs, social services (e.g. shelters, crisis services)
Indirect costs	Loss of income of both victims and offenders, increased mortality and morbidity, lower productivity
Intangible costs	Pain and suffering among victims of violence and their relatives, increased fear and anxiety in society as a whole
Multiplier effects	Erosion of social capital, intergenerational transmission of violence and dysfunctional behaviour, brain drain, lower domestic and foreign investment, lower economic growth

Many, if not most, of the above-mentioned costs are exceedingly difficult to quantify, and one purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the fragility of all attempts to convert the problem of violence into categories expressed in dollars and cents.

The problems are further aggravated by the fact that a large number of acts of violence, not least sexual assault, child abuse and violence within the family, remain unreported by the victims. What is known and registered is often only the tip of the iceberg.

All empirical attempts to assess total costs of violence are therefore likely to be gross underestimates. The usual procedure is to list a number of costs that are difficult but possible to quantify – such as costs of medical treatment of victims of violence, number of working days lost because of violence, costs related to the prosecution and imprisonment of perpetrators of violent crime, and others – while other, intangible and long-term costs are only indicated by category, without attempts to translate them into monetary values. Clearly, these latter costs may be even higher than the directly measurable costs.

Some economists have attempted to quantify the value of intangible costs of crime and violence by using so-called contingency valuation methods based on people's willingness to pay for increased safety; for example, by comparing differences in real estate prices between high-crime and low-crime areas. The few studies that have been carried out appear to document a strongly inverse relationship between house prices and crime rates, demonstrating what everybody already knows: people value a safe environment very highly.

It should also be stressed that all economic calculations based on orthodox methodology are based on existing costs and incomes in a particular country. There is, however, absolutely no rea-

son to assume that pain and human suffering differ according to different individuals' incomes. For example, the economic costs of increased mortality in a particular country are conventionally based on foregone income, i.e. number of working years lost times average income, which means that the estimated cost of one individual being killed in the United States may be fifty times higher than the loss of one life in Zambia. In a similar way, costs of medical treatment, psychological damage among victims of violence and most other forms of costs associated with violence are valued higher if the victim happens to live in a rich country rather than in a poor.

For this and other reasons, inter-country comparisons of costs as measured in monetary terms are notoriously misleading, and all attempts to aggregate cost estimates from different countries in order to reach a global estimate of total costs should be avoided. At best, we can try to make rough estimates of costs in relative terms – as per cent of a particular country's GDP, for example.

Availability and quality of data

As indicated earlier, a large number of violent acts remain unreported. There is also a general lack of uniformity in the way data on violence are collected, and the availability, quality and usefulness of the different data sources for comparing the prevalence and consequences of violence vary considerably between different countries and between different categories of violence.

Data on violence covering different time periods are also often misleading. For example, the willingness of victims of violence

to report to the police may change over time, as social norms and many other factors change. Such changes are particularly important in cases involving sexual abuse and intra-family violence.

To illustrate one pitfall in available statistics on the prevalence of crime, it may be observed that the registered crime rate is usually positively correlated with the number of policemen available in a particular community. The explanation can hardly be that the presence of the police tends to encourage criminal activities – it is rather an effect of the fact that more policemen are needed in unsafe areas, or simply the result of people reporting more crimes when the existence of a police station in the community makes it easier to report.

As for the availability and reliability of different sources of information, mortality data are the most widely collected and available of all sources of data. Most countries maintain birth and death registers and keep basic counts of homicides and suicides. This type of data is generally more reliable than official crime statistics. It is also less sensitive to changing definitions of crimes across different countries and cultures.

While data on homicides can serve as an approximate indication of the extent of lethal violence in a particular community or country, homicide represents an extreme form of violence. Non-fatal outcomes are much more common than fatal outcomes. There is also a need to collect data on morbidity as a result of violence, especially since many forms of violence are poorly represented by mortality data. *Morbidity data* are, however,

appreciably less reliable. Data from hospitals and healthcare centers are collected with a view to providing optimal treatment for the patient; the medical record may contain diagnostic information about the injury, but not the circumstances of the injury. It is highly probable that many injuries which are the result of violence are recorded as mere accidents.

Police records are another source of data which are useful, but highly inadequate. Not least gender-related violence committed by an intimate partner – the by far most frequent form of violence against women – tends to be grossly underreported.

The most reliable source of information on the prevalence of crime is the so-called *victimisation surveys* in which a large number of people are asked if, and how many times, they have been victims of crime and violence. The answers to such surveys give consistently higher figures on crime rates than police records and similar sources of information. Victimisation studies are only available in some countries in some years, however.

To estimate costs of war and of war-like conflicts other data sources and kinds of information are needed. This will be further discussed in chapter 3.

Chapter 2. Assessing Costs of Violence: Examples and Tentative Estimates

The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the costs of violence with the help of statistics and empirical studies from different countries and circumstances. The chapter covers various forms of violent crime, including intra-family violence and sexual abuse, while costs of warfare and war-like situations will be discussed in the following chapter.

Loss of lives

According to conservative estimates by the WHO (see WHO 2002, statistical appendix), an estimated 830,000 people died from homicide (520,000) or war-related acts (310,000) in 2000.

The overwhelming majority of the perpetrators are men, using light arms. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (quoted in *The Guardian*, October 10, 2003), has said that the death toll from small arms "dwarfs that of all other weapons systems, and in most years greatly exceeds the toll of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs. In terms of the carnage they cause, small arms could well be described as weapons of mass destruction – yet there is still no global non-proliferation regime to limit their spread".

Over 90 per cent of violent deaths occur in low- and middle-income countries. The only form of violent death that is more common in the developed countries is suicide.

Appreciably more men than women are killed; the ratio is about three to one. The estimated homicide rate for men and women in different age groups is shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Estimated homicide rate by age group in the world, 2000

Age group (years)	Homicide rate (per 100,000 population)	
	Males	**Females**
0–4	5.8	4.8
5–14	2.1	2.0
15–29	19.4	4.4
30–44	18.7	4.3
45–59	14.8	4.5
over 60	13.0	4.5
Total	**13.6**	**4.0**

Source: WHO (2002), p. 10.

It should be observed that the above figures represent a considerable underestimate, as many violence-related deaths are registered as deaths from other causes (diseases, accidents, etc).

The underreporting is particularly prounounced in the case of young girls. As will be further discussed in a later section about

violence against children, many million girls are estimated to be "missing" from the global population: victims of sex-selective abortion as well as intentional neglect or outright murder after birth.

In terms of number of victims, the active or passive killing of newborn girls may be of greater magnitude than all other forms of death as a result of violence combined.

Violent crime

While most forms of violence can be regarded as criminal acts, this section will apply a more narrow meaning of crime covering acts of robbery, assault, kidnappings etc. which to a large extent are based on economic motives. Intra-family violence will be treated separately.

The prevalence of violent crime differs greatly between different countries. Table 2 gives a very rough picture of regional disparities.

As seen in the table, Latin America and the Caribbean stands out as the worst affected region, followed by the United States. More recent statistics indicate, however, that while the crime rate has been going down in the United States for a number of years, it has been increasing continuously in most Latin American, African and Eastern European and Central Asian countries. In the 1990s, the general level of violent crime appears to have grown particularly fast in many of the former communist countries in Europe and Central Asia.[2]

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[2] For data see, for example, UNICEF, Innocenti Research Centre, The MONEE Project, No. 6/1999

Table 2. Crime rates by region, 1985-95 (number of crimes per 100,000 inhabitants, regional means, rounded figures).

Region	Number of countries	Major robberies	Intentional homicide
Africa	8	36	5
Asia	10	13	5
Latin America and the Caribbean	17	201	14
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	15	28	7
Western Europe	16	54	4
United States	1	249	7

Source: Bourguignon (1999, p. 201)

The disparities between the individual countries in the different regions are very high. For example, while Chile reports fewer than 5 homicides per 100,000 people and year, Venezuela has 14 and Brazil 20. Colombia registers a staggering 66 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.

Major cities are less safe than rural areas. For example, in 1995, the homicide rate was estimated to be 80 per 100,000 in Rio de Janeiro and 52 in Caracas, compared with national averages of 20 and 14.

There are, of course, a number of different factors behind the exceptionally high crime rate in certain regions and countries. Availability of small arms and a tradition of political violence and civil strife, as in Colombia, parts of Central America, former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and several countries in sub-Saharan Africa is one obvious contributory cause. Trade in drugs is another. Various studies (see, for example, Bourguignon, 1999, or Holmqvist, 2000) also identify inequality – extremely high in Latin America and in many of the most violent countries in sub-Saharan Africa – as a major explanatory factor. A weak social capital also emerges as an important factor behind crime and violence.

A high crime rate contributes to a widespread feeling of insecurity among the population at large. In this sense, the victims of crime can be said to include the entire population in a country or community plagued by crime and violence.

From a more narrow economic perspective, violence acts as a deterrent to investment, including foreign investment, and discourages tourism and other visits from abroad. In the worst affected countries it also contributes to outwards migration, not least in the form of highly educated professionals leaving the country.

The economic and social costs of crime are difficult to estimate, but the attempts made (see Buvinic et.al. 1999, Londoño and Guerrero, 1999, and Bourguignon, 1999) indicate that they are considerable. A summary of different categories of costs, based on a study from Latin America, is provided by Buvinic et.al (1999), and reproduced in Table 3:

Table 3. Economic costs of violence (including war-related violence in Colombia) in six Latin American countries (expressed as percentage of GDP in 1997).

	Brazil	Colombia	El Salvador	Mexico	Peru	Venezuela
Losses in health	1.9	5.0	4.3	1.3	1.5	0.3
Material losses	3.6	8.4	5.1	4.9	2.0	9.0
Indirect, or intangible losses	3.4	6.9	11.5	3.3	1.0	2.2
Losses from transfers of assets	1.6	4.4	4.0	2.8	0.6	0.3
Total	**10.5**	**23.7**	**24.9**	**12.3**	**5.1**	**11.8**

Naturally, the above estimates represent different categories of direct and indirect costs, and should be interpreted with great caution. It may, for example, be discussed to what extent "transer of assets" should be regarded as a cost comparable to material losses or damage to human health. But the figures, although highly tentative, do indicate that violence has become a problem of such a magnitude that it has substantial macroeconomic implications. If the long-term multiplier effects are taken into account, it is easy to agree with the conclusion that violence, in the worst affected countries, has become a very serious development constraint.

In another study (Bourguignon 1999, p. 215) some of the findings on economic costs of crime in different countries are summarised in the following way:

"Summing all these components leads to a social cost of crime equal to 3.8 per cent of GDP in the United States and a stunning 7.5 per cent in Latin America. Although both figures are rough, their order of magnitude is probably about right. As noted, by world standards the countries covered by this analysis have very high crime rates. In most European and Asian countries the same calculation would likely result in figures below 2 per cent of GDP."

In a study commissioned by the Inter-American Development Bank, the authors (see Londoño and Guerrero, 1999) estimate that 140,000 people in Latin America are killed every year, and that every adult on average loses three working days per year as a result of violence. In another study from the IDB (Gaviria/Pagés, 1999), data from the *Latinobarómetro* – a public opinion survey covering 17 Latin American countries and more than 50,000 urban households over three years – is used to analyse the incidence and pattern of crime. The surveys reveal, *inter alia*, that in six countries (Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, El Salvador and Guatemala), more than 40 per cent of all urban households had had at least one member suffering from a crime during the previous year. In Guatemala, at least one individual in every two households had been victimised in criminal acts often involving violence or threats of violence.

In countries or communities with such a high prevalence of crime and violence, daily life is severely affected. Families invest large amounts of money in private protection, wealthy families protect themselves by moving to closed, gated communities, people are afraid of going out alone, individuals are dissuaded from working or studying at night for fear of violent crime, etc. And young people, in particular boys, often choose a criminal career – as members of street gangs and as petty criminals and drug dealers – instead of studying or trying to find a job.

In the industrialised countries, violent crime is rarely of a magnitude that has significant effects on a country's macroeconomic developments and economic growth. Still, a number of public opinion surveys reveal that the fear of crime affects the quality of life even in relatively safe countries and communities.

In the most violent of the industrialised countries, the United States, costs of crime – including costs for crime prevention - are, however, staggering. To illustrate just one of several categories of cost associated with crime and violence, the costs of keeping convicts in jail today amount to around 54 billion USD per year. Over 2 million people are currently behind bars in the United States, where the incarceration rate has increased from a rather stable figure of 110 per 100,000 inhabitants between 1925 and 1973 to almost 700 per 100,000 people in recent years. By comparison, the corresponding figures for France and Japan, to take a couple of examples, are 85 and 45, respectively (data from *The Economist*, August 10th, 2002).

All convicts are not, of course, sentenced to jail for crimes

involving violence; in particular, a large and growing share of the imprisoned population in the United States is behind bars for drug-related offenses, all of which may not be relevant to include in our definition of violent crime.

According to other estimates[3], the US government – Federal, state and local governments – spends nearly 39 billion USD on police protection each year. Costs incurred by individual families, corporations and the non-public sector at large are estimated to be even higher. In addition, legal and administrative costs for criminal cases cost approximately 10 billion USD per year. If we further add medical costs of many billion USD stemming from violent crime, as well as lost wages, we easily end up with a total estimate of the costs of crime in the US exceeding 150 or perhaps 200 billion USD, or some two per cent of GDP - and these figures do not include indirect costs such as loss of income for the victims of crime or for the two million prisoners, or the intangible costs of pain and suffering by the victims.

Children as victims of violence and abuse

The missing girl child

Birth sex ratios from a number of countries, in particular in East and South Asia, reveal a horrifying picture of female infanticide – understood as the intentional killing of baby girls due to the

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[3] See estimates by the non-governmental organisation NECASA (Northeast Communities Against Substance Abuse in the US) on their website.

preference for male babies and from the low value associated with the birth of females – and foeticide, i.e. sex-selective abortion.

According to the latest population census in India, the national female-male sex ratio in the 0–6 age group has dropped to 927/1,000 in India as a whole. In the states of Punjab and Haryana, the ratio is as low as 793/1,000 (Aravamudan, 2001).[4]

Behind these figures is a grim reality of a large number of female infanticides. In parts of India, in particular, the method of "passive killing" – phenomena such as withholding food from a newborn girl – is still common. "Active killing" is also frequent; the following example of new forms of infanticide can illustrate how local practices had evolved as a response to mounting surveillance by local authorities:

"In infanticide heartland...modern methods had evolved. The newborn was deliberately weakened and dehydrated by its own parents. They did this by wrapping it in a wet towel or dipping it in cold water soon after delivery or as soon as it came home from hospital. If it was still alive after a few hours, it was taken to a doctor who diagnosed pneumonia and prescribed medicines. The prescription was carefully preserved, but the medicines were never bought. When the child finally died, the infant was fed a drop of alcohol to create diarrhoea. Another certifiable "disease". (Aravamudan, 2001).

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[4] Aravamudan (2001). See also Premi (2001), where further references are found.

In China, the sex imbalance has also been been changing drastically over the past decades. According to official reports[5], the proportion of young boys to girls has increased from 106 to 100 in the 1960s and 1970s to 111 to 100 in the 1990 census. In some provinces, more than 130 boys are born for every 100 girls. Well-informed observers see three factors as primarily responsible for the rise: substantial underreporting of female births (often in connection with abandonment and/or adoption), excessive female infant mortality and an increasing incidence of prenatal sex determination and subsequent sex-selective abortion of female foetuses.

In South Korea, it appears as if it is the latter factor that is primarily responsible for the increase in the male-female ratio among newborn children. In 1991, 115 boys were born per 100 girls, up from 107 in 1982. Even more startling is the fact that while the sex ratio for first-born children was 106:100 in 1991, it rose to 123 for the second child, to 185 for the third and for the fourth child an astonishing 212 boys per 100 girls.

I will not make an attempt to quantify the economic costs of the tens of millions of girls (estimates differ widely) who are estimated to be "missing" in the global population as a result of son preference and female infanticide and foeticide worldwide; there is a limit to what is meaningful to translate into monetary values.

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[5] Quoted in Shanghai Star, October 30, 2002. Information found on web-site www.china.org.cn/english/life/47238.htm. See also Das Gupta (1998) for evidence on "missing girls" in China, India and South Korea.

But it should be stressed that the drastic changes that have taken place in the male-female ratio among children in a number of countries, including the world's two most populous nations, is likely to have profound – and negative – demographic, social and economic consequences over the coming decades.

Child abuse and neglect

The definition of child abuse used by the WHO is very broad and covers a wide range of harmful behaviour and outcomes:

> "*Chile abuse or maltreatment constitutes all forms of physical and/or emotional ill-treatment, sexual abuse, neglect or negligent treatment or commercial or other exploitation, resulting in actual or potential harm to the child's health, survival, development or dignity in the context of a relationship of responsibility, trust or power.*"

This is not the place to discuss the human costs of child abuse; for a good overview of what is known about the extent of child abuse in different contexts, and of the many physical, mental and social consequences of violence against children, the reader is referred to the WHO report on violence (WHO 2002, chapter 3) and to the large, specialised literature on the subject. Suffice here to stress that the direct, quantifiable economic costs include

• expenditures related to apprehending and prosecuting offenders;

- the costs to social welfare organisations of investigating reports of maltreatment, and costs for the protection of children;
- costs associated with foster care including, in many countries, orphanages and other public or private institutions;
- extra costs to the educational system.

The few comprehensive studies available (for references, see WHO 2002) indicate that even in narrow economic terms, the costs of child abuse are considerable. In 1996, the costs associated with child abuse and neglect in the United States were estimated at some 12 billion USD. This figure included estimates for future lost earnings, educational costs and adult mental health services. In the United Kingdom, an estimated annual cost of nearly 1.2 billion USD has been cited for various immediate welfare and legal services alone.

It should however be stressed that the long-term costs are likely to be far higher than current available estimates indicate. The inter-generational impact of abuse and violence is very strong and well-documented; a large number of studies from different countries show that children who are victims of violence and other forms of abuse are far more likely to have disciplinary problems at school, to drop out from school, to become involved in violent crime as adolescents and adults, to use violence against their future female partners and children, etc.

Violence against women

Violence against women is, according to a definition adopted at the Beijing Conference in 1995, defined as *"any act of gender-based violence that results in or is likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private life"*.

Again, as in the case of child abuse, this definition covers a wide range of acts of physical or psychological violence against women.

A convenient typology of violence against women during different phases of a woman's life is provided by UNDP.[6] (See Table 4 on next page)

A categorisation of violence against women could also include harmful traditional practices, i.e types of violence that, according to a UNIFEM definition "have been committed against women in certain communities and societies for so long that they are considered to be part of accepted cultural practice" (UNIFEM 2003, p. 2). These violations include female genital mutilation, dowry murder, "honour killings", early, forced marriage, acid attacks and others which lead to death, disabilities, and physical and psychological dysfunction for milions of women annually.

This section will primarily concentrate on domestic violence and violence against adult women. The problem of female geni-

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[6] See web-site www.undp.org/rblac/gender/objectives.htm

Table 4. Gender Violence Throughout the Life Cycle

Phase	Type of violence present
Prenatal	Battering during pregnancy (emotional and physical effects on the woman; effects on birth); coerced pregnancy; deprivation of food; sex-selective abortion.
Infancy	Female infanticide; emotional and physical abuse; differential access to food and medical services for the girl infant.
Childhood	Child marriage; genital mutilation; sexual abuse; differential access to food and medical care; child prostitution.
Adolescence	Rape; sexual assault; forced prostitution; trafficking; sexual abuse in the workplace; economically coerced sex.
Reproductive age	Abuse of women by intimate partner; dowry abuse and murders; partner homocide; psychological abuse; sexual abuse in the workplace; sexual harassment; rape; legal discrimination.
Old-age	Abuse and exploitation of widows.

tal mutilation (largely, or exclusively, exercised by women) will not be discussed, although the human costs of this practice, which may affect some two million young girls every year[7], are huge, as are the purely medical risks associated with genital mutilation. It does not, however, appear very meaningful to assign monetary values to the costs and suffering caused by this category of violence.

The most common form of violence against adult women is that performed by a husband or intimate male partner. Although women can also be violent in relationships, the overwhelming burden of partner violence is borne by women, with a male partner being the perpetrator.

As in the case of child abuse, data on the extent of domestic violence are notoriously unreliable. For example, police records consistently show a much lower prevalence of violence by an intimate partner than reported in victimisation surveys. In 48 population-based surveys from around the world, between 10 and 69 per cent of all women reported having been physically assaulted by an intimate male partner at some point in their lives (WHO 2002, chapter 4).

While the prevalence of violence against women differs greatly between different countries and communities, all studies reveal that it is common in all countries, regions and cultures. In

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[7] According to UNIFEM estimates, around 130 million women today have undergone female genital mutilation, and an additional two million girls and women are subjected to it each year. See UNIFEM (2003).

the rich, industrialised countries, where violence against women is less frequent than in many low-income countries, approximately one in four women has experienced domestic violence by an intimate partner during her lifetime – with considerable variations between different countries - and around one woman out of ten is the victim of such violence in any given year.

The lasting effects of physical and/or sexual abuse are known to be very harmful; the influence of abuse can persist long after the abuse itself has stopped, and the more severe the abuse, the greater its impact on a woman's physical and mental health. For example, in a study assessing violence against women in the United States, it was found that assaulted women need psychiatric care 4–5 times more often, and have attempted suicide 5 times more often, than women who have not experienced violence.[8]

The high prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV, in many countries makes sexual violence particularly dangerous; for a large but unknown number of girls and women infected by HIV via rape, sexual abuse turns out to be synonymous with homicide.

The immediate economic effects – in the form of costs for medical treatment, foregone earnings during sick leave, etc. – are, in many cases, dwarfed by the long-term impacts such as depression, increased consumption of tobacco and alcohol, suicide attempts and lower productivity at work.

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[8] Heise et.al. (1994). Naturally, all studies if this kind should be interpreted with caution; the two groups of women do not share exactly the same characteristics.

A well-researched study from Finland (Piispa & Heiskanen, 2001) has attempted to estimate total direct costs of violence against women (i.e. excluding foregone earnings, pain and suffering, long-term psychological consequences, etc.). What is interesting is not the absolute figures – which are gross underestimates, given that the data only referred to those female violence victims who had sought official help, who represent a minority of all victims – but the relative importance of different kinds of costs, which are summarised in table 5 below. Naturally, the high costs related to social services (shelter, therapy, etc.) only reflects the situation in a highly developed industrialised country.

Once again it should be stressed that all such studies have modest ambitions: to calculate the "tip of the iceberg" as regards total costs.

The long-term costs should include the effects of domestic violence on children who witness it. Violent families produce violent behaviour, and a vicious circle can be created.

Or, as formulated by Buvinic et.al. (1999, p. 12): *"The transmission of violence from one generation to the next and from the home to the streets is a compelling reason to pursue policies to reduce domestic violence...It is also a compelling reason to bridge the conceptual and programmatic gaps that exist between domestic and social violence – that is, to bring together the now separate worlds of those (mostly men) who study and treat urban criminal and other types of social violence with those (mostly women) who combat domestic violence.*

Table 5. Direct costs of violence against women in Finland in 1998. Millions of Finnish Marks.

Category of cost	
Health care sector	
– visits to a physician	15.1
– hospital care	4.5
– medication	20.6
Social sector	
– shelters	28.6
– crisis services	4.8
– criminal justice system	20.5
– couple and family therapy	16.6
– individual therapy	17.8
Criminal justice system	
– police	37.1
– trial	38.5
– prison	38.5
– other costs	9.9

The causal relationship between increased social violence and subsequent increases in domestic violence is less well established empirically. One can, however, make a plausible argument that increased social violence generates more domestic violence by lowering inhibitions against the use of violence, by providing violent role models, and by subjecting individuals to additional stress, a situational trigger for violent behavior".

Youth violence

Most criminal offenses and acts of violence are committed by young men. Many types of violence are therefore closely related to the situation of young men and their role models among peers and adult men.

Youth violence is the result of a large number of different, but often overlapping and mutually reinforcing, factors, such as

- the individual's own experience of maltreatment and abuse as a child and adolescent;

- other forms of domestic violence, which may condition children and adolescents to regard violence as an acceptable means of resolving problems;

- a high prevalence of violence – perhaps due to war or violent civil strife, inequality, the existence of violent street gangs almost exclusively composed by youth, etc. – in the society or community as a whole;

- availability of drugs, including alcohol;

- youth unemployment;

- availability of firearms or other light weapons in the community;

- urbanisation. In developing countries, in particular, crime rates have risen with urbanisation.

Children who have grown up in single-parent families, foster homes or youth institutions are also more likely than others to become violent offenders. But it would be too simplistic to blame crime and violence on domestic factors, since many of the same factors that contribute to crime – poverty, unemployment, violence and drug abuse – also contribute to domestic fracture.[9]

Worldwide, an average of 565 children, adolescents and young adults die each day as a result of violence. Homicide rates vary considerably, ranging from 0.9 per 100,000 in the high-income countries of Europe and parts of Asia to over 17 per 100,000 in Africa, 18 in Russia and 36 per 100,000 in Latin America (WHO 2002, p. 25. Data referring to the year 2000).

In the United States, where youth violence is more frequent than in other highly developed countries, 6–7 young persons are

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[9] For an interesting discussion, see UNRISD (1995).

killed every day, mostly by handguns in the hands of other adolescents or young adults.[10]

For every fatal injury, there are many more that result in nonfatal injuries.

The costs to society of juvenile crime and violence are very high. The methodology used earlier to assess direct and indirect costs of violence are equally valid in the case of youth violence, but it should be stressed that the costs to society are particularly high in the case of youth violence as total costs – not least in the form of lower productivity because of non-completion of education, number of man-years lost due to injuries or imprisonment, etc – are especially high when young people are involved in violence as offenders or victims. And the earlier a criminal career begins, the more difficult it seems to be to alter the behavioural pattern in a lasting way and to avoid the replication of acts of violence against future spouses and children.

The average costs to society (not including intangibles) of one criminal career in Sweden – i.e. a person who begins with petty crime as an adolescent, never completes his secondary education, spends some 5–7 years in jail and commits the average number of crimes for an average male with a fully developed criminal identity – has been estimated at around two million USD. In the United States, the average cost of housing one inmate in prison can be estimated at over 25,000 USD a year

[10] See Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, University of Colorado, where more data on youth violence in the US are found. Web-address www.colorado.edu/cspv

(total annual costs of prisons of 54 billion USD divided by around 2 million prisoners).

As in so many other areas, prevention is not only better than cure – it is also so much cheaper.

Violence at the workplace

Although little statistical information is available on the prevalence of violence at the workplace – in the form of bullying, sexual harassment and direct physical violence and homicides – it has become increasingly recognised as a serious problem.[11]

Violence at the workplace causes immediate and often long-term disruption of interpersonal relationships and to the whole working environment. The costs of such violence include

- Direct costs, such as
  - accidents;
  - deaths;
  - disability, illness and costs of medical treatment;
  - increased absenteeism;
  - increased turnover of staff and concomitant replacement costs (e.g. recruitment costs, training, lower productivity of new employees);
  - claims for damages and indemnisation payments.

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[11] A brief summary of available evidence is provided in WHO (2002). The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has also produced a number of studies related to the cost of violence and bullying at work; see their web-site

www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/safework/violence/costof.htm.

- Indirect costs, including
  - reduced productivity;
  - a lower quality of goods and services provided.

- More intangible costs, including
  - decreased motivation and morale;
  - lower levels of creativity.

State and political violence

For poor people in many countries, state authorities – not least the police and military forces – are often regarded as institutions representing threat rather than protection.[12] The state itself is many times responsible for criminal and violent acts – either sanctioned at the highest level of through the actions of law enforcement agencies and public institutions.

Extreme cases of state violence are found in countries governed by repressive and authoritarian regimes, of which there are still many. Other examples of violence which may, or may not, be explicity sanctioned by certain state authoritites are the large number of murders of street children in several Latin American cities. Policemen, and private security officials hired by the local elites, are often involved in such crimes. The assassination of trade union leaders, journalists and landless peasants who are

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[12] The mistrust and outright fear that many people, in particular the poor, feel against state authorities are documented in a number of studies. See, for example, the World Bank´s "Voices of the Poor. Can Anyone Hear Us?" (2000).

being killed by public or private armed forces in countries such as Colombia and Brazil could also be mentioned.

Political violence of a different kind could include the violence used by separatist movements (e.g. ETA in Spain or the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka) or revolutionary, insurrectionary political movements.

Terrorist acts have, in recent times, come to the forefront in the public debate about political violence. The direct costs, in terms of fatal and non-fatal injuries and material destruction, of such acts are usually rather small – with horryfying exceptions, such as New York on September 11, 2001 – in comparison with the attention they get, but the indirect impact may be enormous. As an example could be mentioned the effects on the tourist industry in Bali, and even in neighbouring regions and countries, of the bomb attack that killed almost 200 foreign tourists in Bali in October 2002.

Chapter 3. Costs of War

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss economic and social consequences of warfare and, when possible, make tentative estimates of costs in monetary terms. As always, indirect, intangible and long-term impacts are difficult or impossible to assess in quantitative terms.

The chapter begins with a brief overview of one category of costs: military spending. The second and main part of the chapter discusses costs incurred when the weapons are eventually used.

Military spending[13]

One common justification for military expenses – or, as they are called in virtually every country, defense – is that a strong military force acts as a deterrant, thereby actually reducing the risk of military attacks and consequently the number of wars. While this argument may be valid in some countries, we will in this paper disregard the potentially deterrent role of high military expenditures.

We will also disregard all potentially beneficial effects of defense spending in areas such as research and development or job creation. While various "Keynesian" arguments – that any

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[13] Unless otherwise stated, all data on military expenditure are taken from SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute).

kind of public expenditure may stimulate the economy in a recession - are sometimes advanced in the debate we will in this paper treat all military spending as a pure cost, a sacrifice of human and material resources which in a world without wars could be put to civilian use.

To begin with, world military expenditure has been increasing again since 1998, after an eleven-year period of reductions (1987-98). The SIPRI Yearbook 2002 presents an estimate for world military spending in 2001 of 839 billion USD (in current prices). As emphasised by SIPRI, this figure represents an underestimate as various forms of supplementary spending as a result of the 11 September attacks on the United States and the subsequent US-led war in Afghanistan and the additional costs of the war on terrorism in the last quarter of 2001 are not included.

There is also a considerable underreporting of military expenditure in certain countries' regular state budgets.

The increase in the US budget for defense in fiscal year 2002 amounts to approximately 50 billion USD, i.e. of about the same magnitude as the sum total of all development assistance from rich to poor countries. The US 2002 increase is larger than the entire defense budget in 2001 of each of the other major spenders: Russia, France, Japan and the United Kingdom. These five major spenders account for over half of global military expenditure.

The US increase in 2002 is also larger than the combined military spending of all 63 African countries together.

The war against Iraq has further increased US military expen-

diture, which according to budget proposals from the Bush administration may exceed 500 billion USD in 2004.

The regions with the strongest growth in military expenditure in recent years are, apart from the US, Central and Eastern Europe, Africa, South Asia and the Middle East.

In relative terms, the US spends (in 2001, before recent increases) approximately 3.2 per cent of GDP on war and war-related activities, while the corresponding figure for European NATO members is around two per cent. Table 6 below provides a summary of military spending compared to development aid from the US and European Union.

Table 6. Military Spending and Development Aid in 2001.

	United States	European Union
As per cent of GDP:		
Defense spending	3.2 %	1.9 %
Overseas Development Aid	0.1 %	0.3 %

Source: The Economist, November 23rd, 2002.

The countries with the highest burden, as measured by the share of military expenditure in GDP, are located in the Middle East.

In developing countries, total military expenditure was esti-

mated at around 200 billion USD in the mid-1990s.[14] The total number of people within the armed forces exceeded 15 million, and imports of arms in 1995 amounted to 21 billion USD, which represented almost half of all official development assistance received.

Table 7 illustrates military expenditure as per cent of GDP and in comparison with social sector spending in selected countries.

Costs of War

While the above data refer to military expenditure, it remains to assess the costs when war actually breaks out. Our main emphasis is on identifying different kinds of costs rather than actual quantitative estimates, which will only be used as illustrative examples. The discussion is largely focused on the consequences of intra-state conflicts, i.e. civil wars, while international wars will only be touched upon in a final section. But first a brief overview of major global trends as regards armed conflicts and fatal victims in such conflicts.

Number of conflicts and victims

Compared with the situation in the late 1940s and 1950s, the last decades have witnessed a pronounced increase in the number of armed conflicts. Estimates of the number of deaths, including those arising from war-related famines, in wars involving more than 1,000 deaths per year show a rise from nearly half a

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[14] Figures in this paragraph are taken from Nadir Mohammed (1999).

Table 7. Priorities in public spending in selected countries. Per cent of GDP.

Country	Military spending (2000)	Public expenditure on education (1995–97)	Public expenditure on health (1998)
Saudi Arabia	11.6	7.5	n.a.
Jordan	9.5	7.9	3.6
Israel	8.0	7.6	6.0
Turkey	4.9	2.2	3.3
Zimbabwe	4.8	7.1	3.0
Pakistan	4.5	2.7	0.7
Chile	4.0	3.6	2.7
Russia	4.0	3.5	n.a.
United States	3.1	5.4	5.7
India	2.4	3.2	n.a.
China	2.1	2.3	2.1
Germany	1.5	4.8	7.9
Tanzania	1.3	n.a	1.3
Japan	1.0	3.6	5.7
Costa Rica	0.0	3.8	3.1

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2002, Table 17.

n.a. = not available. The categorisation of expenditure on health and education varies between different countries, and data should be treated with caution.

million per year during the 1950s to over 5.5 million in the 1980s.[15] A majority of the deaths, in particular in recent years, are attributable to war-related famines and diseases.

Immediately after the end of the cold war there was a rise in major conflicts in every major region except Latin America. This was followed by a fall in each region in the mid-1990s. At the end of the 1990s there was a resurgence of violent conflicts in Africa. Africa suffered by far the largest number of major armed conflicts during the 1990s, and accounted for over 80 per cent of all deaths from war in developing countries. The second most violent major region was Europe, i.e. the Balkan states.

Over the period 1960–95, about 1.5 per cent of the population in sub-Saharan Africa died as a result of conflict (including deaths from war-related famines), compared with 0.5 % in the Middle East, 0.3 p% in Asia and 0.1 % in both Latin America and Europe. A breakdown of deaths according to per capita income shows that low-income countries have the highest incidence, with 0.5 % of their population dying from conflict between 1960 and 1995, while lower-middle income countries deaths were 0.3 % of their population and upper-middle income countries' deaths were just 0.02 % of the 1990 population (Stewart & Boyden, 2001).

Over 90 per cent of all deaths in armed conflicts during the

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[15] Figures in this paragraph are taken from Stewart/Boyden (2001). As the number of deaths includes deaths from war-related famines, the figures are appreciably higher than those reported by the WHO.

past two decades have been civilian casualties. The number of international refugees as a result of wars has been estimated at over 15 million, while perhaps 20 million people have become displaced within their home countries as a result of war.

Since the end of the Indochina war and of that between Iraq and Iran, the overwhelming majority of all war victims have died as a result of intra-state wars. Naturally, some of these conflicts – i.e. the prolonged civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with an estimated death toll of well over 3 million - have also had an international dimension, i.e. been connected with regional or inter-state conflicts. In a large number of cases, domestic armed conflicts have been financed, to a greater or lesser extent, from abroad.[16]

Characteristics and costs of civil wars

Most of the armed conflicts in the post-1945 era have been civil wars, and fought with conventional methods. In each year of the 1980s and 1990s, there have been between 30 and 40 "major armed conflicts" in progress.[17] At present (2003) over 25 such

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[16] See Stewart & Boyden (2001), who discuss the wide range of foreign financing of civil wars: official aid, loans, advance payments on resources, revenue from current sales of commodities such as drugs, oil, diamonds or timber, and others.

[17] The SIPRI definition specifies that a conflict should involve the use of weapons and incur battle-related deaths exceeding 1,000 people in order to qualify as a "major armed conflict", or war. Other sources define a major armed conflict as a conflict involving more than 500 fatalities.

conflicts – of which almost half take place in Africa, and virtually all are intra-state conflicts – are being waged.

In some respects, the consequences of civil wars can be even more devastating than wars between two or more nation states. Civil wars almost invariably tend to undermine the state and public institutions, which is not always the case when a war is fought against a foreign power, and the social and psychological wounds are often more difficult to heal, as the former enemy remains within the country's borders.

Major categories of costs[18]

The most obvious way in which a civil war damages the economy is through the outright *destruction* of human and material resources: people are being killed or maimed, bridges are blown up, cattle are being killed, etc. However, civil wars are usually fought with much lower technology than international wars, which means that the direct damage to infrastructure and physical capital such as factories and buildings tends to be lower.

A comparison could be made between the civil wars in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the subsequent bombing of Serbia by an alliance of international forces in order to put an end to the aggression against Kosovo. While the civil wars were far more damaging in terms of losses of human lives, the bombings may have created more material damage.

A second effect of civil wars is the *disruption* caused by warfare

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[18] The discussion in this section is to a large extent based on Collier (1999).

and the often concomitant social disorder. Roads become unsafe, people have to abandon their homes, agricultural production suffers as farmers leave their fields, landmines make large areas uninhabitable, crime rates go up and the increased availability of light weapons makes the pattern of crime more violent, families break down and the number of orphans increases, etc. These indirect, disruptive effects of civil wars are often of a long-term character, in particular as many intra-state conflicts tend to be long and drawn out, often without a clear beginning or end.

A third effect is the *diversion* of public expenditure from social services and other useful forms of spending as war-related expenditure increases. The quality of public institutions deteriorates, and the effects of diminishing financial resources are often compounded by an erosion of morale and honesty.

Private costs – of protection, transport and other items – as a result of the conflict also increase. Phenomena such as increased capital flight and brain drain are also common in war-stricken countries and regions, and savings and investment almost invariably go down.

The long-term consequences depend, of course, on the intensity and duration of the conflict, and on the extent to which the parties involved in the conflict can learn to reconcile and cooperate in the post-war reconstruction.

Recovery from war is a long-term process. A large majority of the countries that have suffered a decline in per capita income over the past two decades are countries which have experienced armed conflicts, in most cases in the form of civil war.

To illustrate the direct costs of armed conflicts, Box 1 below presents a quantitative and qualitative overview of various categories of costs incurred between 1983 and 1993 as a consequence of the (still ongoing) civil war in Sudan.

Costs to women and children

In the past, most fatal victims of war were soldiers in uniform. As stressed above, this is no longer the case; a large majority of victims in both civil conflicts and international wars are nowadays civilians.

In civil wars, in particular, it appears as if women and children are the worst affected victims. I will not, however, attempt to quantify the burden on women, let alone translate such statistics into dollars and cents. To indicate some of the most salient aspects of violence against women in connection with armed conflicts I would rather like to quote a few introductory paragraphs in a recent UN study written by Eliabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf:[19]

"Violence against women in conflict is one of history's great silences. We were completely unprepared for the searing magnitude of what we saw and heard in the conflict and post-conflict areas we visited. We knew the data. We knew that 94 per cent of displa-

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[19] "Women, War and Peace. The Independent Experts´ Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women´s Role in Peace-building", 2000, pp. 9–10. See also Graca Machel (1996) and Otunnu (1999).

Box 1. Direct costs of the civil war in the conflict area in Sudan 1983–93.

1. Effects on human capital

- Death toll: civilian deaths were estimated at 200,000 and military deaths at 34,921 during 1983–89

- Effects on education: 85 % of primary schools, 74 % of intermediate schools, 71 % of secondary schools, 75 % of technical schools, 66 % of institutes and the University of Juba were closed down by 1989.

- Effects on health: Only six out of 32 hospitals were opeating in 1989 in the region. Immunization, preventive medicine and malaria eradication services ceased completely in the South. Malnutrition affected most children in the region.

- Displacement, refugees: During 1983-90, some 354,524 persons took refuge outside the Sudan, while about 3 millions were displaced internally. In 1989 only, about 10,000 children were recruited as soldiers.

2. Effects on economic activities and production

- Agriculture: Most of the traditional and rain-fed farming stopped. All the nine new irrigated agricultural schemes were out of operation. Until 1990, 6.6 million heads of cattle, 2 million sheep, and 1.5 million goats were lost.

- Industry. All six major factories in the South were closed won.

- Mining and petroleum. Gold exploration activities stopped. Exploration and production of petroleum stopped (with estimated losses of three million USD during 1983-89)

- Tourism. Annual loss of tourism revenue in the region was estimated as 700,000 USD.

3. Effects on infrastructure.

- Digging of Jonglie Canal ceased in 1983.
- Work on 22 irrigation schemes stopped.
- Railway transportation to the South stopped. 165 wagon cars were destroyed.
- Destruction of two ferries, one steamer downed, and 25 barges locked-up.
- 20 roads and 17 main bridges were either destroyed or rendered inoperative.

4. Environmental effects.

- Poor health, inappropriate sanitation and over-crowding of urban areas in the South.
- Displacement affected fragile land, cutting and eradication of entire forests increased while soil erosion increased in southern and western Sudan.
- Majority of wildlife was depleted (some of the very rare species have vanished).

5. Psychological and social effects.

- Increase in tribal conflict within the South and between tribes in southern and western regions.
- Increase in the number of crimes and prisoners (75 % from southern Sudan)
- Number of patients in mental and psychiatric hospitals increased sharply (with significant increases in the number of patients with schizophrenia, depression and alcoholic addiction).
- Reported use of hallucinogens to push children to battle fields.

Source: Mohammed (1999).

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ced households surveyed in Sierra Leone had experienced sexual assaults, including rape, torture and sexual slavery. That at least 250,000 – perhaps as many as 500,000 – women were raped during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. We read reports of sexual violence in the ongoing hostilities in Algeria, Myanmar, Southern Sudan and Uganda. We learned of the dramatic increase in domestic violence in war zones, and of the growing numbers of women trafficked out of war zones to become forced labourers and forced sex workers.

But knowing all this did not prepare us for the horrors women described. Wombs punctured with guns. Women raped and tortured in front of their husbands and children. Rifles forced into vaginas. Pregnant women beaten to induce miscarriages. Foetuses ripped from wombs. Women kidnapped, blindfolded and beaten on their way to work or school. We saw the scars, the pain and the humiliation. We heard accounts of gang rapes, rape camps and mutilation. Of murder and sexual slavery. We saw the scars of brutality so extreme that survival seemed for some a fate worse than death....

During conflict, women and girls experience violence at the hands of many others besides armed groups. Women are physically and economically forced or left with little choice but to become sex workers or to exchange sex for food, shelter, safe passage or other needs; their bodies become part of a barter system, a form of exchange that buys the necessities of life. Government officials, aid workers, civilian authorities and their own families have all been complicit in using women in this way.

Police and other civilians often take advantage of women's powerlessness even when they are in custody. Women have been raped and tortured as a form of interrogation...."

As regards the impact on children, several costs are of a direct nature: loss of children's lives, loss of parents' lives, loss of access to food, shelter, health and education and other losses.

The widespread dissemination of anti-personnel landmines – which are estimated to be found in some 70 different countries – has exposed children to special risks. Children may even be targeted specifically, as when brightly coloured mines are laid close to schools.

Table 8 summarises approximate estimates of the number of children who have lost their lives as a consequence of civil wars in different countries.

According to a UN report on child soldiers, over 300,000 young persons under the age of 18 – some as young as seven or eight – were, in 2001, taking part in hostilities in over 30 countries. Many of those children have been abducted from schools, refugee camps or their own homes. Girl soldiers are often subjected to sexual abuse and rape, often on a systematic basis.[20]

Even children who survive armed conflicts and the material deprivation suffered as a consequence of war may become permanent victims in a broader sense. Indeed, children themselves commonly report crime, family discord, sexual abuse, lack of

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[20] See www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/soldiers.htm.

Table 8. Estimates of total costs of civil wars in terms of additional infant deaths.

Country	War years	Number of additional infant deaths over war years
Angola	1974–95	80,300
Burundi	1987–95	7,800
Ethiopia	1973–95	879,200
Liberia	1984–95	36,900
Sierra Leone	1990–95	22,800
Sudan	1983–95	59,400
Somalia	1987–95	29,760
Uganda	1970–90	385,700
Nicaragua	1977–93	21,200

Source: Stewart & Fitzgerald and Associates, quoted in Stewart and Boyden (2001), p. 15.

security, loss of education opportunities, poor sanitation and hygiene as even more troubling than the violent clashes they have witnessed or heard about. As evidenced in some studies (see Stewart & Boyden, op.cit.), of those children who suffer serious or long-lived psychological or emotional distress as a result of war, a significant proportion have not experienced a major misfortune but prolonged deleterious circumstances such

as poverty, diminished social interaction, forced migration, continuous discrimination and humiliation, loss of security and reduced opportunities for education and health.

Similar costs are, of course, also incurred by many adults. Depressions, alcoholism and many other expressions of dysfunctional behaviour are often reported among war veterans, and it is a well-known fact that men who have participated in armed conflicts are overrepresented among perpetrators of violence, not least violence against women and children.

International wars

Many of the consequences and costs of international wars are identical to those incurred in intra-state conflicts and need not be repeated here. The major differences are technological and political, social and psychological; civil wars tend to be more prolonged, and produce more lasting effects on a particular society's political institutions, trust and social cohesion than is usually the case when the war is regarded as an act of foreign aggression.

A major difference, related to technology, is the fact that international wars are usually waged with the help of modern, sophisticated and expensive weapons. The costs of military equipment are higher, as is the immediate damage of warfare which includes heavy bombing and massive destruction of physical capital such as infrastructure, factories and buildings. Long-term environmental consequences – as witnessed in, for example, Indochina, Iraq and former Yugoslavia – also tend to be very large.

To illustrate the high costs of modern, high-tech warfare, the costs to the United States and its allies of the Gulf War in 1991 have been estimated at around 76 billion USD (in dollars of 2002).[21] This figure does not include any direct or indirect costs on the Iraqi side.

In the 1990s, more than 200 billion USD was spent by the international community on seven major interventions: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, El Salvador, Haiti, the Persian Gulf, Rwanda and Somalia (Rehn & Johnson Sirleaf, 2002, p. 4). By comparison, the United Nations and all its funds and programmes spend about 10 billion USD per year.

Total costs of the 2003 war against Iraq are, of course, impossible to calculate at present. To indicate the difficulties, we could examine the huge differences in estimates that were made ex ante, i.e. before the war broke out, between sources close to the US administration and independent observers.

Before the war started, according to semi-official estimates by the Bush administration[22], total costs to the US and its allies would amount to about 100 billion dollars.

Other estimates indicated much higher costs. The well-known American economist William Nordhaus[23] calculated, in late

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[21] Nordhaus (2002), p. 7.

[22] See, for example, statements by Larry Lindsey, a top economic adviser to President George Bush, as quoted by CNN (September 16, 2002) and by *The Economist* (November 30, 2002).

[23] See Nordhaus (2002) or, for a brief version, article in The New York Review of Books, December 5, 2002. Available on-line on www.nybooks.com/articles/15850

2002, that total costs – excluding loss of lives and other human costs on the Iraqi side[24] – might amount to a staggering 1.6 trillion USD in a worst-case scenario.

In his review of economic consequences of past wars, Nordhaus observes that nations historically have consistently underestimated the costs of military conflicts.

Nordhaus' methodology illustrates some of the difficulties involved in making assessments of this kind. Nordhaus emphasises that total cost estimates need to be based on a number of unknown factors: different scenarios for the conduct of the war, the aftermath of hostilities, the impacts on the oil markets and other related markets as well as the macroeconomic impact on the overall development of the US economy. Nordhaus considers two possible outcomes, ranging from a short and relatively conflict-free case to protracted conflict with expensive postwar reconstruction and occupation. The estimates of the costs to the US (partly shared by the US allies) over the decade following hostilities range from a low of USD 100 billion to well over USD 1,000 billion.

A comparison between one semi–official US estimate and Nordhaus' high-cost scenario can illustrate which categories of costs are included:

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[24] The final death toll on the Iraqi side will probably never be known, and estimates of the number of fatalities during the short war range between 21,000 and 55,000.

Table 9. Estimates of cost of war with Iraq to the United States. Billions of USD.

	Low	High
Direct military spending	50	140
Follow-on costs:		
Occupation and peacekeeping	75	500
Reconstruction & nation-building	25	100
Humanitarian assistance	1	10
Impact on oil markets	-30	500
Macroeconomic impact	0	345
Total	**121**	**1,595**

Source: Table taken from The Economist, November 30, 2002, and is based on the US institute Centre for Strategic and International Studies (low-cost scenario) and Nordhaus, 2002 (high-cost, worst possible scenario with severe knock-on effects on the global economy).

Neither of the above estimates included losses of lives or other social and human costs on the Iraqi side other than indirectly, in the form of costs borne by the US for reconstruction and post-war humanitarian assistance.

In late 2003, preliminary estimates indicate that total costs are likely to exceed the low-cost estimate by a large margin. The war was short, but the postwar period cannot be described as

conflict-free. Direct military spending and costs of occupation and peacekeeping may already (December 2003) exceed USD 150 billion, and monthly costs of the US military presence in Iraq amount to around four billion.

The Nordhaus high-cost estimate, on the other hand, appears to be grossly inflated as regards the macroeconomic consequences (impact on oil prices and knock-on effects on the global economy). But it is, on the other hand, as impossible today to make guesses about the long-term macroeconomic impact of the war as it is to attempt an assessment of its possible effects in areas such as nation-building and social cohesion in post-war Iraq.

Concluding Remarks: Male Violence as a Major Obstacle to Development

There is, as this paper has attempted to show, a limit to the usefulness of economic analysis and quantitative methods when we try to assess human, social and economic costs of violence. The methodology is poorly developed, and data are often either lacking or unreliable.

All estimates of measurable costs reveal that violence carries huge costs. But all such estimates are still underestimates. Intangible costs, such as human pain and suffering, are never included when cost estimates are being presented. And these types of intangible costs, and the long-term multiplier effects when societies and communities suffer from armed conflict or from other forms of violence, are often the largest costs of all.

If our attention is directed to the long-term effects of violence, the bill rises sharply. Armed conflicts and violent crime can destroy material assets, but even more important is the erosion of the social fabric and the destruction of norms of trust and cooperation in countries and communities plagued by violence. When male role models teach the young that violence can be regarded as a legitimate way of resolving conflicts, male children and adolescents often grow up to use violence themselves, and the intergenerational transmission of violent behaviour is perpetuated.

Violence should be treated not only as a human and social problem but also as a crucial development issue. In modern the-

ories of economic development the role of natural resources and physical capital formation has become downgraded, while increased emphasis is being put on the role of other factors more related to people, institutions and ideas. Foremost of these factors are human capital – people's health, skills, knowledge, experience and creativity –, the role of good governance and the quality of a country's institutions and, last but not least, the importance of social capital, understood as norms of trust and confidence.

The long-term development costs of violence should be assessed against this background. The major damage is done to people's lives, health, minds and values and to a society's public and social institutions, in a broad sense. Viewed from this perspective, violence emerges as a major – perhaps *the* major – obstacle to sustainable development in many countries and communities.

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List of Acronyms

FGM   Female Genital Mutilation

GDP   Gross Domestic Product

IDB   Inter-American Development Bank

ILO   International Labour Organisation

NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

SIPRI   Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

UNDP   United Nations Development Programme

UNIFEM   United Nations Development Fund for Women

UNRISD   United Nations Research Institute for Social Development

USD   US Dollar

WHO   World Health Organisation

Sida