5   The rise of angry white men

Resisting populist masculinity and the backlash against gender equality

Bob Pease

Introduction

This chapter examines the gendered dimensions of populism and how it is expressed in the grievances of angry white working-class and middle-class men. Such men constitute one of the main expressions of contemporary populism's effort to roll back the gains and accomplishments of feminism and other emancipatory social movements such as anti-racist, LGBTI and climate change movements (Johnson, 2017; Pascoe, 2017; Grant & MacDonald, 2018; Roose, 2018). To critically analyse populism, it is thus important to interrogate white masculinity and the sense of entitlement associated with it. While many class-privileged white men *feel* excluded and aggrieved in spite of their privileges, they fail to recognise how many of the disadvantages they experience are the conditions of the very advantages they receive. Other working-class white men experience a sense of aggrieved or thwarted entitlement resulting from economic restructuring and the crisis of global capitalism. Rather than acknowledging their experiences as an outcome of neoliberalism, they face a crisis in their masculinity and feel a sense of powerlessness manifested as an experience of emasculation and impotence. Populist rhetoric claims to 'make men great again' (Pascoe, 2017) in opposition to movements for racial and gender equality and is thus grounded in an ideology of masculinism and hegemonic masculinity. Social workers need to understand why so many white men feel aggrieved by what they experience as the loss of gendered and racial entitlement (Kimmel, 2013) and they need to develop strategies of active resistance against rising white male populism.

Gendering populism

White men voted for Trump disproportionately to other groups (Gelfer, 2016). Given Trump's misogynistic and patriarchal hyper-masculinity, it is unclear whether white men supported and endorsed his misogyny and sexism, or whether it was simply not an issue for them. His misogynist and sexist views and practices obviously did not deter them, and some would say that perhaps such views were even seen as a positive drawcard (Francis, 2018).

Recent research (Cox et al., 2017) shows that economic hardship itself was not a significant factor in why working-class and middle-class voters were more likely to vote for Trump. Rather, it was fears of cultural displacement, support for deporting immigrants living in the country illegally, economic fatalism and support for traditional gender roles that were key factors, all of which were exacerbated by gender differences.

All male populist leaders, from Trump in the United States to Duterte in the Philippines, are renowned for their misogyny and sexism as well as their hyper-masculine style of leadership. Such a leadership style encourages aggression and even violence against one's political opponents, emphasises militarisation as a solution to international conflict and promotes the subordination of women and pre-1970s family values (Tanyag, 2018).

There is considerable empirical validation of the connections between right-wing populism and masculinity (Spierings et al., 2015; Schmitz & Kazyak, 2016; Francis, 2018; Grant & Macdonald, 2018; Norocel et al., 2018; Stiernstedt & Jakobsson, 2018). Most populist parties promote patriarchal values and resist feminist ideals of gender equality. While men are the main promoters of this anti-feminism, the masculinist values underpinning the discourse are also espoused by some women. Right-wing women also advocate a return to a gendered division of labour with men in power in the public world and women confined to domestic responsibilities in the home (Geva, 2018; Grant & MacDonald, 2018).

The roots of populism are varied and contested. Some commentators claim that racism and ethnic demographic change is a defining aspect of right-wing populism, while others argue that it is a backlash against neo-conservative politics and globalisation. The aim of this chapter is not to contest these alternative arguments for the rise of populism, but rather to gender them and to explore the links to anti-feminist male backlash. As some commentators point out, some of the historical roots of right-wing populism can be found in the men's rights backlash against feminism (Nicholas & Agius, 2018; Stiernstedt & Jakobsson, 2018).

Fathers' rights groups and men's rights groups have been part of the organised backlash against feminism and gender equality for many years. They have taken the form of resistance to perceived challenges to existing hierarchies of power and have espoused a commitment to return to an idealised past in which structural inequality was normalised (Flood et al., 2018).

Such groups can be seen as the forerunner of elements of right-wing populist politics. They share the same anger and rage at women and what they perceive as 'female-biased' institutions such as the Family Court, which allegedly discriminate against men. They embody the same narrow construction of masculinity that is unable to come to terms with social changes in gender roles. While some views of these groups were deeply misogynist and chauvinistic expressions of angry men, more recently some of these elements of backlash have become more mainstream, just as populism has attracted so many people.

The alt right also wants to return to an era when white men's dominance was more legitimated (Nicholas & Agius, 2018). Although the alt right is not specifically regarded as a men's rights organisation, it is informed by the same sense of aggrieved entitlement felt by anti-feminist men's groups. There are thus clear links between the alternative right, anti-feminism and white men's sense of victimhood (Stiernstedt & Jakobsson, 2018). Johnson, (2017) refers to these men's experiences of powerlessness as 'the art of masculine victimhood', whereby they claim victimisation in spite of their inherited male and white privilege.

Populist masculinity as aggrieved entitlement

Trump's popularity and support in the US elections is linked to the anger of white men (Norocel et al., 2018). Understanding masculinity, and how it is reproduced in men, illuminates why men are more likely to become involved in right-wing populist movements. The alt right is consumed by an experienced loss of traditional manhood, framed by these men as emasculation (Grant & MacDonald, 2018). Kimmel (2013) refers to this as 'aggrieved entitlement', where masculinity is more an entitlement to power than an experience of power. Many men believe that they are entitled to power, and if they do not have the opportunity to realise that entitlement, they feel thwarted and emasculated.

This sense of entitlement can no longer be guaranteed and it is sometimes unlikely to be achieved. These white men thus direct their anger at women and immigrants, partly because they perceive them as taking jobs which they believe belong to them. Because these men adhere to traditional forms of masculinity, the sense of being aggrieved threatens their sense of what it is to be a man. They want to reclaim and restore a more traditional and patriarchal form of manhood. It is such aggrieved entitlement that is the basis of men's rights advocacy and backlash responses to feminism. In recent years, this has taken the form of men's responses to what they experience as their thwarted sexual entitlement to women's bodies, which has been challenged by the #metoo movement.

Right-wing populism appeals to men's emotions, especially those of anger and rage. Kimmel, (2013) thus suggests that men's identity is the main motivation to explain why men are attracted to right-wing movements. Such men endeavour to embody a brutish form of aggressive and violent masculinity, which they associate with being a 'real man' in contrast to other men who are perceived as being too soft or feminine. Men are promised that by joining such groups they will be able to regain their sense of masculine entitlement by positioning themselves against others they perceive as the cause of the troubles they face. In many ways, such men's masculinity is quite frail and requiring constant re-affirmation.

Some men feel that their very right to be men is attacked by feminists (Allan, 2016). Many men believe that they are 'victims' of feminism because some of their privileges and entitlements have been challenged and other

advantages have been eroded by broader political and economic transformations. Such subjective experiences of some men also co-exist with continuing male privilege at many levels throughout society. However, at a psychic level, these men feel that their masculinity and their manhood are at stake. Allan (2016) suggests that such men use feelings not to express genuine fears and anxieties, but rather to manufacture a sense of crisis and to frame themselves as 'victims' of feminism.

Restoring traditional manhood

Alt right-wing populist movements throughout the world seek to restore a form of masculinity that was more valued in the past. Narrow forms of masculinity which emphasise sexual conquest, aggression and dominance are emphasised in the alternative right. While the alternative right makes an appeal to a particular way of being a man, there is a tension in their expression of masculinity. On the one hand, such men present strength, aggression and dominance, while on the other hand, they seek to cover up insecurity about their masculinity in the face of challenges to their social standing (Grant & MacDonald, 2018).

The dominant form of masculinity portrayed by Trump and his followers is not only aimed at dominance over women, it also aims to marginalise other men as weak, feminine and un-masculine (Pascoe, 2017). Trump has turned the putting down of men he disagrees with as 'losers' and 'weak' into an art form. He portrays himself as a fighter and a protector, moulding himself into a particular expression of successful masculinity (Messerschmidt & Bridges, 2017). Trump even went so far as to emphasise his penis size in a presidential televised debate. Such masculinist sexual imagery seems to resonate with the feelings of many men who feel disempowered by what they perceive as feminist excesses (Page & Dittmer, 2016). The promise to 'make America great again' was interpreted by many men as to 'make men great again' (Pascoe, 2017) by rolling back gender equality initiatives and what was perceived as a 'political correctness' and 'do-gooder' mentality. Since Trump has been in power (less than three years at the time of writing), he has appointed conservative male judges to the Supreme Court, cut funding to reproductive health services, rolled back legislation that forces companies to disclose salaries by gender and supported cuts to maternity leave (Olson, 2019).

Masculinity, class and economic restructuring under neoliberalism

The scholarship on working-class masculinities is useful in understanding how class-based social divisions between men fuels some men's anger and rage. Working-class masculinity emphasises embodiment, physical prowess and strength. The extensive literature on masculinity and work makes it clear that stable, well-paid and fulfilling employment is the main pathway to traditional manhood through being able to provide economically for a family. The

workplace is a central site, especially for working-class men, to form and nurture masculine culture. For many men, the shopfloor is one of the last bastions of male culture and this is why the entry of women to male-dominated workplaces is so strongly resisted. The dehumanising and degrading of women who would enter male workplaces helps men to preserve some sense of masculinity. Men in general, and working-class men in particular, prefer all-male workplace cultures in which to rail about the wider world in particularly masculinist ways (Roberts, 2012). However, with the massive transformation of manufacturing and the rise in mass production, many of the skills of tradesmen are made redundant. This poses a fundamental challenge to working-class men's identities (Meyer, 2016).

Many working-class men (and working-class women) have insecure and meaningless work. They constitute what Standing (2011) refers to as 'the precariat', where insecure income and insecurity about their work govern their lives. Such men and women experience anger in their frustration at not achieving meaningful work, and anomie through alienation and the insecurity of their work. Standing has not, however, identified the gendered dimensions of these experiences and how masculinity shapes and exaggerates this disengagement from the work process. This gendering of the precariat illuminates how these men are vulnerable to being recruited to reactionary politics.

Vandelo and Bosson (2013) use the language of 'precarious manhood' to identify the stress and anxiety men experience over their gender status. This notion explains why challenges to traditional masculinity and manhood causes distress to men, and also why they will often use risk-taking, aggression and violence to re-establish their masculinity. If men are not doing the kind of physically demanding work that affirms their masculinity, they are likely to be particularly sensitive to other challenges to their status as men (Ward, 2012).

White working-class men's experience of disempowerment is at odds with their internalised sense of masculinity. Many working-class men in the new economy feel a lack of respect and honour and thus are vulnerable to right-wing populism, which promises a new world order that will restore them to a position of authority and power. Male politicians like Trump who project forms of hyper-masculinity are attractive to such men (Roose, 2017).

In the context of white men's insecurity about their masculinity and their status, the brutish and aggressive masculine style embodied by Trump, who ridicules what he sees as the 'political correctness' and softness of his opponents, fosters identification and support. Trump's denigration of women and non-white people connects with the sense of disenfranchisement that many white working-class men feel in the current political context (Hustvedt, 2017).

Many working-class communities have been decimated by economic restructuring which has resulted in large-scale job losses and unemployment. However, rather than directing their antagonism towards those creating the economic hardship, they focus their anger on 'foreigners' and women, who they perceive as taking 'their' jobs.

It is thus important to understand white men's anger in the context of increasing economic inequality that impacts not only on working-class white

men but middle-class white men as well. Disaffected working-class men, who have been rejected by the new economy, express anger and rage at their plight. Such men are no longer able to give expression to traditional masculine traits such physical strength and toughness, which was a hallmark of manual labour. White-collar men are also experiencing greater work insecurity as more women enter the professional workforce (Roose, 2018).

Messner (2016) locates white men's backlash in the context of social, cultural and economic changes occurring in Western societies. He points to a series of interrelated social changes that he argues create the possibilities for backlash responses. Such changes include the emergence of a post-feminist sensibility among many men and women, the institutionalisation and professionalisation of feminism, and the rise of neoliberalism and the primacy given to the economic market. Notwithstanding the significance of social media organising and the entry of feminists into the policy-making machinery of government, traditional social movement organising by women in civil society has weakened. This decline in social movement feminism has also paralleled a sense that feminism is no longer needed, as women have supposedly attained equal rights with men.

While some post-feminists acknowledge the accomplishments of feminism, the concerns about gender inequality and women's oppression are seen to belong to the past, and consequently feminist activism is no longer required because it has allegedly achieved its aims (Messner, 2016). Post-feminist discourse makes it more difficult to identify sexism and forms of resistance to gender equality. Because women are represented more in public life (although far from enjoying equal status with men), liberal feminist notions have become more internalised in popular culture. Feminist energies are focused on more limited areas of social reform and are less likely to be grounded in feminist social movement politics and more radical changes in gender relations. Such post-feminism sits comfortably within the current neoliberal focus on individual rights. In this context, men's rights are framed within the language of equality. Anti-feminism in the form of resistance and backlash is thus more implicit and consequently more likely to gain greater community acceptance (Messner, 2016). In Australia, we have witnessed conservative politicians taking up these framings, while their commitment to neoliberal policies is responsible for many of the issues men are facing.

A 'crisis of masculinity': what crisis?

Schmitz and Kazyak (2016) locate backlash responses by men in the context of the so-called 'crisis of masculinity', which alt-right groups seek to address. It is posited that men are in crisis due to lack of support and negative impacts on them resulting from changes in work, education and family.

The 'crisis of masculinity' discourse has been a feature of discussion in masculinity studies for some time (Horrocks, 1994; Coyle & Morgan-Sykes, 1998; McDowell, 2000). Lingard, (1998), in the context of the 'what about the

boys?' backlash in education, argues that attempts to make out that men are the 'new disadvantaged' and that masculinity is under siege and in crisis as a result of feminist reforms, is a form of recuperative masculinity politics.

Bennett and Fox (2014) suggest that men use the refrain of 'what about the men?' to derail and silence conversations about misogyny and sexism. Many commentators report on the ways in which men feel under threat from feminism (Lingard, 1998; Kimmel, 2013; Meer, 2013), as men draw attention to their health problems and longevity, and what they see as unfair divorce and custody arrangements and claims of violence by women. Saatchi and Saatchi (2013), for example, argue that Australian men are under attack from over-empowered women who are undermining masculinity, and as a result face mental and physical illness, violence, suicide and relationship breakdown.

Blais and Dupuis-Deri (2012) point out that essentialist beliefs based on evolutionary psychology lead to the view that men's traditional roles have been destabilised by feminism.

Masculinists and mythopoetic men's advocates seek to restore what they see as a natural form of masculinity rooted in myths and sacred symbols (Bly, 1990). Such approaches to masculinity are premised upon essentialist and natural notions of the masculine and the feminine. These men see themselves as victims of women in general and feminism in particular. Framing men and masculinity in crisis as a response to feminism leads to anti-feminism and the promotion of traditional masculinity (Blais & Dupuis-Deri 2012).

The issue of male suicide is often used to 'prove' the claim that men and masculinity are in crisis (Jordan & Chandler 2018). Issues facing males in relation to boys' schooling, men's crime, absent fatherhood and health issues are all claimed to be symptoms of a crisis in masculinity. For some, male heterosexuality itself is under threat, as noted by Garcia-Favaro and Gil (2016), where men feel 'emasculated'. Feminists are characterised as 'extremists' who have 'gone too far' and demonised men. Jordan Peterson (2018). who has risen to popstar-like fame in recent years for his opposition to gender neutral pronouns and his critique of feminism, is a recent proponent of the notion of men in crisis.

While most advocacy of men and masculinity in crisis is advanced by anti-feminist critics and men's rights activists, some feminist commentators and pro-feminist supporters have also used this notion (Field, 2017). Jordan and Chandler, (2018), for example, identify both conservative and progressive arguments in support of the notion of masculinity in crisis. Conservative proponents of the crisis narrative regard these issues as an outcome of threats to traditional forms of masculinity and manhood. For them, the solution is to return more fully to traditional gender roles and norms. They do not see any negative consequences of traditional masculinity for women or men. Progressive proponents, however, use the notion of men in crisis to argue that it results from traditional gender norms that also harm men; so instead of returning to traditional gender roles, they need to be transformed, although this transformation is still to occur within the framework of masculinity rather than beyond it.

In the wider public discourse, the language of 'toxic masculinity' is used to describe such brutish male behaviour. Proponents of this concept are at great pains to emphasise that they are not criticising masculinity per se but only this particularly narrow version of it, while anti-feminist men perceive this language as a 'broad brush' condemnation of masculinity and all men. In this context, it is difficult to problematise the notion of masculinity itself because it leads to being positioned as 'anti-male'.

Right-wing populism is attractive to men who are experiencing this so-called 'crisis of masculinity'. Men's rights advocates and anti-feminist activists draw attention to men's insecurity about their manhood in response to what are perceived as anti-male sentiments among feminists' critique of patriarchy, male violence and 'toxic masculinity' (Schmitz & Kazyak, 2016). Men's rights and populist movements promise to resolve this 'crisis of masculinity' by affirming men's anger and resentment towards feminism and proponents of gender equality and social justice.

When masculinity is threatened, it can lead to violence both in the private realm of the family, as in men's domestic violence, but also in the public world where political and collective violence is enacted. Populist defenders of hate speech and supporters of Trump's 'locker room talk' argue that these are 'just words' and are unrelated to violence or discriminatory practices. In contrast, feminist scholars interpret such 'locker room' talk as a form of symbolic violence which constitutes a rape culture that encourages sexual violence against women (Pascoe, 2017). We see such violence reflected in cyber bullying, and on-line trolling in what is called the 'manosphere', a net-work of men's groups and organisations that are focused on men's rights, including 'incels' and 'red pill' activists (Zuckerman, 2018).

Rage and anger are directed at asylum seekers, immigrants and women because their presence seems to contribute to further marginalisation of white men's concerns. In a context of increasing unemployment, increased insecurity of work and low wages, these men are vulnerable to right-wing political movements which promise great economic prosperity and a return to traditional gender roles.

How should social work respond to white male populism?

As many social work writers have noted, populism challenges the principles of social work that are associated with human rights and social justice (Fazzi, 2015; Ife, 2018; Noble & Ottmann, 2018). Populism fuels the issues that social workers are required to address: backlash to gender equality and multiculturalism, terrorism, resentment and anger associated with increasing economic inequality and work insecurity, and class-based sexism and racism.

Social work educators need to prepare students to critically engage with populism, as it arises in their practice, in the wider public arena and in their own professional associations and networks. Social work clients may express populist attitudes, and the profession itself may be pressured to accommodate to populist policy directions.

Social workers in working-class communities need to understand the consequences of neoliberalism, globalisation and economic restructuring for the lives of white working-class men. So when such men express anger and rage about 'others' who are 'taking their jobs', they can be encouraged to see the wider context of the social forces at play. They need to develop some form of sociological framing of their plight so as not to blame others, who are also suffering, for their own loss of privilege and social status (Dominelli, 2016).

Ironically, there is little attention given in social work education to dealing with class, whether it be in the forms of class analysis, professional class privilege or working-class subjectivities and identities (Hosken, 2016), let alone the intersection of masculinity with working-class experiences. Consequently, social workers seem ill-equipped to deal with the challenges facing working-class male clients who experience distress in relation to their lost identities and privileges and who enact aggression and violence as ways of trying to restore some form of dominant masculinity.

As many commentators in the literature note (Kaye & Tolmie, 1998; Salter, 2013; Messner, 2016), it is important to acknowledge that many men face real problems. We should acknowledge the pain and distress of these men, while refuting their distorted analysis of the causes of their distress. As noted earlier, such problems are primarily a result of globalisation, economic restructuring and unintended effects of patriarchy on men. Thus, the problems facing these men need to be reframed to address this form of backlash and the populism that fuels it.

When white men articulate their claims in the language of rights and equality, they need to be challenged about the sense of entitlement that drives them. This sense of entitlement can also be used to understand fathers' rights groups' criticisms of family law and backlash responses to challenging men's violence against women (Kimmel, 2013). Some policy and advocacy responses to this loss of power argue that men need to be restored to their 'proper' place as breadwinner and head of the household, and only then can they be 'real men' again. However, strategies to address men's anger must focus on ways to encourage men to abandon their sense of male entitlement and to untangle themselves from traditional forms of masculinity on which that sense of masculine entitlement is based. Men must be encouraged to see the costs of having to continually 'prove' masculinity and live up to unrealistic expectations of manhood. This means challenging male peer cultures that validate traditional forms of masculinity. It also means locating men's experiences in the context of the deindustrialisation and the elimination of manufacturing jobs that has occurred (Messner, 2016).

Counter-hegemonic educational work with men in relation to men's violence against women may provide some guidelines for engaging men more generally in understanding the social context of their lives (Pease, 2017). If angry white working-class men are to be a target group, social workers will need to understand the gendered and class-based dimensions of populism, and why it is attractive to so many white men.

While it is important that social workers engage publicly to counter populist ideologies in the public media and to provide alternative views of controversial social and political issues, direct dialogue with some proponents of populism may not be fruitful. At one level, it is relatively easy to demonstrate the false premises of many populist claims; however, it will not negate men's feelings. Coston and Kimmel (2013) argue that it is important to acknowledge the pain and anguish men feel. Otherwise, political arguments about the real causes of their situation will not be heard.

Some commentators (Gelfer, 2016; Ife, 2018) note that one cannot oppose populism by rational argument and facts. This is because populism is fuelled by feelings that are often not connected to reality. Also, many such proponents are so deeply embedded ideologically that they are not open to a constructive dialogue about alternative ideas. Those of us who have attempted to engage in dialogue with men's rights activists know how frustrating such encounters are. Such men use rhetorical tricks to derail views they do not agree with (Zuckerman, 2018).

The populist backlash against feminism, however, involves a wide range of different political stances. Not all supporters of populism would embrace the more misogynist and violent expressions of anti-feminism held by men's rights and alt-right groups. Populist masculinity is not homogeneous. Rather, there is a range of populist masculinities divided by class, culture and power (Gelfer, 2016).

Some of the forms of loss that white working-class men experience in relation to white male privilege should not be lamented. However, the loss of wages due to economic restructuring resulting from transformations of global capitalism should not be dismissed. The fracturing of men's identities in response to economic changes needs to be engaged with, but in ways that go beyond the crisis of masculinity discourse. In engaging with institutionalised men's privilege and power, we must remember that all men do not share the benefits of patriarchy equally (Connell, 1987). Thus, a focus on gender dominance to the exclusion of class will not address the subjective experiences of men who are marginalised by the global economy.

There is a danger in acknowledging the validity of some experiences of men within populism, that it may normalise and legitimate some populist concerns. However, it is important to recognise that those at the bottom of the class hierarchy within populism do have different class interests than those at the top. Thus, some forms of alliance could be made with more progressive class-based movements (Gelfer, 2016).

It is important in framing resistance to male populism and men's violence that counter-responses do not reproduce the very forms of masculinity that are being critiqued. As I have noted elsewhere (Pease, 2017), some forms of anti-violence work by men reproduce the patriarchal gender order. Pascoe (2017) suggests that some forms of anti-Trumpism also promote forms of dominant masculinity, whereby attempts are made to frame anti-Trump proponents as 'decent men' and 'good men' in contrast to Trump and his supporters as 'bad men'.

It is understandable that in response to the misogyny, sexism and racism of white men, so-called 'good men' who oppose these values and practices will themselves express anger and hostility towards these supporters of right-wing populism. What is needed is a nuanced critique of the society that encourages men to develop entitlements associated with particular forms of masculinity and then denies these men the structurally-based opportunities to achievement them (Pascoe, 2017). We thus need to understand and address the conditions under which some white men become marginalised and disenfranchised from the system.

Responding to white male populism in the social work classroom

Populism dismisses progressive viewpoints by labelling them 'elitist' and in conflict with ordinary people's concerns, which they claim to speak for (Mahdawi, 2017). Populism relies upon so-called 'common sense' over research and theory to advance its arguments. Populists also tend to frame alternative intellectual viewpoints as feminine or weak in contrast to their emphasis on authoritarian forms of masculinity (Read, 2018).

Populism's critique of 'elites' extends to intellectuals within universities, who are also seen to be out of touch with ordinary working people (Read, 2018). As many scholars have noted, populism has crept into higher education and is often embodied in student resistance to progressive ideas (Burke & Carolissen, 2018; Gray & Nicholas, 2018). Social work education is not immune from these influences.

White male social work students sometimes say that they are 'victimised' because they are white males in the same ways expressed by white men in the wider community (Gibbons et al., 2006). They have also internalised the masculinist ideology that reinforces an epistemology of dominance and a dismissal of feminist and Indigenous understandings of the world (Gray & Nicholas, 2018).

When white male social work students express the view that they too suffer bigotry and discrimination, they place themselves on a level 'playing field' rather than acknowledging their privileged positioning in hierarchical power relations. They use their subjective experiences and feelings as representing a truth about the wider society that does not need any validation beyond their personal feelings. Thus, we must remind ourselves in social work that populism is not just 'out there' (Roher, 2018). It is also sometimes in the social work classroom, and social work educators need to develop pedagogical strategies for challenging it. The aim of this chapter has been to provide an intellectual basis for this critical engagement.

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
THE CHALLENGE OF RIGHT-WING NATIONALIST POPULISM FOR SOCIAL WORK

A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH

Edited by
Carolyn Noble and Goetz Ottmann

The Challenge of Right-wing Nationalist Populism for Social Work

Right-wing nationalist populism poses direct attacks on social tolerance, human rights discourse, political debates, the survival of the welfare state and its universal services, impacting on the roles of social work. This book demonstrates how right-wing nationalist populism can and must be countered.

Using case studies from around the world, this book shows how a revitalised radical social work involving community organisation, building alliances, trade union commitment and social action can be used as a political force to speak up against discrimination and hate in accordance with human rights, social justice, and social work values. The rise of national populism signals that now is the time for social work to forge and reforge such networks, and create links with civil society and challenge right-wing populist policies wherever they manifest themselves.

It will be of interest to all social work students, practitioners and academics, particularly those working on critical and radical social work, green social work, anti-oppressive practice and community development.

Carolyn Noble is Former Associate Dean and Foundation Professor of Social Work at ACAP in Sydney and Emertia Professor of Social Work at Victoria University, Melbourne. She is author and co-author of several books and many chapters and peer-reviewed articles. Her research interests include social work theory, philosophy and ethics, work-based learning, professional supervision and gender justice. She is editor-in-chief of open access social issues magazines for IASSW. www.socialdialogue.online.

Goetz Ottmann is Associate Professor of Social Work at the Australian College of Applied Psychology in Sydney. He has published extensively on a range of topics including the construction of citizenship in countries within the context of under-developed welfare states, and the impact of participatory budgeting and policy making on the development of effective welfare services. He has published three books and numerous peer-reviewed articles and book chapters.

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