

The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal

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The state, gender, and sexual politics

Theory and appraisal

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A strategic question

The classic feminist slogan “the personal is political” states a basic feature of feminist and gay politics, a link between personal experience and power relations. In many cases the power relations are immediately present in personal life, in matters conventionally thought “private”: housework, homophobic jokes, office sexuality, child rearing. Yet there is also a highly “public” dimension of these politics. During the 1970s, Western feminisms made open and substantial demands on the state in every country where a significant mobilization of women occurred. So did gay liberation movements, where they developed. The list of reforms sought includes the decriminalization of abortion in France, a constitutional guarantee of equal rights for women in the USA, rape law reform in Australia, decriminalization of homosexuality in many countries; not to mention expanded state provision of child care, non-sexist education, protection against sexual violence, equal employment opportunity, and anti-discrimination measures. By the early 1980s a women’s peace movement had added disarmament and feminist environmentalists had added environmental protection – neither conventionally thought of as gender politics but both now argued in gender terms.¹

Across this spectrum of demands, the results at the end of the 1980s seem discouraging. The ERA was defeated in the United States. Abortion was decriminalized in some countries, but a powerful American movement to re-criminalize it is under way. Men’s homosexuality was decriminalized in some countries and some jurisdictions, but usually in a grudging and partial way, and official homophobia is on the rise again, in Britain most conspicuously. Public provision of child care remains massively below demonstrable need. Non-sexist education

policies with teeth (and funding) remain rare. Governments led by Thatcher, Reagan, and Kohl, riding the neo-conservative tide, have been openly reactionary in matters of sexual politics. Those led by figures such as Mitterand and Hawke, who came to power with support from feminists, have been glacially slow to introduce the reforms feminists want, beyond the easy symbolic gestures.

Does this experience show the strategy was mistaken? If the modern state is itself "the general patriarch," in Mies's evocative phrase,² then demanding that the state redress injustices worked by the "individual patriarch" in the family (or any other setting) is merely appealing from Caesar unto Caesar. Seeking reform through the state is an exercise in futility, perhaps even in deception.

What is at issue here is not just a practical appraisal of the results of a particular period of political activism. At issue is the way we think about gender and about the state. Complex theoretical questions are involved.

There is no established theoretical framework to which the appraisal can be related. In a widely read article, MacKinnon ruefully remarked that "feminism has no theory of the state."³ This is not completely correct, but it is certain that feminism has no developed or widely agreed theory of the state. The same applies to gay liberation, and to social-scientific conceptualizations of gender. Yet the slate is not blank. Many beginnings with the problem have been made.

Recent theoretical writing contains a remarkable series of sketches of a theory of the patriarchal state; at least nine have appeared in English, as essays or book chapters, since 1978.⁴ Materials for developing them are available in immense volume, in practical experience and academic writing.

Yet the sketches have remained sketches; there has not been a sustained *development* of theory. This suggests that we need to look carefully at the conceptual foundations of the discussion and perhaps configure it in another way. The first section of this article is an exploration of the main ways of thinking about gender, sexuality, and the state to be found in English-language writing in recent decades. I argue that there are indeed some problems in the theoretical bases of this literature that have severely limited it.

The second section of the article is an attempt to move beyond these limits by proposing, not an alternative sketch of the patriarchal state, but at a somewhat more generalized level a framework for theorizing the interplay of gender relations and state dynamics. This is meant to be systematic, though brief. It is based on the view that gender is a collective phenomenon, an aspect of social institutions as well as an aspect of personal life, and is therefore internal as well as external to the state. Put another way, the state as an institution is part of a wider social structure of gender relations. A recognition of the historicity of gender relations is the essential point of departure. Accordingly the exposition of the framework begins with the question of the historical constitution of the state. The analysis moves from this starting-point toward issues of political practice. My assumption throughout is that the point of a theory of the state is a better capacity to make appraisals of political strategy.

A note about terms and scope is necessary. Sexuality is part of the domain of human practice organized (in part) by gender relations, and "sexual politics" is the contestation of issues of sexuality by the social interests constituted within gender relations. "Gender politics" is a broader term embracing the whole field of social struggle between such interests.

"The state" is empirically as well as theoretically complex. Actual states include local government, and regional (for example, provincial or state) and national levels, and there is even an international level of the state, found in international law and inter-governmental organizations such as the European Economic Community and the United Nations. Drawing boundaries around "the state" is not easy; taxation departments and courts are obviously state institutions, but are medical associations? welfare agencies? universities? unions? The problem is compounded by the fact that the realm of the state as well as the form of the state changes historically.

The approach taken in this article, as in much modern state theory, is to emphasize the state as process rather than the state as thing. In this respect the approach parallels the work on the state and sexuality by Foucault and those influenced by him, and I have drawn on this tradition in discussing processes of regulation. But the history of gender politics requires also an analysis of the institutional apparatus of the state that makes regulation possible, and of the process of internal coordination that gives state apparatuses a degree of coherence in

practice. Here I have found more helpful models in socialist state theory and in the sociology of bureaucracy. Coordination (which can be linked on the one hand to the concept of “sovereignty,” on the other hand to the institutional transformations that compose the structural history of the state) is the main point of reference in this article for marking out the sphere of the state. When I speak, to save circumlocution, of the state as an object or as an actor, I mean the set of institutions currently subject to coordination (by administrative or budgetary means) by a state directorate.

The focus of the discussion, as in most of the English-language literature, is the liberal state associated with industrial-capitalist economies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Living in a semi-colonial country makes one acutely aware of the importance of imperialism in the history of modern states, and at various points I discuss divergences in gender politics between metropole and colony. I do not discuss communist states, though in principle the framework should be of use in discussing them. If it is true, as I suspect, that most communist states have little to do with socialism and in most respects are a quite familiar form of the state, a kind of military dictatorship, then their sexual politics will differ from liberal states in the way interests in sexual politics are articulated, but in other ways will be similar.

The field of argument

Mainstream state theory and liberal feminism

Classical theories of the state are unhelpful in the sense that they have had little to say directly about gender. The liberal tradition that discusses citizenship, property, personal rights, and the rule of law presents the “citizen” as an unsexed individual abstracted from social context. Socialist and anarchist analyses of the state as an agent of domination add an account of social context, but only in the form of class; the contending classes seem to be all of the same sex. So are the bureaucrats in the Weberian tradition that spawned the endless modern discussion of the state apparatus.⁵

More strikingly, the recent inheritors of these traditions also ignore gender. The neo-marxist debate over Poulantzas’s conception of the “relative autonomy” of the state is concerned with autonomy from class interests only. As Burstyn eloquently argues, the radicalism of Marxist

state theory is severely compromised by its gender blindness. Skocpol's model of social revolution and the state places gender and sexual politics on the sidelines. Giddens's attempt to historicize the state in the light of structuration theory makes only passing mention of women. Poggi's neo-liberal sociology of the state as a succession of systems of rule has nothing to say about sexual dominion, with the exception of one point. It seems that the historical definition of "the state" as an area of discourse sharply distinct from civil society or the family is still a powerful influence on the most sophisticated modern theorists.⁶

The exception comes where Poggi notes, correctly, that the model of bourgeois citizenship depends on the "citizen" being supported by a functioning patriarchal household. This is a remarkable concession to make in an aside. If *citizenship* is admitted to be gendered, can we fail to explore whether *rule* is gendered? Feminists digging into the foundations of liberal political theory have uncovered a dense cobweb of assumptions about gender. Pateman argues that the fraternal "social contract" of Rousseau and later liberalism is based on an implicit sexual contract requiring the subordination of women and regulating men's sexual access to women. This is not confined to the early stages of liberalism. As Kearns shows for the modern version in Rawls's *A Theory of Justice*, the social contract is implicitly between men, presumed to be heads of families and in charge of wives-and-children.⁷

So the issue of gender, *formally* excluded from the discourse of state theory, is nevertheless present under the surface. State theory must deal with it somehow. The result, as seen in the liberal account of citizenship, is likely to be that an implicit sociology of gender becomes an important if unspoken part of theories of the state.

The same is true of Marxist state theory. The analysis of the state as an agency of class power is based on a specific conception of class. This arises from a political economy that excludes domestic production, therefore much of women's work, from calculation. At the same time, the concept of the state is based on a demarcation of politics from "civil society" or from an "ideological instance." No prizes are offered for seeing the connection with the public/private distinction, which is a major feature of patriarchal definitions of "women's place." In both directions the Marxist theory of the state presupposes the gender division of labor and its cultural supports.⁸

So, ironically, does neo-conservatism. The New Right envisions the

state as a mindlessly expanding system of bureaucratic control, which needs to be rolled back to liberate the entrepreneurs and redistribute wealth to "the producers." In principle, this program assumes that the low-paid or un-paid labor of women will always be there to pick up the pieces in terms of family life, welfare, and personal survival.⁹ In practice, a fair amount of neo-conservative energy is devoted to attempts to make this postulate come true.

The implicit discourse of gender in accounts of the state is brought to the surface by liberal feminism, a tradition of thought with a 200-year history embracing Wollstonecraft and Mill in Britain, Stanton and Friedan in the United States. Liberal feminism took the doctrine of "rights" seriously and turned it against the patriarchal model of citizenship. "Equal rights" is more than a slogan, it is a wholly logical doctrine that is as effective against the "aristocracy of sex" as the doctrine of the "rights of man" was against the aristocracy of property.¹⁰

The concept of rights is connected with a particular concept of the state. In this view the state is, or ought to be, a neutral arbiter between conflicting interests and a guarantor of individual rights. The right to a voice in its proceedings is given by citizenship. Liberal feminism adopts this view of the state, with one significant shift: it argues that *empirically* the state is not neutral in its treatment of women. Liberal feminism, in effect, treats the state as an arbiter that has been captured by a particular group, men. This analysis leads directly to a strategy for redress: capture it back. If women's situation is defined as a case of imperfect citizenship, the answer is full citizenship. If men presently run the governments, armies, and bureaucracies, the solution is more access, packing more and more women into the top levels of the state until balance is achieved.

In its own territory this is a powerful and sharp-edged analysis. It underpins what successes the women's movement has had in dealings with the liberal state. The campaign for the suffrage itself was based on this analysis, as were the campaigns for married women's property rights last century and for equal pay in this century. More recently, liberal feminist logic has led to antidiscrimination laws, equal employment opportunity (EEO) programs, and an expanded recruitment of women to the middle levels of political power. The themes of the United Nations Decade for Women (1975–85) broadly followed liberal feminist notions of equal citizenship. Liberal feminism has developed enough leverage to receive occasional endorsement from the political

leadership of the superpowers. Carter in his day endorsed the ERA; while Gorbachev seeks to include liberal-feminist themes in *perestroika*:

Today it is imperative for the country to more actively involve women in the management of the economy, in cultural development and public life. For this purpose women's councils have been set up throughout the country.¹¹

All that said, the liberal feminist analysis is theoretically rootless to a striking degree. In a basic sense it treats patriarchy as an accident, an imperfection that needs to be ironed out. It understands men as a category overrepresented in the state structure. But it has no way of explaining why that biological category should have a collective *interest* needing to be defended. Therefore it has no way of accounting for men's resistance except as an expression of prejudice. Liberal feminists typically speak of "sexism" not of patriarchy, and accordingly seek to change men's minds to cure the prejudice. The account of women's abstinence from the public realm is likewise based on a description of attitudes, most often on the idea that women are socialized into traditional sex roles that hamper full citizenship.

So far as liberal feminism has a social theory it is "sex role" theory. Accordingly its analysis suffers from the well-documented shortcomings of that theory as an analysis of gender. Most pertinently it suffers from sex role theory's inability to understand the division of labor, and its evasion of the issues of force and violence. It is telling that Friedan, the most prominent figure in North American liberal feminism, finds the entry of women cadets into West Point to train for military leadership a positive move – a judgment consistent with the politics of access but horrendously at odds with recent feminist analyses of warfare. It is equally telling that Gorbachev goes on from the passage just quoted to blame Soviet social difficulties on a breakdown of family life, and to emphasize the question of "what we should do to make it possible for women to return to their purely womanly mission."¹²

Liberal feminism has brought to the surface the suppressed truth that the state is gendered, and has used this truth to inspire a formidable and sustained politics of access. But it has not been able to grasp the character of gender as an institutional and motivational system, nor to develop a coherent analysis of the state apparatus or its links to a social context. The underlying individualism of classic liberalism, as Z. Eisenstein argues, is at odds with the social analysis required for the develop-

ment of feminism. Only through a break with liberal presuppositions can these antinomies be overcome. It is, indeed, in the more radical feminisms of the 1970s and 1980s that a new concept of the state has emerged.¹³

The patriarchal state

Where liberal feminism sees itself as challenging prejudice, radical feminisms see themselves as contending with a social system. The name "patriarchy" is much debated; it has been criticized in particular for a false universality, attributing modern western patterns of men's domination over women to the rest of the world and the rest of history. If this implication is dropped, "patriarchy" is a serviceable term for historically produced situations in gender relations where men's domination is *institutionalized*. That is to say, men's overall social supremacy is embedded in face-to-face settings such as the family and the workplace, generated by the functioning of the economy, reproduced over time by the normal operation of schools, media, and churches. Prejudice is part of this institutionalization, but only a small part of the whole.¹⁴

An account of patriarchy as a social system was initially modelled on socialist theories of class; feminist theorists such as Firestone adopted even the terminology, speaking of "sex class" alongside "economic class." They did not at first adapt socialist theories of the state; but these existed and could be asked feminist questions.¹⁵ In the first translations of socialist ideas into sexual politics, the state was seen as being patriarchal in order to pursue the class interests of the bourgeoisie. The ruling class through the state might seek social order by repressing homosexuality, or bolster profit by maintaining a low wage structure for women, or solve employment crises by shunting female labor between home and factory. Although some of these effects certainly occur, and are documented in research on the welfare state, the theoretical premise is untenable. As Burstyn argues, we cannot continue to see class dynamics as the ultimate cause of gender dynamics in the state. These social dynamics constantly interact, but one cannot be dissolved into the other. As this point has been increasingly accepted, a more sophisticated analysis has developed that sees the state as implicated in a class system and a system of patriarchy at the same time. Indeed, the state may be seen as the vital bridge between these two sys-

tems, as in Ursel's historical analysis of the regulation of women's labor in Canada.¹⁶

Socialist feminism has generally seen the link between the family and the economy as the theoretical key to women's oppression. It has therefore focussed on the way the state regulates or restructures this link. In the most sophisticated statement of this view, McIntosh sees the state intervening both in the family, and in the capitalist workplace and labor market, not to pursue immediate class interests so much as to pursue the long-term goal of securing the social conditions that allow capitalist production to continue. The moves made by the state depend on a balancing of needs and demands that may be in conflict with each other, and that certainly change historically. Thus McIntosh introduces the very important issue of the *strategic complexity* of state action in gender politics. State agencies act under contradictory pressures, which often result in ambivalent policies. McIntosh emphasizes that the state's role in the oppression of women is usually indirect. It plays a part in establishing or regulating "systems" (the family, wage labor) in which women are oppressed. But the state can appear in itself to be gender-neutral; and this is a vital aid to legitimacy.¹⁷

To some extent this approach overcomes the tendency of socialist theory to prioritize class over patriarchy. But the emphasis is still on the reproduction of *capitalist* relations of production; gender relations are still conceptually derivative. The problem is only fully overcome when the analysis is generalized to the reproduction of social structure in general. Burton has proposed an "extended theory of social reproduction," which treats the state as central. She points to the importance of state action in spheres that Marxist-feminist analysis tended to bypass, notably biological reproduction and mass education. While sociological analysis of the state, whether feminist or not, has generally seen the state as influenced by a pre-given social structure, Burton forcibly draws attention to the role of the state in *constituting* the categories of social structure. In particular she emphasizes the ways in which masculinity and femininity, and the relation between them, are produced as effects of state policies and state structures. The interplay between schools and families, for instance, is fertile ground in the making of gender.¹⁸

Although this line of thought connects with the most sophisticated levels of social theory, the main line of feminist thinking has taken an-

other path. Its point of departure is a criticism of liberal feminism for not realizing the depth at which the state is connected with men's interests. As Scutt puts it, reflecting on the defeat of feminist proposals in a process of rape law reform in Australia, "governments and laws are established for the benefit of men, and against women." In such a view the state is a direct expression of men's interests, it is socially masculine. The idea of the "male state" spread in feminist writing of the later 1970s. Daly's widely read *Gyn/Ecology* spoke of the "sado-state," assimilating the state to the destructive aspect of male sexuality. Very similar ideas became important in the feminist anti-war movement in the 1980s, which has often treated the state's military apparatus – especially nuclear weapons – as an expression of male aggression and destructiveness.¹⁹

These conceptions are close to a view of the state widespread in the early gay liberation movement, which likewise broke with a liberal politics of law reform in favor of mass mobilization and confrontation. Gay men in particular faced the state as direct oppressor, because their own sexuality was criminalized. Police homophobia has been an important issue; it is significant that the gay liberation movement was triggered by a confrontation between gay men and police in New York, the so-called "Stonewall riot" of 1969. Lesbians have experienced the state as oppressor in the courts (for example, in custody battles), in the exclusion of lesbian experience from education, and through experiences shared with heterosexual women. Gay and lesbian writers have not, however, produced much formal theorization of the state. What there is, notably the work of Fernbach, emphasizes the historical embedding of violent masculinity in the state with the creation of armies and empires.²⁰

On any reading, the idea of the "male state" commits feminism against the state. It has been, however, nuanced in two ways that imply rather different politics. The first treats the state as the hireling or messenger-boy of patriarchy, as an agent for a social interest – that of men – that is constituted outside it. Scutt's comment that governments are "established for the benefit of men" illustrates this position. This is closer to liberal feminism, as it suggests at least a logical possibility of turning the state around. The second conception (perhaps deriving from anarchist views of the state as well as the new feminist focus on sexual violence) sees the state itself as oppressor; the state *is* the patriarchal power structure. Mies's comment on the state as "the general patriarch,"

quoted earlier, illustrates this idea. Here there is no political ambiguity: the state as such has got to go, in the interests of women.²¹

It is the second variant that has led to the most interesting developments, which give more bite to the conception of the state as patriarch. An influential paper by MacKinnon explores how the U.S. legal system operates in relation to rape. Historically, rape has been constructed as a crime from the point of view of men. The legal system translates this interested point of view into impersonal procedural norms, defining (for instance) what must be proven and what is acceptable or convincing evidence. The courts are not patriarchal because they are improperly biased against women; rather they are patriarchal through the way the whole structure of rape law operates. The more *objective* they are in procedure the more effectively patriarchal they are. The norm of "legal objectivity" thus becomes an institutionalization of men's interests.²²

A very similar point is made by Burton about job evaluations in Australia. "Equal opportunity" or "pay equity" programs often call for an objective assessment of jobs to overcome traditional gender inequalities. But the appearance of technical neutrality is contradicted as the underlying rationale of evaluation schemes embeds patriarchal points of view, for instance in the weighting given to different aspects of a job. On a broader canvas, Grant and Tancred-Sheriff in Canada point to the arrangement of administrative units within bureaucracies as a practice embodying gender interests. Departments where women's interests are represented tend to be peripheral. Thus women's advisory units have slight organizational power compared with, say, economic policy-making units dominated by men.²³

What these arguments have in common is the perception that patriarchy is embedded in *procedure*, in the state's way of functioning. This perception is extremely important. It allows us to acknowledge the patriarchal character of the state without falling into a conspiracy theory or making futile searches for Patriarch Headquarters. It locates sexual politics in the realm of social action, where it belongs, avoiding the speculative reductionism that would explain state action as an emanation of the inner nature of males. Finally it opens up the question of the *state apparatus*, overlooked by liberal feminism and earlier radical feminism alike. The character and dynamics of the state apparatus, the actual machinery of government, are a major theme in non-feminist state theory, and urgently need analysis in terms of gender.²⁴

The research agenda

These theoretical debates have been strategy-driven rather than data-driven; they respond to the feminist and gay movements' urgent needs for ideas about what to do rather than to a contemplative scientific model of theory-linked-to-research. Indeed it is not always obvious what kind of research could resolve the theoretical issues posed. Nevertheless empirical research on gender and the state has been building up at a rapid rate, mainly as a result of the impact of feminism on social science in the universities. It has taken three main forms.

First, feminist historians have traced the political history of feminism itself and its encounters with the state. Biographies of prominent feminists, such as Magarey's life of Catherine Spence, convey a great deal of information about conceptions of the state, policy debates, and the tactical interplay among feminists, bureaucrats, and governments. Other feminist historians have traced the state's changing regulation of women, of families, of sexual violence, and so on. A notable example is Gordon's exploration of domestic violence in the northeastern United States, studying the interplay among charity, state control, and working-class women's responses. Gay historians such as Weeks in Britain and Kinsman in Canada have similarly unpacked a complex history of state regulation of homosexual practice and desire.²⁵

Second, the well-oiled machinery of quantitative sociology and political science is capable of sending forth, when the right button is pushed, a limitless stream of survey studies of gender and politics. One fruit of this is the debate on the "gender gap" in voting patterns. We now have a mass of information on sex differences in voting, political participation and recruitment, attitudes, political learning, and so on, in all countries where survey research is common. Most of this is quite innocent of theory, but it is not irrelevant to theory. A major finding of this research, as Epstein's recent review shows, is a broad *similarity* between women's and men's political attitudes, interests, and partisanship. This contradicts the theoretical idea that men's domination of the political apparatus arises from natural differences in motivation or outlook between the sexes.²⁶

Third, a fast-growing collection of feminist policy studies traces state administrative action in particular fields of gender or sexual politics. This research often illuminates the debates within the state that accompany new policies, and the limits of state interventions. Smart's study of

British family law, and its ambiguous reinforcement of patriarchal domestic relationships, is a notable example. Research of this kind can, more surprisingly, also illuminate structural questions. This is shown in Ruggie's comparative study of working women in Britain and Sweden; the markedly better labor market position of Swedish women is found to be connected with the different structure of the welfare state in the two countries.²⁷

This adds up to a convincing picture of the state as an active player in gender politics. Nobody acquainted with the facts revealed in this research can any longer accept the silence about gender in traditional state theory, whether liberal, socialist, or conservative. The research also demonstrates that the state is, at the very least, a significant vehicle of sexual and gender oppression and regulation. The general tendency of feminist theory to move toward a conception of the "patriarchal state" appears to be valid.

But a theory constructed on this postulate alone would give no grip on strategy. To say that "government is women's enemy," as Presley and Kinsky do; or in Walby's more sophisticated language, "the state represents patriarchal as well as capitalistic interests and furthers them in its actions"; gives no way of grasping what feminism *in practice* has seen in the state that makes the state worth addressing as a resource for progressive sexual politics.²⁸ To gain some purchase on that question requires an exploration of the changing circumstances in which state instrumentalities act, the strategic problems of state directorates, and the scope and limits of the state's embroilment in gender relations.

A theoretical framework

1. *The state is constituted within gender relations as the central institutionalization of gendered power. Conversely, gender dynamics are a major force constructing the state, both in the historical creation of state structures and in contemporary politics.*

Many of the policy-oriented discussions of topics such as "women and welfare" take the already written history of the modern state for granted, and inquire about its consequences for women. This traps the analysis of gender politics in an external logic, most commonly in a logic of class. Rather, we need to appraise the state from the start as having a specific location within gender relations, and as having a his-

tory shaped by a gender dynamic. This is not the only basis of state history, but it is an essential and irreducible aspect of the state.

The state is a structure of power, persisting over time; an institutionalization of power relations. It is not the only institutionalization of power, nor even the monopolist of legitimate force, as some classic theory has it. Feminism points to the family as a domain of power, and to husbands' violence against wives – which survey research shows very widespread – as a socially legitimated use of force. Violence against gay men is also widely regarded as legitimate, and in bashings of gays, as in husbands' bashing of wives, the laws against assault are generally inactive.²⁹

The state, then, is only part of a wider structure of gender relations that embody violence or other means of control. It is a node within that network of power relations that is one of the principal sub-structures of the gender order. The state is indeed the main organizer of the power relations of gender. Its scale and coherence contrast, for instance, with the dispersed, cellular character of power relations institutionalized in families. Through laws and administrative arrangements the state sets limits to the use of personal violence, protects property (and thus unequal economic resources), criminalizes stigmatized sexuality, embodies masculinized hierarchy, and organizes collective violence in policing, prisons, and war. In certain circumstances the state also allows or even invites the counter-mobilization of power.

To speak of "history" is to court discussions of "origins." Delphy has eloquently shown the traps in "origins" arguments about patriarchy, and we should not fall into a search for a mythical "moment of origin" of the state. It is, however, possible to launch a genuinely historical investigation of early state development. Lerner's notable study of early Mesopotamia argues that archaic states were organized in the form of patriarchy, and from the start promoted patriarchal family forms, the economic dependence of women, and the control of women's sexuality. Fernbach's suggestions about the construction of a "masculine specialization in violence" are also of interest. He argues a close link between the founding of states and the demographic and economic changes that led to the historical emergence of warfare. While serious historical investigation of such themes is still rare – most archaeology is still pre-feminist in its understanding of social structure – it seems likely that an emerging history of the state will have the gender division of labor and the institutionalization of violence as central themes.³⁰

Why "origins" arguments fail is that the constitution of the state is a continuing historical process, which creates fundamentally new forms. On a global scale, modern states were created by the dynamics of European imperialism over the last four hundred years. This was a gendered, and partly gender-driven, process. There was a sharp gender division of labor in conquest, a masculine adventure perceived and motivated as such. The imperial state structures created to rule colonial empires were masculinized institutions to an even greater degree than the European states from which they grew. There might be Queens Regnant like Isabella or Elizabeth at home, but no woman was ever sent out as Viceroy of the Indies or Governor of Van Diemen's Land. When conquest was succeeded by settlement, a new gender and sexual politics arose where the state was reorganized around racist population and workforce policies. In different parts of the colonial world states changed in different directions to sustain white family settlement, Afro-american slavery, or racial bars in colonial administration. This creation of new state structures (never simply exported) could lead in unexpected directions. It is a notable fact that states on the frontier of European settlement, in the western United States and Australasia, were the first to concede woman suffrage, and some of them did so a generation before the metropolitan states.³¹

In the imperial centers the state went through a fundamental transformation between the eighteenth and the twentieth century, traced in conventional histories as a shift from the absolutist state to the liberal-constitutional state and then to the interventionist state. One of the key components of this shift, persistently missed by gender-blind research, is a politics of masculinity. The states of the *Ancien régime* were integrated with, indeed operated through, a hegemonic form of masculinity that prized personal and family honor, worked through kinship and patronage obligations, and connected the exercise of authority with a capacity for violence (symbolized in the duel, and more systematically seen in the role of the landed gentry in military affairs). The creation of a liberal-constitutional order, and especially the creation of an impersonal bureaucracy in place of an administrative apparatus run by patronage, involved an attack on this form of masculinity and its ramifications, apparent in the scarring attacks on "Old Corruption" by English reformers in the early nineteenth century. The hegemonic masculinity of the old regime was displaced during the nineteenth century by a hegemonic masculinity organized around themes of rationality, calculation, and orderliness.

This change in gender was not a *consequence* of the bourgeois revolution, it was a *central part* of it, part of the dynamic that created modern industrial capitalism as an already-gendered social order. Associated changes gradually worked through education, the arts, and other spheres of culture. Thus a bureaucratized school system became a major component of the state from the mid-nineteenth century; the curriculum was gradually modified to prioritize science; “technical education” was invented. The process was far from tension-free. The creation of a “rationalized” masculinity split off personal violence from social authority: Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Rockefeller, and Mr. Morgan did not fight duels. Violent or wild masculinities were nevertheless socially constructed on the colonial frontier, as shown in the research on New Zealand by Phillips. And a calculative violence was institutionalized in the military in the wake of the Napoleonic wars. These changes came home with the terrific shock delivered to European gender orders by the first World War. The fascist movements that devastated European society in the following decades had immediate roots in the violent masculinity of the front-line soldiers of that war – one of whom was Adolf Hitler.³²

A key part of the liberal state was the creation of a system of representation, elected parliaments and officials. This system was closely linked to an emerging distinction between a “public” sphere, in which representation occurred, and a private sphere of domestic and personal life. Feminist historians have traced the nineteenth-century construction of a feminized “domestic” realm, increasingly seen as the exclusive sphere of women. The link between the two, in the bourgeois ideal adopted by much of the labor movement also, was the husband/father: he was the economic actor (wage-earner or property owner) and the citizen of the state.

Though powerful as ideology, this model never reflected reality. Among other things it drastically underestimated women’s economic activity, and ignored women’s role as cultural producers (for example, novelists) and lobbyists in church and politics. Unless women could be absolutely controlled by a domestic patriarch, the liberal model of citizenship contained a major contradiction – forcefully pointed out by J. S. Mill. Domestic patriarchy was never up to the task. The result was deepening problems of legitimacy for the state, which gave the women’s suffrage movement leverage, and drove an expansion of the system of representation toward the contemporary model of universal citizenship and plebiscitary elections.³³

2. *As a result of this history the state is a bearer of gender (though in a much more complex way than ideas of the "male state" suggest). Each empirical state has a definable "gender regime" that is the precipitate of social struggles and is linked to – though not a simple reflection of – the wider gender order of the society.*

It is misleading to talk of a "male state" where millions of the state's workers are women, unless one assumes them all to have become honorary men, or assumes that their gender is irrelevant to what they do and how they do it. Rather, women and men tend to occupy particular positions within the state, and work in ways structured by gender relations. This is the "gender regime," defined as the historically produced state of play in gender relations within an institution, which can be analyzed by taking a structural inventory.³⁴ Three main structures can be identified.

A gender division of labor is the most obvious, and frequently documented, feature of the state's gender regime. The state directorate (the "elites" of politics, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the military) almost everywhere in the world is composed 95 to 100 percent of men. The coercive apparatus of the state (police, military, prison officers) has a comparable percentage of men. Men's employment in infrastructural state services (railways, maritime services, power, construction) approaches these levels. Women predominate in some categories of human-service state employment (elementary school teaching, nursing). Women fill almost all secretarial positions through the administrative structure.

In other sectors (secondary school teaching, general administration, mass communication) both women and men are present in substantial numbers. Here another pattern appears, which has been documented in recent research for equal-opportunity programs. Women predominate in the part-time, casual, and unskilled positions; men in "promotion" positions with supervisory tasks and career prospects. The predominance of men increases steadily as one works up the hierarchy of authority and income, eventually producing the lop-sided sex ratio seen among policy-making elites.³⁵

As well as a gender division of labor in terms of individuals there is also a division of labor at the collective level, in terms of bureaucratic units. Grant and Tancred-Sheriff's important observation on this point has already been mentioned: women's interests are articulated in relatively




Figure 1. Gender structuring of state apparatus

peripheral parts of the state apparatus. The individual gender division of labor is both cause and consequence of a cultural differentiation of state units along gender lines. The coercive and infrastructural apparatus is strongly “masculinized” in its ideology and practice as well as its workforce. The point is obvious in the case of armies and police forces. Equally notable is the emphasis on men’s camaraderie, endurance, and skill with heavy tools in the workplace culture of manual workers in the infrastructure. In the state directorate too, though the style of masculinity is more bourgeois, the few women who bring back ethnographic reports describe a milieu actively antagonistic to femininity. H. Eisenstein, in her experience as an Australian “femocrat,” provides a particularly vivid account of the embeddedness of masculinity in the upper reaches of the state.³⁶

Putting these points together with the useful work on taxonomy of the state apparatus in recent class-based theory, it is possible to make a classification of the major instrumentalities of the contemporary liberal state in terms of their gender structuring. A simple model is shown in Figure 1. The quasi-governmental sector that Shaver has called “the non-government state” is a particularly interesting feature of the history of the liberal state. Organizations in this sector have been the only means, until very recently, by which women have had any significant role in shaping state policy or the use of public funds. Some operate in sex-segregated fields, such as girls’ schools and women’s hospitals, which were important in forming and transmitting feminist traditions in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A good many feminist activists of the 1970s worked in the non-government state, and feminist welfare initiatives, such as health centers and refuges, often took the shape of subsidized voluntary agencies already familiar in this sector.³⁷

The second component of a gender regime is a *structure of power*. More feminist analysis has focused on the external power relations of the state than on its internal arrangement, but there has been some discussion of the most conspicuous feature of authority in the modern state, its bureaucratization. Bureaucracy, as argued by Ferguson and by Grant and Tancred-Sheriff, is a "gendered hierarchy." Its connection with the rise of new models of masculinity in the nineteenth century has already been mentioned. The classical theory of bureaucracy developed by Weber and his followers emphasized the connection of bureaucracy with the secularization and rationalization of human relationships. Feminist research on cultural history, especially the history of science, is now showing the fundamental connections of this model of rationality with gender politics and the legitimation of men's domination over women.³⁸

Yet seeing bureaucracy in direct opposition to feminism, as Ferguson does, misses key points about it. As Deacon points out, the growth of a "white-collar" workforce as the state's administrative apparatus expanded in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a crucial means of access for women, who entered the resulting clerical and semi-professional occupations in very large numbers. Women in the bureaucracy fought, and eventually won, battles to eliminate the many organizational barriers (such as "marriage bars") set up to restrict their access. The very "rationalization" of practice on which bureaucracy is built is potentially subversive of patriarchy. Like the concepts of citizenship and representation, rationality implicitly contains universalizable claims; once made, these corrode the legitimacy of traditional gender inequalities. Equal employment opportunity programs are now using this leverage to some effect.³⁹

Bureaucracy is not the only feature of the organization of power within the state. The "other side of bureaucracy" involves personal networks, factions, the informal organization of resources and contacts. Organized as networks among men, these may survive the advent of formal sex equality. The various units of the state require coordination; and the means of coordination change historically. In the 1980s a pattern of administrative coordination within state structures was increasingly displaced by fiscal coordination, and this shift is not gender-neutral. The language of finance and "economic rationalism" has been the vehicle for an attack on welfare ideology, and a downgrading of women's interests on a very broad front, from the abolition of women's access programs in further education to the gutting of child-care pro-

grams.⁴⁰ Finally the system of representation has also been socially organized on gender lines, with the enormous majority of elected officials being men though at least half of most electorates are women. Electoral patriarchy, as we might call this situation, has been surprisingly resilient. The only part of the world where it is seriously frayed, where women are elected in substantial numbers to positions of real power, is Scandinavia.

The third component of a gender regime is the *structure of cathexis*, the gender patterning of emotional attachments. This is the side of the state we know least about, by far. There is a long tradition of psychological research on attachment to political authority, going back to early psychoanalytic speculation about political leadership, and culminating in the research on fascism that produced theories of the "authoritarian personality." There was almost no recognition of *gender* in this literature, though it can now be re-read as a discourse about masculinity and the ways men can be attached to political leaders. Macciocchi has explored the parallel problem for women in Italian fascism. A gender patterning of emotion may also be significant within the state apparatus. Pringle has explored the complexities of boss/secretary relationships and suggests the importance of pleasure for understanding these workplace connections. What Hochschild calls "emotional labor" is an important part of the labor process in some fields of state employment, such as welfare and nursing. Such work is often allocated to women, and emotion thus becomes linked into the state's sexual division of labor.

One might speculate that the growth and impersonality of the state structure has created increasing problems in the management of cathexis, and that modern official nationalism is partly a response to this. There is certainly an active gender politics around nationalism. Mies has pointed to a dramatic shift in nationalist imagery in post-revolutionary states:

In this phase, the female image of the nation, found on the revolutionary posters mentioned above, is replaced by the images of the founding-fathers: Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Ho Chi Minh, Castro, Mugabe, to name only a few. Typically, among this gallery of socialist patriarchs, there are no women.

A patriarchal structure of cathexis, it appears, cannot be presumed; strenuous work goes into trying to guarantee it.⁴¹

3. *The way the state embodies gender gives it cause and capacity to “do” gender. As the central institutionalization of power the state has a considerable, though not unlimited, capacity to regulate gender relations in the society as a whole.*

This issue has been the subject of more feminist and gay discussion about the state than any other, and the contours are becoming familiar. Again we may trace this issue across the three substructures of labor, power, and cathexis.

In terms of the gendered organization of production and the gender division of labor, the liberal state was an “interventionist” state well before the twentieth century. “Protective” legislation on women’s work affected women’s participation in wage labor and attempted to impose a nuclear-family model on the nineteenth-century working class. State control of women’s wages through wage boards, arbitration, legislation, and decree is now a familiar theme in economic history. The state’s capacity to change its tack was shown in the shift of women into manufacturing during the world wars. A highly visible gender politics of employment re-emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, revolving around “equal opportunity” principles and affirmative action programs. This has carried over strongly into the international dimension of the state, with the ILO, OECD, and UN being forums where policy and progress around women’s employment are debated. At the same time there is a system of indirect control of the division of labor, as McIntosh has argued, through welfare provision, the education system, and other machinery.⁴²

The state similarly has a capacity to regulate the power relations of gender in other institutions. The most-discussed case of this is marital violence, where regulation involves a violation of the cultural boundary between the “public” and the “private” spheres. Police reluctance to intervene in “domestic disputes” is familiar. In effect, feminist research indicates, the state’s non-intervention has tacitly supported domestic violence – which mainly means husbands battering wives – up to the point where a public-realm scandal is created and state legitimacy is at issue. At that point men as state agents will move to restrain men in households: arrests may take place, legal proceedings begin, refuges are funded. The effect of this routine of management is to construct the issue as one of a deviant minority of violent husbands, and to deflect criticism of marriage as an institution that generates violence. Radical

feminists in the 1970s used this problem of legitimacy very effectively to get funding for the women's refuge movement, but as Johnson observes of the Australian experience they found themselves trapped in this construction of the issue of violence.⁴³

Nevertheless, the fact that the state will restrain some manifestations of private-sphere patriarchy is significant. Donzelot, in a widely read book on the "policing of families" in France, suggests that the growth of an apparatus of surveillance and regulation – in what Anglo-Saxon writers call the welfare state – has generally undermined domestic patriarchy. The idea is shared by some of the American right, who wish to roll back the state in order to restore women's dependence on men ("traditional family life"). This view is exaggerated, but it is nevertheless true that the state has functioned as an alternative means of economic support for many women disadvantaged by a patriarchal economy. "Welfare mothers" and age pensioners are not exactly a mass base for feminism; they are nevertheless not abjectly dependent on particular men. Defending the level of income coming to women through the state has been a key issue for feminism since the onset of the recession of the 1970s.⁴⁴

The state has a capacity to regulate sexuality and has shown an active interest in doing so. There are legal definitions of forbidden heterosexual relationships, for instance, laws on age of consent and on incest. Around the prohibition of incest a to-and-fro comparable to that on domestic violence occurs. As the 1987 furor about diagnoses of incest at Cleveland in England shows, vigorous enforcement can create legitimacy problems at least as severe as non-enforcement. Marital sexuality is regulated in the name of population policy. The state in early twentieth-century Australia banned the sale of contraceptives and introduced "baby bonus" payments in order to increase the (white) population. The state in contemporary India and China is vigorously trying to restrain population growth. During the nineteenth and early twentieth century state repression of men's homosexuality became heavier. The process escalated through criminalization of all male homosexual behavior (for example, the Labouchère Amendment in Britain in 1885) to the rounding-up of gay men into concentration camps in Nazi Germany.⁴⁵

Much of this regulation can be read as an attempt to promote a particular form of sexuality in the conjugal family against a whole series of tendencies in other directions. This is not a simple matter of "social

reproduction.” Often, as population policies illustrate, the state is pursuing a *re-structuring* of the family or of sexuality. And there is no doubt that these policies have met a great deal of resistance. The criminalization of male homosexuality failed to stop male homosexual behavior, though it drove it underground for a couple of generations. The public banning of contraceptives failed to stop the early twentieth-century decline in family size, as women found other means of regulating births. Nor are third-world governments wonderfully successful in restraining population growth at present, while children remain an important asset in peasant society and are valued in urban culture.

4. *The state's power to regulate reacts on the categories that make up the structure being regulated. Thus the state becomes involved in the historical process generating and transforming the basic components of the gender order.*

The masculinization of the military apparatus was mentioned earlier as an example of the gender division of labor. It is more than a statistical trend. In armies a dominance-oriented masculinity is deliberately cultivated, in the rigors of basic training and in the manners of the officer corps. The space for femininity of any kind is narrow, a point re-discovered by women recruited to the American military in the recent phase of “equal opportunity.” But this masculinity is not all of a piece. The violent masculinity of the frontline soldier would be worse than useless in the commanding general. The most successful general of the twentieth century, Georgi Zhukov, was domineering and brutal but never fired a shot at the Japanese or the Germans; he was a manager, not a fighter, as is clear in his memoirs. A modern army is built around the relations among frontline fighters, managers, supply staff, and technical experts; none can function without the others. In military affairs the state apparatus is visibly constructing particular forms of masculinity and regulating the relations between them, not as an incidental effect of its operations but as a vital precondition of them. This part of the state operates *through* the gender relation thus constructed.⁴⁶

The attempts at regulating sexuality made in the core industrial states in the nineteenth century led to equally dramatic effects. As Walkowitz's research indicates, the state's intervention on the terrain of venereal disease, morality, and military efficiency produced the modern socio-legal category of the “prostitute” – creating a category out of what had been much more fluid and relational before. At much the same time, the same state apparatuses restructured the legal proscrip-

tion of men's homosexuality. In combination with the medicalization of sexual "deviance" by a state-backed medical profession, this marked off "the homosexual man" as a distinct type of person, transforming what had been a much more fluid play of sexuality, at most a sub-cultural tendency among urban men, into a clearly-flagged social barrier.⁴⁷

In such cases the metropolitan state is involved in *generating* categories of gender relations. The same occurs when the colonial state, engaged in setting up institutions of permanent conquest, defines permitted sexuality. It is a notable fact that colonial systems, over the long sweep of history from the sixteenth century to the twentieth, became on the whole more racist. The colonial state became more opposed to inter-marriage of colonizer and colonized, came in effect to define racial categories of citizenship through its regulation of marriage. An increasing regulation of marriage developed in the metropole as well. Two centuries ago, marriage in European culture was a precipitate of kinship rules, local custom, and religion. It has increasingly become a product of *contract* as defined and regulated by the state. But civil, state-regulated contract is capable of civil, state-regulated abrogation; so divorce as a social institution has developed in the wake of state regulation of marriage. Again the consequence is a new category in gender relations, the divorcée, and the reorganization of other institutions around it (for example, the "blended family").⁴⁸

The state thus is not just a regulatory agency, it is a creative force in the dynamic of gender. It creates new categories and new historical possibilities. But it should not be forgotten that the state also destroys. Modern states kill on a horrific scale, and gender is central to this fact. Probably the most destructive single action in modern history was not the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, but the relatively forgotten fire-bombing of Dresden, a town of no military significance, by the British and American air forces in February 1945. About 135,000 civilians were burned to death in a day during an attack that followed mechanically from a bureaucratic planning process. Masculine toughness had become institutionalized in an "area bombing" approach that delivered genocide; and no process in a military bureaucracy could stop it.⁴⁹

5. *Because of its power to regulate and its power to create, the state is a major stake in gender politics; and the exercise of that power is a constant incitement to claim the stake. Thus the state becomes the focus of interest-group formation and mobilization in sexual politics.*

It is worth recalling just how wide the liberal state's activity in relation to gender is. This activity includes family policy, population policy, labor force and labor market management, housing policy, regulation of sexual behavior and expression, provision of child care, mass education, taxation and income redistribution, the creation and use of military forces – and that is not the whole of it. This is not a sideline; it is a major realm of state policy. Control of the machinery that conducts these activities is a massive asset in gender politics. In many situations it will be tactically decisive.

The state is therefore a focus for the mobilization of interests that is central to gender politics on the large scale. Feminism's historical concern with the state, and attempts to capture a share of state power, appear in this light as a necessary response to a historical reality. They are not an error brought on by an overdose of liberalism or a capitulation to patriarchy. As Franzway puts it, the state is unavoidable for feminism. The question is not whether feminism will deal with the state, but how: on what terms, with what tactics, toward what goals.⁵⁰

The same is true of the politics of homosexuality among men. The earliest attempts to agitate for toleration produced a half-illegal, half-academic mode of organizing that reached its peak in Weimar Germany, and was smashed by the Nazis. (The Institute of Sexual Science was vandalized and its library burnt in 1933; later, gay men were sent to concentration camps or shot.) A long period of lobbying for legal reform followed, punctuated by bouts of state repression. (Homosexual men were, for instance, targeted in the McCarthyite period in the United States.) The gay liberation movement changed the methods and expanded the goals to include social revolution, but still dealt with the state over policing, de-criminalization, and anti-discrimination. Since the early 1970s gay politics has evolved a complex mixture of confrontation, cooperation, and representation. In some cities, including San Francisco and Sydney, gay men as such have successfully run for public office. Around the AIDS crisis of the 1980s, in countries such as the United States and Australia, gay community based organizations and state health services have entered a close – if often tense – long-term relationship.⁵¹

In a longer historical perspective, all these forms of politics are fairly new. Fantasies like Aristophanes's *Lysistrata* aside, the open mobilization of groups around demands or programs in sexual politics dates only from the mid-nineteenth century. The politics that characterized

other patriarchal gender orders in history were constructed along other lines, for instance as a politics of kinship, or faction formation in agricultural villages. It can plausibly be argued that modern patterns resulted from a reconfiguration of gender politics around the growth of the liberal state. In particular its structure of legitimation through plebiscite or electoral democracy invited the response of popular mobilization.

This response was, however, asymmetrical. In class politics the mobilization of a subordinate group, via socialist parties, was followed by a counter-mobilization of conservative parties, with remarkable success. But feminist mobilization has not been followed by a counter-mobilization of anti-feminist men. There have been some small "men's rights" groups but they have had no mass appeal. The right-wing mobilizations that have opposed feminism, for instance on the abortion issue, are based in churches and include a large number of women.

The absence of mobilization "from above" in gender politics raises questions about the way men's power is institutionalized, and about the connection between different sites of power. A banal but perhaps largely correct explanation is that patriarchy is so firmly entrenched in existing political institutions, such as the bureaucracy, the press, and the major parties, that in the normal run of things no more is needed; state and media substitute for a mobilization of men. In some situations of crisis, however, this can break down. In European fascism in the 1920s and 1930s, and Iran in the 1980s, a political mobilization in favor of patriarchy has occurred, feminism and sexual degeneracy were denounced, and violent repression followed the seizure of state power by the movement.⁵²

6. The state is constantly changing; gender relations are historically dynamic; the state's position in gender politics is not fixed. Crisis tendencies develop in the gender order, which allow new political possibilities.

Much social analysis seems to imply that the state directorate has it easy, that the functional thing to do is obvious and straightforward. In reality, state elites typically face shifting situations and contradictory pressures that their strategies can only partly resolve. Their power may be destabilized by crisis tendencies arising from sources outside their control.⁵³

One such is a tendency toward crisis in the legitimation of patriarchy, a breakdown of established bases of authority. The long-term decline of religion has stripped patriarchy of its main cultural defense. The rise of the liberal state gave weight to generalizable claims of equality. The use of state power must be balanced with a search for legitimation if the power is to continue, and legitimation involves the ballot-box credibility of governing parties, the willingness of citizens to pay taxes and obey officials, the discipline or compliance of state employees. Feminism lays demands on the state that may be difficult to dodge without putting legitimacy at risk. The liberal feminist platform of equal citizenship, employment rights, and anti-discrimination measures is formulated in a way that maximizes this leverage on the state. That is one reason why liberal feminism on certain issues has been very effective. Even the Reagan government found it expedient to appoint women to senior levels of the judiciary.

Yet there are risks for the state here. Too close an alignment with feminism gives offense to patriarchal ideology as mobilized in the churches, and to men's employment interests as mobilized in corporate managements and male-dominated unions. There is potential for destabilizing the gender order in too vigorous an intervention in the family in pursuit of domestic violence and incest offenders, too firm a support of women's rights in divorce. A telling example is the turbulence in United States politics created around abortion after the 1973 Supreme Court decision in *Roe v. Wade* effectively legalized it. "Pro-life" mobilizations have attempted to use Congress, courts, and street politics to reverse this decision, resulting in a complex and bitter series of disputes about constitutional issues as well as the ethics of abortion.⁵⁴

There are also tendencies toward crisis in the gendered accumulation process connected with the division of labor. The rising labor-force participation and rising levels of education and training of women in the postwar decades, together with the dis-employment of men that has become visible in the recession (with youth unemployment, earlier retirement, ethnic minority unemployment), have not revolutionized women's economic dependence but have certainly put pressure on existing models of family economics. They create serious difficulties for state policies that are predicated on breadwinner/housewife families, including the taxation/welfare regime and the organization of elementary education. They provide an economic basis for two movements among women that threaten the power of men: the unionization

of working-class women, and the emergence of second-wave feminism (whose main base is women in higher education and the semi-professions).

The recession of the 1970s triggered a change in the state's relation to these trends. With the end of the postwar boom, buying off diverse pressure groups by expanding and diversifying state services ceased to be possible; the state directorate is now concerned to limit costs and emphasize "efficiency." The state itself comes under attack in the shift from Keynesian to neo-conservative economics, with heavy pressure (mostly from capitalists and middle-class men) to reduce the size of government, cut taxes, and cut expenditure. With mass unemployment, policies that bring more people into the labor market have a high political cost. They are often re-configured around a conservative gender politics. In Australia, for instance, even under a Labor government in the mid 1980s, immigration was reorganized around "family reunion"; the government backed off long-day child-care commitments that would support full-time employment for women; unemployment benefits for youth were cut on the grounds that families should support them.⁵⁵

Finally there are tendencies toward crisis in the social organization of sexuality. The criminalization of men's homosexuality in the late nineteenth century not only failed to repress the sexual practice, it stimulated political mobilization of gay men in the twentieth. This suggests a long-term difficulty in maintaining a policy of selective sexual repression; yet that policy is required if the state is to sustain the dominance of heterosexual masculinity. In various ways hegemonic heterosexuality is unravelling. Among women, feminism has validated the assertion of women's sexual desire in a way almost inconceivable a couple of generations ago. Among men, the fixation of desire involved in the making of hegemonic heterosexuality cannot be contained within the conjugal family. It moves on to create an externalized and alienated sexuality, now a major feature of commercial popular culture. Ehrenreich picks up an important dimension of this in her map of the postwar "flight from commitment" by heterosexual men in the United States.⁵⁶

Feminist pressure on men's sexuality should not be underestimated. Some current research on masculinity suggests it is much wider in its reach than previously assumed, though it leads to very diverse responses. Positive responses by men include attempts to create egalitarian households and sexual ethics. Negative responses include the re-

assertion of a dominating masculinity that can be seen in one form in hysterical tendencies in media (such as the “Rambo” movies), in another form in the cult of the ruthless entrepreneur in business. The state directorate may endorse neither, but will have to position itself in relation to the crisis tendencies underlying them. In the United States at the time of this writing (1989) a serious effort is under way by the right, with the support of the Bush administration, to reimpose a primitive birth/contraception regime. The more militant anti-abortion forces have made no secret of their intention to move on, if they succeed in overturning the *Roe v. Wade* decision, to further attacks on feminist gains.⁵⁷

Appraisals

Is the state patriarchal? Yes, beyond any argument, on the evidence discussed above. It is not “essentially patriarchal” or “male”; even if one could speak of the “essence” of a social institution, this would exaggerate the internal coherence of the state. Rather the state is *historically* patriarchal, patriarchal as a matter of concrete social practices. State structures in recent history institutionalize the European equation between authority and a dominating masculinity; they are effectively controlled by men; and they operate with a massive bias towards heterosexual men’s interests.

At the same time the pattern of state patriarchy changes. In terms of the depth of oppression and the historical possibilities of resistance and transformation, a fascist regime is crucially different from a liberal one, and a liberal one from a revolutionary one. The most favorable historical circumstance for progressive sexual politics seems to be the early days of social-revolutionary regimes; but the later bureaucratization of these regimes is devastating. Next best is a liberal state with a reformist government; though reforms introduced under its aegis are vulnerable in periods of reaction.

Though the state is patriarchal, progressive gender politics cannot avoid it. The character of the state as the central institutionalization of power, and its historical trajectory in the regulation and constitution of gender relations, make it unavoidably a major arena for challenges to patriarchy. Here liberal feminism is on strong ground.

Becoming engaged in practical struggles for a share of state power

requires tactical judgments about what developments within the state provide opportunities. In the 1980s certain strategies of reform have had a higher relative pay-off than they did before. In Australia, for instance, the creation of a network of "women's services" was a feature of the 1970s, and the momentum of this kind of action has died away. Reforms that have few budgetary implications but fit in with other state strategies, such as modernizing the bureaucracy, become more prominent. Equal employment opportunity and anti-discrimination legislation have been highlighted; decriminalizing homosexuality is consistent with this.

Of course reform is not all in the same direction. The ascendance of market-oriented technocrats in central government leads to a re-shaping of higher education that emphasizes training for men (technology, engineering, business, physical sciences) and drains money from areas with a high proportion of women (welfare, social science other than economics, humanities). Thus new defensive battles have to be fought. Sometimes they are fought with marked success, as in the Australian "Tax Summit" in 1985 when a coalition of women's, welfare, and labor groups blocked a federal government shift to a more regressive taxation structure.⁵⁸

The problem is not the fact of engagement in the arena of the state, but the shape of that engagement. For liberal feminism the state has provided leverage for reform mainly through the citizenship/legitimacy nexus. But an exclusive focus on those opportunities leads to a form of politics organized around "representation" rather than mass participation, and emphasis on reforms such as "equal opportunity" programs conceived in terms of career paths. This prioritizes the interests of an educated minority of women. Working-class women do not have "careers" and are unlikely to be picked out as "representatives." The strategies of liberal feminism thus risk creating a structural split between organized feminism and working-class women, the movement's potential mass base.

A more radical form of engagement in the arena of the state will have to pay closer attention to the crisis tendencies in the gender order and the contradictions in state patriarchy discussed in the previous section. Some moments in the politics of the last twenty years do seem to embody a different form of engagement with the state, more radicalizing and participatory. One is the moment of gay liberation in the first years of the 1970s, contesting the state's repression of a major form of non-

conjugal sexuality. Mobilization occurred on a scale far beyond that of any previous homosexual politics, and for several years sustained a high level of political radicalism and cultural creativity. Another example is the evolution of a women's refuge documented by Johnson, set up by radical feminists in the mid-1970s making a successful claim for state funding. Feminist principles stressed a participatory style of management, which eventually led to a takeover by the working-class women whom the mainstream welfare state defined as "clients."⁵⁹

If such a politics can be generalized – and no one should doubt the difficulty of the task – what would be its ultimate goal? Is the state as a whole capable of being transformed; or should it, as anarchist tradition prescribes, be smashed? To put the question another way, we can conceive a patriarchal state, because we have one; is a *feminist* state conceivable?

One way of answering this is to look at the "utopias" conceived by feminist novelists. On the whole they seem to answer no. They tend to present, as an image of a society free of patriarchy, a society without the state – such as the communities in Piercy's *Woman on the Edge of Time* or Le Guin's *Always Coming Home*. Or they locate a feminist state in a world fundamentally different from our own, such as the hidden world without men in Gilman's *Herland*.⁶⁰

The problem with such a position is that it fails to deal with the sheer scale of issues in a global society requiring a decision-making and co-ordination capacity. We live in a world of five-thousand million people, not a world of villages, however high-tech they may become. Rather than moving to a smaller-scale political structure, it may be that a move to a *larger* scale is needed to achieve the goals of eco-feminism and the women's peace movement. An argument can be made that the nation-state as the unit of sovereignty is an institution of patriarchy, requiring – in a context of competition between sovereign states – militarization and internal hierarchy.

Another way of approaching the question is to start from existing state structures and ask how they would have to be re-shaped. Considering the gender regime of the liberal state outlined above, it is clear that the masculinized "core" of decision-making and enforcement would have to go, replaced by demilitarization and participatory democracy. The idea of a "representative bureaucracy" canvassed in some 1970s reform movements seems consistent with this.

However, these moves would be nugatory unless the cultural distinction that reproduces women's exclusion from state power, the distinction between public (masculinized) and private (feminized), were abolished. In one sense that seems to imply an end to the state as such, which is founded on such a distinction. In another sense it suggests an expansion of the realm to which a program of democratization would apply. The state would become, so to speak, broader and thinner.

Gay activists and many feminists are rightly concerned about increasing the existing state's powers of surveillance and control over personal life – a point on which libertarian feminists have split with anti-pornography feminists. Yet this does seem to be consistent with the tendency of all radical feminisms to apply political criteria to events and settings conventionally defined as “private”: from unequal domestic labor through marital violence and incest to date-rape and household divisions of income. A feminist state that is a structure of authority, a means by which some persons rule over others, is self-contradictory.⁶¹ A feminist state that is an arena for a radical democratization of social interaction may be a very important image of our future.

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This article is deeply influenced by Suzanne Franzway and by the late Dianne Court; it develops in new ways ideas that went into our joint book *Staking a Claim*. Both the ideas and the writing owe an immeasurable amount to Pam Benton. My concern with the state has been stimulated and sustained by the work of Sheila Shaver. Research assistance was provided by Julienne Vennard and Jan O'Leary, and at earlier stages in my work on these questions by Tim Carrigan, John Lee, Gary Dowsett, and Sandra Kessler. Typing was done by Helen Easson, Stephen and Therese Humphrey, and Marie O'Brien.

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Committee, and more recent work has been funded by Macquarie University Research Grants. Continuing support has been provided by friends in several countries, by colleagues at Macquarie University in Sydney, and at the University of Southern California (Program for the Study of Women and Men in Society) in Los Angeles, where the final draft was written. This is more than a formal acknowledgment of academic neighbors. The political position of a heterosexual man pursuing feminist and gay-liberation themes is ambiguous at best, and the personal position is liable to be stressful and exposed. The political, intellectual, and personal support I have had for work on these issues has been vital.

Notes

1. See for example the narratives in A. Coote and B. Campbell, *Sweet Freedom* (London: Pan, 1982); J. Jenson, "Ce n'est pas un hasard: The Varieties of French Feminism," forthcoming in *Contemporary France*, ed. J. Howorth and G. Ross (London: Frances Pinter, 1989); A. Curthoys, *For and Against Feminism* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988).
2. M. Mies, *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale* (London: Zed Books, 1986), 26.
3. C. MacKinnon, "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory," *Signs* 7 (1982): 515-544, "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence," *Signs* 8 (1983): 635-638. The reasons for my qualification of her claim will be apparent in following notes.
4. The nine such sketches, cited at various points below, are by McIntosh (1978), Barrett (1980), Z. Eisenstein (1981: 225-229), MacKinnon (1982), Burstyn (1983), Burton (1985), Walby (1986), Knuttila (1987), Connell (1987). I would be surprised if these were all.
5. Two recent reviews of the history of "theories of the state" make this point about gender-blindness: D. Held, "Central Perspectives on the Modern State," in *States and Societies*, ed. D. Held et al. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), 1-55; and M. Knuttila, *State Theories* (Toronto: Garamond, 1987).
6. N. Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes* (London: NLB and Sheen & Ward, 1973); V. Burstyn, "Masculine Dominance and the State," *Socialist Register* 1983: 45-89; T. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); A. Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985); G. Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978).
7. Poggi, *Development*; C. Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); D. Kearns, "A Theory of Justice and Love: Rawls on the Family," in *Australian Women and the Political System*, ed. M. Simms, (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1984), 191-203.
8. For these general features of Marxist theory see the classic argument in C. Delphy, *Close to Home* (London: Hutchinson, 1984); for a striking illustration, the treatment of patriarchy in J. Mitchell, *Psychoanalysis and Feminism* (New York: Vintage, 1975).

9. As argued by E. Wilson, "Women, the 'Community' and the Family," in *Community Care*, ed. A. Walker (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), and M. Mowbray and L. Bryson, "Women Really Care," *Australian Journal of Social Issues* 19 (1984): 261–272. It is difficult to find an intellectually substantial "new right" theorization of the state, most is rhetoric. A. de Jasay, *The State* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985) is an interesting book with some flavor of neo-conservatism; it ignores gender.
10. M. Wollstonecraft, *Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975 [1792]); J. S. Mill, "The Subjection of Women," in *Three Essays* (London: Oxford University Press, 1912 [1869]).
11. A particularly clear exposition of the machinery of anti-discrimination law is C. Ronalds, *Affirmative Action and Sex Discrimination* (Sydney: Pluto, 1987); recent documentation of recruitment of women is in C. F. Epstein, *Deceptive Distinctions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), ch. 8. Quotation from M. Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, new edition (London: Fontana, 1988), 116.
12. For the problems of sex role theory see A. R. Edwards, "Sex Roles: A Problem for Sociology and for Women," *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology* 19 (1983): 385–412; J. Stacey and B. Thorne, "The Missing Feminist Revolution in Sociology," *Social Problems* 32 (1985): 301–316; R. W. Connell, *Gender and Power* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 47–54. For amazing scenes at West Point see B. Friedan, *The Second Stage* (New York: Summit, 1982) ch. 5; and on truly womanly missions, Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, 117–118. For more radical views see J. Stiehm, editor, *Women and Men's Wars* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1983).
13. Z. Eisenstein, *The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1986 [1981]).
14. An excellent recent review of the concept is B. J. Fox, "Conceptualizing 'patriarchy,'" *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 25 (1988): 163–182.
15. For different versions of this modelling see Delphy, *Close to Home*, and S. Firestone, *The Dialectic of Sex* (London: Paladin, 1971); for the persistence of the idea of sex class, see Z. Eisenstein, *Radical Future*, passim.
16. A clear illustration of class dynamics being presupposed is E. Wilson's important study *Women and the Welfare State* (London: Tavistock, 1977), Burstyn, "Masculine Dominance," provides a comprehensive critique of such logic. For variations on the "dual systems" idea, see R. W. Connell, *Which Way is Up?* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1983); J. Ursel, "The State and the Maintenance of Patriarchy," in *Family, Economy and the State*, ed. J. Dickinson and B. Russell (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1986), 150–191; and S. Walby, *Patriarchy at Work* (Cambridge: Polity, 1986).
17. M. McIntosh, "The State and the Oppression of Women," in *Feminism and Materialism*, ed. A. Kuhn and A.-M. Wolpe (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), 254–289.
18. C. Burton, *Subordination* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1985).
19. J. Scutt, "United or Divided? Women 'Inside' and 'Outside' Against Male Law-makers in Australia," *Women's Studies International Forum* 8 (1985): 15–23; M. Daly, *Gyn/Ecology* (Boston: Beacon, 1978); Stiehm, *Women and Men's Wars*.
20. An excellent account of state controls over homosexuality is G. Kinsman, *The Regulation of Desire* (Montréal: Black Rose Books, 1987). Police homophobia in three countries is documented in S. A. Rosen, "Police Harrassment of Homosexual Women and Men in New York City 1960–1980", *Columbia Human Rights Law Review* 12 (1980–81): 159–190; G. W. Smith, "Policing the Gay Community," *International Journal of the Sociology of Law* 16 (1988): 163–183; D. Thompson, *Flaws in the Social Fabric* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1985). For a notable attempt to

- theorize the state see D. Fernbach, *The Spiral Path* (London: Gay Men's Press, 1981).
21. The state is seen as an agent for men by Burstyn, "Masculine Dominance"; by M. Barrett, *Women's Oppression Today* (London: Verso, 1980), ch. 7; more ambiguously by Scutt "United or Divided?" For the state as patriarch see Mies, *Patriarchy and Accumulation*, and S. Presley and L. Kinsky, "Government is Women's Enemy," in *Freedom, Feminism and the State*, ed. W. McElroy (Washington: CATO Institute, 1982), 77-83.
 22. MacKinnon, "Feminist Jurisprudence."
 23. C. Burton, *Women's Worth* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1987); J. Grant and P. Tancred-Sheriff, "A Feminist Perspective on State Bureaucracy," paper to conference on L'Etat Contemporain, Lennoxville, 1986.
 24. Compare G. Clark and M. Dear, *State Apparatus* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1984). An institutional approach to the state is sketched in Connell, *Gender and Power*, 125-132, and pursued in much greater depth in S. Franzway, D. Court, and R. W. Connell, *Staking a Claim* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989).
 25. S. Magarey, *Unbridling the Tongues of Women* (Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1985); L. Gordon, *Heroes of their Own Lives* (New York: Viking, 1988); J. Weeks, *Coming Out* (London: Quartet, 1977); Kinsman, *Regulation*.
 26. A representative text is *Australian Women and the Political System*, ed. M. Simms (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1984); cf. Epstein, *Deceptive Distinctions*.
 27. Examples of this genre are *Women, Social Welfare and the State*, ed. C. V. Baldock and B. Cass (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1983) and S. Atkins and B. Hoggett, *Women and the Law* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984). Cited: C. Smart, *The Ties that Bind* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984); M. Ruggie, *The State and Working Women* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
 28. Presley and Kinsky, "Government"; Walby, *Patriarchy*, 57.
 29. For the "monopoly" concept, deriving from Weber, see Knuttila, *State Theories*. For documentation of the scale of domestic violence, R. E. Dobash and R. P. Dobash, *Violence Against Wives* (New York: Free Press, 1979).
 30. On the problem of poststructuralism see C. Weedon, *Feminist Practice and Post-Structuralist Theory* (New York: Blackwell, 1987) and J. Flax, "Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory," *Signs* 12 (1987): 621-643. On the question of origins, see Delphy, *Close to Home*, 199-206; Fernbach, *Spiral Path*; and above all G. Lerner, *The Creation of Patriarchy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), which places the issue on the terrain of genuine historiography. S. Coontz and P. Henderson, editors, *Women's Work, Men's Property* (London: Verso, 1986) is disappointing as prehistory but usefully highlights the sexual division of labor.
 31. This dimension has been spectacularly absent from both Marxist theories of accumulation and from world-systems theory; though it is now beginning to be added back in by scholars such as Mies.
 32. The history sketched in these two paragraphs is still mostly fragmented or unwritten; but I should draw attention to the pioneering work on the colonial frontier by J. Phillips, "Mummy's Boys: Pakeha Men and Male Culture in New Zealand," in *Women in New Zealand Society*, ed. P. Burkle and B. Hughes (Allen & Unwin, 1980), 217-243. K. Theweleit, *Male Fantasies* (University of Minnesota Press, 1987), illuminates the origin of fascism.
 33. E. Zaretsky, *Capitalism, the Family and Personal Life* (London: Pluto, 1976); L. Davidoff and C. Hall, *Family Fortunes* (London: Hutchinson, 1987); Mill, "Subjection."

34. The procedure of structural inventory is defined and illustrated in Connell, *Gender*, 91ff., 119ff.
35. Dramatic statistics on sex and hierarchy are in Director of Equal Opportunity in Public Employment, Office of, *Equal Employment Opportunity Management Plan Resurvey 1985: Preliminary Report* (Sydney: New South Wales Government, 1985). Sources for other details are cited in Connell, *Gender*, ch. 1; Epstein, *Distinctions*, chs. 7, 8; C. O'Donnell and P. Hall, *Getting Equal* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988).
36. Grant and Tancred-Sheriff, "State Bureaucracy." P. Patton and R. Poole, editors, *War/Masculinity* (Sydney: Intervention, 1985) have material on military masculinity; infrastructural masculinity is celebrated in P. Adam-Smith, *Folklore of the Australian Railwaymen* (Adelaide: Rigby, 1969). H. Eisenstein, "The Gender of Bureaucracy: Reflections on Feminism and the State," in *Women, Social Science and Public Policy*, ed. J. Goodnow and C. Pateman (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1985), 104-115, is a remarkable "insider" account; see also L. Lynch, "Bureaucratic Feminisms: Bossism and Beige Suits," *Refractory Girl* 27 (1984): 38-44.
37. For "taxonomy" see Clark and Dear, *State Apparatus*. For "voluntary" sector see S. Shaver, "The Non-Government State," paper to Conference on Social Policy in the 1980s, Canberra 1982.
38. K. E. Ferguson, *The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy* (Philadelphia: Temple University, 1984); for a useful compilation of feminist thinking on scientific rationality, see S. Harding and M. Hintikka, editors, *Discovering Reality* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983).
39. D. Deacon, *Managing Gender* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1989). The relevance of rationalization is particularly clear at the international level of state structure, in intergovernmental organizations like the OECD: see Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Women and Employment* (Paris: OECD, 1980).
40. See Franzway, Court, and Connell, *Staking a Claim*; on a specific policy area, D. Brennan and C. O'Donnell, *Caring for Australia's Children* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986).
41. The classics on fascism are E. Fromm, *Fear of Freedom* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1942) and T. W. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswick, D. Levinson, and R. N. Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper, 1950). For newer work see Theweleit, *Male Fantasies*, and M.-A. Macciocchi, "Female Sexuality in Fascist Ideology," *Feminist Review* 1 (1979): 67-82. A. R. Hochschild, *The Managed Heart* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983) treats a related problem in the commercial sector; problems of authority are more in focus in R. Pringle, *Secretaries Talk* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989). Quotation from Mies, *Accumulation*, 199.
42. These themes are comprehensively documented for Britain: see Walby, *Patriarchy*; McIntosh, "State"; Wilson, *Welfare State*; Ruggie, *Working Women*.
43. See for instance Gordon, *Heroes*; Walby, *Patriarchy*; V. Johnson, *The Last Resort* (Melbourne: Penguin, 1980). A. R. Edwards, *Regulation and Repression* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1988) is a useful survey of the regulatory apparatuses and their impact.
44. J. Donzelot, *The Policing of Families* (New York: Pantheon, 1979); S. Shaver, "Sex and Money in the Welfare State," in *Women, Social Welfare and the State in Australia*, ed. C. Baldock and B. Cass (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1983), 146-163; R. Sidel, *Women and Children Last* (New York: Penguin, 1987).
45. "Family Secrets: Child Sexual Abuse," Special Issue of *Feminist Review* 28 (1988).

- For the strange story of Australian pro-natalism see R. Pringle, "Octavius Beale and the Ideology of the Birth-Rate," *Refractory Girl* 3 (1973), 19–27, and N. Hicks, *This Sin and Scandal* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1978). For the Labouchère amendment see J. Weeks, *Coming Out* (London: Quartet, 1977), ch. 1; for the Nazis, R. Plant, *The Pink Triangle* (New York: Holt, 1986).
46. A fascinating case study of femininity and the military is C. L. Williams, *Gender Differences at Work* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). I have sketched the relations among military masculinities in R. W. Connell, "Masculinity, Violence and War," in *Men's Lives*, ed. M. Kimmel and M. Messner (New York: Macmillan, 1989), 194–200. Zhukov's style is well shown in his memoirs, *Marshal Zhukov's Greatest Battles* (London: Sphere, 1971).
 47. J. R. Walkowitz, *Prostitution and Victorian Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Weeks, *Coming Out*, and also his *Sexuality and its Discontents* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985).
 48. This perception of the colonial state is based on discussions with Ann Stoler of the University of Wisconsin-Madison. On conceptual developments in the metropole see Pateman, *Sexual Contract*. On practical developments, E. Stoper and E. Boneparth, "Divorce and the Transition to the Single-Parent Family," in *Women, Power and Policy*, 2nd edition, ed. E. Boneparth and E. Stoper (New York: Pergamon, 1988), 206–218.
 49. The story is told by D. Irving, *The Destruction of Dresden* (Elmfield: Morley, 1974); for an astonishing account of a survivor's experience on the ground see K. Vonnegut, *Slaughterhouse-Five* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1969).
 50. S. Franzway, "With Problems of their Own: Femocrats and the Welfare State," *Australian Feminist Studies* 3 (1986): 45–57.
 51. Parts of this story can be found in C. A. Tripp, *The Homosexual Matrix* (London: Quartet, 1977); D. Altman, *The Homosexualization of America, the Americanization of the Homosexual* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982); J. D'Emilio, *Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); G. W. Dowsett "You'll Never Forget the Feeling of Safe Sex! AIDS Prevention Strategies for Gay and Bisexual Men in Sydney, Australia," paper presented to WHO Workshop on AIDS Health Promotion Activities Directed Towards Gay and Bisexual Men, Geneva, 29–31 May 1989. A compendium of gay history with a clear perception of the significance of the state is D. F. Greenberg, *The Construction of Homosexuality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
 52. The most perceptive account of "men's rights" politics is still J. Interrante, "Dancing Along the Precipice: The Men's Movement in the '80's," *Radical America* 15/5 (1981): 53–71.
 53. This concept of crisis is derived from J. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (London: Heinemann, 1976); for crisis in gender relations see Connell, *Gender*, chs. 7, 12.
 54. The turbulence, well documented for the early 1980s by M. Segers, "Can Congress Settle the Abortion Issue?" *Hastings Center Report* June 1982: 20–28, reached a new peak in 1989. For the larger intentions of an anti-abortion campaigner see "Soldier in a 'Holy War' on Abortion," *Los Angeles Times* 17 March 1989.
 55. Compare Sidel, *Women and Children Last*, "Future Insecure: Women, Feminism and the Third Term," *Feminist Review* 27 (1987); the Australian developments mentioned can be traced in successive issues of *Australian Society*.
 56. Kinsman, *Regulation*; J. Weeks, *Sexuality* (London: Horwood and Tavistock, 1986); B. Ehrenreich, *The Hearts of Men* (London: Pluto, 1983).
 57. Positive responses to feminism are documented in some items in Kimmel and

- Messner, *Men's Lives*. For an astonishing collection of literary effusions on this theme see *Men in Feminism*, ed. A. Jardine and P. Smith (New York: Methuen, 1987). The anti-feminist intention of anti-abortion forces is clear in media statements from "Operation Rescue" in the United States in March-April 1989.
58. See Franzway, Court and Connell, *Staking a Claim*; O'Donnell and Hall, *Getting Equal*.
 59. A. Walter, editor, *Come Together: The Years of Gay Liberation* (London: Gay Men's Press, 1980); Johnson, *Last Resort*.
 60. M. Piercy, *Woman on the Edge of Time* (New York: Knopf, 1976); U. K. Le Guin, *Always Coming Home* (Bantam, 1987); C. P. Gilman, *Herland* (London: Women's Press, 1979 [1915]).
 61. The libertarian feminist position on censorship, much less widely publicized than the anti-pornography position, is argued and illustrated in K. Ellis et al., *Caught Looking* (Seattle: Real Comet Press, 1988). A curious illustration of a well-known male novelist's inability to conceive feminist politics as anything but an inversion of men's dominance of women is the anti-utopia in T. Berger, *Regiment of Women* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1973). Not incidentally, "Female Domination" (i.e., over men) is a well-defined category of pornography, and has been since the nineteenth century.