

Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research

Barbara J. Risman
Carissa M. Froyum
William J. Scarborough *Editors*

Handbook of the Sociology of Gender

Second Edition

 Springer

Barbara J. Risman · Carissa M. Froyum
William J. Scarborough
Editors

Handbook of the Sociology of Gender

Second Edition

 Springer

Editors

Barbara J. Risman
University of Illinois at Chicago
Chicago, IL
USA

William J. Scarborough
University of Illinois at Chicago
Chicago, IL
USA

Carissa M. Froyum
University of Northern Iowa
Cedar Falls, IA
USA

ISSN 1389-6903 ISSN 2542-839X (electronic)
Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research
ISBN 978-3-319-76332-3 ISBN 978-3-319-76333-0 (eBook)
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76333-0>

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018934862

1st edition: © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2006

2nd edition: © Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Printed on acid-free paper

This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer International Publishing AG part of Springer Nature
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

Unit on Gender Theory and Epistemology

Part I Theoretical and Epistemological Context

- 1 **Introduction: New Developments in Gender Research: Multidimensional Frameworks, Intersectionality, and Thinking Beyond the Binary** 3
William J. Scarborough
- 2 **Gender as a Social Structure** 19
Barbara J. Risman
- 3 **Feminist Epistemology, Feminist Methodology, and the Study of Gender** 45
Joey Sprague
- 4 **Gender Theory as Southern Theory** 57
Pallavi Banerjee and Raewyn Connell
- 5 **Intersectionality and Gender Theory** 69
Zandria F. Robinson

Unit on Theoretical Explorations of Levels of Analysis

Part II The Individual Level of Analysis in the Gender Structure

- 6 **Becoming Gendered** 83
Heidi M. Gansen and Karin A. Martin
- 7 **Gendered Embodiment** 95
Katherine Mason
- 8 **Does Biology Limit Equality?** 109
Shannon N. Davis and Alysia Blake
- 9 **Gender Identities** 119
Natalie N. Castañeda and Carla A. Pfeffer
- 10 **Mental Health: An Intersectional Approach** 131
Verna M. Keith and Diane R. Brown

- 11 Multiple Masculinities** 143
James W. Messerschmidt

Part III The Interactional Level of Analysis

- 12 Framing Gender** 157
Susan R. Fisk and Cecilia L. Ridgeway
- 13 Interactional Accountability** 173
Jocelyn A. Hollander
- 14 Racializing Gendered Interactions** 185
Koji Chavez and Adia Harvey Wingfield
- 15 Gendered Interactions in School** 199
Kristen Myers

Part IV The Macro Level of Analysis

- 16 Gender Ideologies** 217
Anna Chatillon, Maria Charles and Karen Bradley
- 17 Gender and Welfare States** 227
Marie Laperrière and Ann Shola Orloff
- 18 Gender and Education** 245
Anne McDaniel and Erica Phillips
- 19 Gender Inequality and Workplace Organizations:
Understanding Reproduction and Change** 257
Alexandra Kalev and Gal Deutsch

Unit on Empirical Applications in Social Context

Part V Sexualities and the Body

- 20 Surgically Shaping Sex: A Gender Structure Analysis of the
Violation of Intersex People's Human Rights** 273
Georgiann Davis and Maddie Jo Evans
- 21 The Sexuality of Gender** 285
Virginia E. Rutter and Braxton Jones
- 22 Gender and Sexuality in High School** 301
C. J. Pascoe and Andrea P. Herrera
- 23 Gender and Hooking Up** 315
Arielle Kuperberg and Rachel Allison
- 24 Gender and Sexuality in Aging** 329
Pepper Schwartz and Nicholas Velotta

Part VI Families and Intimate Relationships

- 25 Gender Inequality in Families** 351
Michele Adams

26	Gender (Non) Conformity in the Family	365
	Katie L. Acosta and Veronica B. Salcedo	
27	The Gendered Division of Household Labor	377
	Oriel Sullivan	
28	Parenting and Gender	393
	Emily W. Kane	
29	Gender, Families, and Social Policy	405
	Jennifer Randles	
30	Gender and Emotion Management	417
	Carissa Froyum	
Part VII Gendered Contexts in Social Institutions		
31	Contemporary Approaches to Gender and Religion	433
	Jennifer McMorris and Jennifer Glass	
32	Gender, Race, and Crime: The Evolution of a Feminist Research Agenda	449
	Kenly Brown and Nikki Jones	
33	Sociology of Gender and Sport	459
	Cheryl Cooky	
34	Caring as Work: Research and Theory	469
	Amy Armenia	
35	Scientific and Medical Careers: Gender and Diversity	479
	Laura E. Hirshfield and Emilie Glass	
36	Women on the Move: Stalled Gender Revolution in Global Migration	493
	Carolyn Choi, Maria Cecilia Hwang and Rhacel Salazar Parreñas	
Part VIII Feminists Changing the Gender Structure		
37	Combating Gender Bias in Modern Workplaces	509
	Alison T. Wynn and Shelley J. Correll	
38	Gender and Human Rights	523
	Bandana Purkayastha	
39	Gender in Movements	537
	Jo Reger	
40	Feminists Reshaping Gender	549
	Alison Dahl Crossley and Laura K. Nelson	

Part V
Sexualities and the Body

Surgically Shaping Sex: A Gender Structure Analysis of the Violation of Intersex People's Human Rights

20

Georgiann Davis and Maddie Jo Evans

Abstract

We begin this chapter distinguishing sex from gender, while also showing that neither phenomenon is a simple two-category characteristic. We then offer a gender structure analysis (Risman in *Gend Soc* 18(4):429–450, 2004) of intersex in contemporary U.S. society to show how these binary ideologies about sex and gender problematically shape the lives of intersex people. At the institutional level of gender structure, we focus on how doctors routinely subject intersex people to medically unnecessary and irreversible interventions in an attempt to force them into the sex binary—a process that begins with doctors assessing the person's gender identity, or attempting to predict it, if the diagnosis occurs at birth. At the interactional level of gender structure, we show how doctors present intersex as a medical emergency to the parents of intersex children. We explain that this style of diagnosis delivery puts parents in a panic and leads them to hastily consent to medical recommendations in order to “normalize”

their child's body so that they fit more neatly into sex and gender expectations. At the individual level of gender structure, we describe how doctors treat intersex in ways that disregards intersex people's bodily autonomy while violating their human rights. However, as we explain in the conclusion, when intersex people age and learn the truth about how they were treated, they often fight back and crack the gender structure by joining the intersex rights movement in an attempt to challenge the institutional level of gender structure and, more specifically, how doctors harmfully approach intersex. We end with questions regarding intersex advocacy and a call for sociocultural scholars to center race in future intersex studies.

1 Introduction

When a baby is born doctors immediately categorize the infant as either male or female based on the appearance of the baby's external genitalia. This genital categorization is the child's sex, which is often viewed as synonymous with gender given those with penises are typically raised as boys, and those with vaginas are typically raised as girls. However, sex and gender are not synonymous with one another, nor is each a simple two-category phenomenon (Fausto-Sterling, 2000, 1993; Dreger, 1998; Kessler,

G. Davis (✉) · M. J. Evans
University of Nevada, 4505 S. Maryland Parkway,
455033, Las Vegas, NV 89154, USA
e-mail: georgiann.davis@unlv.edu

M. J. Evans
e-mail: evansm43@unlv.nevada.edu

1998, 1990). For example, in its most simplistic definition, gender is an identity and a fluid one at that given how it is understood differently across time and space. What was considered masculine a generation ago is not necessarily viewed the same way today. There are also many different ways to be masculine, just as there are many different ways to be feminine. You can have a penis and enact a femininity, much the same way you can have a vagina and enact a masculinity. Thus, it is problematic for doctors to predict a baby's gender by examining the baby's genitals—a faulty categorization process that, in many instances, begins even before birth with the assistance of a pregnancy ultrasound.

We can perhaps best understand the problem of assuming sex and gender are simple and neatly correlated phenomenon by looking to those born with intersex traits. Intersex traits are congenital characteristics that blur the controversial boundary between male and female bodies (Fausto-Sterling, 2000, 1993; Dreger, 1998; Kessler, 1998, 1990). An intersex trait can appear in the body as “ambiguous” genitalia, sexual organs, and/or as sex chromosomes that deviate from normative expectations. For example, those with complete androgen insensitivity syndrome (CAIS) typically have testes, albeit internal and undescended, and XY chromosomes, yet their outward female appearance which includes a vagina and breasts marks them as female. While intersex traits do not threaten a person's health (Nakhal et al., 2013), doctors routinely treat intersex traits as medical problems that they can fix with their scalpels—a horrific human rights violation that many intersex people have endured, including sociologist Georgiann Davis (see Davis, 2015a).

Doctors routinely subject those born with intersex traits to medically unnecessary and irreversible interventions (Davis, 2015a, 2011). They do this to uphold our narrow understanding of sex as a binary feature of our body even though intersex is strong evidence that sex is anything but simple (Davis, 2015a, 2011). Doctors tend to believe it is in a person's best interest for their sex and gender to be aligned, so, in the case of intersex, they attempt to predict an

intersex infant's gender, and then they use that prediction to surgically shape that child's sex. Otherwise they worry parents will not be able to gender socialize their intersex child (e.g., Karkazis, 2008).

Although intersex traits are usually diagnosed at birth or adolescence depending upon the intersex trait, doctors often withhold the known diagnosis from the intersex person, and encourage parents to do the same, out of fear that disclosing it would interfere with the development of the child's gender identity (e.g., Karkazis, 2008; Preves, 2003; Kessler, 1998, 1990). Instead of providing the intersex person with open and honest information at the time of diagnosis, or as they age if they are diagnosed at birth so that they can be included in medical decision making processes about their body (see, for example, Preves, 2003), doctors construct elaborate, and seriously problematic, narratives that range from telling intersex people that they were born with underdeveloped reproductive structures, to telling them that they were born with early onset cancer of the reproductive system (e.g., Karkazis, 2008). Although this medical deception might be understood as doctors attempting to help intersex people, it has been associated with their ideological stance that sex, gender, and sexuality are neatly correlated and essentialist features of our bodies that they can surgically protect by, for instance, removing the testes of a person born with CAIS because of their belief that a person with a vagina shouldn't also have testes (Davis, 2015a, 2011; Karkazis, 2008). This medical approach to intersex traits, and the deception that goes along with it, has also been tied to medical authority over the body, which creates, rather than ameliorates, physical and emotional pain and suffering (Davis, 2015a, 2011; Karkazis, 2008).

Any attempt at understanding the experiences of intersex people must begin by accepting that sex is a naturally variable phenomenon (Kessler, 1998). We suggest that we approach gender not only as an identity characteristic, but as sociologist Barbara Risman's (2004) theorizes, a stratification system that operates at the institutional, interactional, and individuals levels of

society. The institutional level of gender is where organizational practices and policies are regulated and enforced. The interactional level of gender is where gendered expectations are navigated and negotiated, and lastly, the individual level is where people internalize and embody a gender identity.

In the sections that follow, we draw on existing sociocultural analyses, alongside critiques from intersex activists, to offer a gender structure analysis of how intersex is experienced and contested in contemporary U.S. society (Risman, 2004). Although our discussion extends beyond the U.S., we focus on the U.S. in this chapter because it is the cultural context that we are personally and professionally most familiar with. It is also the perspective that, albeit problematically, dominates contemporary intersex discourse. However, we attempt to remain conscious of the ways in which our Americentric perspective is limited in its own regard, and invite readers to do the same. We also look forward to sociocultural scholars extending our analyses beyond the U.S. context through both empirical and theoretical perspectives different from our own.

We begin with the institutional level of gender structure by offering an overview of the medical treatment of intersex traits from historical to contemporary times, including critiques from intersex activists. We focus specifically on how medical providers violate intersex people's bodily autonomy in order to problematically align sex and gender. We next turn to the interactional level of gender structure to critique parental consent for these medically unnecessary and irreversible interventions. We show how doctors influence parents' compliance with their recommendations by presenting intersex as a medical emergency that needs an immediate medical response. Framed as an emergency, parents are left without time to consult with other parents of intersex children and/or intersex adults before granting consent for doctors to surgically shape their child's body so that sex and gender can be aligned. We then move to the individual level of gender structure to discuss how intersex people feel their human rights are violated in harmful and irreversible ways that also unnecessarily

leave them forcefully sterilized. However, as we describe in the conclusion, many intersex people join the intersex rights movement when they learn the truth about how they were treated in order to seek an end to the medically unnecessary and irreversible interventions intersex people are forced to endure. They do so as activists by raising intersex awareness through the media, drawing on legal strategies to hold doctors accountable for their actions, and more all in an attempt to disrupt the institutional level of gender structure where doctors surgically shape children's bodies to problematically align sex and gender. We place these activist efforts in dialogue with a feminist sociological understanding of medical processes that recognizes how our lives are structured by gender and how institutions, such as medicine, are positioned to enforce, or challenge, ideological understandings of gender.

2 The Medical Mutilation of Intersex Bodies: The Institutional Level of Gender Structure

Intersex is perhaps one of the best examples to highlight how the medical profession has the power, and is also equipped, to reinforce and perpetuate the problematic gender ideologies at the institutional level of gender structure that maintain sex and gender are naturally correlated phenomenon (Risman, 2004; Connell, 1987; Foucault, 1963). Although there is evidence that doctors have subjected intersex people to medically unnecessary interventions to uphold the sex binary as far back as the 18th century (Warren, 2014; Mak, 2012; Reis, 2009; Dreger, 1998), today's medical approach to intersex stems mostly from the medical advances of the 20th century. These medical advances include the invention and availability of medical imaging including ultrasonography, the discovery of sex chromosomes, and the advancement of surgical techniques.

Alongside these medical advancements, it was in the mid 1950s that psychologist John Money

introduced his “optimum gender of rearing” [OGR] model (Money, Hampson, & Hampson, 1957). The OGR model “held that *all* sexually ambiguous children should—indeed *must*—be made into unambiguous-looking boys or girls to ensure unambiguous gender identities” (Dreger & Herndon, 2009, 202). Sex and gender in this context were each binary and malleable but simultaneously thought of as needing to be strictly correlated. While Money was later discredited for unethical research practices and abuse of his power over minor children (Colapinto, 2000, 1997), the surgical practices at the core of his theory remain in practice today. Only now doctors no longer see sex and gender as flexible phenomena (Davis, 2015a; Karkazis, 2008). Instead, they view gender as a hard-wired and essentialist characteristic of the body that they can scientifically uncover with medical tests and visual inspections of a person’s body (Davis, 2015a; Karkazis, 2008). Once doctors have medically determined one’s gender (wrongly assuming such is even possible), they surgically shape the person’s sex to match in normative ways, meaning externally, girls should look female and boys should look male. Or, in the case of those with CAIS who have an outward female appearance, they remove the internal and undescended testes because girls aren’t supposed to have them. This attempt to predict one’s gender identity, and then modify the intersex body in accordance with the predicted gender, illustrates just how powerful the medical profession is in upholding the gender structure.

With doctors being the arbiters of intersex status, they hold exclusive jurisdiction over intersex. They are uniquely positioned to define what constitutes an intersex trait, and they are also medically equipped with the tools to treat a person’s intersex trait however they feel it should be treated. But intersex traits rarely, if at all, pose a health threat (see, for example, Nakhla et al., 2013). What intersex traits do threaten are the sex, gender, and perhaps to a lesser extent, sexuality binary ideologies upon which the framing of intersex as an abnormality rests. Thus, doctors who perform these medically unnecessary and irreversible interventions on intersex bodies are

erasing natural evidence that sex, gender, and sexuality are each a continuum instead of a binary.

Both feminist scholars and individuals with intersex traits have criticized the medical approach toward intersex. Feminist scholars are critical of this medical approach toward intersex traits, often citing the fact that it relies on an oversimplified understanding of sex that presumes there are clear medical markers that distinguish male from female bodies (e.g., Fausto-Sterling, 2000, 1993; Dreger, 1998). Feminist scholars are also critical of medical providers for assuming a strict correlation between sex, gender, and sexuality (e.g., Kessler, 1990). While some individuals with intersex traits share the critiques about intersex medical care that feminist scholars posit, they are even more concerned about the physical and emotional harm that result from medical interventions. Intersex people are deeply hurt by the lies their doctors and parents tell them about their diagnosis, and arguably most importantly, the medically unnecessary and irreversible surgeries they endured. With these critiques in hand, individuals with intersex traits gathered, mostly in the global north, in the late 1980s and early 1990s to challenge the medical treatment of intersex (Chase, 1998, 1993; see also Holmes, 2008). Intersex social movement organizations emerged and the intersex rights movement flourished (Preves, 2005, 2003). Intersex activists organized public protests at medical association meetings, gained media attention, and collectively grew as a social movement (Preves, 2005). They wanted the world to know that they were unhappy with how they were treated as minor children. They wanted, in short, to change medical care.

The medical profession initially wrote off intersex activists as “zealots” (Gearhart qtd. in Angier, 1996), but by the year 2000, everything seemed to change. Cheryl Chase, a leader who is often considered the founder of the U.S. intersex rights movement, was invited to deliver a plenary address to the then named Lawson Wilkins Pediatric Endocrine Society, a group she had once protested against (Karkazis, 2008).

That same year, the American Academy of Pediatrics issued a statement on the medical management of intersex conditions (Committee on Genetics, 2000). Within the statement were several recommendations that could be viewed as the medical profession responding to their critics. For example, the topic of diagnosis disclosure was discussed, and the recommendation was for medical providers to be open and honest with their patients and their patients' families. It is worth noting that today it is far less common for medical professionals to withhold the diagnosis from their patients than it was prior to the 1990s activism that led to the 2000 medical statement (Davis, 2015a). However, an individual's fertility and presumed capacity for sexual function remained the critical factors for determining gender assignment. In 2006, the American Academy of Pediatrics revised its policy on the medical management of intersex, citing—among other factors—advances in diagnosis and surgical intervention in the medical sciences (Lee, Houk, Ahmed, & Hughes, 2006). The revised policy also acknowledges the importance of patient advocacy, which may explain why it advises against unnecessary surgical intervention on intersex bodies, which has for a long time been a key concern among intersex activists.

While the 2000 and 2006 statements on the medical management of intersex traits are evidence that intersex activists (supported by feminist scholars) were beginning to be heard by the medical profession as they attempted to challenge the gender structure, there is reason to question if intersex medical care has genuinely experienced substantial change since the formation of the intersex rights movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For example, while medical protocols advise against doctors performing medically unnecessary surgeries on intersex bodies, many doctors don't follow these protocols. They continue to perform corrective surgeries on intersex babies and small children instead of waiting until the child is old enough to consent to these irreversible medical interventions (Davis 2015a). At the same time, many medical professionals refuse to refer intersex people and their families to support groups when

research has shown that connecting with similarly situated others has been important throughout the intersex community (e.g., Davis, 2015a; Preves, 2003; Karkazis, 2008). The gender structure is, in other words, upheld despite activist and scholarly critiques of the medicalization of intersex bodies.

There is at least one medical recommendation from the 2006 medical protocol that has been widely implemented across the medical profession: the recommended shift in nomenclature from intersex terminology to the language of "disorders of sex development" (DSD) (Lee et al., 2006). The fact that this recommendation has been extremely successful across medicine in such a short amount of time might be read as both evidence of a jurisdictional struggle over intersex and the power of the gender structure (Davis, 2015a). In the 1990s, feminist scholars and intersex activists challenged intersex medical care leaving doctors under the spotlight (Fausto-Sterling, 2000, 1993; Chase, 1998, 1993; Dreger, 1998; Kessler, 1998, 1990). By renaming intersex a disorder of sex development, doctors are able to escape this public criticism while reasserting their authority over the intersex body (Davis, 2015a, 2011). While it is the case that DSD terminology has created new tensions across the intersex community with some intersex people embracing it, others rejecting it, and a minority selectively employing it (Davis, 2015a, 2014), what's most alarming is that doctors continue to mutilate intersex children by violating their patient's bodily autonomy.

3 Gendered Expectations and Problematizing Parental Consent: The Interactional Level of Gender Structure

What parents tend to want most for their child is happiness and health. And, for the latter, at least in the U.S. where everything from prenatal care to childbirth is medicalized, parents look to doctors to verify that their child is in fact healthy. And, sadly, given the power of the gender structure throughout society, this logic positions

parents to believe that their intersex child will not be healthy unless their child's sex and gender are neatly aligned. We explain in this section that doctors perpetuate this logic by framing intersex as a medical emergency, even going so far as to cite faulty cancer risks (Lee et al., 2006), rather than present intersex as a naturally occurring bodily variation.

Throughout the world, doctors, and the medical institution within which they practice, have an incredible amount of power over the body (Connell, 1987; Foucault, 1963). However, in the case of children, so do parents who are legally looked upon to consent, or refuse to consent, to medical recommendations on behalf of their minor child who legally is not able to offer their consent (Committee on Bioethics, 1995). When it comes to consenting to medical procedures, the law doesn't fully recognize children's voices. Instead, the law relegates all of a child's bodily autonomy to the child's parents disregarding that the child's wishes may be different from the parents. At the same time, the law also assumes that parents always have their child's best interest in mind. It also dismisses the possibility that parents are influenced by the gender structure that is upheld by doctors who are quick to surgically enforce it by attempting to align an intersex child's body with their assigned gender—an action masked by doctors perpetuating faulty claims that intersex traits are health risks (see Lee et al., 2006 for a discussion of the risks, and Nakhal et al., 2013 for contradictory evidence).

Intersex does pose a unique challenge when it comes to parental consent for a child's medical care, for as explained above, intersex traits rarely, if at all, threaten a person's health (see Nakhal et al., 2013). Yet, doctors often frame intersex as a medical emergency to the parents of intersex children, thus establishing the need for a medical response (Davis & Murphy, 2013; see also Davis, 2015a; Karkazis, 2008). And because intersex is most commonly diagnosed when one is a minor child, the parents of intersex children are put in an uncomfortable position to act on their child's behalf, and they usually do so without hesitation because of how doctors frame intersex.

It is through this communication between doctors and parents, where gendered expectations are enacted, that the interactional level of gender structure is visible (see Risman, 2004). The framing of intersex as a medical emergency begins with doctors frantically searching for biological answers to their young patient's intersex trait (Davis, 2015a; Davis & Murphy, 2013). These answers are intended to classify the child as either female or male because doctors assume parents will not otherwise be able to properly gender socialize their child (see Davis, 2015a; Karkazis, 2008). The process usually involves telling the child's parents that there is a problem that necessitates further testing. These tests can range from extensive laboratory workups that include identifying sex chromosomes, costly medical imaging scans in search of testes, ovaries, and/or a uterus, to invasive external and/or internal examination of the child's genitalia. This framing of intersex as a medical emergency alongside the immediate search for answers puts parents in panic mode, and in turn, establishes intersex as a problem that only doctors can fix. It's no wonder then that the parents of intersex children regularly consent to medically unnecessary and irreversible interventions on their children's bodies. They want their child to be healthy, and they trust that doctors can make that happen.

However, rather than present intersex as a medical emergency to the parents of intersex children, doctors could alternatively attempt to challenge the gender structure by describing the intersex trait as a natural variation of the body. By doing so they would not only problematize the sex binary and its ties to gendered expectations, but they would also reassure parents that intersex rarely, if ever, poses a health threat. If doctors framed intersex as a normal variation, parents would be less likely to consent to cosmetic interventions on their children's bodies. Or, at the very least, they would be less likely to grant their consent without much hesitation. But doctors rarely question the sex binary. Instead, as documented above, they often draw on the sex binary, and its ideologies, to problematize intersex and justify their medical interventions. In other words, they reinforce the gender structure.

Despite decades of effort by intersex activists to end the medically unnecessary interventions on intersex bodies described in more detail in the previous section (e.g., Dreger & Herndon, 2009; Holmes, 2008; Preves, 2005; Chase, 1998), parents of intersex children continue to consent to the procedures in large part due to, as explained above, the medical framing of intersex as an emergency (Davis, 2015a; Davis & Murphy, 2013). Yet they later, after connecting with other parents of intersex children and intersex adults, express decisional regret (Davis, 2015a, b). Parents hear from other parents of intersex children that intersex traits are not medical emergencies. They also learn from intersex adults that medically unnecessary and irreversible interventions are not helpful but rather harmful because they cause physical and emotional struggles (e.g., Preves, 2003). When parents connect with the intersex community prior to consenting to the recommended medical procedures, research shows that their child's body would likely be left intact, and their child's autonomy respected (e.g., Davis, 2015a; Karkazis, 2008).

While parents aren't the ones who are forced to live within the mutilated body they consented to, they might also be understood as victims of these intersex medicalization practices that uphold the gender structure (Davis, 2015a, b), although perhaps to a lesser extent. By adhering to doctor's recommendations, they were more often than not trying to ameliorate their child's medical emergency (Davis, 2015a, b). But, after they learn the truth that the intersex trait rarely poses a health threat, they must justify to their child why they consented to these procedures and this does often involve parents perpetuating the gender structure by claiming their child would have had a more difficult life if their sex and gender were not aligned (see Davis, 2015a). Regardless, for the rest of their lives, parents must live with their decision that they consented to medically unnecessary, and irreversible, interventions on their child's body. This is hardly good medical care for intersex people or their families.

Doctors, however, evade responsibility for their actions at the institutional level of gender

structure. They are not held accountable for upholding gender ideologies by surgically aligning sex and gender, nor are they held accountable for violating their own medical protocols that prohibit medically unnecessary surgeries (see Lee et al., 2006). They also do not take responsibility for framing intersex to parents as a medical emergency (Davis, 2015a; Davis & Murphy, 2013), nor do they accept the fact that they should have connected the parents of intersex children to similarly situated parents and intersex adults before asking the parents to follow through with their recommendations (Davis, 2015a, b). Instead, of taking responsibility for their sequential actions, they treat parents as pawns in the medical treatment of intersex by shifting all of the responsibility for their actions, or lack thereof, onto them (see Davis, 2015a, b).

If a doctor discovers one of their young patients has an intersex trait, rather than police the gender structure, they should, as outlined above, explain to the parents that intersex is a natural and normal variation of the body, and that sex and gender are two distinct, and variable, phenomena. They should also connect the parents with the intersex community, and lastly they should encourage the parents to be honest with the child by openly sharing the diagnosis. If medical professionals were to approach intersex in these ways, the gender structure would be less powerful, there would be far fewer medically unnecessary interventions, parents wouldn't be in a position to later express decisional regret, and most importantly, an intersex person's bodily autonomy would be respected.

4 Disregarding Bodily Autonomy: The Individual Level of Gender Structure

The individual level of gender structure is where a person's gender identity is internalized (Risman, 2004), which can be constraining for all of us regardless of our bodies given the power of the institutional and interactional levels of the gender structure. Yet, in the case of intersex, this constraint is uniquely complex given that doctors

surgically shape an intersex person's body to match the gender identity they choose for their patient—a process that usually happens when one is a minor child and are unable to legally refuse recommended medical interventions. This action, which is enacted at the institutional level of gender structure and enforced at the interactional level through the way in which the diagnosis is presented to parents, is a remarkable disregard for an intersex person's bodily autonomy. By subjecting intersex people to medically unnecessary and irreversible interventions, doctors rob intersex people of the ability to form their gender identity within the body they were born with. And they do this by enforcing the individual level of gender structure that recognizes only two sexes and two genders, or in other words, masculine males and feminine females. This enforcement of the individual level of gender structure leaves many intersex people, as they discover their diagnosis and learn the truth about the surgeries they endured when they were children, feeling violated and mutilated—emotions they channel, as described in the conclusion, as they challenge the medical mutilation of intersex bodies and the perpetuation of the institutional level of gender structure (Davis, 2015a; Holmes, 2008; Karkazis, 2008; Preves, 2003).

In 2003, sociologist Sharon Preves published the very first book length academic account of the experiences of intersex people. She documented the physical and emotional struggles intersex people faced after being subjected to medically unnecessary and irreversible interventions. As Preves explains, almost all intersex people undergo surgery to “fix” their intersex body at some point in their life (see also Davis, 2015a; Holmes, 2008; Karkazis, 2008; Preves, 2003). Those who were subjected to surgery on their external genitalia were left with nerve damage and a loss of sensitivity, and for some, pain while urinating and/or genital penetration, and, among other negative consequences, leakage from the urinary tract. In many cases, intersex people are subjected to numerous surgeries in attempt to remedy the problems associated with their previous, and unnecessary, surgeries. If the

initial surgery was never conducted, there would be no need for reparative interventions.

Even those without “ambiguous” external genitalia are typically still subjected to surgery in order to be squeezed into the sex binary. For example, because those with complete androgen insensitivity syndrome (CAIS) have an outward female appearance and mostly live their lives as women, doctors remove their internal and undescended testes despite the fact that the testes are the primary producers of sex hormones in the CAIS body (see, for example, Davis, 2015a; Karkazis, 2008). It's worth noting that intersex people who undergo surgery on their external genitalia are also often subjected to having their internal anatomy surgically altered, similar to those with CAIS. While doctors express concern that internal and undescended testes might turn cancerous, there is no empirical evidence for this assumption (Nakhil et al., 2013), nor is this action logically sound, for any body part might turn cancerous. Rather than, for instance, preemptively removing women's breasts out of fear that they might someday turn cancerous, doctors recommend preventative screening that ranges from self-examining one's own breasts to medical imaging procedures. This same preventative approach could also be prescribed to intersex people, but rather than monitor an intersex person's organs and tissues for the emergency of abnormalities, doctors surgically modify the body making their claims of reducing malignancy risks all the more suspicious (see Davis, 2015a; Karkazis, 2008).

Because this surgical enforcement of the individual level of gender structure most often happens when an intersex person is a minor child whose parents consented to the procedures on their behalf, the intersex person's bodily autonomy is jeopardized and their human rights violated (see, for example, Carpenter, 2016; Feder & Dreger, 2016). Intersex people are left without a voice for what they would have wanted for their body, and in turn, are typically left frustrated and angry with their doctors as well as their well-intended parents due to the ways in which they went along with medically unnecessary

recommendations (see Davis, 2015a; Karkazis, 2008). It is also important to keep in mind that any surgeries that are performed are irreversible. Once a person's anatomy is altered, the body is changed for life. Reconstructive surgery is not possible, nor is it effective. It also means that doctors leave intersex people in a position to be dependent upon costly hormone replacement therapy for the rest of their lives.

Although described in more detail in the conclusion of this chapter, it is necessary to note here that intersex people are not passive victims. Angry with doctors, and in some cases parents, for how they were treated as children, many intersex people fight back by joining intersex social movements organizations to publicly critique doctors in an attempt to end the medical mutilation of intersex bodies. And, intersex activists are not the only ones critiquing these medically unnecessary and irreversible interventions. A number of global entities have drawn attention to the ways in which the medicalization of intersex disregards the importance of bodily autonomy. The Swiss Ethics Council,¹ the Council of Europe Commissioner For Human Rights,² as well as the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture³ have all weighed in on the matter and are critical of the medicalization of intersex bodies. In 2015, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, warned:

Far too few of us are aware of the specific human rights violations faced by millions of intersex people. Because their bodies don't comply with typical definitions of male or female, intersex children and adults are frequently subjected to forced sterilization and other unnecessary and irreversible surgery, and suffer discrimination in schools, workplaces and other settings.⁴

¹See http://www.nek-cne.ch/fileadmin/nek-cne-dateien/Themen/Stellungnahmen/en/NEK_Intersexualitaet_En.pdf. Retrieved December 9, 2016.

²See <http://www.ft.dk/samling/20142/almdel/suu/bilag/44/1543761.pdf>. Retrieved December 9, 2016.

³See http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/A.HRC.22.53_English.pdf. Retrieved December 9, 2016.

⁴See <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16414%26>. Retrieved December 7, 2016.

Most doctors are however not deterred by critiques of their practices, including statements such as that quoted above from a powerful global leader. Doctors continue to subject intersex people to surgeries and other medical procedures in order to uphold the sex binary and enforce the individual level of gender structure (see, for example, Davis, 2015a; Karkazis, 2008). Although many intersex people are born infertile, with advances in reproductive technologies, doctors enacting these irreversible procedures also eliminate any possibility of reproduction, essentially employing forced sterilization practices.

When doctors are forced to defend their approach to intersex, they often refute claims that the surgeries are medically unnecessary (Davis, 2015a; Karkazis, 2008). They typically point to cancer risks (see Looijenga et al., 2007); although, in most cases, these cancer risks are no higher than they are for those without intersex traits. At the same time, they also allege that their surgical interventions allow intersex people to comfortably fit into society, an unsupported assertion (Davis, 2015a; Karkazis, 2008). Sociocultural research (Davis, 2015a; Holmes, 2008; Karkazis, 2008; Preves, 2003), as well as anecdotal accounts from intersex people (e.g., Davis, 2015a; Holmes, 2008), has repeatedly shown that the medicalization of intersex harms, rather than helps, intersex people. As outlined above, medical interventions on intersex bodies result in physical and emotional struggles (see Preves, 2003). These struggles are even further complicated when doctors withhold the diagnosis from intersex people allegedly to protect the formation of the intersex person's gender identity (e.g., Karkazis, 2008).

By enforcing the gender structure at the institutional and interactional levels, doctors also interfere with the formation of an intersex person's gender identity resulting in the policing of the individual level of gender structure. What these consequences reveal is the interrelated workings of the institutional, interactional, and individual levels of the gender structure. When one dimension is enforced, so are the others as they are interrelated in a way that seemingly

makes systematic change to the gender structure difficult if not impossible. In the following section we describe in more detail how intersex activists are currently attempting to crack through the gender structure. We also raise new questions about the direction of advocacy and offer our suggestions for future intersex research.

5 Conclusion: Cracking the Gender Structure

The medical profession is a powerful institution capable of enforcing, or challenging, the gender structure (Connell, 1987; Foucault, 1963). Yet, as outlined in this review of activism and research on intersex, it's evident that most doctors uphold and even police the gender structure by attempting to surgically align sex and gender. While they are not naturally evil people and instead operate within, and are controlled by, the same gender structure we all face in our daily lives, it's undeniably alarming that the vast majority of providers ignore the call from intersex activists to end the medically unnecessary and irreversible interventions on intersex bodies (Davis, 2015a). We acknowledge that labeling the surgeries doctors perform on intersex bodies "medical mutilation" is harsh. However, we find it fitting given intersex medicalization sterilizes intersex people and leaves them physically and emotionally harmed.

Although Lee et al.'s (2006) consensus statement on the medical management of intersex introduced new divides in the intersex community by proposing disorder of sex development terminology in place of intersex language, intersex activists continue to collectively challenge the medicalization of intersex at the institutional level of gender structure (see Davis, 2015a). They do this by attempting to hold doctors legally accountable for disregarding their own protocols and enforcing binary ideologies about sex, gender, and sexuality.⁵ They work

with producers on television shows and documentaries to raise intersex awareness about the unfortunate medicalization practices they endure at the hands of medical professionals.⁶ They organize protests at medical association meetings.⁷ They share their experiences with various global government entities.⁸ And, among other efforts including a vibrant presence on social media, they even conduct and distribute their own scholarly research that draws attention to the medical mutilation of intersex bodies while critiquing binary ideologies about sex, gender, and sexuality.⁹

Each of the strategies for change converge to combat the medical profession's power at the institutional level of gender structure, but they also have cumulative effects that seem to be simultaneously cracking through the interactional and individual levels of gender structure. For example, as described above, the U.N.'s High Commissioner is speaking out about the medicalization of intersex,¹⁰ and although its potential for success is to be determined, the Association of American Medical Colleges now has a DSD Subcommittee made up of various stakeholders who are attempting to create a progressive medical curriculum that will hopefully begin to shift how tomorrow's doctors are taught about intersex.¹¹ While intersex activists aren't the only people challenging the constraints of the gender structure, they are often, alongside trans activists,

⁵See <http://interactadvocates.org/intersex-law-and-policy/>, http://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/20161122_zzyym, and <http://www.starobserver.com.au/news/intersex-groups-condemn-family-court-decision-grant-surgery-five-year-old/154388>. Retrieved December 14, 2016.

⁶See <http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/live-feed/mtvs-faking-tell-intersex-story-732076>. Retrieved December 14, 2016.

⁷See <http://stop.genitalmutilation.org/>. Retrieved December 14, 2016.

⁸See <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Astepforwardforintersexvisibility.aspx>. Retrieved December 14, 2016.

⁹See <http://oiieurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/How-to-be-a-great-intersex-ally-A-toolkit-for-NGOs-and-decision-makers-December-2015.pdf> and <http://oii.org.au/wp-content/uploads/key/Intersex-Stories-Statistics-Australia.pdf>. Retrieved December 14, 2016.

¹⁰See <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16414&>. Retrieved December 7, 2016.

¹¹See <https://www.aamc.org/initiatives/diversity/portfolios/330894/lgbt-patientcare-project.html>. Retrieved December 13, 2016.

at the center of these challenges that are slowly cracking through the gender structure, which will benefit all of us, regardless of our genitalia.

But the work of intersex activists is far from over. Intersex activists have been fighting for human rights for over 20 years, yet as outlined in this chapter, today's intersex children continue to be subjected to medically unnecessary and irreversible interventions. This leaves us with a number of questions that invite further exploration. For instance, we ask, how has whiteness shaped the formation and current trajectory of intersex activist efforts? The intersex community is overwhelmingly white, yet there hasn't been an analysis of this pattern. What might the intersex community gain by openly joining forces with the LGBT community and its movement for equality? As it stands, this collaborative effort is contested across the intersex community.¹² How do ideologies about the ideal body—which is white, thin (but not too thin), able, and normatively gendered—shape the medicalization of intersex people? How can intersex activists join forces with other social justice movements in order to crack through gender structure and other interrelated structural oppressions? When will we finally see an end to the medical mutilation of intersex bodies?

References

- Carpenter, M. (2016). The human rights of intersex people: Addressing harmful practices and rhetoric change. *Reproductive Health Matters*, 24(47), 74–84.
- Chase, C. (1993). Letters from Readers. *The Sciences* (July/August), 3.
- Chase, C. (1998). Hermaphrodites with attitude: Mapping the emergence of intersex political activism. *GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies*, 4(2), 189–211.
- Colapinto, J. (1997, December 11). The true story of John/Joan. *Rolling Stone*, 54–73, 92–97.
- Colapinto, J. (2000). *As nature made him: The boy who was raised as a girl*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Committee on Bioethics. (1995). Informed consent, parental permission, and assent in pediatric practice. *Pediatrics*, 95, 314–317.
- Committee on Genetics: Section on Endocrinology and Section on Urology. (2000). Evaluation of the newborn with developmental anomalies of the external genitalia. *Pediatrics*, 106(1), 138–142.
- Connell, R. (1987). *Gender and power: Society, the person, and sexual politics*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- Davis, G. (2011). 'DSD is a perfectly fine term': Reasserting medical authority through a shift in intersex terminology. In P. J. McGann & D. J. Hutson (Eds.), *Sociology of diagnosis* (155–182). Wagon Lane, Bingley UK: Emerald.
- Davis, G. (2014). The power in a name: Diagnostic terminology and diverse experiences. *Psychology & Sexuality*, 5(1), 15–27.
- Davis, G. (2015a). *Contesting intersex: The dubious diagnosis*. New York: New York University Press.
- Davis, G. (2015b). Parents as pawns: Intersex, medical experts, and questionable consent. In *Families as they really are* (2nd ed., pp. 441–455). W. W. Norton & Company.
- Davis, G., & Murphy, E. L. (2013). Intersex bodies as states of exception: An empirical explanation for unnecessary surgical modification. *Feminist Formations*, 25(2), 129–152.
- Dreger, A. D. (1998). *Hermaphrodites and the medical invention of sex*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Dreger, A. D. & Herndon, A. M. (2009). Progress and politics in the intersex rights movement: Feminist theory in action. *GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies*, 15(2), 199–224.
- Fausto-Sterling, A. (1993, March/April). The five sexes: Why male and female are not enough. *The Sciences*, 20–5.
- Fausto-Sterling, A. (2000, July/August). The five sexes, revisited. *The Sciences*, 18–23.
- Feder, E. K. & Dreger, A. (2016, June 4). Still ignoring human rights in intersex care. *Journal of Pediatric Urology*. Available online <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpurol.2016.05.017>.
- Foucault, M. (1963). *The birth of the clinic: An archaeology of medical perception*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Gearhart, J. P. (1996, February 4). Interviewed in Natalie Angier's "Intersexual Healing: An Anomaly Finds a Group." *New York Times*.
- Holmes, M. (2008). *Intersex: A perilous difference*. Selinsgrove, PA.: Susquehanna University Press.
- Karkazis, K. (2008). *Fixing sex: Intersex, medical authority, and lived experience*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Kessler, S. (1990). The medical construction of gender: Case management of intersexed infants. *Signs*, 16(1), 3–26.
- Kessler, S. (1998). *Lessons from the intersexed*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Lee, P. A., Houk, C. P., Ahmed, S. F., & Hughes, I. A. (2006). Consensus statement on management of intersex disorders. *Pediatrics*, 118(2), 488–500.

¹²See <http://everydayfeminism.com/2016/06/intersex-lgbtq-misses-the-point/>. Retrieved December 13, 2016.

- Looijenga, L. H. J., Hersmus, R., Oosterhuis, J. W., Cools, M., Drop, S. L., & Wolffebuttel, K. P. (2007). Tumor risk in disorder of sex development (DSD). *Best Practice & Research Clinical Endocrinology & Metabolism*, 21(3), 480–495.
- Mak, G. (2012). *Doubling sex: Inscriptions, bodies and selves in nineteenth-century hermaphrodite case histories*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
- Money, J., Hampson, J. G., & Hampson, J. L. (1957). Imprinting and the establishment of gender role. *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, 77, 333–336.
- Nakhil, R. S., Hall-Craggs, M., Freeman, A., Kirkham, A., Conway, G. S., Arora, R., et al. (2013). Evaluation of retained testes in adolescent girls and women with complete androgen insensitivity syndrome. *Radiology*, 268(1), 153–160.
- Preves, S. E. (2003). *Intersex and identity: The contested self*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Preves, S. E. (2005). Out of the O.R. and into the streets: Exploring the impact of intersex media activism. *Cardozo Journal of Law & Gender*, 12(1), 247–288. (Reprinted from *Research in Political Sociology*).
- Reis, E. (2009). *Bodies in doubt: An american history of intersex*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Risman, B. J. (2004). Gender as a social structure: Theory wrestling with activism. *Gender & Society*, 18(4), 429–450.
- Warren, C. A. B. (2014). Gender reassignment surgery in the 18th century: A case study. *Sexualities*, 17(7), 872–884.

Georgiann Davis is assistant professor of sociology at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Her research and teaching are at the intersection of sociology of diagnosis and feminist theories. Among other scholarly contributions that appeared in the *American Journal of Bioethics*, *Gender & Society*, *Psychology & Sexuality*, and *Feminist Formations*, she is the author of *Contesting Intersex: The Dubious Diagnosis* (NYU Press, 2015).

Maddie Jo Evans received her bachelor's and master's degrees in sociology from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Her master's thesis was a qualitative study of women's body projects and their self-perceptions of the ideal bridal body.

Virginia E. Rutter and Braxton Jones

Abstract

This chapter presents theory and research on gender and sexuality as well as on knowledge production in this area. Study in this area begins with the idea that gender and sexuality are interactional, socially constructed through micro and macro institutions ranging from family and individual couples to the nation, with effects varying by different social markers like race, class, cohort, age, and relationship status. What we know of the history of sexuality plus what we recognize as challenges for contemporary work are contingent on our epistemologies. This is because knowledge, too, about gender and sexuality is socially constructed, hampered by the legacy of constrained categories combined with limitations of imagination—our habits of mind. This chapter will help students and scholars of gender recognize transformations in the expression of gender and sexuality, even as it highlights the persistence of normative linkages between the two through heteronormativity. Do we think gender and sexuality

will ever be disconnected from one another? It matters less to us whether they are connected or disconnected than that heteronormativity ceases to be a source of social control, racism, and structured inequalities by regulating gender and sexuality.

1 Two Questions

Let us begin with two questions: First, how does gender play a role in sexuality? And, second, how does sexuality play a role in gender? Work on *what gender is* gives clear direction for answering these. Our starting place is to recognize gender as a social structure, as Risman (2004, 2018 [this volume]) has demonstrated. Gender is performed (West & Zimmerman, 1987), gender is intersectional (Crenshaw, 1989; Robinson, 2018 [this volume]) with multiple and fluid statuses, and gender is forever carrying us backwards even as we move forward in time (Ridgeway, 2011; Fisk & Ridgeway, 2018 [this volume]). All this gendering happens at the macro, organizational, and cultural level; it is not just something that happens face-to-face, but involves structures of work, economy, and politics.

Next is to recognize the extent of “gendered sexualities”—defined as how “individual and societal constructions of gender overlay and intermingle with sexual behaviors, ideations, attitudes, identities, and experiences” (Gagné &

V. E. Rutter (✉)
Framingham State University, Framingham, USA
e-mail: vrutter@gmail.com

B. Jones
Boston University, Boston, USA
e-mail: braxton@bu.edu

Tewksbury, 2005, 4). Heteronormativity—in its expression as well as resistance to it through breaking the imaginative limits of heteronormativity—looms large. Heteronormativity references the way that heterosexuality is assumed to be the “norm,” and that social systems and interactions work to promote and idealize it. Heteronormativity has gender binaries (i.e. male + female) as a cornerstone and dominates these “gendered sexualities.” But we see it tentatively giving way to transformational experiences, structures, and identities. We say “tentatively” in part because scholarship—such as that guiding this chapter and this book—fills us in, but also reproduces explicit as well as sneaky ways that gender and sexuality are repressively linked, as suggested by Weeks (2009) and Foucault (1978). Therefore, to grasp links between gender and sexuality we also address the social construction of knowledge about it. Through our lens—pulling on the current approaches in areas ranging from hooking up to coming out; from the heteronormativity of U.S. family policy to marketing of gay porn; from the racialized respectability politics of gender and sexuality to effective resistance of those very forces—the links are *persistent*, though their relations are evolving and unstable.

In our approach, we present a vast array of cases to depict approaches to gender and sexuality. Multiple identities and contexts make it difficult—antithetical to our perspective, even—to provide a quick blurb about what sex and gender are like for each (falsely assumed) monolithic group. Doing so might obfuscate the common (though differently experienced) ways that context and institutions inform and follow from gender and sexuality. Thus, our approach aspires to resist the performance of socially constructed boundaries such as analyzing straight versus gay versus married versus single versus trans versus cis versus an enormous matrix of other identities. Our approach, though, should lead you to understanding more about all of these.

Think, for example, of discourse on family policy, seemingly devoid of categorical information: yet it reveals gender and sexuality

structures by affirming some identities and neglecting others. The de facto model of family in debates about paid leave or childcare persists as a heteronormative, biologically based family: Sexuality—from norms to practices—is fundamental and yet not central in these debates. Norms and practices are, instead, submerged, often naturalized. The default model of the aspirational family is frequently inflected with whiteness when one traces the debates on family structure that are infused with racist backlash. In a 20th anniversary look back at the Welfare Reform Act of 1996, Cohen (2016) demonstrates how racist stereotypes were a key basis for making welfare more punitive, especially towards black single moms. He mapped attitudes linking poverty, race, and family structure to overwhelming belief that dependence (rather than a lack of opportunities) was a serious harm. The popular sentiment against single parents that grew in the early 1990s justified a welfare reform program that limited opportunities even more. You see the synergy between gender and sexuality, and the relevance of intersecting statuses. The unsexy case of family policy reminds us that gender functions in remote and impersonal ways (Mills, 1959) to organize personal experience. Sexuality seems personal, private, and particular, but it really isn't only that. Looking at sexuality with a gender lens (Rutter & Schwartz, 2012) allows us to start with thinking about what gender *is* to move on to look at what gender *does*. And while heteronormativity, as the family policy example suggests, is the cornerstone of gendered sexuality, resistance to these constraints is real and has implications for other forms of inequality by means of calling out the essentialism implied by rigid categories in fixed relation to one another.

2 What Gender Does to Sex

Is the persistent connection between gender and sexuality necessary? Some evolutionary psychologists argue yes: they observe behavioral *differences* between men and women and see these as an affirming product of reproductive

differences between males and females (Buss, 1995). Men inseminate, women incubate, and these biological differences, goes this essentialist view, are fundamentally fixed and as such account for differences in desire and social relations. Others critique these as “just so stories” (Gould & Lewontin, 1979). For sociologists of sexuality, the causal ordering, if anything, seems backward; social context may generate desire, rather than desire generating a social order. Looking to social context leads to recognizing when categories of “man” and “woman”—as well as “male” and “female”—are invoked as restrictive binaries rather than used as a heuristic—a short-hand to reference a broad range of social experience. Binaries assume the relation between gender and sexuality is already known, and neglect the persistence of gender and sexual fluidity, intersex, and transgender statuses. Recent work we review here invokes categories of man, woman, male, and female in a way that broadly can be understood as heuristics used for discovery and understanding how context generates a wide range of reinforcing connections between gender and sexuality. Recent attention to gender and sexual fluidity has enriched scholarship, and also serves as a robust rebuttal to the rigid relation between gender and sex category that is often reinscribed even by sociological accounts of gender difference.

3 Gender Difference Constructs and Reconstructs

Gender difference—what in the 1990s was made popular by the notion of “men are from Mars, women are from Venus”—is a powerful, and sometimes sneaky, tool for upholding binaries and keeping links between gender and sexuality alive. A recent study shows how the social world uses sex to tout, tease, and toy with ideas of gender difference: In 2013, Kornrich, Brines, and Leupp (2013) reported that heterosexual couples who shared household tasks equally had less sex than those who followed more gender-traditional scripts—think men in the yard, women in the kitchen. The study tore up the media with

coverage in *USA Today*, *Washington Post*, *CNN*, and others.

It harkened back to ideas widely popular in earlier times. For example, Kościańska (2016, 236) analyzed the work of Polish sexologists from the 1970s and 1980s and found that experts suggested that sex was vital to happy marriages, that traditional gender roles were best for a couple’s sexual relationship, and thus worried that heterosexual couples in which the wife worked would be less satisfied. For analysis in more recent times of discourses on gender, Kuperberg and Stone (2008) demonstrated how media mislead about women’s work/family decisions in preference for “opting out”; editors were seemingly influenced by gender stereotypes even as data demonstrated contravening evidence (Boushey, 2005).

The scholarly critiques of the provocative Kornrich article pertained to the recency of the data—from 20 years prior to publication. Couples from 1993 might be different from couples today, given changes in resources and cultural norms (Carlson, Miller, Sassler, & Hanson, 2016; Rutter, 2014). Multiple new studies made the correction, showing that when more recent data are used, couples with more egalitarian arrangements (income, housework, childcare) report greater sexual satisfaction (Sassler, 2016).

Yet, those corrections aren’t so different from the argument made by Kornrich et al. Their study recalls the insight of Blumstein and Schwartz, who, in their 1983 *American Couples* research, asked whether gender, sexual orientation, or type of relationship would be more or less influential over sexual behavior—as well as decision making and other power-related issues. Times—and patterns—may change, but intersecting features such as gender and relationship type keep coming up. The new work in response to Kornrich from Carlson and others in the 2010s tells us that structures of gender do *something* to sex. The updated cases argue that egalitarian relationships exceed traditional ones in terms of measures of sexual satisfaction or frequency. There is a “sexual mystique inside our heads” (Rutter, 2013) that is infused with the way that gender structures that have nothing to do with doing sex

nonetheless influence behavior, and even influence desire. Those structures are strengthened when uncomplicated versions of gender difference are presented.

You will continue to read new and updated versions of the gender-housework-sex story. The story will change but, epistemologically, the components will continue to persist: gender, sex, and larger contexts (such as domestic arrangements and the political economy¹ that dictates them) are useful for understanding sexual desire. These studies don't focus on race, ethnicity, and national status, as we do below; they begin, however, to show us the robust, embedded features of the political economy that influence personal matters.

4 Gendering Desire, Intersectionally

You can read many articles about the power of context over desire. Consider this recent study: Hypothesizing that there was more than biology at play in women's orgasms, Harris, Hornsey, and Barlow (2016, 1924) found that women's frequency of orgasm related negatively to their own endorsement of "benevolent sexism," that is, a system of "prejudicial attitudes toward women [that] are justified through the guise of care and protection" such as through chivalry. Benevolently sexist attitudes predicted women's "decreased willingness to ask a partner for sexual pleasure," which ultimately resulted in fewer orgasms for women. The connections between attitude and experience enabled by statistical techniques are missing from popular explanations: adolescent women in an online message board noted gender inequality as a reason for the gender gap in orgasms, but many attributed orgasm gaps to differences in biology (Saliars, Wilkerson, Sieving, & Brady, 2017). Sexist beliefs predicted what might be thought of as the natural proclivities of men, too: Swami and Tovée (2013) found that sexist, oppressive, and

hostile attitudes toward women predicted men's preferences for large breasts. Social psychological research abounds with examples like these.

It isn't just microinteractions and cultural attitudes that play a role in gendering sexuality. Institutions, too, inform the combined shape of gender, sexuality, race, and ethnicity. Institutions pick and choose who or what is a "social problem" or a "social good." Mann (2013, 681–682) studied "Latina youth sexualities in the context of sexual and reproductive health care provision" to highlight "that providers emphasize teenage pregnancy as a social problem... to the exclusion of other dimensions of youth sexualities." Hood and colleagues (2017) found that African American women, like Latinas, were similarly encouraged to use condoms as a way to prevent pregnancy. Such a limited way of envisioning sexuality—as only about reproduction—reduces the impact and focus on other kinds of sex positivity as well as sexual health, as was the focus for these scholars concerned with HIV prevention. Pathologizing extends across sexual identities: social stigma motivates socially subordinated groups such as the Latina lesbians studied by Acosta (2016) to police their sexuality, further marginalizing those outside of their "charmed circle" of respectable femininity.

Resistance, too, makes institutions and racism visible. Young Latinas, profiled in Garcia's *Respect Yourself, Protect Yourself: Latina Girls and Sexual Identity* (2012), developed empowering strategies to go beyond school- and family-based raced and classed fears about their sexuality. The Black Women's Blueprint (2016) in "An Open Letter from Black Women to the Slutwalk" demonstrated how race intersects with sexuality for white women versus women of color. The background is this: In 2014, mainly white students at the University of Toronto, outraged by woman-blaming comments regarding "slutty dress" by campus police, initiated Slutwalks, which spread across North America. The Black Women's Blueprint (BWB) letter argued that marching publicly in revealing clothes as a symbol is easier for white women than for women of color: "As Black women, we do not have the privilege or the space to call

¹Political economy here simply means the conjunction of market and non-market determinants of behavior.

ourselves ‘slut’ without validating the already historically entrenched ideology and recurring messages about what and who the Black woman is,” (BWB, 2016, 10). They continue, “The personal is political. For us, the problem of trivialized rape and the absence of justice are intertwined with race, gender, sexuality, poverty, immigration, and community” (11).

Geography is a more diffuse, yet key factor in gendering sexuality. Historically, links between gender, sexuality, and geography have been recognized in examining the city as a space for non-normative sexualities, transgender people, and non-gender conforming identities (Chauncey, 1994). Such work has evolved into observing how cities generate paths and opportunities for LGBTQ identity formation (e.g., Muñoz Laboy, Parker, Perry, & Garcia, 2013; Brown-Saracino, 2015). For example, the role of place is highlighted in a study of same-sex attracted youth in urban and rural high schools (Wilkinson & Pearson, 2009). Gay, lesbian, and bisexual teens were more depressed in rural schools than urban schools—with results more pronounced for men. (Religiosity affected women more.) Regional differences highlighted in “Midwest or Lesbian?” by Emily Kazzyak (2012) showed how in rural areas, “butch” gender expression is understood in ways that relate to the outdoors and rustic life: Thus, women who are butch can be interpreted as “tomboys”—that is straight women who do masculine things—or as lesbian. Thus, gender performance is coded as a way to understand sexuality (whether to signal or to interpret), but that performance varies by context, including geographical context.

Nation is another aspect of geography that can drive expression: In 1920s Hungary, anti-Semitic scientific racism motivated “race biologists” to emphasize that women’s (procreative, intra-racial) sexuality was fundamental for the survival of the Magyar [Hungarian] people (Kund, 2016). To achieve this goal, women were encouraged to pursue motherhood at the cost of employment and education (Kund, 2016, 197). In contemporary China, economic prosperity enabled by the opening of Chinese markets in 1978 spurred on a culture of

individualism—and with it a culture in which asexual dating sites and support for “notions such as platonic love, celibacy, the DINK (double income, no kids) family and the big family” have become popular (Wong, 2014, 100). At the same time, however, the Chinese government and medical establishment have pathologized asexuality. The government’s emphasis on the importance of sexual relationships is intended as a corrective to disintegrating trends such as rising divorce rates, which are perceived as resulting from a growing trend toward asexuality (Wong, 2014, 105–106).

National comparisons are also a tool for understanding gendered sexuality. Schalet’s study of U.S. and Dutch adolescents and their parents included comparisons of women’s sexual subjectivity. Sexual subjectivity involves perceiving oneself as one who can “be aware of one’s sexual feelings, ...enjoy sexual desire and pleasure, ...conceive of oneself as the subject of one’s sexual acts, and ...experience a certain amount of control in sexual relationships” (Schalet, 2010, 305). In The Netherlands, where teen sexual health and education are provided without strings or stipulations such as abstinence-only, many practices from childhood lead to the “common sense” that sex is for relationships. In the U.S., parents and institutions assume teens are in a “war between the sexes,” gripped by “raging hormones” rather than a wider range of emotions; parenting and policies reflect this. Relationships at this stage are not real to the U.S. parents, so sex is “acting out.” Indeed, reinforcing Schalet’s findings, another study, comparing popular magazines read by adolescent girls in the U.S. with those in the Netherlands, found that U.S. media featured more content on the hook-up culture and casual sex, while Dutch media “focused more on committed sex” and “sex within the emotional context of love” (Joshi, Peter, & Valkenburg, 2014, 291).

The larger contexts combined add up to influence over sexual subjectivity: In the U.S., Schalet argues, women have less access to the experience of being in control of their sexuality. The U.S. and Dutch cases have much in common: they are economically and politically

similar countries. Teens in both countries start having sex on average at age 17. U.S. teens, however, have a high rate of unintended pregnancy and STDS (though lower than two decades ago) while the Netherlands has the lowest worldwide (Schalet, 2011).

Zeroing in on family life, parents make their child's sexuality about gender even as the parents themselves are gendered. For example, heterosexual fathers, in interviews, reported that they want their children "to be as heterosexual as possible" (Solebello & Elliott, 2011, 301). The dads distinctly emphasized this with sons through myriad methods of reinforcing hetero masculinity and punishing anything outside these strict boundaries. Such identity work in families dynamically constructs heteronormative desire. LGBTQ parents are conscious of being held accountable for their children—and for themselves as queer parents, reports Averett (2016). She advises, "LGBTQ parents are involved not only in the continual bringing forth of their own self-identities but also in bringing their children's identities into social being when they, as parents, (mis)recognize gender expression and sexuality in their children" (193). Dozier (2015), writing about parenting as a trans man, highlights the significant opportunity—as well as the many challenges—of being a "guy mom." Dozier notes, "upending expected gendered behaviors and family structures forces both individuals and institutions to examine heteronormative systems that create and perpetuate gender inequality" (473). Embedded in national and cultural contexts, the work done in families around gender and sexuality is continual, even relentless. It reveals the reliance on marriage—and family—as a staging ground for heteronormative sexualities (Goffman, 1977). This means it is a space for resistance as well as control.

5 Markets Mediating Gender and Sexuality

What about "free markets?" An infinity of heteronormatively gendered and racist stereotypes are sold and displayed through mainstream media,

as well as alternative markets, such as gay adult film. Casting in the gay adult film industry relegates (presumably dominant, hypersexual, hypermasculine) black men to the "niche sites" and Asian men to submissive and less prestigious roles (Burke, 2016, 596), and privileges young (20–35), white, "jockish," "well-endowed" men with more scenes at higher pay rates (599). These casting choices reify ideals of "hegemonic masculinity" for viewers (Burke, 2016, 601), suggesting that "gay adult film studios are complicit in the domination of gay and effeminate men" (587). You can look, for example, at the most popular gay porn categories on Pornhub (2016)—to see a map of gendered desire in the marketplace: (1) Black; (2) Straight Guys; (3) Bareback; (4) Big Dick; (5) Daddy. In contrast to some of the less-popular categories like "Reality," "Solo Male," and "Japanese," the top searches draw on notions of hegemonic, racialized masculinity and femininity.

Lesbian dating sites provide similarly gendered examples. Women, using labels such as femme, butch, and queer, telegraph different expressions of gender and sexuality. Hightower (2015, 20) observed: "Femme members sought to highlight their femininity, butches' boundary work made salient their sexual interest, and queer members defended their sex category as female and sexual identity as lesbian." Marketing desire and the sexual self, even in settings that are quite remote from the "family policy" example at the beginning of this chapter, keeps landing us back in the world of gender conventions. While links between gender and sexuality persist, they persistently offer opportunities, like these, to use those links for unconventional desires and interests.

Colorism, too, contours gender and desire. Colorism is skin color stratification seen across groups but also within racial and ethnic groups; it shapes employment opportunities as it does romantic ones (Darity, 2010). Darity and others have shown, for instance, that lighter-skinned African Americans earn more and are promoted more quickly than darker-skinned peers; and so goes attention on the dating market. The racialized romantic market is evidenced in the slow (though persistent) rise of interracial marriages

(Poulin & Rutter, 2011). A 2013 study of online dating showed that white women and men received the most interest online, while blacks received the least; Asians and Latinx were in between (Lin & Lundquist, 2013). Biracial and multiracial individuals add additional dimension to this simplified hierarchy, suggesting colorism as well as race stage desire (Curington, Lin, & Lundquist, 2015). Three multiracial groups, in Curington et al.'s study, appeared to get more attention when online dating. Asian-white women were viewed more favorably than any other group of women by white and Asian men, getting more responses than women of the same race or ethnic group. Asian-white and Hispanic-white men were also of greater interest to Asian and Hispanic women. Asian and Hispanic women responded more frequently to the multiracial men than to either their co-ethnic men or whites. While it seems that barriers are declining, preferences that mirror advantages for lighter skinned mixed-race individuals shape online dating. This suggests markets—including dating markets—are not “free.”

6 What Sex Does to Gender

Is the unstable relation between gender and sexuality the very source of its persistence? To understand gender and sexuality combined, you need to recognize that sexuality and sexual practices influence gender, not just the other way around. In the 19th century, the “True Woman,” which was central to the homemaker/breadwinner model of family life, was a mother and wife, completely devoid of sexual desire and yet situated in society based on her reproductive function; this was a marker of her femininity (D’Emilio & Freedman, 1988). The same relation—where sexual desire confirms gender—operates in other contexts, such as trans sexualities. Close examination of trans men’s autobiographies, for example, points to how sexual behaviors “materialize maleness” (Latham, 2016, 362). Through examination of trans men’s narratives, Latham suggests that these men’s purported lack of sexual desire is more artifact than fact. Trans

men are aware that in order to receive gender-affirming healthcare, they must conform to a diagnosis of gender dysphoria, which is “persistent discomfort” with their body (Latham, 2016, 348). This may be the source of medical claims that low sexual desire is definitive of trans men’s sexuality. Even the small amount of legitimacy granted by medical diagnosis shapes how trans men report (in some spaces) their level of sexual desire. In this case, *how one does sex*—including refraining from it—affirms “maleness.” Latham’s point is that for medical practitioners—who can legitimate patients’ claims to identity—reports of (lower) sexual desire become a stand-in for confirming that patients are “true” trans men. Links between how one does (or says one does) sex and identity emerge elsewhere as well: Dozier’s study of trans men’s sexual encounters also highlights this. Dozier (2005, 297) explains, “When sex characteristics do not align with gender, behavior becomes more important to gender expression and interpretation.” The power of the fragile link between gender and sexuality is clear where the 19th century “True Woman” as well as 21st century trans men link low sexual desire to gender affirmation.

Prison is another space for gendering sexuality. Jenness and Fenstermaker (2014, 2016) wrote about the interactional processes between desire and gender in men’s prisons: Gender dictates sexuality/desire in prisons such that inmates identified as “real men” were drawn toward the femininity of transgender inmates. Yet, in this setting, sexual desire also had an influence on gender affirmation. For women or femme-expressing individuals in men’s prisons, “the attention and affection of ‘real men,’ in turn, is taken to be a measure of gender status” (Jenness & Fenstermaker, 2014, 14). Transgender women in prison also noted gender norms that constrained their behavior: Women in men’s prisons felt the need to “act like a lady,” which entailed “staying in line,” and enabled some women to slut-shame those who were non-monogamous. Prisoners occupy a world where sexuality and gender are intertwined, and punishment, including rape (Jenness & Fenstermaker, 2016) are among the

stakes of gender transgression. Indeed, a dilemma with the intersection between gender and sexuality is that it has a costly hierarchy of idealized forms with femininity consolidating inequality at the bottom of that hierarchy, as illustrated in the context of an “all-male” prison.

Gendering desire infiltrates many contexts and leads to a wide range of expressions that nonetheless return us to the persistent link between the two. We’ve looked at social psychology that shapes people in or out of orgasm. We’ve reviewed national contexts and cultural statuses that can generate normalcy for asexual identities, or sex-positive sexual health, or a war between the sexes mode of thinking about sexuality. Examples have shown how family and parenting can be a setting for generating fear or optimism about their children’s range of self-expression, and how the role of being a parent can also be stressed by whether one is conforming to hegemonic versions of gender and sexuality. We’ve seen how racism—as well as colorism—shapes what desires get revealed or expressed. We’ve recognized how these same social contextual factors shape gender non-conforming people’s experiences. Finally, we’ve seen how the relation between gender and sexuality can be viewed in terms of what sex does to gender, as in cases where how we do sex or claim desire itself becomes a way to be accorded a gendered status. You can read copiously about the diverse ways that social context impinges on the expression of desire. Throughout all, the prominence of gender as a mediating factor means that gender and sexuality are rarely de-linked.

7 Newer Sex Research

As gender and sexuality are socially constructed, so is knowledge in this field. Researchers of sexuality and gender occupy contexts, carry histories, and have identities that influence the knowledge produced. Sometimes researchers encounter “inconvenient facts”—facts that can conflict with taken-for-granted positions in the world (Weber, 1946, 147). Newer research

brings to light the inconvenient facts that might threaten dominant group ideologies about gender and sexuality. Prior to the 1970s, sex research was very busy telling the story of sexuality from straight white men’s point of view. For example, the assumption that women were devoid of sexual interest meant that white women’s interracial sexual relationships could be easily read by white people as evidence of rape of white women—and made it easy to overlook the possibility of white women’s desire or even sexual coercion against black men, as suggested in the case of Willie McGee (Brownmiller, 1975, 263–270). McGee was a black man in Mississippi who was convicted in 1945 and sentenced to death for raping a white woman, who made the accusation. Subsequent reporting suggested that the relationship had been consensual or possibly forced by the white woman (Heard, 2010). Similarly, in 2017, news emerged (Tyson, 2017) that a white woman had very belatedly confessed that no verbal or physical advances towards her had occurred, even though her claims that she had been targeted had been at the center of African American child Emmett Till’s 1955 murder in Mississippi by a group of white men. None of Till’s murderers or false accusers were brought to justice.

The 1970s ushered in efforts to rethink women’s orgasms with such works at Barbach’s *For Yourself* (1976), which dismissed earlier ideas of the supremacy of vaginal orgasms and celebrated sexual pleasure. In the 1990s, efforts to collect nationally representative data about sexual behavior, attitudes, and interests were quashed and ridiculed from the U.S. Senate floor. Scholars had been both spurred on and punished by the legacy of the 1970s sexual revolution. The “Sex in America” survey—modestly named The National Health and Social Life Survey (Laumann, Gagnon, Michael, & Michaels, 1994)—became a key resource for understanding evolving sexualities in that decade and was eventually funded by private foundations. But not without resistance: A backlash around sexuality and unsettling shifts towards gender equality and queer identities curtailed earlier, ambitious plans that were funded and then rescinded by the U.S. National Institutes of Health.

Beyond survey research, a newer, more diverse generation of sexualities scholars has made ethnography key to more intersectional understandings about gender and sexuality. Indeed, study of gender and sexuality has been improved by having more queer scholars and scholars of color asking and answering questions. *Dude, You're a Fag*, a 2007 study of how high school boys relate to each other and engage in what author C.J. Pascoe named the “fag discourse,” made heteronormativity—the joint social construction of gender and sexuality—recognizable to scholars and students well beyond those who were already studying gender and sexuality. Pascoe’s description of raced and classed differences around heteronormativity made a lasting impact on how others study gender and sexuality.

In 2011, Mignon Moore’s *Invisible Families: Gay Identities, Relationships and Motherhood among Black Women* (2011) profiled lesbian women of color and the multiple intersections of sexuality with class and national origin, and presented variations of “coming into the life”—her frame for coming out. Moore’s work decentered the story of gender and sexuality from privileged white binaries. The decentering was not just an augmentation of categorical knowledge, but shifted theories of gender and sexuality. Moore foregrounded accounts of social class, immigration status, and gender expression and how they related to a whole set of ways that lesbians come into the life. This set forth the view that intersectional looks at gender and sexuality provide more reliable knowledge of experience. For *Respect Yourself, Protect Yourself: Latina Girls and Sexual Identity* (2012), Lorena Garcia spent time with Mexican American and Puerto Rican high school women, and offered their accounts of managing home, school, and societal sources that stigmatized their sexuality. Garcia wrote of these women’s resourcefulness when countering racist, sexist, cultural, and institutional forms of social control. These works highlight how ethnography has filled in the ample, white-washed blind spots on heteronormativity, coming out, and coming of age sexually as women of color. This kind of

work—and much other—has been valuable empirically but also theoretically, as it demands more of scholars as they apply an intersectional analysis.

Research methods influence the complexity of analysis, but also directly affect data. For example, women report their sexual behavior differently depending on race: One experiment found that, among college women, “non-White participants were more sensitive to changes in ... experimental variables and more likely than White participants to report fewer behaviors and more conservative attitudes when completing computer-based surveys, when in laboratory experiments, or while in the presence of experimenters” (McCallum & Peterson, 2015, 2296). As emphasized by the Black Women’s Blueprint (2016), women of color are more likely to live under regimes of respectability politics as well as to live in a world where state surveillance of them is familiar and common.

8 The Production of Knowledge

Social trends affect what we know about gender and sexual behavior. For example, using data from the General Social Survey (GSS), Twenge, Sherman, and Wells (2016) found that in 2010, twice as many American adults had at least one same-sex sexual encounter than in the 1990s. Twenge et al. (2016, 1713) reported numerous group differences: “Increases in same-sex sexual behavior were largest in the South and Midwest and among Whites, were mostly absent among Blacks, and were smaller among the religious.” Attitudes liberalized in this time, more of the increase was among women than men, and nearly all of the increase was among people who have sex with *both* men and women. The increases in behavior could only be partially explained by the historic liberalization of attitudes towards homosexuality that occurred in that time period. Twenge and colleagues (2016, 1724) speculate that more accepting media depictions of homosexuality may lead people to overestimate what is admissible, and to act on those estimates. Alternatively, one’s overestimate

of social acceptability may also make people more comfortable reporting their behavior in a person-to-person survey like the GSS. Work by Paula England and colleagues demonstrates that women's behaviors and attitudes—engaging and supporting same-sex sexuality—have a stronger influence than men's, giving hints that the “fluidity” is less of an option for men (England, Mishel, & Caudillo, 2016). Our point is that data can facilitate a recognition of greater diversity of gender and sexual experiences—but that social context—or in this case social trends—make our ability to *see* what is in our data possible.

9 Fluidity

Recent focus on gender and sexual fluidity suggests that researchers might not have a clear consensus on what to study. Surveys are only as good as the (socially constructed) measures they use (Westbrook & Saperstein, 2015). Albury (2015, 649), in research on “alternative” sex subcultures, suggested that attention to survey respondents’ “simultaneous affiliation with heterosexual, homosexual *and* bisexual identities might (productively) trouble academic research and sexual health policy frameworks” that assume a single and fixed sexual identity. For example, Pfeffer's (2014, 15) study of women dating trans men documents how they surpass binary definitions of their sexuality: 50% of the sample (partners of trans men) identified as queer, 22% “lesbian” or “dyke,” and 14% bisexual. Vrangalova and Savin-Williams (2012, 96–99) recommend that researchers add survey categories to reflect “mostly heterosexual” and “mostly gay/lesbian,” because of significant differences in same-sex attraction and behavior along a five-stage sexual orientation scale. As England et al. (2016) echoed (discussed above), they find that fewer men than women use the “non-exclusive” categories.

Recent collegiate “hooking up” studies (Wade, 2017) have been a source of information about sexual behavior and fluidity, and have made distinctions about different contexts. Women on middle class campuses who identified with professional goals were more likely to see

hooking up as the dominant sexual script (Armstrong, England, & Fogarty, 2012). Those mainly middle-class campus studies highlight, too, the way that “straight girls kissing” is an extension of the sexual script in those mainly heteronormative spaces (Rupp & Taylor, 2010; Rupp et al., 2014)—yet also, for some, a pathway to exploring and moving toward lesbian and queer identities. This potential for movement to queer from (defaulted and assumed) straight identities has looked more limited for working class women. Nevertheless, as Budnick (2016) points out, working class women have the highest prevalence of same-sex behavior. This qualitative study shows that working class women were influenced by other life scripts—such as earlier parenthood and greater preference for “bisexual” over “queer” identifiers. Taken together, these studies highlight *sexual fluidity*. They also point to how much context—social class in this case—shapes expression and meanings of sexual desire. Ultimately, these cases show that we are still limited in understanding fluidity even when we include lots of questions about people's sexuality and present them as a spectrum, because different groups define the same concepts differently.

Researchers at the Williams Institute (2009, 6) recommend that surveys assessing sexuality use three measures: identity, behavior, and attraction. This might better enable subjects, like the straight men studied by Jane Ward in *Not gay: Sex between straight white men* (2015), to fully describe their sexuality. Ward's study examines settings where straight men have sex with each other, such as in fraternity and military hazing routines, and yet do not see this as gay or queer sex.

Not everyone comes to a survey with the same experiences. Adolescents, for example, may not have had sex, and may not be ready to commit to a particular sexual orientation, but may be able to tell a researcher the gender of the type of people they are attracted to. In one representative sample of Swedish high school students, “Prevalence rates of sexual minority orientation varied between 4.3% for sexual behavior (males 2.9%, females 5.6%) and 29.4% for emotional or sexual attraction (males 17.7%, females 39.5%)” (Priebe & Sveden, 2013, 727). Researchers have found that

“milestones” of understanding of one’s sexuality occurred at different ages based on gender and sexual orientation identification (Katz-Wise, Reisner, Hughto, & Keo-Meier, 2016, 10). On the whole, men achieved these milestones earlier (Katz-Wise et al. 2016:10) and adolescent women and bisexuals less stably reported their sexual attraction (Savin-Williams, Joyner, & Rieger, 2012), but all adolescents tended to decrease their reports of same-sex attraction over time (Savin-Williams & Joyner, 2014).

The use of multiple measures allows for further recognition and discovery of emerging newer arrangements between gender and sexuality. James Joseph Dean’s *Straights: Heterosexuality in a Post-Closeted Culture* (2014) examines manifestations of sexuality (and gender) in an age when heterosexuality, he argues, is not taken for granted. Metrosexuals, for example, may display non-traditional masculinities (Bridges, 2014), and it is increasingly unacceptable to be overtly homophobic. But straight men still have methods to convey their heterosexual identity, including through frequent reference to their girlfriends or through hypervigilance about not crossing their legs (Dean, 2013, 547–554). Similarly, Ward’s *Not Gay* tells the story of how straight men, occupying a world where sexual fluidity is more evident and acknowledged, go to great efforts to deny sexual fluidity, harkening back to the idea of Weber’s “inconvenient facts.” These studies challenge the ultimate “naturalized” and taken-for-granted comparison group (straight white men) as well as the “biological essentialism now at the heart of gay rights claims” (Ward, 2016, 75) by merely studying them from a social constructionist perspective. Ward refers to this as part of “dyke methods” (2016). These efforts are core to disentangling that long history of uncertainly intertwined relations between sexuality and gender.

10 Sex/Gender/Politics

Want to witness the synergy between gender and sexuality? Watch politics and read political history. In the 19th century, U.S. Postmaster General

Anthony Comstock used the anti-pornography regulations of the postal service to prevent mailing contraceptive information: This garnered him political power via the gambit to control women’s bodies. Sexual scandals bring to mind the 1990s President Bill Clinton’s encounters with a White House intern or the case of Donald Trump’s “Grab’em by the pussy. You can do anything,” (New York Times, 2016) televised remarks. Such cases use women’s bodies and sexual stories about them to generate a hostile climate, anxiety, and fear, all in the service of raising or lowering the power of the figures involved.

We see links between those tabloid scandals to legislative fronts that are really “exclusion from society” bills (GLAAD, 2016). As we write, many states are following North Carolina with bills that limit access to bathrooms. A spate of bills across the U.S. seeks to prevent people from using a men’s or women’s restroom that aligns with their gender identification. The HB2 bill—which was passed by the N.C. legislature in 2016 and was nominally repealed in 2017 only to have other discriminatory policies put into place—denies human rights to transgender people by using the troll that girls and women are made vulnerable by imagined predatory opportunities (Schilt & Westbrook, 2015). Whether 1890s, 1990s, or more recently, the sexual scandals and sex/gender legislation stories are about power. Finally, the wind in the sails of these stories is heteronormative structures of gender.

Any who doubt the frame of sex as a political football can consider the issue of wartime rape, where rape is literally a weapon of war, such as in the 1990s war in Bosnia. As Henry (2015) argues, crimes against humanity, including sexual violence in conflicts, are done by individuals, but they are not *individual* crimes “because victims are targeted predominantly on the basis of their membership of a targeted group,” (Henry, 2015, 45). Given documentation of a widespread campaign using rape to terrorize Serbians, the International War Crimes Tribunal prosecuted those involved. News reports (Goodman, 1997) illustrated the denials in one case:

In a reply to his accusers, Mr. Mejajic, who along with others under indictment remains safely in Serb territory, described Ms. Cigelj as being old and unattractive; he added that he wouldn't have leaned his bicycle against her, much less raped her.

Such remarks were paralleled in the 2016 statements of (then) presidential candidate Donald Trump:

Donald Trump on Friday intimated a woman who accused him of sexually assaulting her was not attractive enough to have drawn his interest, part of a broader attack on the integrity and physical appearance of multiple women who've come forward this week to accuse the GOP presidential nominee of sexual assault (Lim, 2016).

These men, in and out of military settings, first deny their actions and harms, and then repeat them through degrading women to elevate themselves specifically and symbolically. These cases are part of what Pascoe and Hollander (2016) call "mobilizing rape," which they argue is the case of men making claims of masculinity for their performing opposition to rape. They note "that *not* sexually assaulting may also do dominance work. Men can assert dominance both over women and over other men, who are constructed as ruled by emotions, unable to exercise masculine self-control, or not masculine enough to have young women simply fall over themselves with sexual desire" (76). In the case of Mekajic in the 1990s or Trump in the 2010s, the "denial" talk that purports not to threaten physical acts of harm and abuse reinforces the right to harm and abuse and normalizes the use of rape language to support desperate ties to masculinity. In the case of Trump, the denial talk is countered by the proud expression of "grab'em by the pussy," made in the same campaign.

11 Conclusions

Dean's *Straights: Heterosexuality in a Post-Closeted Culture* (2014) offers the premise that heterosexuality is less naturalized, less often the default assumption, and examines how (straight) people signal straightness in such a world. The more things change the more they remain the

same—people do what they have always done around gendered sexuality—the Trump and Mekajic cases show this. Except that more and more people do not do the same thing, and that is new. On the one hand, our conclusions revolve around this gender conundrum (Jones, Rutter, & Boateng, 2015), that gender—including gendered sexuality—persists in different forms to do similar work of supporting inequality. On the other hand, the way forward is through detecting change and transformation wherever we find it. For example: Sennott and Angotti (2016) observed in their rural South African fieldwork that the majority of conversations about HIV/AIDS and gendered sexuality included questioning notions of hegemonic gender norms, because they put families and communities at risk for the disease. These reconsiderations were enabled by a raging epidemic, and even still members of the community appealed to the notions of the naturalness of gendered sexuality that are not unique to South Africa: Men should not have to "eat chicken (or fish) every day of the week," (947) and women should not be sexually agentic or challenge the behavior of their partners. Scholars and activists ideally will make use of both the change and stasis parts of this story.

Our reading of the literature on sexuality is that the synergy between gender and sexuality is alive and strong. In previous decades, sociology has seen the gendering of sexuality as a powerful tool for policing it, employing race, ethnicity, and social class along the way to strengthen that power. Heteronormativity and homophobia have fueled the mutually reinforcing connection between gender and sexuality such that the logic of heteronormativity—i.e. "to be a good woman is to be a good heterosexual woman"—idealizes hetero but also makes gendered identity a virtue, a kind of sexiness.

This has not gone away—but new connections are being forged. With the emerging recognition of gender and sexual fluidity, a wide range of gender expression (that has always existed) is gaining more legitimacy. With a growing understanding of the lives of transgender people, the connections of gender to sexuality keep getting decentered. Do we think gender

and sexuality will ever be disconnected from one another? It matters less to us whether they are connected or disconnected than that heteronormativity ceases to be a source of social control, racism, and structured inequalities by regulating gender and sexuality.

References

- Acosta, K. L. (2016). Cultivating a Lesbiana Seria identity. *Sexualities, 19*, 517–534.
- Albury, K. (2015). Identity plus? Bi-curiosity, sexual adventurism and the boundaries of ‘straight’ sexual practices and identities. *Sexualities, 18*, 649–664.
- Armstrong, E. A., England, P., & Fogarty, A. C. K. (2012). Accounting for women’s orgasm and sexual enjoyment in college hookups and relationships. *American Sociological Review, 77*, 435–462.
- Averett, K. (2016). The gender buffet: LGBTQ parents resisting heteronormativity. *Gender & Society, 30*, 189–212.
- Barbach, L. (1976). *For yourself: The fulfillment of female sexuality*. Garden City: Anchor Press.
- Black Women’s Blueprint. (2016). An open letter from black women to the SlutWalk. *Gender & Society, 30*, 9–13.
- Blumstein, P., & Schwartz, P. (1983). *American couples: money, sex, work*. New York: William Morrow.
- Boushey, H. (2005, November). *Are women opting out? Debunking the myth*. Center for Economic and Policy Research Briefing Paper. Washington DC: CEPR.
- Bridges, T. (2014). A very “Gay” straight?: Hybrid masculinities, sexual aesthetics, and the changing relationship between masculinity and homophobia. *Gender & Society, 28*, 58–82.
- Brownmiller, S. (1975). *Against our will: Men women and rape*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Brown-Saracino, J. (2015). How places shape identity: The origins of distinctive LBQ identities in four small US cities. *American Journal of Sociology, 121*, 1–63.
- Budnick, J. (2016). “Straight girls kissing?”: Understanding same-gender sexuality beyond the elite college campus. *Gender & Society, 30*, 745–768.
- Burke, N. B. (2016). Hegemonic masculinity at work in the gay adult film industry. *Sexualities, 19*, 587–607.
- Buss, D. (1995). Psychological sex differences: Origins through sexual selection. *American Psychologist, 50*, 164–168.
- Carlson, D. L., Miller, A. J., Sassler, S., & Hanson, S. (2016). The gendered division of housework and couples’ sexual relationships: A reexamination. *Journal of Marriage and Family, 78*, 975–995.
- Chauncey, G. (1994). *Gay New York: Gender, urban culture, and the making of the gay male world, 1890–1940*. New York: Basic Books.
- Cohen, P. (2016, August 22). *Council on contemporary families brief: Welfare reform attitudes and single mothers’ employment after 20 years*. <https://contemporaryfamilies.org/tanf-attitudes-at-20/>. Accessed January 15, 2017.
- Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: A black feminist critique of anti-discrimination doctrine, feminist politics and anti-racist politics. *University of Chicago Legal Forum, 1989*, 139–167.
- Curington, C. V., Lin, K.-H., & Lundquist, J. H. (2015). Positioning multiraciality in cyberspace: Treatment of multiracial daters in an online dating website. *American Sociological Review, 80*, 764–788.
- Darity, W. A., Jr. (2010). Racism and colorism in post-racial societies. In L. Bond, F. McGinnity, & H. Russell (Eds.), *Making equality count: Irish and international research measuring equality and discrimination* (pp. 113–129). Dublin: The Liffey Press.
- Dean, J. J. (2013). Heterosexual masculinities, anti-homophobic, and shifts in hegemonic masculinity: The identity practices of black and white heterosexual men. *The Sociological Quarterly, 54*, 535–560.
- Dean, J. J. (2014). *Straights: Heterosexuality in post-closeted culture*. New York: NYU Press.
- D’Emilio, J., & Freedman, E. B. (1988). *Intimate matters: a history of sexuality in America*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Dozier, R. (2005). Beards, breasts, and bodies: Doing sex in a gendered world. *Gender & Society, 19*, 297–316.
- Dozier, R. (2015). The power of queer: How “guy moms” challenge heteronormative assumptions about mothering and family. In B. J. Risman & V. Rutter (Eds.), *Families as they really are*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
- England, P., Mishel, E., & Caudillo, M. (2016, November 7). Increases in sex with same-sex partners and bisexual identity across cohorts of women (but not men). *Sociological Science*.
- Fisk, S., & Ridgeway, C. (2018). Framing gender. In *Springer Handbook of the Sociology of Gender*.
- Foucault, M. (1978). *The history of sexuality: Volume I: An introduction*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Gagné, P., & Tewksbury, R. (2005). Introduction: Advancing gender research at the intersection of gender and sexuality. In P. Gagné & R. Tewksbury (Eds.), *Gendered sexualities* (pp. 1–12). West Yorkshire: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
- Garcia, L. (2012). *Respect yourself, protect yourself: Latina girls and sexual identity*. New York: NYU Press.
- GLAAD. (2016). *Debunking the “bathroom bill” myth*. http://www.glaad.org/sites/default/files/Debunking_theBathroom_Bill_Myth_2016.pdf. Accessed December 20, 2016.
- Goffman, E. (1977). The arrangement between the sexes. *Theory and Society, 4*, 301–331.
- Goodman, W. (1997, March 3). Women as victims of the Bosnian War. *New York Times*.

- Gould, S. J., & Lewontin, R. C. (1979). The spandrels of San Marco and the panglossian paradigm: A critique of the adaptationist programme. *Proceedings of the Royal Society B*, 205, 581–598.
- Harris, E. A., Hornsey, M. J., & Barlow, F. K. (2016). On the link between benevolent sexism and orgasm frequency in heterosexual women. *Archives of Sexual Behavior*, 45, 1923–1931.
- Heard, Alex. (2010). *The eyes of Willie McGee: A tragedy of race, sex, and secrets in the Jim Crow*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.
- Henry, N. (2016). Theorizing wartime rape: Deconstructing gender, sexuality, and violence. *Gender & Society*, 30, 44–56.
- Hightower, J. L. (2015). Producing desirable bodies: Boundary work in a lesbian niche dating site. *Sexualities*, 18, 20–36.
- Hood, K. B., Shook, N. J. & Belgrave, F. Z. (2017). “Jimmy cap before you tap”: Developing condom use messages for african american women. *The Journal of Sex Research*, 54, 1–14.
- Jenness, V., & Fenstermaker, S. (2014). Agnes goes to prison: gender authenticity, transgender inmates in prisons for men, and pursuit of “the real deal”. *Gender & Society*, 28, 5–31.
- Jenness, V., & Fenstermaker, S. (2016). Forty years after Brownmiller: Prison for men, transgender inmates, and the rape of the feminine. *Gender & Society*, 30, 14–29.
- Jones, B., Rutter, V., & Boateng, J. (2015, May). *The gender conundrum*. Center for excellence in learning, teaching, scholarship, and service: A day in may conference. Framingham, MA.
- Joshi, S. P., Peter, J., & Valkenburg, P. M. (2014). A cross-cultural content-analytic comparison of the hookup culture in US and Dutch teen girl magazines. *The Journal of Sex Research*, 51, 291–302.
- Katz-Wise, S. L., Reisner, S. L., Hughto, J. W., & Keo-Meier, C. L. (2016). Differences in sexual orientation diversity and sexual fluidity in attractions among gender minority adults in Massachusetts. *The Journal of Sex Research*, 53, 74–84.
- Kazyak, E. (2012). Midwest or lesbian? Gender, rurality, and sexuality. *Gender & Society*, 26, 825–848.
- Kornrich, S., Brines, J., & Leupp, K. (2013). Egalitarianism, housework, and sexual frequency in marriage. *American Sociological Review*, 78, 26–50.
- Kościańska, A. (2016). Sex on equal terms? Polish sexology on women’s emancipation and ‘good sex’ from the 1970s to the present. *Sexualities*, 19, 236–256.
- Kund, A. (2016). Duties for her race and nation’: Scientific racist views on sexuality and reproduction in 1920s Hungary. *Sexualities*, 19, 190–210.
- Kuperberg, A., & Stone, P. (2008). The media depiction of women who opt out. *Gender & Society*, 22, 497–517.
- Latham, J. R. (2016). Trans men’s sexual narrative-practices: Introducing STS to trans and sexuality studies. *Sexualities*, 19, 347–368.
- Laumann, E. O., Gagnon, J. H., Michael, R. T., & Michaels, S. (1994). *The social organization of sexuality: Sexual practices in the United States*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lim, N. (2016, October 13). *CNN breaking news: Donald Trump on accuser: “Take a look at her...I don’t think so.”* <http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/13/politics/natasha-stoynoff-donald-trump-women/>. Accessed January 23, 2017.
- Lin, K-H., & Lundquist, J. (2013). Mate selection in cyberspace: The intersection of race, gender, and education. *American Journal of Sociology*, 119, 183–215.
- Mann, E. (2013). Regulating Latina youth sexualities through community health centers: Discourse and practice of sexual citizenship. *Gender & Society*, 27, 681–703.
- McCallum, E. B., & Peterson, Z. D. (2015). Effects of experimenter contact, setting, inquiry mode, and race on women’s self-report of sexual attitudes and behaviors: An experimental study. *Archives of Sexual Behavior*, 44, 2287–2297.
- Mills, C. W. (1959). *The sociological imagination*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Moore, M. (2011). *Invisible families*. Oakland: University of California Press.
- Muñoz-Laboy, M., Parker, R., Perry, A., & Garcia, J. (2013). Alternative frameworks for examining Latino male bisexuality in the urban space: A theoretical commentary based on ethnographic research in Rio de Janeiro and New York. *Sexualities*, 16, 501–522.
- New York Times. (2016). *Transcript: Donald Trump’s taped comments about women*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/us/donald-trump-tape-transcript.html>. Accessed January 15, 2017.
- Pascoe, C. J. (2007). *Dude, you’re a fag: Masculinity and sexuality in high school*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Pascoe, C. J., & Hollander, J. (2016). Good guys don’t rape: Gender, domination, and mobilizing rape. *Gender & Society*, 30, 67–79.
- Pfeffer, C. A. (2014). I don’t like passing as a straight woman: Queer negotiations of identity and social group membership. *American Journal of Sociology*, 120, 1–44.
- Pornhub Insights. (2016). *Gay searches in the United States*. <http://www.pornhub.com/insights/gay-searches-united-states>. Accessed December 20, 2016.
- Poulin, C., & Rutter, V. (2011, March 29). *Council on contemporary families brief: How colorblind is love? Interracial dating facts and puzzles*. <https://contemporaryfamilies.org/how-colorblind-is-love/>. Accessed January 15, 2017.
- Priebe, G., & Svedin, C. G. (2013). Operationalization of three dimensions of sexual orientation in a national survey of late adolescents. *Journal of sex research*, 50, 727–738.
- Ridgeway, C. (2011). *Framed by gender*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Risman, B. J. (2004). Gender as a social construct: Theory wrestling with activism. *Gender & Society, 18*, 429–450.
- Risman, B. J. (2018). Gender structure theory. In *Springer Handbook of the Sociology of Gender*.
- Robinson, Z. (2018). Intersectionality. In *Springer Handbook of the Sociology of Gender*.
- Rupp, L., & Taylor, V. (2010). Straight girls kissing. *Contexts, 9*, 28–32.
- Rupp, L., Taylor, V., Regev-Messalem, S., Fogarty, A. C. K., & England, P. (2014). Queer women in the hookup scene: Beyond the closet? *Gender & Society, 28*, 212–235.
- Rutter, V. (2013, February 20). The sexual mystique stuck inside our heads. *The Society Pages*. <https://thesocietypages.org/girlwpn/2013/02/20/nice-work-the-sexual-mystique-stuck-inside-our-heads/>. Accessed February 18, 2017.
- Rutter, V. (2014, June 9). Love and lust. *Psychology Today*.
- Rutter, V., & Schwartz, P. (2012). *The gender of sexuality*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Salières, E., Wilkerson, J. M., Sieving, R. E., & Brady, S. S. (2017). Sexually experienced adolescents' thoughts about sexual pleasure. *The Journal of Sex Research, 54*, 1–15.
- Sassler, S. (2016, June 20). *Council on contemporary families brief: A reversal in predictors of sexual satisfaction in marriage*. <https://contemporaryfamilies.org/sex-equalmarriages/>. Accessed January 23, 2017.
- Savin-Williams, R. C., & Joyner, K. (2014). The dubious assessment of gay, lesbian, and bisexual adolescents of add health. *Archives of Sexual Behavior, 43*, 413–422.
- Savin-Williams, R. C., Joyner, K., & Rieger, G. (2012). Prevalence and stability of self-reported sexual orientation identity during young adulthood. *Archives of Sexual Behavior, 41*, 103–110.
- Schalet, A. (2010). Sexual subjectivity revisited: The significance of relationships in Dutch and American girls' experiences of sexuality. *Gender & Society, 24*, 304–329.
- Schalet, A. (2011). *Not under my roof: Parents, teens, and the culture of sex*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Schilt, K., & Westbrook, L. (2015). Bathroom battlegrounds and penis panics. *Contexts, 14*(3), 26–31.
- Sennott, C., & Angotti, N. (2016). Reconsidering gendered sexualities in a generalized AIDS epidemic. *Gender & Society, 30*, 935–957.
- Sexual Minority Assessment Research Team (Williams Institute). (2009). *Best practices for asking questions about sexual orientation on surveys*. <http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/SMART-FINAL-Nov-2009.pdf>. Accessed January 15, 2017.
- Solebello, N., & Elliott, S. (2011). “We want them to be as heterosexual as possible”: Fathers talk about their teen children's sexuality. *Gender & Society, 25*, 293–315.
- Swami, V., & Tovée, M. J. (2013). Men's oppressive beliefs predict their breast size preferences in women. *Archives of Sexual Behavior, 42*, 1199–1207.
- Twenge, J. M., Sherman, R. A., & Wells, B. E. (2016). Changes in American adults' reported same-sex sexual experiences and attitudes, 1973–2014. *Archives of Sexual Behavior, 45*, 1–18.
- Tyson, T. (2017). *The blood of Emmitt Till*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Vrangalova, Z., & Savin-Williams, R. C. (2012). Mostly heterosexual and mostly gay/lesbian: Evidence for new sexual orientation identities. *Archives of Sexual Behavior, 41*, 85–101.
- Wade, L. (2017). *American hookup: The new culture of sex on campus*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company Inc.
- Ward, J. (2015). *Not gay: Sex between straight white men*. New York: NYU Press.
- Ward, J. (2016). Dyke methods: A meditation on queer studies and the gay men who hate it. *WSQ: Women's Studies Quarterly, 44*, 68–85.
- Weber, M. (1946). Science as a vocation. In H. H. Gerth & C. W. Mills (Eds.), *From Max Weber Essays in Sociology* (pp. 129–156). New York: Oxford Press.
- Weeks, J. (2009). *Sexuality* (3rd ed.). New York: Routledge.
- West, C., & Zimmerman, D. H. (1987). Doing gender. *Gender & Society, 1*, 125–151.
- Westbrook, L., & Saperstein, A. (2015). New categories are not enough: rethinking the measurement of sex and gender in social surveys. *Gender & Society, 29*, 534–560.
- Wilkinson, L., & Pearson, J. (2009). School culture and the well-being of same-sex attracted youth. *Gender & Society, 23*, 542–568.
- Wong, D. (2014). Asexuality in China's sexual revolution: Asexual marriage as coping strategy. *Sexualities, 18*, 100–116.

Virginia E. Rutter is Professor of Sociology at Framingham State University (MA) and on the Board of the Council on Contemporary Families. She is co-author or co-editor of *Families as They Really Are 2nd edition*, *The Gender of Sexuality*, and *The Love Test*, and writes and researches topics related to sexuality in more- and less-committed relationships; divorce; family policy; infidelity; and inequalities. She is Vice-President and Director of her local union chapter of the Mass State College Association (MTA/NEA).

Braxton Jones is a doctoral student in Sociology at Boston University, who researches gender, sexuality, and criminal justice systems. He earned his M.A. in Sociology at the University of New Hampshire; his thesis examined policies that are restrictive and supportive of queerness in prison and their implications for violence against LGBTQ prisoners. He has served as a Graduate Research & Public Affairs Scholar for the Council on Contemporary Families since 2015.



C. J. Pascoe and Andrea P. Herrera

Abstract

Schools are organizers of gender and sexual practices, identities and meanings. Boys and girls learn from school rituals, pedagogical practices, and disciplinary procedures that heterosexuality is normal and natural. In tandem with school-sanctioned forms of masculinity and femininity, young people themselves construct adolescent cultures that normalize heterosexuality and normative forms of gender, which in turn intersect with other axes of identity like race and class to produce varied and disparate experiences for students of different backgrounds. Though education is often cited as an equalizing force, schools promote gender differences between boys and girls that can result in gender inequality. This happens through both formal and informal schooling processes. More research is needed on sexual and gender minorities in school, as most of it has focused on heterosexual and cisgender students and gender inequality.

1 Introduction

Schools play a pivotal role in the development of young people's gender and sexual identities. Beginning in elementary school, students participate in a "heterosexualizing process" (Renold, 2000) as schools convey and regulate sexual meanings organized in heteronormative and homophobic ways (Walters & Hayes, 1998; Wood, 1984). The ordering of sexuality from elementary school through high school is inseparable from the institutional structuring of gendered identities. Through school rituals, pedagogical practices and disciplinary procedures, high schools set up routines, expectations and rituals which reflect definitions of masculinity and femininity as opposite, complementary, unequal and heterosexual (Butler, 1993).

In addition to the ways schools organize gender and sexuality, young people themselves also invest in cultural routines and practices that emphasize heterosexuality as well as normative masculinity and femininity. In high school, masculinities and femininities are iterated both through mundane, daily practices like clothing, style, lingo, hobbies, and sports (Bettie, 2002), and through highly ritualized and gendered events like quinceañeras and proms. The flourishing of various social media platforms has simultaneously amplified, muted, and otherwise transformed various ways that high school students construct and perform masculine and

C. J. Pascoe (✉) · A. P. Herrera
University of Oregon, Eugene, USA
e-mail: cpascoe@uoregon.edu

feminine identities (Ito et al., 2010). Crucially, high school femininities and masculinities intersect with and are produced through other axes of identity and difference, such that race, class, and sexuality (among other considerations) are highly salient in the construction and interpretation of any given expression of femininity and masculinity.

2 Schooling

2.1 History

Gender difference and heterosexuality are built into the history of public education in the United States as well as the very concept of adolescence itself (Lesko, 2001). Prior to the 19th century the main job of upbringing youth was carried out by the family (Bowles & Gintis, 1976). The responsibility to instruct children fell to mothers—boys to read and write and girls to read and sew (Tyack & Hansot, 1992). As schooling during the Progressive era became formalized—universal, tax-supported, free, compulsory, bureaucratically arranged—gender-segregation increased and difference was emphasized (Tyack & Hansot, 1992).

Formal education for girls continued to be a controversial topic through the early 20th century. Pro-education forces argued that educating girls would make women more effective in their own private domain, raising future citizens, rendering them better wives or mothers, helping to form the political convictions of the young, teaching them about civic virtue. Chief among the foes of girls' education were Dr. Edward Clark, a specialist in nervous disorders at Harvard Medical School who wrote a book called *Sex in Education* in 1873 and G. Stanley Hall, president of Clark University and a psychologist who invented the concept of "adolescence" to describe the phase of life between childhood and adulthood. Dr. Clark argued that education damaged girls biologically—diverting the limited "forces" of the human body from their reproductive organs to their brains in a masculinization process that threatened the future of the white

race (Tyack & Hansot, 1992). G. Stanley Hall suggested that co-education masculinized girls and, more importantly, feminized boys. He advocated more masculine high schools, ridding the curriculum of sissiness, hiring more men teachers and segregating high schools by gender, thus allowing boys to pass through the necessary "raw period of revolt" in order to move into a "virile manhood" (Tyack & Hansot, 1992). While the intensity of these arguments subsided in the mid-1920s, similar ideologies continue to shape the gender of schooling.

2.2 Contemporary Schooling

Contemporary schooling processes reproduce a gender binary and schools themselves are dependent on and structured around this binary. Though education is often cited as an equalizing force, schools promote gender differences between boys and girls that can result in gender inequality. This happens through both formal and informal schooling processes. Formal curricular processes include explicit educational goals, topics covered in textbooks, learning objectives, and test material for example. Informal curricula, also known as hidden curricula, refers to norms, values, attitudes, and ideologies that children learn at school but that are not an official part of schools' lesson plans (Martin, 1976). Schools reinforce gender difference, heteronormativity and heterosexism through both informal and formal curricula.

Teachers regularly prefer to divide students into the categories of boys and girls (Thorne, 1993). Teachers expect different things from boys and girls, with boys taking up most of teachers' attention in the forms of discipline and rewards. Teachers give boys more attention, call on them more often, wait longer for their answers, and correct, criticize, help, and praise them more frequently than they do girls (Bailey et al., 1992). Rather than giving girls the same types of step-by-step instructions they give boys, teachers tend to do things themselves for girls, robbing girls of everyday opportunities to learn (DeZolt & Hull, 2001). This practice encourages

helplessness, incompetence and dependency among girls, which are hallmarks of a particular form of “emphasized femininity” that reproduces gender inequality (Connell, 1987). Teachers are more likely to comment on girls’ appearance and clothing, and to socialize girls to become “perfect students” (Bailey et al., 1992). Boys are allowed more freedom with their bodies than girls are and have to be more disruptive to earn a reprimand from a teacher as well (Martin, 1998). Girls are told to be quieter and to request things in a “nicer” voice (Martin, 1998). Linguists highlight the way in which these gendered disciplinary practices play out in adult conversations: women hedge, are super polite, tag questions, hypercorrect grammar, lack a sense of humor, ask questions when they are making declarations—what linguists call “powerless language” (O’Barr & Atkins, 2014).

In addition to emphasizing gender difference, informal curricula emphasize heterosexuality. The vast majority of parental images in school-based literature, for example, show a mother and a father, rather than two mothers or two fathers, reinforcing ideologies about heterosexuality, monogamy and families. The way science, in particular, is framed and communicated to students underscores heteronormativity and androcentrism (Letts, 2001) explaining animal sexuality with assumptions about heterosexuality and normative masculinity or femininity, ignoring extensive diversity of sex, gender, and sexuality in the animal kingdom (Roughgarden, 2013). Similarly, human biology textbooks explain reproduction using gendered metaphors that frame sperm as physically aggressive, dominant and male and eggs as passive, waiting females (Martin, 1991).

2.3 Formal Curricula

Formal curricula about sexuality and gender is best exemplified by sex education. Contemporary sex education curricula—or the lack thereof—often reinforce inequalities on the axes of sexuality, gender, race, and class (Fields, 2008) and are among the most controversial and politicized aspects of the school curriculum

(Trudell, 1993). Three approaches currently govern sex education curricula: Abstinence Only, Abstinence Plus and Comprehensive Sex Education. Abstinence Only approaches position abstinence as the only morally correct option for teenagers and censor information about contraception. Abstinence Plus approaches include information about condoms and contraception in the context of strong abstinence messages. Comprehensive sex education approaches teach about abstinence as the best method for avoiding STDs and unintended pregnancy, but also teach about condoms and contraception to reduce the risk of unintended pregnancy and of infection with STDs, including HIV. They also teach interpersonal and communication skills and help young people explore their own values, goals, and options.

Absent federal regulation on sex education nationally, it is highly varied and inconsistent across American states: only 24 states and Washington, DC require sex education in public schools; 33 states and Washington, DC require education about HIV/AIDS; and only 20 states require that sex education should be medically accurate (NCSL, 2016). As a result of these irregular standards, young people are not always familiar with safer sex practices. Among those ages 18–19, 41% say they know little to nothing about condoms, and 75% say they know little to nothing about the contraceptive pill.

The scattered state of contemporary sex education is largely shaped by the response of conservative political forces to attempts to introduce comprehensive sex education in schools in the 1970s and 1980s by a group called the Sexuality Information and Education Council of the United States (SIECUS). The powerful movements of the “New Right” quickly mobilized against the SIECUS curriculum by arguing that children were too young for sex, there should be a spiritual component to this sort of education, and that talking about sex leads to sex (Irvine, 2005; Luker 2007). Conservative activism led to the passing of legislation in the 1980s and 1990s like the Adolescent Family Life Act and the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Act (TANF). Both of these limited the amount of

federal funding available to sex education programs that did not focus on abstinence or attempted “denigrate, diminish or deny role differences between the sexes as they have been historically understood in the United States” (Trudell, 1993).

The religious right designed and marketed curricular materials that promote chastity and avoidance of all sexual activity moral absolutes, premarital abstinence, heterosexual family forms, heterosexual intercourse, traditional gender expectations, and emphasized procreation (Trudell, 1993). As a result, a 2004 federal report shows that the most widely-used federally-funded abstinence education curricula contain pervasive errors and misinformation—underestimating the effectiveness of condoms and other contraceptives, false claims about the physical and psychological risks of abortion, misinformation on incidence and transmission of STDs and the replacement of scientific facts with religious views and moral judgments. This education has negative consequences for young people in the United States as in countries with comprehensive sex education, youth have far lower rates of teen pregnancy and STI transmission, as well as more accurate and egalitarian views of sexuality (e.g., Schalet, 2011).

2.4 Boys and Girls in School

Informal and formal curricula results in a gender differentiated educational experience for both boys and girls. Although boys stand out at the top of the class, get more attention from teachers, have higher standardized test scores, get more scholarships, and later receive higher salaries, boys also populate the bottom of the class (Sadker & Sadker, 2010). Boys are more likely to be in special education and to drop out (Grant, 2014). They tend to be louder than girls, talking and joking while girls do schoolwork (Sadker & Sadker, 2010). That said, girls tend to be awarded higher grades than boys, a trend that has remained unchanged for nearly a century (Voyer & Voyer, 2014).

Some research suggests that classrooms are biased against boys’ natural behaviors, resulting in unfair treatment (Kindlon & Thompson, 2009). According to this perspective, the classroom is a feminine environment (Kindlon & Thompson, 2009) where girls’ behavior is rewarded and where teachers pay too much attention to girls at the expense of boys. In contrast with girls’ ostensibly natural good behavior, boys have more trouble controlling themselves and are developmentally disadvantaged in school, especially in the lower grades. Some argue that boys are socialized to be aggressive, active, independent and then schools want a different skill set from them (Sadker & Sadker, 2010). Teachers should view boys’ bad behavior as “life-affirming” and therefore allow “moments of anarchy” (Kindlon & Thompson, 2009:50). Other scholars argue that schools do not feminize boys, but definitions of masculinity keep boys from succeeding academically. Even at the turn of the twentieth century girls were doing better than boys in school, but this didn’t lead to more structural power among girls and women in society (Sadker & Sadker, 2010). Indeed, even as girls outperform boys academically, boys become more confident and girls less so during middle school.

The “bias against boys” perspective does not incorporate an intersectional analysis of race and gender. Nonetheless, research on race and gender indicates that male students of color are disproportionately targeted for punishment in schools. Low-income Latino males and black males are regarded with suspicion both in and out of schools (A.A.U.W., 2001). African American boys are likely to be punished for the same behavior white boys exhibit that goes unpunished, for example, a process that Ann Ferguson calls “adulthoodification” (Ferguson, 2001). Teachers’ assumptions Latino boys will be low achievers and that they pose a threat to the school order can lead the boys to disengage from schools (A.A.U.W., 2001). Various institutions in the lives of young men of color collude to frame their behavior as criminal rather than childlike (Rios, 2011). This process is part of what scholars call

the school to prison pipeline, the systematic way in which young men of color are funneled out of education and into the criminal justice system. In the year 2000, more black men were in jail or prison than in college. By contrast, in 1980, before the modern prison boom, black men in college outnumbered black men behind bars by a ratio of 3–1. Thus, the way scholars need to reframe the debate around boys and girls in school is to move away from a zero-sum estimation where girls' gains are purported to signify boys' losses, and toward an investigation of *which* boys and girls are succeeding or not (Justice Policy Institute, 2002).

For female students, teachers have expectations of cooperation, compliance, polite silence, and invisibility (Brown, 1999). To succeed socially and academically girls navigate a "school-sanctioned femininity" (Bettie, 2002), a de-sexualized self which allows them to be academically successful as well as normatively feminine enough to not have their gender performances called into question.

These school-sanctioned femininities reward particular racialized and classed enactments of femininity. Brown (1999) finds that middle-class girls tend to hide their frustration about sexism they experience in school while working-class girls express their anger in visible and physical ways, such as refusing to "sit up straight" when teachers ask them to do so. Girls who speak out about sexism in high school are perceived as loud and obnoxious, and teachers often tell them that anger is not an appropriate emotion for school (Brown, 1999). African American girls, for instance, resist gendered racism through "loudness" or "contrariness," which empowers them to defy discourses of white, middle-class femininity based on passive compliance with (white) authority (Fordham, 1993). These "loud black girls" (Fordham, 1993) refuse to participate in an academic system bent on excluding them, but teachers disapprove of their loudness and do not take them seriously as learners. African American girls who are more quiet, who more closely approximate school-sanctioned versions of femininity often feel disconnected from other

African American students and their families, even as their participation in this type of femininity facilitates their academic success. Over time, these dynamics of gender and race result in lower self-esteem among girls than boys, with African American girls reporting the lowest levels of self-esteem. Latinas are less likely to be policed and criminalized, though they are often perceived as unserious about schoolwork (A.A. U.W., 2001; Bettie, 2002).

High school girls experience and produce femininities in different ways according to their race and class positions (Bettie, 2002). What might be viewed as "gender victories" for high school girls are often also "class injuries". For instance, some girls take leadership courses, plan for successful careers, and are not intimidated by boys. While these girls may seem like the product of years of feminist struggles, they also tend to be middle-class and to display school-sanctioned versions of femininity. Thus, their success as girls cannot be decoupled from their success as middle-class girls whose particular gender performances are rewarded by teachers and administrators. High school teachers expect a white, middle-class, school-sanctioned version of femininity. This gender regime ends up disadvantaging girls of color and working-class girls who refuse to suppress their feelings about injustice at school, making it harder for them to succeed academically and ultimately helping to reproduce race- and class-based systems of inequality in society more broadly.

3 Social Life in High School

Gender and sexuality in high school are produced not only through institutional policies and practices, but also through mundane, everyday interactions and behaviors among students themselves. High school is a staging ground for identity formation and the primary hub of social life in adolescence. The social organization of school, social rituals and social aggression reinforce and sometimes transgress social norms of gender and sexuality.

3.1 Social Organization

The social organization of high schools often reflect gendered, classed and raced inequalities. At midcentury as the amount of time spent in school and the number of students enrolled increased, adolescents began spending increasing time with others their own age, and notions of popularity began to rule adolescence (Modell, 1991). According to John Modell, “Popularity was the universally understood term for what the great majority of high schoolers sought to a greater or lesser degree” (1991:84). Students organize themselves and are organized by the school into loose hierarchies (Milner, 2013).

Gender and sexuality are central to the character of these hierarchies. The sociology literature is divided regarding the degree to which popularity among high school girls is linked to the performances of conventional femininity. While Payne (2007) and Thorne (1993) suggest that normative femininity and masculinity correlate with popularity other scholars find that certain forms of gender transgression for girls, when they align with normative masculinity, can result in popularity for girls (Pascoe, 2007).

The production of femininities is evident in the way high school students speak to and about one another. In accordance with their particular understanding of feminism, some high school girls disparage their feminine peers, declaring themselves to be “one of the guys,” or more like boys than the “other girls” (Fine and Macpherson, 1992:176). In their effort to achieve gender parity with high school boys, these girls abandon femininity, which they view as silly and trivial. Pascoe (2007) finds that girls who perform athletic versions of masculinity—even when they are lesbians—gain social status relative to their more feminine peers. Conversely, some high school girls use their voices to cultivate particular types of femininities to resist forms of inequality based on gender, race, and sexuality. Fordham (1993) argues that high schools, as institutions within a patriarchal society, define appropriate femininity in terms of “white middle-class womanhood” (3). White girls and girls of color have to navigate raced and classed expectations

of gender and sexuality in high school (Bettie, 2002; Garcia, 2012). Cheerleading squads, often the home of the most popular girls, can privilege whiteness in primarily white schools (Adams & Bettis, 2003).

Whom is considered desirable or who is romantically linked to whom is also important in the social world of high school. While the majority of adolescents experience their first sex within a committed relationship (Williams & Adams, 2013), “hookup culture” (Bogle, 2008) has emerged alongside the dating order that originated in the 1950s as the dominant form of sexuality and romance among adolescents. Hookups are broadly defined as sexual interactions between people who are not in a committed relationship (Bogle, 2008), and often occur alongside parties and alcohol and drug use (Williams & Adams, 2013). Many teens view committed dating relationships as not “cool” and describe hookups as having less “baggage” (Paul, Wenzel, & Harvey, 2008). The emergence of high school hookup culture is important to pay attention to, since girls experience less power relative to boys in one-time hookups than they do in more committed dating relationships (Risman & Schwartz, 2002). Hookups are a highly gendered form of sexuality among adolescents, with girls reporting higher rates than boys of stigma and shame after hooking up (Williams & Adams, 2013). Furthermore, high school girls come of age in a culture that values women according to their attractiveness, so many girls hope to use sexuality and hookups to segue into more committed forms of relationships with boys (Williams & Adams, 2013). While the literature on hookups in high school is much sparser than the literature on college hookup culture, Williams and Adams (2013) find that among white and Latina high schoolers, hookups rarely evolve into committed dating relationships, resulting in considerable emotional pain and embarrassment for girls, particularly when they feel alcohol is a contributing factor in their sexual behavior. In addition to gender inequalities manifested through hookup culture, hookups are not equally accessible to all types of students: working-class students and students of color are less likely to

engage in or speak positively about hookups, and queer students may feel excluded from hookup scenes that revolve around heterosexual pairings (Williams & Adams, 2013; Bogle, 2008).

The story of dating is not one that is just about romance, but also about inequality. Boys and girls enter into dating on unequal footing due to cultural scripts around puberty, the embodied experience of adolescence. Cisgender¹ boys and girls have very different experiences of these bodily changes. Shame and embarrassment happen for all genders: bras, jockstraps, voice changes, erections, and periods are accompanied by feelings of humiliation for many teens. But while bodily changes for boys tend to be eventually empowering, girls often feel betrayed by their bodies, particularly as boys demean their bodies and make fun of their periods as “dirty”. Girls often experience puberty as a transition to a disempowered adult femininity, in which girls’ changing bodies are associated with sexuality and thus potential danger (Tolman, 1994). Boys’ bodily changes lead to a rise in the agency they feel as soon-to-be men (Tolman, 1994). Boys are characterized by being driven by hormones and sexual desire (Schalet, 2011).

While cisgender teens certainly “do” gender in a variety of ways more or less consistent with the expectations of normative masculinity and femininity, cisgender boys and girls tend to experience their changing bodies as embarrassing, yet natural progressions on their way toward becoming cisgender men and women. Transgender teens, on the other hand, may feel as though they are trapped in the “wrong body” (an experience psychologists call “dysphoria”) or may experience their bodies in more fluid, genderqueer² ways (Barker-Plummer, 2012; Olson,

Schrager, Belzer, Simons, & Clark, 2015), either of which may be difficult for trans teens to locate in dominant discourses about puberty, romance, and sexuality in high school. Furthermore, trans teens are more likely to experience not only hostile school environments, bullying, and harassment (Kosciw, Greytak, & Diaz, 2009) but also are at higher risk of dating violence than their cisgender counterparts (Dank, Lachman, Zweig, & Yahner, 2014). This is especially true for trans girls of color (Garofalo, Deleon, Osmer, Doll, & Harper, 2006). More research is needed on the ways trans teens negotiate and navigate the complex world of sexuality, hookups, and dating in high school.

In addition to body changes, high schoolers experience many changes in their social worlds during adolescence, which are frequently encourage the development of heterosexual, highly gendered identities. Heterosexual high school dating relationships and sexuality are thus characterized by gendered modes of sexuality where boys are expected to be active and girls are passive. This dynamic encodes and builds on meanings of masculinity and femininity that will undergird high schoolers’ adult gender identities (Hird & Jackson, 2001). Sexual coercion is not outside of the normal (Hird & Jackson, 2001); rather, it is an integral part of heteronormative romantic relationships. This coercion is often non-violent, taking the form of boys pressuring girls, appealing to girls’ longing for romance, and “working a yes out” (Sanday, 2007). High school discourses of boys’ and girls’ sexual desire frame boys as either “wusses” or “studs” and girls as either “sluts” or “angels,” depending on their frequency of sexual activity (Hird & Jackson, 2001).

To be appropriately feminine, girls must put boys’ desires before their own, something Tolman calls the “missing discourse of desire” (2003). There is no way for girls to talk about desiring sex; if they do, they are stigmatized as sluts, so girls view sex as something that happens to them, as something they have to rationalize (Martin, 1998). Boys, for the most part, experience sexuality and adolescence in general as empowering, as they begin to inhabit an adult

¹“Cisgender” is the opposite of “transgender,” and means that the sex one is assigned at birth (male or female) corresponds to the way one experiences one’s gender (boy or girl, man or woman).

²A “genderqueer” understanding of transgender experiences seeks to question and dismantle the categories of “boy” and “girl,” “man” and “woman,” rather than conceptualizing transgender people as being “actually” one gender, born unluckily into the body of the other gender.

masculinity, ushering them into a powerful adult identity. Sexuality and sex in high school encodes cultural requirements of heteronormative gender difference.

3.2 Social Events

Stylized social events such as rituals are an important part of the informal curricula of schooling. Social rituals are symbolic, bodily performances that affirm in and out-groups, the normal and the abnormal, (Quantz, 1999) reproducing dominant understandings of race, gender and class (Foley, 1990). In adolescence, these rituals reflect and affirm heteronormative gender difference.

Prom is an iconic high school event in American culture, a “cultural object” (Griswold, 1987) that tells a story about the culture in which it is found. It is a rite of passage for adolescents, signifying impending adulthood, and even functioning as a sort of pre-wedding in the ways it bolsters heteronormativity (Best, 2000). “Prom is a space in which teens makes sense of what it means to be young in culture today, negotiate the process of schooling, solidify their social identities, and struggle against the structural limits in which they find themselves” (Best, 2000:2). Discourses of romance and sexuality at prom naturalize inequality between boys and girls (Best, 2000:67). Prom restricts girls’ demands for equality because gender equality would destroy the romance and mystique of prom night. While high school girls hope for romance and magic on prom night, boys’ discussions of prom are centered around achieving masculinity through drinking, partying, and male friendship/camaraderie. Boys decide the course of the night, so many girls feel sad at prom because their dream of romance does not materialize. Proms also reflect race, class and sexual inequalities through an emphasis on clothing, expectations of dancing and explicit or implicit framing around opposite sex dates.

While school rituals like proms and pep rallies are designed with both the schools’ and the students’ interests and values in mind, gendered

rituals like quinceañeras and purity balls occur outside of school and thus represent a cultural arena over which students (and their families) have a little more control. Historically, middle- and upper-class girls would “come out” to society at debutante balls and cotillions, often wearing white dresses to present themselves as future brides (Pompper & Crandall, 2014). A similar pre-marriage ritual is the purity ball. Linked to the increase in funding for abstinence-only programs for high schoolers since the Welfare Reform Act of 1996, purity clubs are often ostensibly gender-neutral, yet the majority of recruits are women (Fahs, 2010). At purity balls, girls “essentially ‘marry’ their fathers” in white dresses, sign virginity pledges and put on rings that symbolize their commitment to wait until their “real” wedding day to have sex (Fahs, 2010). While debutante balls and purity balls tend to occur mostly in white communities, though some upper-class black high schoolers also put on debutante cotillions (Graham, 1999), many Latina high school girls also participate in a heterosexualized, highly gendered ritual—the quinceañera. Quinceañeras are fifteenth-birthday parties for Catholic Latina girls; they are a culturally-specific ritual that encourages high school girls to perform a particular version of heterosexual femininity. They are often lavish, expensive events even among working-class families. For many working-class Latinx immigrants, the quinceañera provides an opportunity to give their daughters the type of special party they could not afford in their home country (Alvarez, 2007), a symbol of their achievement of the “American dream” (Colloff, 2009).

What proms, but more specifically, the debutante ball, the purity ball, and the quinceañera have in common are their foundations of heterosexuality, femininity, and impending adulthood for high-school girls. Even if girls do not adopt a normatively feminine, heterosexual adult identity, they are always in conversation with it. Thus, for girls, the construction of an adult identity is inextricable from discourses of appropriate femininity and heterosexuality. These rituals reflect a high school culture where

girls' and women's bodies are the property of men, and where sexuality is constructed as something boys should desire and girls should avoid.

3.3 Social Aggression

Social aggression in adolescents often takes the form of bullying. While much research frames bullying as a result of individual psychological variables, in many cases bullying reinforces social inequalities—particularly of gender, sexuality, race and class (Pascoe, 2013).

Boys bully more than girls (Frisén, Jonsson & Persson, 2007; Levy et al., 2012; Seals & Young, 2003; Stein, 2002) in both on and offline environments (Li, 2006). They are also more often the victims of bullying than are girls (Erdur-Baker, 2010). Boys are more likely to engage in some physical and verbal types of bullying (Peskin, Tortolero, & Markham, 2006). Yet, perhaps contrary to some of the claims made about the gendering of “relational aggression” (see for instance Rys & Bear, 1997), it is also true that girls do physically intimidate others and that boys also spread rumors (Levy et al., 2012).

Boys bullying of other boys' tends to take a sexualized form. Homophobic language and attitudes are disproportionately deployed by boys (Poteat & Rivers, 2010). Boys use homophobic epithets more than girls do and rate them much more seriously (Thurlow, 2001). Straight boys are often the recipients of these slurs (Pascoe, 2007). 90% of random school shootings have involved straight-identified boys who have been relentlessly humiliated with homophobic remarks (Kimmel and Mahler 2003). Homophobic bullying is central to shaping contemporary heterosexual masculine identities (Kehler, 2007; Levy et al., 2012; Pascoe, 2007; Poteat, Kimmel & Wilchins, 2011). Through homophobic harassment boys learn what it is to “be a boy”.

Young men's homophobic practices often take the form of a “fag discourse” (Pascoe, 2007) consisting of jokes, taunts, imitations and threats through which boys publicly signal their rejection of that which is considered unmasculine. In

other words, homophobic harassment has as much to do with definitions of masculinity as it does with actual fear of other gay men (Corbett, 2001; Kimmel, 2001). These insults are levied against boys who are not masculine, if only momentarily, *and* boys who identify (or are identified by others) as gay. Interactions like this set up a very complicated daily ordeal in which boys continually strive to avoid being subject to the epithet, but are simultaneously constantly vulnerable to it.

Boy's aggressive behavior towards girls primarily takes the form of sexual harassment.

Though presumably students (male and female) have been protected from sexual harassment since the passage of Title IX in 1972, 44% of girls are afraid of being sexually harassed as compared to 20% of boys (Orenstein, 1994; A. A.U.W., 2001). Indeed, girls report being sexually harassed as a “normal” part of their high school experience (Hlavka, 2014). Boys' sex talk and predatory behavior have become so normalized that teachers don't even recognize them as harassment, but rather as harmless flirting (Orenstein, 1994). Even when asked about their behavior boys don't seem to understand that what they did was wrong, rather that pointing out such behavior infringes on their sense of entitlement to girls and their bodies (Orenstein, 1994).

4 Conclusion

The effects of heteronormative and gender normative schooling and social practices in adolescence on sexual and gender minority young people are profound, both on students who construct appropriately masculine and feminine heterosexual identities and on those who are LGBTQ or gender nonconforming. Nationally representative studies show that adolescents with same-sex sexuality experience a greater risk for depression, low self esteem, and substance abuse; often feel less connected to their schools; and have lower rates of advanced course completion (Wilkinson & Pearson, 2009; Pearson, Miller, & Wilkinson, 2007). Boys with same-sex

sexuality also experience lower GPAs and higher course failure rates (Pearson et al., 2007). The most recent available data show that LGB youth are vastly more likely than heterosexual youth to experience physical violence, substance abuse, and risky sexual practices (Kann et al., 2016; Russell, Franz, & Driscoll, 2001). Thus, there are considerable social, emotional, physical, and academic consequences for youths with same-sex sexuality in heterosexist environments, with particular outcomes shaped by youth gender—indicating the different ways in which heteronormativity affects boys and girls. Importantly, these emotional and psychological effects do not emanate solely from LGBTQ students' psyches; rather, school culture and context play large roles in the social, emotional, and academic wellbeing of youth with same-sex sexuality. Attending a school with a greater proportion of boys playing football—a sport tied tightly to hegemonic masculinity and heteronormativity—negatively affects the wellbeing of boys and girls; girls who attend schools with a greater proportion of highly religious students experience negative effects; and schools located in rural or suburban areas, as compared to urban, negatively affect the wellbeing of boys (Wilkinson & Pearson, 2009). Indeed, while many LGBTQ youth form positive views of themselves despite structural heterosexism—a testament to their resilience (Savin-Williams, 2005)—youth who are outspoken about gender and sexual inequality or who do not embody white, middle class, gender-normative gay identities face marginalization even in schools with purportedly progressive policies (Elliott, 2012). This even shapes teaching, as teachers are expected to be “professional” when they are gay, which means they are expected to enact particularly middle-class forms of masculinity and femininity.

Research indicates that schools, rather than being places that challenge gender and sexual inequalities, often reproduce them. Targeted measures to improve the wellbeing of LGBTQ

youth in schools are imperative. However, studies show that heterosexuality is so institutionalized as an invisible part of schools' organization and culture that efforts aimed at specific populations, in the absence of widespread institutional changes, are likely inadequate. Furthermore, most schools are in states that do not have laws around bullying and harassment, such that many students who would seek to challenge heterosexist practices at their schools have no legal mechanism through which to do so. More research is needed on how schools can be places for “anti-discriminatory responses to marginalization” (Pallotta-Chiarolli, 1999). It is likely that no single solution exists, but rather schools must seek to eradicate practices that reproduce inequalities at an institutional level while parents, community members, and teens themselves strive to support teens in their social lives outside of school.

References

- Adams, N., & Bettis, P. (2003). Commanding the room in short skirts: Cheering as the embodiment of ideal girlhood. *Gender & Society, 17*(1), 73–91.
- Alvarez, J. (2007). *Once upon a Quinceañera: Coming of age in the USA*. New York: Viking.
- American Association of University Women. (2001). *Beyond the gender wars: A conversation about girls*. Washington, D.C.: Boys and Education.
- Bailey, S., Burbidge, L., Campbell, P. B., Jackson, B., Marx, F., & McIntosh, P. (1992). *The AAUW report: How schools shortchange girls*. Washington, DC: National Education Association.
- Barker-Plummer, B. (2012). Fixing Gwen. *Feminist Media Studies, 13*(4), 710–724.
- Best, A. (2000). *Prom night: Youth, schools, and popular culture*. New York: Routledge.
- Bettie, J. (2002). *Women without class: Girls, race, and identity*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Bogle, K. (2008). *Hook-up culture: Sex, dating, and relationships on campus*. New York: New York University Press.
- Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (1976). *Schooling in capitalist America* (Vol. 57). New York: Basic Books.
- Brown, L. M. (1999). *Raising their Voices: The politics of girls anger*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Butler, J. (1993). *Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of 'sex'*. New York and London: Routledge.
- Colloff, P. (2009). Sweet 15: The rise of the all-out, over-the-top, super-spectacular, bank-breaking Quinceañera. In *Texas Monthly*. Austin, Texas.
- Connell, R. W. (1987). *Gender and power*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Corbett, K. (2001). Faggot = Loser. *Studies in Gender and Sexuality*, 2(1), 3–28.
- Dank, M., Lachman, P., Zweig, J. M., & Yahner, J. (2014). Dating violence experiences of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender youth. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, 43, 8460857.
- DeZolt, D., & Hull, S. (2001). Classroom and school climate. In J. Worrel (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of women and gender* (pp. 257–264). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- Elliott, K. O. (2012). The right way to be gay: How school structures sexual inequality. In E. Miners & T. Quinn (Eds.), *Education*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Erdur-Baker, Ö. (2010). Cyberbullying and its correlation to traditional bullying, gender and frequent and risky usage of internet-mediated communication tools. *New Media & Society*, 12(1), 109–125.
- Fahs, B. (2010). Daddy's little girls on the perils of chastity clubs, purity balls, and ritualized abstinence. *Frontiers: A Journal of Women's Studies*, 30(3), 116–142.
- Ferguson, A. A. (2001). *Bad boys: Public schools in the making of black masculinity*. University of Michigan Press.
- Fields, J. (2008). *Risky lessons: Sex education and social inequality*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Fine, M., & Macpherson, P. (1992). Over dinner: Feminism and adolescent female bodies. In M. Fine (Ed.), *Disruptive voices: The possibilities of feminist research*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press.
- Foley, D. E. (1990). The great American football ritual: Reproducing race, class, and gender inequality. *Sociology of Sport Journal*, 7(2), 111–135.
- Fordham, S. (1993). Those loud black girls: Black women, silence, and gender 'passing' in the academy. *Anthropology and Education Quarterly*, 24(1), 3–32.
- Frisén, A., Jonsson, A-k, & Persson, C. (2007). Adolescents' perception of bullying: Who is the victim? Who is the bully? What can be done to stop bullying? *Adolescence*, 42(168), 749–761.
- Garcia, L. (2012). *Respect yourself, protect yourself: Latina girls and sexual identity*. New York: New York University Press.
- Garofalo, R., Deleon, J., Osmer, E., Doll, M., & Harper, G. W. (2006). Overlooked, misunderstood and at-risk: Exploring the lives and HIV risk of ethnic minority male-to-female transgender youth. *Journal of Adolescent Health*, 38, 230–236.
- Graham, L. O. (1999). *Our kind of people: Inside America's black upper class*. New York: Harper Perennial.
- Grant, J. (2014). *The boy problem: Educating boys in Urban America 1870–1970*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Griswold, W. (1987). A methodological framework for the sociology of culture. *Sociological Methodology*, 17, 1–35.
- Hird, M. J., & Jackson, S. (2001). Where 'angels' and 'wusses' fear to tread: Sexual coercion in adolescent dating relationships. *Journal of Sociology*, 37(1), 27–43.
- Hlavka, H. R. (2014). Normalizing sexual violence: Young women account for harassment and abuse. *Gender & Society*, 28(3), 337–358.
- Irvine, J. M. (2005). *Disorders of desire: Sexuality and gender in modern American sexology*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Ito, M., Baumer, S., Bittanti, M., Cody, R., Stephenson, B. H., Horst, H. A., et al. (2010). *Hanging out, messing around, and geeking out: Kids living and learning with new media*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Justice Policy Institute. (2002). Cellblocks or classrooms? The funding of higher education and corrections and its impact on African American men. Washington, D. C.
- Kann, L., Olsen, E. O., McManus, T., Harris, W. A., Shankin, S. L., Flint, K. H., Queen, B., ..., Zaza, S. (2016). Sexual identity, sex of sexual contacts, and health-related behaviors among students in grades 9–12—United States and selected sites, 2015. *MMWR. Surveillance Summaries*, 65.
- Kimmel, M. S., & Mahler, M. (2003). Adolescent masculinity, homophobia, and violence: Random school shootings, 1982–2001. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 46(10), 1439–1458.
- Kimmel, M. S. (2001). Masculinity as homophobia: Fear, shame, and silence in the construction of gender identity. In S. Whitehead & F. Barrett (Eds.), *The masculinities reader*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
- Kindlon, D., & Thompson, M. (2009). *Raising cain: Protecting the emotional life of boys*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Kosciw, J. G., Greytak, E. A., & Diaz, E. M. (2009). Who, what, where, when, and why: Demographic and ecological factors contributing to hostile school climate for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender youth. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, 38, 976–988.
- Lesko, N. (2001). *Act your age! A cultural construction of adolescence*. New York: Psychology Press.
- Letts, W. (2001). When science is strangely alluring. *Gender and Education*, 13, 261–274.
- Levy, N., Cortesi, S., Gasser, U., Crowley, E., Beaton, M., Casey, J., et al. (2012). *Bullying in a networked era: A literature review* (pp. 2012–2017). Cambridge, MA: Berkman Center for Internet & Society Research Publication Series.
- Li, Q. (2006). Cyberbullying in schools a research of gender differences. *School Psychology International*, 27(2), 157–170.

- Luker, K. (2007). *When sex goes to school: Warring views on sex—And sex education—since the sixties*. New York: WW Norton & Company.
- Martin, E. (1991). The egg and the sperm: How science has constructed a romance based on stereotypical male-female roles. *Signs, 16*(3), 485–501.
- Martin, J. R. (1976). What should we do with a hidden curriculum when we find one? *Curriculum Inquiry, 6*(2), 135–151.
- Martin, K. A. (1998). Becoming a gendered body: Practices of preschools. *American Sociological Review, 63*(4), 494–511.
- Milner, M. (2013). *Freaks, geeks, and cool kids*. New York: Routledge.
- Modell, J. (1991). *Into one's own: From youth to adulthood in the United States, 1920–1975*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- National Conference of State Legislatures. (2016). *State policies on sex education in schools*. Washington, D. C.
- O'Barr, W. M., & Atkins, B. K. (2014). 'Women's Language' or 'powerless language'? In Gita DasBender (Ed.), *Language: A reader for writers*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Olson, J., Schrager, S. M., Belzer, M., Simons, L. K., & Clark, L. F. (2015). Baseline physiologic and psychosocial characteristics of transgender youth seeking care for gender dysphoria. *Journal of Adolescent Health, 57*, 374–380.
- Orenstein, P. (1994). *Schoolgirls: Young women, self-esteem, and the confidence gap*. New York: Anchor.
- Pallotta-Chiarolli, M. (1999). Diary entries from the 'teachers' professional development playground': Multiculturalism meets multisexualities in Australian Education. *Journal of Homosexuality, 36*(3–4), 183–205.
- Pascoe, C. J. (2007). *"Dude, you're a fag": Masculinity and sexuality in high school*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Pascoe, C. J. (2013). Notes on a sociology of bullying: Young men's homophobia as gender socialization. *QED: A Journal in GLBTQ Worldmaking, 1*, 87–103.
- Paul, E. L., Wenzel, A., & Harvey, J. (2008). Hookups: A facilitator or barrier to relationship initiation and intimacy development? In S. Sprecher, A. Wenzel, & J. Harvey (Eds.), *Handbook of relationship initiation* (pp. 375–390). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
- Payne, E. C. (2007). Heterosexism, perfection, and popularity: Young lesbians' experiences of the high school social scene. *Educational Studies: A Journal of the American Educational Studies Association, 41*, 60–79.
- Pearson, J., Muller, C., & Wilkinson, L. (2007). Adolescent same-sex attraction and academic outcomes: The role of school attachment and engagement. *Social Problems, 54*(4), 523–542.
- Peskin, M. F., Tortolero, S. R., & Markham, C. M. (2006). Bullying and victimization among black and hispanic adolescents. *Adolescence, 41*(163), 467–484.
- Pompper, D., & Crandall, K. (2014). The erotic-chaste dialectic and the New Southern Belle code at the high school prom: Feminine gender role stress across ethnic and socio-economic factors. *Journal of Popular Culture, 47*(5), 937–951.
- Poteat, V. P., & Rivers, I. (2010). The use of homophobic language across bullying roles during adolescence. *Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 31*(2), 166–172.
- Poteat, V. P., Kimmel, M. S., & Wilchins, R. (2011). The moderating effect of support for violent beliefs on masculine norms, aggression, and homophobic behavior during adolescence. *Journal of Research on Adolescence, 21*(2), 434–447.
- Quantz, R. A. (1999). School ritual as performance: A reconstruction of Durkheim's and Turner's uses of Ritual. *Educational Theory, 49*(4), 493–513.
- Renold, E. (2000). Coming out: Gender, (hetero)sexuality and the primary school. *Gender and Education, 12*(3), 309–326.
- Rios, V. M. (2011). *Punished: Policing the lives of black and latino boys*. New York: New York University Press.
- Risman, B., & Schwartz, P. (2002). After the sexual revolution: Gender politics in teen dating. *Contexts, 1*(1), 16–22.
- Roughgarden, J. (2013). *Evolution's rainbow: Diversity, gender, and sexuality in nature and people*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Russell, S. T., Franz, B. T., & Driscoll, A. K. (2001). Same-sex romantic attraction and experiences of violence in adolescence. *American Journal of Public Health, 91*(6), 903–906.
- Rys, G. S., & Bear, G. G. (1997). Relational aggression and peer relations: Gender and developmental issues. *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 43*(1), 87–106.
- Sadker, M., & Sadker, D. (2010). *Failing at fairness: How America's schools cheat girls*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Sanday, P. R. (2007). *Fraternity gang rape: Sex, brotherhood, and privilege on campus*. New York: NYU Press.
- Savin-Williams, R. (2005). The new gay teen: Shunning labels. *The Gay & Lesbian Review Worldwide, 12*(6), 16.
- Schalet, A. T. (2011). *Not under my roof*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Seals, D., & Young, J. (2003). Bullying and victimization: Prevalence and relationship to gender, grade level, ethnicity, self-esteem, and depression. *Adolescence, 38*(152), 735–747.
- Stein, N. (2002). Bullying as sexual harassment. In S. M. Bailey (Ed.), *The jossey-bass reader on gender in education* (pp. 409–428). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Thorne, B. (1993). *Gender play: Girls and boys in school*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Thurlow, C. (2001). Naming the "outsider within": Homophobic pejoratives and the verbal abuse of Lesbian, gay and bisexual high school pupils. *Journal of Adolescence, 24*, 25–38.

- Tolman, D. L. (1994). Doing desire: Adolescent girls' struggles for/with sexuality. *Gender & Society*, 8(3), 324–342.
- Tolman, D. L. (2003). Daring to desire: Culture and the bodies of adolescent girls. In R. Weitz (Ed.), *The politics of women's bodies*. Cambridge: Oxford University Press.
- Trudell, B. N. (1993). *Doing sex education*. Routledge.
- Tyack, D., & Hansot, E. (1992). *Learning together: A history of coeducation in American public schools*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Voyer, D., & Voyer, S. (2014). Gender differences in scholastic achievement: A meta-analysis. *Psychological Bulletin*. Retrieved from <http://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2014/04/girls-grades.aspx>.
- Walters, A. S., & Hayes, D. M. (1998). Homophobia within schools: Challenging the culturally sanctioned dismissal of gay students and colleagues. *Journal of Homosexuality*, 35(2), 1–23.
- Wilkinson, L., & Pearson, J. (2009). School culture and the well-being of same-sex-attracted youth. *Gender & Society*, 23(4), 542–568.
- Williams, L. R., & Adams, H. L. (2013). Parties, drugs, and high school hookups. *Affilia*, 28(3), 240–255.
- Wood, J. (1984). Groping towards sexism: Boys' sex talk (pp. 54–84). In A. McRobbie & M. Nava (Ed.), *Gender and generation*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

C. J. Pascoe is an associate professor of sociology at the University of Oregon. She is the author of *Dude, You're a Fag: Masculinity and Sexuality in High School* and the co-editor of *Exploring Masculinities: Identity, Inequality, Continuity and Change*. Her current research focuses on online homophobia, queer coming of age experiences and young people's social and emotional relationships.

Andrea P. Herrera MA is a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Oregon. Her work focuses on femininities, sexualities, race, embodiment, and new media. In her most current research, she analyzes performances of femininity among queer femmes, burlesque performers, drag queens, and pinup girls.



Arielle Kuperberg and Rachel Allison

Abstract

Hookups, or encounters that include varied sexual behaviors without expectation of a committed relationship, have received substantial academic and popular interest over the past two decades. We review research on college hookup culture, focusing on gender and patterns of hookup participation, experiences, and outcomes. We critically examine theoretical perspectives that have been offered to explain gender differences in hooking up, explore problematic dynamics in hookups including gendered sexual double standards and sexual assault, and describe recent advances in hookup research related to campus sex ratios, same-sex hookups, and race and class intersections. We offer a critique of existing research and provide suggestions for future studies of gender and sexual encounters. Specifically, research on the intersections of gender with race/ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation are lacking, as are studies of transgender hookups, hookups among same

aged non-college attending young adults, and hookups that occur later in the life course.

1 Introduction

At the turn of the 21st century, scholars began to document an emergent form of sexual interaction among youth and young adults: hooking up. ‘Hookups’ refer to sexual encounters that take place outside of committed relationships, and may be limited to only kissing and touching, or may include vaginal, anal and/or oral sex (Paul, McManus, & Hayes, 2000). The majority of college students do not have vaginal intercourse during a typical hookup, with estimates of one-quarter to two-fifths of heterosexual hookups involving vaginal sex, and approximately a third of hookups involving only kissing or non-genital touching (England & Thomas, 2006; Fielder & Carey, 2010b; Kuperberg & Padgett, 2015). Hookups typically involve no a priori expectation of a future sexual or romantic relationship, although “repeat” hookups happen with some regularity and hookups often lead to committed relationships; recent studies found that around half of students hooked up with the hope of forming a longer-term relationship, and around one-third of recent marriages among young adults began with a hookup (Garcia & Reiber, 2008; Rhoades & Stanley, 2014). Hooking up is a common experience, particularly among

A. Kuperberg (✉)
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro,
Greensboro, USA
e-mail: atkuperb@uncg.edu

R. Allison
Mississippi State University, Starkville, USA
e-mail: rallison@soc.msstate.edu

college students; 50–60% of undergraduate students reported at least one hookup in the past year (Fielder & Carey, 2010b; LaBrie, Hummer, Ghaidarov, Lac, & Kenney, 2014; Owen, Fincham, & Moore, 2010; Owen, Rhoades, Stanley, & Fincham, 2011). At least three fourths of students have ever hooked up while in college; England and Thomas (2006) found that 80% of undergraduates had ever hooked up in college, while Allison and Risman (2014) put this figure at 82%.

While today's college students do not have more sexual partners than past generations (Monto & Carey, 2014), a variety of demographic, economic, and cultural changes have altered experiences of sex and romance for college-attending young adults over the past half-century. Hooking up as a sexual practice emerged with many of these changes. The term "hooking up" began to be used sometime during or after the 1960s, a result of the growing liberalization of sexual attitudes, an increasing age at first marriage, the availability of the birth control pill, the influence of the feminist movement, increased enrollment of women in higher education, and decline of *in loco parentis* college policies that separated men and women, among other changes (Bogle, 2008; Garcia, Reiber, Massey, & Merriwether, 2012; Heldman & Wade, 2010). Later, rates of hooking up increased, and a hookup "culture" arguably emerged on college campuses in the 1990s (Heldman & Wade, 2010).

The rise of hookup culture on U.S. college and university campuses reflected the changing social status of women and increased opportunities for women in education and work, particularly for racially- and class-privileged women who attain postsecondary degrees (England & Thomas, 2006). New forms of sexual and romantic engagement reveal the relative relations of power between men and women in society. As a result, scholars have debated what hookup culture means for gender relations and gender (in)equality. This chapter reviews existing research on gender and hookup culture, exploring theories of gendered sexuality and empirical patterns of hookup motivations, experiences, and

outcomes. Ultimately, we offer a critique of this body of literature and provide suggestions for future research on gender and hooking up.

2 Theoretical Perspectives on Gender and Hooking up

Sexual Strategies Theory developed by evolutionary theorists, argues that women have a preference for long-term relationships over short-term sexual encounters because they have more of a personal stake in pregnancy and childbearing, can have fewer children, and want to maximize the quality of each child by securing a partner who will invest in them and their children long-term, while men are more interested than women in shorter-term sexual relationships with many different partners, which will maximize their number of potential children (Bailey, Gaulin, Agyei, & Gladue, 1994; Buss & Schmitt, 1993). Often this theory is interpreted to mean that men want casual sex *more* than long-term relationships, but others have argued that men and women actually have few differences in their desire for long- or short-term relationships, with both preferring long-term relationships, and gender differences perhaps driven by a small number of men with extremely high desire for short-term relationships who distort averages (Schmitt, Shackelford, & Buss, 2001).

The degree to which empirical research on hookups supports this theory is mixed. While one study found no difference in hookup participation by gender (Owen et al., 2010), most research found that men had a slightly higher rate of ever participating in hookups and a higher number of reported hookups than women (Kuperberg & Padgett, 2016; LaBrie, Hummer, Ghaidarov, Lac, & Kenney, 2014; Paul et al., 2000). Research also confirmed that men were more likely than women to prefer hookups over dates, but that most members of both groups, 77% of men and 95% of women, preferred dates over hookups (Bradshaw et al. 2010). A recent study similarly found 48% of men and only 17% of college women wanted more hookup

opportunities, but an even greater number of both women (66%) and men (71%) wished they had more opportunities to form long-term relationships (Kuperberg & Padgett, 2016). Not only did both men and women prefer long-term relationships, college men wanted opportunities for those relationships *more* than women! But they were also less likely to form them compared to women, or to their likelihood of hooking up; only 44% of college men formed long-term relationships in college versus 55% of women, while 65% of men and 61% of women had hooked up (Ibid).

Evolutionary theory alone cannot explain these findings. Instead, sociologists turn to theories related to *social norms* and *sexual scripting* to explain gender differences in hooking up and forming longer-term relationships. Social norms are collective values or unofficial ‘rules’ of ideal conduct that guide behavior, and which are determined by local culture (Gibbs, 1965). These norms, which often differ for men and women, help shape *social scripts* which are a kind of cognitive ‘map’ of expectations that guides behavior in a given social interaction or social setting; in the context of sexual encounters these are called *sexual scripts* (Alksnis, Desmaris, & Wood, 1996; Kuperberg & Padgett, 2015; Plante, 2006; Simon & Gagnon, 1986).

Hooking up as a sexual script has become *normative* among college students. While the more traditional “date” is still common on college campuses, students are now as likely to participate in hookups as they are to go on a date, and are more likely to hookup than to form long-term relationships (Kuperberg & Padgett, 2016). Partly, this is due to the compatibility of the hookup *script* with the development trajectory of young adults, who in recent decades have experienced an elongated transition from adolescence to adulthood (Furstenberg, 2010). Many students want sex and romance, but are not yet ready for time- and emotion-greedy committed relationships, especially those that detract from success in school (Hamilton & Armstrong, 2009). In this context, hookups become attractive as a way to balance desires for intimacy, educational attainment, and individual freedom to

focus on self- and career development. Additionally, cultural and media images of college focus nearly exclusively on parties, alcohol consumption, and frequent casual sexual experimentation. As a result, college students who rarely hooked up due to time, money, and residential limitations often felt they were “missing out” on the true “college experience” (Allison & Risman, 2014).

Due to the normative status of hookups, many students believe that approval and endorsement of hooking up is more widespread than it is. Multiple studies found that students overestimated their peers’ comfort with hooking up and the frequency of specific hookup behaviors (Barriger & Valez-Blasini, 2013; Lambert, Kahn, & Apple, 2003; Reiber and Garcia 2010). This phenomenon has been referred to as *pluralistic ignorance*, which is “when, within a group of individuals, each person believes his or her private attitudes, beliefs, or judgments are discrepant from the norm displayed by the public behavior of others” (Lambert et al., 2003, 129). Pluralistic ignorance may lead students to feel they should approve of and engage in hookups in order to be a ‘normal’ college student.

While all students may feel pressure to hook up while in college given the cultural dominance of this sexual script, these pressures take unique forms for men and women who also must navigate gender-specific social norms for sexuality and relationships, including norms related to partner preferences and personal behavior. College men may be more likely than women to want long-term relationships because of norms related to partner preferences among women, which are related to broader norms related to relationships, gender and work that situate men as ‘breadwinners’; women tend to prefer older men and were less likely than men to be accepting of a partner who earned less, had less education, or who did not have a steady job (Raley & Bratter, 2004). Since men in college are not yet financially established and traditional-aged college men are restricted in their ability to date younger women (who are often underage), these norms restrict the opportunities for college men to form long-term

relationships. Instead they may turn to casual sexual encounters.

Gendered double standards for norms related to sexual conduct that value hookups for men but critique women who hook up also contribute to gendered patterns of hookup preference and participation. While sexual activity inside relationships, even of relatively short duration or limited commitment, is now subject to little social stigma, evaluations of sex outside of relationships remain more negative and more deeply gendered. The *sexual double standard* refers to judgements of lower status or value to the same sexual behavior when engaged in by women, compared to men. In its most acute form, women may experience censure for a sexual behavior that men are rewarded for.

Every qualitative study of hookup culture to date has found that students believed in the operation of sexual double standards whereby women's reputations are at risk for engaging in hookups, while men gain social status for the same behaviors (Bogle, 2008; Hamilton & Armstrong, 2009; Reid, Elliott, & Webber, 2011). Quantitative research tells a similar, if slightly more complex, tale. Allison and Risman (2013) found that students' modal response to "a lot" of hooking up was to lose respect for both men and women. However, a higher percent of men (24) than women (4) endorsed a traditional double standard whereby they lost respect for women who hooked up "a lot," but not men. And Kettrey (2016) found that a higher percent of women, compared to men, felt they had been judged for hooking up. Some found college men and women strategically used the vague nature of the term "hookup" to comply with gendered norms of behavior; men sometimes used the term to imply they engaged in frequent or 'heavy' sexual activity, while women used the term to suggest 'light' sexual behaviors such as kissing and making out (Bogle, 2008; Currier, 2013). Real or perceived censure for hookups creates a power disadvantage for women in heterosexual pairings, while expectations of and reward for frequent hookups for men may explain why men may forgo long-term relationships to increase

their number of hookups despite a greater desire for long-term relationships.

3 Problematic Gender Dynamics: Double Standards, Regret, and Sexual Assault

Gendered social norms and resulting power imbalances in heterosexual hookups generate several troubling patterns of hookup experiences and outcomes. The sexual double standard presents women who hook up as unworthy of respect and value. Perhaps as a result, sexual reciprocity is not an expectation in hookups, and women experience less sexual pleasure and sexual satisfaction in hookups than men do. Women report more orgasms and higher levels of satisfaction in relationships, compared to hookups, due to the greater frequency of sexual behaviors such as cunnilingus (Armstrong, Hamilton, & England, 2010). Expectations of sexual pleasure in hookups for men but not necessarily women also means that women sometimes engage in certain sexual behaviors just to please their partners. For instance, Kettrey (2016) found that women who reported they had been judged negatively for hookups had a greater likelihood of engaging in sexual behaviors only to please their partner, including agreeing to intercourse following verbal pressure. Sexual double standards and the lower sexual satisfaction of women in hookups combine to impact gender differences in how much hookups are enjoyed; while most students of both genders reported hooking up to be a positive experience (Snapp, Ryu, & Kerr, 2015), women enjoyed hookups less than men and were more likely to report their hookup experiences to be disappointing and disempowering. Women also regret hookups more often than men do, and report higher levels of emotional distress following hookups (Fielder & Carey, 2010a; Townsend & Wasserman, 2011).

Sexual assault is also a danger when students hook up. The popular media often make the connection between hookup 'culture' that encourages drinking during hookups and casual

sexual contact, and sexual assault on campus (Charen, 2016; Turner, 2016). High levels of intoxication have been reported during hookups, with one study finding that around half of all hookups involve binge drinking (defined as 4 or more drinks for women and 5 or more for men) during or right before the hookup, indicating drinking is an important part of the hookup 'script' (Kuperberg & Padgett, 2015). Studies have found that students often attributed sexual assault during hookups to alcohol, stating that it impaired their judgement and put them at a higher risk of assault, and that students who had experienced sexual assault were more likely to drink weekly, or to have been drinking during a hookup that ended in assault (Flack et al., 2007, Kuperberg, Choi, & Padgett, 2016). Heterosexual, gay and bisexual male and female students were all found to be more likely to have experienced sexual assault while in college if they had participated in more hookups while in college (Ford & Soto-Marquez, 2016). One study found that 79% of campus sexual assaults occurred in the context of a hookup (Flack et al., 2007).

Studies of sexual assault among college students tend to focus on student's *total* risk of sexual assault throughout college, rather than sexual assault within encounters they describe as a 'hookup'. Most of these studies focus on women as victims, with few examining men victims. These studies generally find that women are at a higher risk of sexual assault than men, with studies variously finding 7–10% of women experiencing forcible rape while in college and 14–26% of college women experiencing either forcible rape, attempted rape, or rape while drunk, passed out, asleep or otherwise incapacitated (Armstrong & Budnick, 2015). Men have much lower rates of sexual assault while in college compared to women, but still reported substantially high rates; one study found 19.3% of college women and 11.5% of college men reported they had ever experienced either forcible rape, incapacitated rape, or attempted rape while in college (Kuperberg et al., 2016).

When examining sexual assault only during encounters that students call *hookups*, surprising findings emerged. While women reported a

higher rate of attempted rape during their last hookup (2.5% of women versus 1.4% of men) the rates of forced or incapacitated rape were statistically equal; 0.99% of women and 1.2% of men reported forced rape, and 2.0% of women and 1.7% of men reported rape while incapacitated (Kuperberg et al., 2016). While a little over 15% of men who were assaulted during hookups were assaulted by other men (compared to less than 2% of women being assaulted by other women), a full 84% of hookup rapes reported by men involved a woman as perpetrator (Kuperberg et al., 2016). Perhaps reflective of average physical upper body strength differences which can enable men to overpower women who are less inebriated and average gender differences in alcohol tolerance, men who were victims of assault generally drank more (7.2 drinks compared to 5.5 among female assault victims) and were about twice as likely as female assault victims to have used marijuana and five times more likely to have used other drugs during or before the assault (Ibid).

Men were also less likely to report in surveys that they had *ever* experienced sexual assault while in college if they had reported experiencing rape during their last hookup while in college, *even in the same survey*. 80% of women who reported sexual assault during their last hookup that took place while in college also reported they had *ever* been sexually assaulted while in college in a later question in the same survey, while the rate for men who were sexually assaulted during their last hookup was only 65% (Kuperberg et al., 2016). Discrepancies suggest estimates of total sexual assaults during college may undercount both women and men's rate of assault victimization, but that men's rates are especially underreported.

The lack of public and academic attention to men's experiences with rape within hookups or in general, along with the greater reporting discrepancy of men, reflect gendered expectations of assault and sexual consent. Gendered sexual scripts and norms suggest that men always want to have sex and would not say no to an opportunity for sex; acknowledging men as sexual assault victims violates strongly held beliefs about the nature of sexual relationships, which

position men as pursuer/initiator/assaulter in sexual encounters and women as the pursued/restrictor/assaulted (Bevan, 2003; Byers, 1996; O'Sullivan & Byers, 1996; O'Dougherty Wright, Norton & Matusek, 2010). These beliefs may increase the chances that men experience sexual assault in hookup encounters. One study found that women were more likely than men to attempt to verbally coerce their partner to have sex with them after feeling rejected sexually, but noted that women may not feel they are pressuring their partners to have sex because they assume that men are always eager and ready for sex (O'Dougherty Wright et al., 2010).

4 The Structure of Gender: Campus Sex Ratios and Partnering

A recent line of research on hookups has explored campus sex ratios (the ratio of men to women) and how they impact partnering. Women comprise a slight majority of undergraduate students on college and university campuses nationwide. The relative scarcity of men, and thus competition among heterosexual women for partners, may exacerbate power imbalances between men and women and foster relationships that mean that women may be less able to exercise their preferences compared to men. Empirical findings related to sex ratios have been mixed. Uecker and Regnerus (2010) find that on campuses with more women than men, women are more sexually active, go on fewer dates, and have more negative evaluations of college men and college relationships. Similarly, Adkins, England, Risman, and Ford (2015) find that the higher the ratio of women to men, the higher the number of hookups and the greater the total number of sexual partners among both men and women. As the sex ratio increased, the proportion of students agreeing that they would not have sex without love decreased. However, sex ratio was unrelated to the likelihood of vaginal intercourse on hookups. These findings, they argue, are largely compatible with a *dyadic power theory* holding that an imbalanced sex ratio shifts power to men and allows men's

preferences for sexual and romantic relationships to predominate. On the other hand, Kuperberg and Padgett (2015, 2016) found that campus sex ratios were not significantly related to men or women's overall probability of hooking up, dating, or forming long-term relationships, but on campuses that had a larger share of women, women were more likely to start dating other women.

5 Same-Sex and Transgender Hookups

While same-sex 'casual sex' among men is well-researched, research on same-sex 'hookups,' which more broadly includes sexual encounters that may only include kissing or other lower-order sexual activity, is very limited. The more-general literature on casual sex with same-sex partners usually is written from a public health or psychological perspective, focuses on encounters in which anal or oral sex occurs, and almost exclusively focuses on men, often those at high risk of transmitting HIV. Much less is known about same-sex hookups that don't include casual sex or hookups among women, and little research on college hookups includes or focuses on same-sex hookups.

Some limited recent research on hookups has focused on sexual orientation and participation in and desire for opportunities for hooking up, sexual and risk-taking activity during same-sex college hookups, and same-sex hookup partner meeting contexts (Kuperberg & Padgett, 2015, 2016, 2017). This research found homosexual men were more likely to have hooked up in college compared to heterosexual or bisexual men, and same-sex hookups between men were more likely to include sex (broadly defined to include vaginal, anal, oral sex or any hand-genital stimulation) compared to their hookups with women; by contrast identifying as homosexual or bisexual did not impact the chance of a woman hooking up in college, and women's hookups with men or women were equally likely to include sex during the hookup (Kuperberg & Padgett, 2015, 2016). Focusing on

unsafe sex practices most likely to lead to disease transmission, unsafe sex, defined as ‘anal or (for heterosexuals) vaginal sex with no condom,’ was more common in male-female hookups compared to male-male hookups; less than 6% of men’s hookups with men involved unsafe sex, versus 13% of men’s and 14% of women’s hookups with other-sex partners (Kuperberg & Padgett, 2017). Men hooking up with men were also considerably less likely to binge drink during hookups compared to men hooking up with women, or women hooking up with men or women (Kuperberg & Padgett, 2017). These differences may perhaps be attributed to safe sex public health campaigns aimed at men who have sex with men.

While homosexual men had higher rates of hooking up, they were not more likely than heterosexual men to wish they had opportunities for hooking up (Kuperberg & Padgett, 2016). A greater desire for casual sex among men in general may explain these findings; men who hook up with women are limited by the extent to which women will participate in hooking up, and since women are less likely to desire these encounters compared to men, whether for biological or norm-related reasons or both, heterosexual men will have fewer opportunities to hook up compared to homosexual men (Kuperberg & Padgett, 2016). While these arrangements are further complicated by the limited number of men willing to hook up with men in general, internet websites and apps may enable same-sex encounters despite this scarcity, explaining why almost 19% of college men hooking up with men and 6.4% of women hooking up with women used the internet to find their last hookup partner, compared to 1.2% of men and 2.2% of women hooking up with other-sex partners (Kuperberg & Padgett, 2015).

Research on sexual orientation and hookups is complicated by discrepancies between student’s reported sexual orientation and the reported gender of their last hookup partner. Research on a large dataset of college students found around one out of every eight men whose last hookup was with a man and one out of four women whose last hookup was with a woman reported their sexual

orientation as “heterosexual” (Kuperberg and Walker, forthcoming). Some research has examined college women who self-identify as heterosexual but hook up with other women, usually in public settings such as fraternity parties; often these women described these activities as being intended to attract an audience of heterosexual men, but some women participated in these activities when no one else was present, indicating some women used these occasions to experiment with same-sex attractions (Hamilton, 2007). Researchers argue that the hookup scene is used by some women who are not heterosexual to experiment with and affirm non-heterosexual identities (Rupp et al., 2013). Other more limited research has examined instances in which men who identify as heterosexual engage in sexual activity with other men, such as fraternity hazing rituals, arguing that in some cases these activities serve a similar experimental purpose for men (Ward, 2015). Ongoing research examining students who identified as heterosexual but hooked up with same-sex students found they were more religious, more opposed to same-sex relationships, and more inebriated during the encounter than those who identified their sexual orientation as homosexual, with around one-third of such encounters among women occurring in public, often among freshman (Kuperberg and Walker, forthcoming).

Almost nothing is known about transgender hookups, in part because of their rarity. Like research on LGB individuals, research on transgender sexual practices tend to focus on casual sex rather than the more inclusive ‘hookup’ that can include encounters without sex, and often focuses on public health concerns related to potential HIV transmission, risk taking, and the use of Internet sources to meet anonymous partners (c.f. Benotsch et al., 2016; Clements-Nolle et al., 2001; Nemoto, Operario, Keatley, Han, & Soma, 2004). Even in the OCSLS, a survey of over 24,000 college students, only 25 self identified Male-to-Female Transgender students and only 11 Female-to-Male Transgender students appear (0.15% of the total dataset); with numbers so small, it is hard to conduct any systematic comparisons. One complication is that trans people

often don't want to self-identify as such, even in an anonymous survey (someone who is "female-to-male" may identify as "male"). In general, this population is hard to identify, but is of increasing visibility in contemporary society, and has much to contribute to understandings of gender, sexual practices, sexual orientation, and gender and sexual fluidity.

6 Race and Class Intersections

Also understudied is how social class and race/ethnicity, in interaction with gender, shape students' hookup attitudes and experiences. Working class college students hook up less frequently than their middle- and upper-middle class peers (Allison & Risman, 2014; Armstrong & Hamilton, 2013; Brimeyer & Smith, 2012; Owen et al., 2010). Armstrong and Hamilton's study of white college women living together in one dormitory found that hookups were considered more culturally foreign to working class women, who preferred committed relationships (2013). Perceiving college as an "experience" of self-development is a class-specific perspective that reflects both the opportunities and norms of those with greater resources. Further, Allison and Risman's (2014) interviews with students at a diverse urban commuter university found that the hooking up script assumes the class privilege to spend time and money socializing. Students who live with parents or who work while taking classes are less able to take part. Working class women who lived with or near family members were particularly discouraged from hookups due to gendered protectionist rationales (Allison, 2016).

Although little research has been done on racial/ethnic differences in hooking up, studies have suggested that students of color hook up less than white students (Allison & Risman, 2014; Bogle, 2008; Kuperberg & Padgett, 2016; McClintock, 2010; Spell, 2016). Patterns of hookup participation are both raced and gendered. Spell (2016) found that among women, White women reported double the number of hookup partners of women of color, while Asian

men reported less than half the number of hookups of other men. Another study examining participation rates by race similarly found that White women were more likely than women of any other race to have hooked up while in college, and that among men fewer racial differences occurred, except that Asian men had a much lower hooking up rate than other men (Kuperberg & Padgett, 2016). This was not due to differences in interest in hooking up; in fact, Asian men and both Black and Asian women were more likely to report they wished they had more opportunities to hookup on campus compared to their White counterparts.

Scholars have developed several explanations for why some groups, particularly Asian men and Black women, face barriers to hooking up. First, small group size and high visibility make hookups less anonymous for students of color than for white students. Women of color may be particularly affected by sexual double standards; as visible members of relatively rare groups on campus they may feel they are undergoing extra scrutiny, and therefore restrict their sexual activity more than White women (Kanter, 1977; Kuperberg & Padgett, 2016). Second, campus sex ratios are highly racialized. Given racially homophilous preferences, partners are less available to women of color than to White women (Allison & Risman, 2014; Spell 2016). Third, sexual stereotypes attributed to race and gender groups shape partner preferences (McClintock, 2010). Racial preferences among men may affect the lower hookup rate of women of color; White and Hispanic men tend to favor whiteness in sexual partners (Laumann, Ellingson, Mahay, Paik, & Youm, 2004). Differences among men may result from cultural stereotyping of Asian men as "desexualized" or cultural differences related to the acceptability of hooking up versus participating in other activities on campus (Kuperberg & Padgett, 2016).

Critiques of Hookup Research and Future Directions. In the field of sociology, the topic of hookups has received a recent surge of research attention, in part because researchers have been analyzing the Online College Social Life Survey (OCSLS), a large dataset of over 24,000 college

students that was collected between 2005 and 2011 by Paula England, recent president of the *American Sociological Association*. Almost all recent quantitative research particularly examining encounters that college students call ‘hookups’ have relied on this dataset, and its large size and rich set of questions have allowed for many analyses that otherwise would be impossible to conduct. The dataset was collected in a somewhat unconventional manner; Dr. England contacted other professors that were within her personal network to ask them to distribute this survey in courses such as Introduction to Sociology, and other courses related to gender, sexuality, and public health. While this enabled the collection of a very large dataset with a high participation rate on a limited budget, as a result of selection into Dr. England’s professional networks, the dataset is heavily biased towards Very High Research Activity Universities (Sometimes also referred to as “R1s”), undersamples regions such as the South, and as a result of the course content, oversamples students who take sociology courses and courses with content related to gender, family and sexuality. Since women are disproportionately likely to take these courses, the percentage of research respondents who are women is much higher than the percentage of women attending these universities. Some of those courses may also have been taken by students more interested in sex and sexuality than typical students. The dataset also only includes one community college, which researchers often exclude from their analyses. While this dataset provides a large sample of students, it therefore can hardly be called representative of college students, and reports in research and in the popular media based on this survey often overlook this fact.

The OCSLS only asks about hookups in college and only surveys college students; it cannot speak to hookups among non-college students or among college students after they graduate. Some qualitative research suggests hookups occur after college in specific contexts related to partying (Bogle, 2008), but the nature of hookups outside of college is understudied. Research on sexual practices outside of college often

focuses on ‘casual sex’; as in, vaginal or sometimes also anal sexual intercourse. However, we know from the OCSLS that less than half of the encounters that students consider “hookups” actually involve vaginal or anal sex (Kuperberg & Padgett, 2015). Almost nothing is known about hookups outside of college in which sexual intercourse does not occur, and the extent and nature of these encounters. What about high school hookups, or hookups among those who do not attend college? How do sexual practices change when students graduate? Do they hook up less (probably) but still hookup as they move through young adulthood, and in what settings? Do they meet hookup partners in different places—perhaps utilizing the Internet to a greater degree after graduation? What about hookups among the middle-aged and the elderly, perhaps after divorce or widowhood?

Hookup research is often envisioned as an early stage in a linear process that occurs between people with little prior contact. Hookups may precede relationships, but no research has examined hookups that may occur with ‘exes’ or those who are in long term ‘friends with benefits’ arrangements. The OCSLS certainly hints at these possibilities. When asked about number of prior hookups with their last hookup partner prior to their last hookup, the average respondent answered 2.8, indicating they were almost on their 4th hookup with the same person. When asked how well students knew their partner only 13% indicated “not at all” and almost half described knowing their partner “moderately well” (24%) or “very well” (23%) indicating most had some pre-existing relationship with their partner. But while the survey asks if students hooked up with their last long-term relationship partner before that relationship, the section on hookups does not ask much about the nature of the prior relationship of hookup partners; were they friends beforehand or in a prior romantic relationship? Examining these issues may be a fruitful area of future research, especially when attempting to promote safer sex on campus; research indicates that students who report being more familiar with their partner are more likely to engage in unprotected sex during

encounters, leading those with pre-existing relationships with their partner an especially vulnerable group when it comes to sexual risk-taking (Kuperberg & Padgett, 2016).

The OCSLS also only asks students about total number of hookups that occurred while in college, and then a series of questions about what happened during the last hookup with a certain partner. The survey does not give any insight into the number of partners a student may be juggling concurrently, an area of inquiry with important public health implications. It also assumes that students' last hookup involved only one partner; hookups with multiple partners and the extent to which they occur are not measured. Speaking of public health implications, the survey asked about condom use during last hookup but did not ask about any other forms of birth control; while condom use is certainly crucial when it comes to sexually-transmitted infections, we do not know the extent to which individuals are using alternative forms of birth control when not using (or concurrent with) condoms; for instance, prior findings that those who know their partner more are less likely to use condoms may be a result of students moving to an alternative form of birth control after multiple hookups with the same partner.

Generally, research on hookups treats students of the same gender as a homogenous group. As noted above, limited research on racial differences in hookups suggests that examining the practices of race/ethnic minorities such as Asian Americans are deserving of closer attention. Hooking up research has also focused on the United States and the hookup 'culture' that exists on US campuses; research comparing the U.S. to sexual practices on campus in other countries may also prove to be a fruitful area of research. Additional research on hookups among students of different class backgrounds, and among homosexual and transgender students and other adults is certainly warranted.

Finally, the OCSLS has the advantage of being recently collected, but collection ended in 2011, and society is in a stage of rapid flux regarding gender, sexuality, and technology. Same-sex marriage was legalized nationally in the United States in 2015, after the OCSLS dataset was collected, and sexual identities continue to shift; a recent study found only 48% of 13–20 year olds identify as “completely heterosexual,” down from 65% among those aged 21–34 (Laughlin, 2016). Smart phones were just starting to become popular as data collection ended; Tinder, a popular hookup ‘app’ was not launched until a year later in 2012. The role of social media has also grown and shifted since data collection completed. How have these shifts impacted hooking up? To what extent will the legalization of same-sex marriage and growing acceptance of same-sex relationships change the types of hookups in which students engage? As transgender celebrities such as Caitlyn Jenner bring attention to gender transition as a viable option, will more students transition to another gender, and how will new understandings of gender impact hookups? Future research on hookups and gender has much to explore.

References

- Adkins, T., England, P., Risman, B. J., & Ford, J. (2015). Student bodies: Does the sex ratio matter for hooking up and having sex at college? *Social Currents*, 2, 144–162.
- Alksnis, C., Desmaris, S., & Wood, E. (1996). Gender differences in scripts for different types of dates. *Sex Roles*, 34, 321–336.
- Allison, Rachel. (2016). Family influences on hooking up and dating among emerging adults. *Sexuality and Culture*, 20, 446–463.
- Allison, R., & Risman, B. J. (2014). “It goes hand in hand with the parties”: Race, class, and residence in college student negotiations of hooking up. *Sociological Perspectives*, 57, 102–123.
- Allison, R., & Risman, B. J. (2013). A double standard for “hooking up”: How far have we come toward

- gender equality? *Social Science Research*, 42, 1191–1206.
- Armstrong, E. A., & Hamilton, L. T. (2013). Paying for the party. *How college maintains inequality*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Armstrong, E., & Budnick, J. (2015). Sexual assault on campus. *Council on Contemporary Families Online Symposium on Intimate Partner Violence*. <https://contemporaryfamilies.org/assault-on-campus-brief-report/>. Accessed September, 2016.
- Armstrong, E. E., Hamilton, L., & England, P. (2010). Is hooking up bad for young women? *Contexts*, 9, 23–27.
- Bailey, J. M., Gaulin, S., Agyei, Y., & Gladue, B. A. (1994). Effects of gender and sexual orientation on evolutionarily relevant aspects of human mating psychology. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 66, 1081–1093.
- Barriger, M., & Velez-Blasini, C. (2013). Descriptive and injunctive social norm overestimation in hooking up and their role as predictors of hook-up activity in a college student sample. *The Journal of Sex Research*, 50, 84–94.
- Benotsch, E. G., Zimmerman, R. S., Cathers, L., Heck, T., McNulty, S., Pierce, J., Perrin, P. B., ... (2016). Use of the internet to meet sexual partners, sexual risk behavior, and mental health in transgender adults. *Archives of Sexual Behavior*, 45, 597–605.
- Bevan, J. L. (2003). Expectancy violation theory and sexual resistance in close, cross-sex relationships. *Communication Monographs*, 70, 68–82.
- Bradshaw, C., Kahn, A. S., & Saville, B. K. (2010). To hook up or date: Which gender benefits? *Sex Roles*, 62, 661–669.
- Brimeyer, T. M., & Smith, W. L. (2012). Religion, race, social class, and gender differences in dating and hooking up among college students. *Sociological Spectrum*, 32(5), 462–473.
- Bogle, K. (2008). *Hooking up: Sex, dating, and relationships on campus*. New York: New York University Press.
- Buss, D. M., & Schmitt, D. P. (1993). Sexual strategies theory: An evolutionary perspective on human mating. *Psychological Review*, 100, 204–232.
- Byers, E. S. (1996). How well does the traditional sexual script explain sexual coercion? Review of a program of research. *Journal of Psychology and Human Sexuality*, 8, 7–25.
- Charen, M. (2016). What the Stanford rape case reveals: Hook-up culture is the foundation of our sexual-assault problem. *National Review*, June 9.
- Clements-Nolle, K., Marx, R., Guzman, R., & Katz, M. (2001). HIV prevalence, risk behaviors, health care use, and mental health status of transgender persons: Implications for public health intervention. *American Journal of Public Health*, 91, 915–921.
- Currier, D. (2013). Strategic ambiguity: Protecting emphasized femininity and hegemonic masculinity in the hookup culture. *Gender & Society*, 27, 704–727.
- England, P., & Thomas, R. J. (2006). The decline of the date and the rise of the college hookup. In A. Skolnick & J. Skolnick (Eds.), *The family in transition* (14th ed., pp. 151–162). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Fielder, R. L., & Carey, M. P. (2010a). Predictors and consequences of sexual “hookups” among college students: A short-term prospective study. *Archives of Sexual Behavior*, 39, 1105–1119.
- Fielder, R. L., & Carey, M. P. (2010b). Prevalence and characteristics of sexual hookups among first-semester female college students. *Journal of Sex and Marital Therapy*, 36, 346–359.
- Flack, W. F., Daubman, K. A., Caron, M. L., Asadorian, J. A., D’Aureli, N. R., Gigliotti, S. N., et al. (2007). Risk factors and consequences of unwanted sex among university students Hooking up, alcohol, and stress response. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, 22, 139–157.
- Ford, J., & Soto-Marquez, J. G. (2016). Sexual assault victimization among straight, gay/lesbian, and bisexual college students. *Violence and gender*, 3(2), 107–115.
- Furstenberg, F. F. (2010). On a new schedule: Transitions to adulthood and family change. *The future of children*, 20(1), 67–87.
- Garcia, J. R., & Reiber, C. (2008). Hook-up behavior: A biopsychosocial perspective. *Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology*, 2(4), 192–208.
- Garcia, J. R., Reiber, C., Massey, S. G., & Merriwether, A. M. (2012). Sexual hookup culture: A review. *Review of General Psychology*, 16, 161–176.
- Gibbs, J. P. (1965). Norms: The problem of definition and classification. *American Journal of Sociology*, 70, 586–594.
- Hamilton, L. (2007). Trading on heterosexuality: College women’s gender strategies and homophobia. *Gender & Society*, 21, 145–172.
- Hamilton, L., & Armstrong, E. A. (2009). Gendered sexuality in young adulthood: Double binds and flawed options. *Gender & Society*, 23, 589–616.
- Heldman, C., & Wade, L. (2010). Hook-up culture: Setting a new research agenda. *Sexuality Research and Social Policy*, 7, 323–333.
- Kanter, R. M. (1977). *Men and women of the corporation*. New York: Basic Books.
- Kettrey, H. H. (2016). What’s gender got to do with it? Sexual double standards and power in heterosexual

- college hookups. *Journal of Sex Research*, 57, 754–765.
- Kuperberg, A., & Padgett, J. E. (2015). Dating and hooking up in college: Meeting contexts, sex, and variation by gender, partner's gender and class standing. *The Journal of Sex Research*, 52, 517–531.
- Kuperberg, A., & Padgett, J. E. (2016). The role of culture in explaining college student's selection into hooking up, dating and forming long-term romantic relationships. *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, 33, 1070–1098.
- Kuperberg, A., & Padgett, J. E. (2017). Partner meeting contexts and risky behavior in college students' other-sex and same-sex hookups. *Journal of Sex Research*, 54(1), 55–72.
- Kuperberg, A. & Walker, A. M. (forthcoming). Heterosexual college students who hookup with same-sex partners. *Archives of Sexual Behavior*.
- Kuperberg, A., Choi, C. C., & Padgett, J. E. (2016). Male rape in college. In *Presented at the Southern Sociological Society Annual Conference*, Atlanta GA.
- LaBrie, J. W., Hummer, J. F., Ghaidarov, T. M., Lac, A., & Kenney, S. R. (2014). Hooking up in the college context: The event-level effects of alcohol use and partner familiarity on hookup behaviors and contentment. *Journal of Sex Research*, 51, 62–73.
- Lambert, T. A., Kahn, A. S., & Apple, K. J. (2003). Pluralistic ignorance and hooking up. *Journal of Sex Research*, 40, 129–133.
- Laughlin, S. (2016). Gen z goes beyond gender binaries in new innovation group data. *Journal of Walter Thompson Intelligence*. <https://www.jwtintelligence.com/2016/03/gen-z-goes-beyond-gender-binaries-in-new-innovation-group-data/>. Retrieved October, 2016.
- Laumann, E. O., Ellingson, S., Mahay, J., Paik, A., & Youm, Y. (2004). *The sexual organization of the city*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McClintock, E. A. (2010). When does race matter? Race, sex, and dating at an elite university. *Journal of Marriage & Family*, 72, 45–72.
- Monto, M. A., & Carey, A. G. (2014). A new standard of sexual behavior? Are claims associated with the "hookup culture" supported by general social survey data? *The Journal of Sex Research*, 51, 605–615.
- Nemoto, T., Operario, D., Keatley, J., Han, L., & Soma, T. (2004). HIV risk behaviors among male-to-female transgender persons of color in san francisco. *American Journal of Public Health*, 94, 1193–1199.
- O'Dougherty Wright, M., Norton, D. L., & Mausek, J. A. (2010). Predicting verbal coercion following sexual refusal during a hookup: Diverging gender patterns. *Sex Roles*, 62, 647–660.
- Owen, J. J., Fincham, F. D., & Moore, J. (2011). Short-term prospective study of hooking up among college students. *Archives of Sexual Behavior*, 40, 331–341.
- Owen, J. J., Rhoades, G. K., Stanley, S. M., & Fincham, F. D. (2010). 'Hooking up' among college students: Demographic and psychosocial correlates. *Archives of Sexual Behavior*, 39, 653–663.
- O'Sullivan, L. F., & Byers, E. S. (1996). Gender differences in responses to discrepancies in desired level of sexual intimacy. *Journal of Psychology and Human Sexuality*, 8, 49–67.
- Paul, E. L., Brian, M., & Hayes, A. (2000). "Hookups": Characteristics and correlates of college students' spontaneous and anonymous sexual experiences. *The Journal of Sex Research*, 37, 76–88.
- Plante, R. F. (2006). *Sexualities in context*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Reiber, C., & Garcia, J. R. (2010). Hooking up: Gender differences, evolution, and pluralistic ignorance. *Evolutionary Psychology*, 8, 390–404.
- Reid, J. A., Elliott, S., & Webber, G. R. (2011). Casual hookups to formal dates: Refining the boundaries of the sexual double standard. *Gender & Society*, 25, 545–568.
- Rhoades, G. K., & Stanley, S. M. (2014). Before 'I Do': What do premarital experiences have to do with marital quality among today's young adults? *The National Marriage Project Working Paper*.
- Rupp, L. J., Taylor, V., Regev-Messalem, S., Fogarty, A. C. K., & England, P. (2013). Queer women in the hookup scene: Beyond the closet? *Gender & Society*, 28, 212–235.
- Schmitt, D. P., Shackelford, T. K., & Buss, D. M. (2001). Are men really more 'oriented' toward short-term mating than women? A critical review of theory and research. *Psychology, Evolution & Gender*, 3, 211–239.
- Simon, W., & Gagnon, J. H. (1986). Sexual scripts: Permanence and change. *Archives of Sexual Behavior*, 15, 97–120.

- Snapp, S., Ryu, E., & Kerr, J. (2015). The upside to hooking up: College students' positive hookup experiences. *International Journal of Sexual Health, 27*, 43–56.
- Spell, S. A. (2016). Not just black and white: How race/ethnicity and gender intersect in hookup culture. *Sociology of Race and Ethnicity*.
- Raley, R. K., & Bratter, J. (2004). Not even if you were the last person on earth! How marital search constraints affect the likelihood of marriage. *Journal of Family Issues, 25*(2), 167–181.
- Townsend, J. M., & Wasserman, T. H. (2011). Sexual hookups among college students: Sex differences in emotional reactions. *Archives of Sexual Behavior, 40*, 1173–1181.
- Turner, J. (2016). Rape culture and hookup Culture are two sides of the same coin. *The Federalist*, June 28.
- Uecker, J. E., & Regnerus, M. D. (2010). Bare markets: Campus sex ratios, romantic relationships, and sexual behavior. *The Sociological Quarterly, 51*, 408–435.
- Ward, J. (2015). *Not gay: Sex between straight white men*. New York: New York University Press.

Arielle Kuperberg Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. Her research examines the sociology and demography of romantic and sexual relationships, including college hookups, dates, romantic relationships, cohabitation, marriage and divorce. She also researches intersections of gender, work, education, and family; and the impact of student loans on the transition to adulthood. Her research has been published in leading journals including *Social Forces*, *Journal of Sex Research*, *Journal of Marriage and Family*, and *Gender & Society*. She has a Ph.D. in sociology and demography from the University of Pennsylvania.

Rachel Allison is an Assistant Professor of Sociology and affiliate of Gender Studies at Mississippi State University. She has studied college hookup culture and the gender politics of U.S. women's professional soccer. Her book, *Kicking Center: Gender and the Selling of Women's Professional Soccer*, is forthcoming in 2018 with Rutgers University Press.



Pepper Schwartz and Nicholas Velotta

Abstract

Sexuality continues to have gendered scripts and cultural directives even towards the middle and last quartile of men and women's lives. This article looks at how these scripts create different meanings and consequences for men and women's sexual self-definition, behaviors, and opportunities. We also help direct future research on men and women post-50 as this population has been under-researched and often overlooked by studies seeking to better understand human sexuality. Studies that do exist generally emphasize the importance of biology and age on sexual activity, too readily neglecting social factors such as gender and presence of an intimate partner. We provide a review of the current knowledge regarding (1) how women and men's sexuality functions in later life (e.g. frequency of sexual encounters, sexual satisfaction, and the impact of different kinds of pairings), (2) major sex-specific physical transitions that impact sexuality in older populations, and (3) psychosocial factors that influence sexual behavior and

attitudes in both heterosexual and LGB individuals. We further analyze gender as a social construct and discuss cultural beliefs about aging as they impact sexuality. We note the paucity of data on older LGB and minority groups and discuss issues that affect these groups' sexual realities.

1 Introduction

It is important to understand the cultural context of gendered sexuality among older men and women in order to interpret their sexual beliefs and practices in the third and perhaps fourth quartile of their lives. In order to understand the gendered context of sexuality and aging, we review what scholars know about important aspects of sexual functioning. That said, however, we are missing key information in the research literature. We do not have adequate data on how transsexual men and women experience their sexual lives at older ages, nor do we have that kind of information on bisexual men and women, for example. Given these and other limitations, we will include a reasonably thorough review of the literature in order to shed light on how gender, aging, and sexuality intersect. We need to admit, however, that much of what we do have is thin, allowing some glimpses, but most in soft focus rather than empirical depth. The preponderance of research on sexuality describes heterosexual men

P. Schwartz (✉) · N. Velotta
University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA
e-mail: pepperschwartz@hotmail.com

N. Velotta
e-mail: ndvelotta@icloud.com

and women of reproductive age, as well as gay men and sexually active singles—the latter mostly because of public health research on sexually transmitted diseases (Das, Waite, & Laumann, 2012). Besides a general prissiness about sex among men and women 50 and older (think grandmother and her lover), there seems to be less interest in older men's and women's sexual lives in general, even though people are living longer, healthier lives, and are committed to maintaining all the things about their youth that they prized, including sex (Fisher, Anderson, Chapagain, Montenegro, Smoot, & Takalkar, 2010). The fervent desire of Boomers to stay youthful and sexually active (Schwartz, Diefendorf, & McGlynn-Wright, 2014) has been observed but not well studied, and this is especially true for those in the oldest boomer population who are now into their 70s (Hensel & Fortenberry, 2014). Even research that does include older people in their sample rarely pays more than passing attention to people over 70 and rarely focuses on how social factors affect men and women in different ways. In fact more often than not, all people over 70 are lumped into one category of behavior (see Fisher et al., 2010) and rarely through a gendered lens. Logically we know that 80 year olds are likely to have more problems with physical impairment and will be more likely to be single, and that older women's lives will change because of gender ratios affected by differential rates of male and female mortality, but there is little attention to these major differences.

On the bright side, there is quite a bit of scholarship on gendered patterns of heterosexual sexual behavior of men and women in their 50s, as well as qualitative data on the intra-psychic impact of various kinds of sexual patterns. Quite a few studies observe correlations between sexual states, traits, and overall sexual satisfaction. Many studies have compared the emotional outcomes for men and women under different kinds of committed and uncommitted relationships.

The research is still uneven, however, for men and for women. And much of it is weighted heavily on frequencies and acts and not much at all about the felt experience of men and women

dealing with cultural perspectives affecting their own sexual satisfactions or dissatisfactions, desire, or quality of relationships. Some attention is paid to certain lifecycle transitions, such as menopause, but not much recognition, that this stage in women's lives is culturally as well as physiologically defined.

As social science researchers we resist a medicalized interpretation of older men's and women's sexuality but we do not ignore the biological changes that affect older populations. We understand that these changes have an impact on men's and women's psychological and physical happiness and health. Nonetheless, in most cases, we choose cultural explanations for behavior over biological ones since, as social constructionists, we believe evidence points to the evolution of sexual attitudes and behaviors within the context of cultural, class, and gender socialization. Men and women adopt their sense of the possible from their bodies, but also what society tells them about their bodies, and what life experience teaches them about permissible or tabooed acts and thoughts. In this way gender as a social construct has crafted binary visions of what men and women should and do experience later in life. Gender values are developed within hegemonic beliefs about men versus women (e.g. men are more socially permitted to initiate sexual contact) while our individual material conditions, our bodies and physiology, display these cultural ideologies (see Risman, 2016 for more discussion on gender as a social structure). Thus, while we describe current population-based data, we believe we only describe what men and women are doing now as opposed to what the same given ages might mean for the future with the possible spread of new social ideologies.

While age is not only a state of mind, it is at least partially just that. As attitudes about aging change and as more medical innovation increases, not only will the ability to be sexually active longer be influenced, but the expectation that sex can be fulfilling late in life will also be influenced. We describe the present situation in this paper but we caution the reader to remember that

these behaviors and values are fluid in a rapidly changing culture.

2 Sexuality and Aging: The Numbers

The elderly are commonly categorized as either asexual due to a waning libido, or, if not asexual by psychological disposition, older men and women are assumed to be physically incapable of intense desire or of frequently engaging in sexual behaviors. We think it is fair to say that a common perception is that it is “normal” for older men and women to have a sex-free existence. The fact of the matter is that these stigmatic tropes are, to say the least, misleading. In this section we will show evidence to the contrary and examine what intimate relationships look like later in the life cycle.

2.1 Partnerships Later in Life

As we age, our pool of available partners becomes smaller. We are more likely to have had partners and potential mates become impaired or die. Partnering has also been influenced by the fact that women live longer and healthier lifespans than most men, leading to more widows than widowers among heterosexual couples. Not only are women the majority of the aging demographic, more men mate with younger females far later in life (England & McClintock, 2009), and heterosexual men are more likely than women to have a sexual partner at most ages (Fisher et al., 2010; Lindau & Gavrilova, 2010). This lopsided sex ratio is one factor leading to an increasingly single, older female population which can influence the formation of atypical statuses later in life (for example, staying “unattached” or choosing atypical characteristics in a partner, or choosing cohabitation over marriage). Demographic realities affect female sexuality in old age in a myriad of ways, including the fact that older men are more likely than older women to report continued sexual activity

as a very important aspect of life satisfaction (Fisher et al., 2010).

Research has pointed out that women generally show greater desire for sexual contact while partnered (Lindau & Gavrilova, 2010). The presence of a partner is not the only important influence on female sexuality later in life but it seems to be a strong predictor of whether a female remains sexually active. When we look at women’s sexual interest only among women who have partners, it is more similar to men’s values about the importance of staying sexually active (Delamater & Koepsel, 2015; Delamater & Sill, 2005; Fisher et al., 2010; Lindau & Gavrilova, 2010). In fact, being paired enhances sexual desire for both genders. The majority of sexual activity for older men and women takes place in coupled relationships and so is predictive about how much sex either men or women have as they age (Gagnon, Giami, Michaels, & De Colomby, 2001). The *type* of relationship, however, influences sexual behavior. We will focus our discussion on the most common of pairings: marriage and cohabitation in same sex and opposite sex relationships.

Marriage. Married men and women often comment enviously about the sexual lives of singles, which they assume are much more frequent than their own sex lives. Envy is clearly not necessary seeing as most data consistently contradict such claims. The facts are incontrovertible: while sex among singles has its advantages, the stable presence of a sexually accessible mate who is dedicated to the relationship has an undeniably positive affect on sexual frequency and satisfaction. Lindau and Gavrilova (2010) found that both married men and women report higher frequencies of sexual activity than do their single peers. Though sexual activity in marriage generally declines with age, 52% of couples in the AARP *Survey of Midlife and Older Adults* reported that they are still satisfied with their sex life even though almost three quarters of couples had been together 10 years or more (Fisher et al., 2010). Marriage may be especially vital for women’s sexual frequencies in their very late years. In one study ($n = 1216$) focusing on the very old, married women were 24 times more likely to be sexually

active than their unmarried equivalents (Matthias, Lubben, Atchison, & Schweitzer, 1997).

This is not to say that marriage equates to a better sex life. Marital (and human) happiness is cyclical and sex suffers under stress conditions. But overall, marriage and sexual satisfaction are correlated. Data from the National Social Life, Health, and Aging Project (NSHAP), shows that spousal support as well as reported relationship happiness is positively associated with greater sexual frequency and sexual satisfaction (McFarland, Uecker, & Regnerus, 2011). In essence, if a marriage is emotionally supportive for both partners, sex is likely to be perceived positively by both men and women.

Many older couples, however, may have a demanding amount of time to consider and re-consider their relationship satisfaction. The increase in both men's and women's projected life span seems to have the effect of revising an individual's estimation of when midlife occurs and whether or not they might want to stay in their marriage for the next "half" or quartile of their life. Increasing relationship duration can elevate the risk of potential problems arising between partners. Corrosive emotions that have built up over the years can fray intimate bonds (Gottman, Coan, Carrere, & Swanson, 1998; Gottman & Levenson, 2000). Relationship issues in older couples will affect their sexual activity; unsatisfying marital relationships have been associated with significant increases in psychological distress and a serious decrease in sexual functioning (Trudel, Villeneuve, Prévaille, Boyer, & Fréchette, 2010). Additionally, a significant number of married couples who have been together for extended periods of their life begin to experience boredom in the bedroom and decreased desire for sexual activity (Call, Sprecher, & Schwartz, 1995). A number of studies find that duration of marriage negatively relates to sexual frequency (Marsiglio & Donnelly, 1991). Overall studies emphasize the negative relationship between age and sexual activity (rather than marital duration) as the driving factor for decreases in marital sexual frequencies, but duration is, nonetheless, important.

The impact, however, is gendered. Northrup, Schwartz, and Witte (2012) found that men reported sex as a main cause for relationship stress almost two times as much as women. The authors also observed that 60% of men versus 30% of women indicated that they were not having frequent enough sex (Northrup, Schwartz, & Witte, 2012). Discrepancies in sexual desire between spouses at any age has been correlated with lower sexual satisfaction and relationship satisfaction. It is also the most common complaint that brings couples to sex therapists (Willoughby, Farero, & Busby, 2014).

Another issue, this one more specific to older partners, comes in the form of stigma. Sexuality later in life can be seen as unnatural or abnormal and this belief can help lead to infrequent or absent sexual activity in older couples. Some older men and women internalize ageist attitudes that our youth-centric culture exaggerates. Women in particular, subjected to both ageist and sexist beliefs, may feel that sex after 60 or 70 is "unseemly" or "irrelevant" and a drop in sexual interest may be seen as a natural consequence of getting older. Indeed, some feminist approaches to sexual disinterest in women oppose the idea of any medical remediation for this condition (Tiefer, 2004). Many older men, while still being positive about life long sexuality, see declining erectile functioning as a loss in masculinity and shy away from sex out of embarrassment and humiliation. Women, experiencing side effects of menopause, can be convinced that this also means the end of their interest in sex. (We discuss this later in more depth.) These factors and cultural directives about sexuality in later life can lead partners to more readily accept sexual decline as a natural part of life (Weeks, 2002).

Many factors, including sexual issues, are involved with the increase in divorce in older couples. Utilizing multiple data sets (The American Community Survey, 2010, and the U. S. Vital Statistics Report, 1990), Brown and Lin (2012) found the rate of divorce between 1990 and 2010 had *doubled* for middle-aged and older adults—one in four divorces in 2010

occurred within people above 50 years old. Assuming their observed trends hold steady, the number of expected divorces by 2030 is anticipated to rise by yet another third in this population (Brown & Lin, 2012). At first, divorce seems to lower sexual activity and satisfaction (Blumstein & Schwartz, 1983). Fisher et al. (2010) found that only 4% of divorced respondents stated they were currently dating and it can be assumed that even fewer heterosexual women than men are able to reenter the dating pool due to lack of available partners. But those that do reenter the dating and mating marketplace and find sexual partners can increase their sexual satisfaction. When examining divorcees' and separated partners' current sexual satisfactions, Fisher et al. (2010) also found 16% of them reported that present sexual satisfaction was better than it was 10 years ago—compared to 13% that reported the opposite. Even more consequential, Wade and DeLamater (2002) found that the dissolution of a relationship within the past year correlated with an increase in sexual frequency. Perhaps viral stories of such changes in mid and late life sexuality encourage people in a conflicted or sexually dead relationship to leave their partner.

LGB marriages. Though research on LGB marriages is relatively new given the recent legalization of gay marriage, some early research findings are worth mentioning. In his review of data collected by the *Caring and Aging with Pride Project* which surveyed LGB adults 50 years of age and older between 2010 and 2011, Williams (2012) recorded some significant patterns. First, greater health and life satisfaction was seen in married populations when compared against unmarried LGB members. Secondly, the emotional, social, and financial benefits of having a spouse may also help to safeguard against detrimental health effects caused by stress in the aging LGB community. Legal commitment seems to help buffer couples from outside pressures and stress, which is presumed to increase the likelihood of a satisfying sex life in most couples.

Cohabitation. The rise of divorce, and the re-coupling of people post midlife, has made

alternatives to marriage more popular late in life. Cohabitation no longer has the stigma it had in the past and thus older couples who may have financial and other considerations that make marriage less attractive, now have an alternative way to live together. Older couples make up a significant sector of growth in cohabitating individuals—the number of partners over the age of 50 cohabiting has more than tripled since 2000 (Brown, Bulanda, & Lee, 2012). In the past it has been reported that cohabiters do not have as much sex or as much relationship satisfaction as married couples (Waite & Gallagher, 2000), however this may not be the case anymore and in any case, may not apply to seniors. Current research on cohabitation across age groups indicates that emotional satisfaction, relationship satisfaction, psychological well-being, pleasure, time spent with one's partner, and the number of disagreements seem to be about equivalent to or better than those levels found in married samples (Brown & Kawamura, 2010; King & Scott, 2005; Musick & Bumpass, 2012). Recent data suggest that the dynamics experienced within cohabitating partnerships can be just as positive as those experienced within a marriage. Fisher et al. (2010) found that older men and women who are partnered and unmarried experience higher sexual frequencies and greater sexual satisfaction ratings.

Younger couples now use cohabitation as a step-up in dating or as a "trial marriage," however older adults who cohabit are much less likely to have their coupling culminate in marriage (Brown, Bulanda, & Lee, 2012). Older cohabiters use this form of relationship as an alternative to marriage, many have been married previously and gone through divorce (Manning & Brown, 2011), and given the demographic shifts later in life, it may not come as a surprise that a woman's probability of post-marital cohabitation increases the more time that she has spent divorced (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2002). This pattern was not as strong in divorced African American women as it was in Hispanic and Caucasian women, perhaps more so due to the lack of eligible Black males in the dating pool. With high incarceration rates, increased

socioeconomic disadvantages, and more serious health risks, older African American males are a much smaller demographic (Schwartz, Dieffendorf, & McGlynn-Wright, 2014).

Alongside the rise of cohabitation, older generations show an increase in committed partners who retain their own separate living spaces, a relationship dynamic known as *living apart together* (LAT). Estimating the prevalence of LATs in the United States is difficult due to the lack of reliable data and trouble operationalizing such arrangements in surveys, however it seems clear that these partnerships are on the incline (Benson & Coleman, 2016). Reasons that older couples may opt for this nontraditional dynamic include financial autonomy, family living arrangements, relocation costs, and satisfaction with having alone time. LATs may be associated with a decline in sexual activity (Manning & Brown, 2011), possibly due to the lowered opportunity to initiate sex with your partner, but we hesitate to draw conclusions.

LG cohabitation. For decades, cohabitation was the highest form of commitment legally allowed to gay couples. With the legalization of same-sex marriage, the meaning of cohabitation is likely to see some change, so we emphasize the temporal context of current data on lesbian and gay cohabitation. Recent estimates calculate that one in eight older cohabiters are in same-sex relationships, they are evenly split between lesbian and gay couples, and are much more likely to be Caucasian than are heterosexual cohabiters (Manning & Brown, 2015). Another difference between same-sex and opposite-sex cohabiters is that the former tend to have greater financial and educational status than their heterosexual comparison (Manning & Brown, 2015). The fact that cohabitation has been a prevalent relationship form in the LG community much longer than the general population most likely explains the advantages they have accumulated over heterosexual cohabiters. Disadvantages, however, include the fact that same-sex couples still face institutional discrimination and stigma around the world as well as in the United States. Their sexual lives and intimate relationships are threatened by a multitude of psychosocial factors we will discuss later in this chapter.

Averett, Yoon, and Jenkins (2012) found that older lesbians focus on the stability and companionate qualities of a partnership, deemphasizing the role of sexuality within the relationship. Interestingly, in a previous analysis, the same researchers found that half of the lesbians in their sample ($n = 456$) reported being married to a man at some point in their life (Averett, Yoon, & Jenkins, 2011). This past experience has been noted by other researchers but it is unclear how past heterosexual experience might affect current same-sex sexual behavior. It may be the case that past heterosexual frequencies were based on male sexual preferences and male sexual initiation and not on what any particular woman might have seen as ideal. It may also be the case that many women who have not had lesbian desires earlier in life, but who are able to sexualize who they love, feel more free at older ages to allow themselves to love and sexualize other women. How this all affects sexual frequency is not clear. But there may also be some demographic encouragement for women becoming interested in other women at older ages since the sex ratio of men to women changes rather drastically in the 70s and later. Older women are more likely to be in a world where the majority of their contacts will be with other women and therefore the opportunity of falling in love with another woman increases. Averett and colleagues found that three in five respondents were currently in some form of relationship with another woman (emotionally, physically, and/or sexually) with an average duration of 15.4 years. Over 90% of these women labeled the relationship as a "life-time partnership" (Averett et al., 2011).

Seeing that lesbians, like all women in the studies we've read, value the companionate aspects of their living situations, it is unsurprising that their sexual satisfaction increases while partnered. Relationship satisfaction is positively associated with greater arousability, sexual pleasure, sexual satisfaction, and sexual functioning in lesbian pairings (Tracy & Junginger, 2007). One relationship factor that is negatively associated with sexual desire, arousability, and overall sexual satisfaction was relationship duration (Tracy & Junginger, 2007). Habituation affects all kinds of couples, but it is possible that

there might be somewhat less of a duration effect in older lesbian relationships that do not prioritize sexual activity.

While it seems that being partnered is more important culturally and perhaps historically for women, it is true that gay males also receive substantial benefits from being partnered. Studying older gay men in Australia ($n = 1179$), Lyons, Pitts, and Grierson (2013) found that about half of all men aged 40 and up were in an ongoing relationship, and differentiating by age brackets showed little variance. Of those in a relationship, about half of them defined their relationship as non-monogamous. This percent of non-monogamous gay couples has been replicated in other research (Blumstein & Schwartz, 1983; Northrup, Schwartz, & Witte, 2012) and is not present in heterosexual or lesbian relationships. It does not seem to have much to do with age or with sexual frequency in the relationship. In fact, in their 60-year-old-and-up bracket, Lyons et al. (2013) found only 35% of men reported no sex in the past four weeks while 32% reported sex one to two times in the past month, 21% reported six to ten times, and 12% reported more than ten times. Even with such high ratios, the majority of men still wanted more frequent sex and, it seems, sex outside the relationship.

Gay male participants' relationship to their most recent sexual partner was studied by Rosenberger et al. (2011). 34.5% of gay men's most recent partner (across age groups) was a new acquaintance. About 30% of 60-plus year olds had their most recent encounter with a boyfriend, significant other, or someone they were dating (casually or formally)—the percentage was slightly higher for 50–59-year-olds. The percentage of those who had sex with a spouse or domestic partner was 7.7% for 50–59 year olds and 6.3% for the oldest bracket. We assume the lower number of men having their last experience with a spouse or domestic partner reflects the non-monogamous contract of many gay couples and that only about half of gay men report being partnered who are over 40 years of age (Lyons et al., 2013).

2.1.1 All Older Intimate Relationships

So what makes sex in a long lasting partnership thrive? Gillespie's (2016) survey of older coupled respondents ($n = 9164$) showed most men's and women's sexual patterns and satisfaction ratings fit into two categories of relationships: 43.5% fell within the low frequency with low satisfaction category (abbreviated LL), while 34.5% were categorized as having high frequency with high satisfaction (abbreviated HH). In terms of communication styles, HH pairings were much more open about sexual desires and needs from their partner (e.g. asking for something specific in bed, inquiring for feedback on sexual performance, and texting their mate sexual content to tease them). Other areas HH partners outshined their LL counterparts were in mood setting and romantic gestures before and during sex. Some actions included lighting candles, playing music, saying "I love you," passionate kissing during sex, giving oral sex, and incorporating anal play. HH couples incorporated significantly more variety into their sexual acts, which is associated with higher sexual satisfaction (Kleinplatz et al., 2009). Northrup, Schwartz, and Witte (2012) found that 30% of men wanted more diversity in the bedroom while 19% of women also wished for less predictability. Of those most sexually satisfied, researchers found 24% incorporate role playing into their sex lives (Northrup, Schwartz, & Witte, 2012).

Heterosexual Singles. Being single does not mean that individuals are necessarily sexually unsatisfied, far from it; but it does seem they need to be dating in order to have a fulfilling sex life. Of those 45 and older, only 10% who report not dating say they are sexually satisfied—88% haven't had sex in the past 6 months (Fisher et al., 2010). As mentioned earlier, dating individuals generally have more sex than married couples—48% of singles who continue dating have sex at least once a week compared to 36% of married individuals (Fisher et al., 2010). 60% of dating older singles report satisfaction with their sex life, compared to 52% of married respondents (Fisher et al., 2010). We speculate that this difference is probably a result of the sexual novelty and higher frequencies present in

newer sexual relationships. It may also be that if high sexual satisfaction is not present, dating relationships among older men and women are terminated more quickly than if the same circumstances were present in a marriage.

This picture of sexual satisfaction outside of a committed relationship is likely to decrease with age—especially for women who cannot find a partner. Surprisingly, however, some research indicates that having an orgasm is more likely for women who are having sexual intercourse with a partner they do not consider a long-term mate (e.g. a man they are dating or casually seeing) (Schick et al., 2010). Schwartz, Diefendorf, and McGlynn-Wright (2014) suggest that this increased likelihood of orgasm with a casual partner could indicate that women who are dating may be the recipient of more romantic gestures and benefit from the freshness of new relationships or it could mean that they are more able to ask for what they want—without considering the needs of a long-term partner—and therefore more easily have an orgasm because they are likely to be orgasm focused rather than relationship focused. They also speculate that older women could be more confident in their sexual needs, enabling them to be direct about asking their partner to perform certain acts that will enhance their sexual experience. What is interesting is that this is a far different picture from the one painted in studies of college age women hooking up (Armstrong, England, & Fogarty, 2012). Young women in England's and other researchers' studies on casual sex show a big orgasm gap between men and women in casual sexual pairings, with women's orgasms being much rarer than men's. The interpretation has been that they enjoy sex less and feel more inhibited when there is no relationship or an uncertain bond. It may be that older women are able to shuck the normative judgments and taboos that bedevil younger women and are able to enjoy sex more despite the casual nature of the sexual encounter.

Of course all sex is not relational. Even if single men and women decide to forgo relationships later in life they can still masturbate. Those who do not wish to enter the dating pool again but still desire sexual stimulation may be completely satisfied using sexual devices. The

marketplace for various masturbatory aids is vast and is utilized by both individuals and coupled partners. The occasional solo session with a sex toy may be enough for many older adults experiencing the dilemma of not wanting to date but still seeking exciting new sexual stimulation. A caution here however: while women far outnumber men as users of vibrators and other sexual aids, the fact is that there are fewer women than men who masturbate, and fewer women over 50 use vibrators than women in their twenties and thirties (Northrup, Schwartz, & Witte, 2012). This seems to indicate that older women still feel that masturbation is “sinful” or wrong or “pitiful” (because a woman ought to be able to have an orgasm with another person and failing that, is a disappointment). Self-pleasuring, it seems, is still more culturally stigmatized for women than for men—and this is especially true for older women.

LGB Singles. Studies like Rosenberger et al.'s (2011) indicate that there are high rates of non-committed sex within the gay community. What is unexpected is that the percent of men 60 years of age and older who had their last sexual event in the past week (62.9%) is greater than all age brackets sampled besides 40–49 year olds (63%). Obviously, age is not a bar to sexual participation for gay men. This is partially a result of a sub-cultural permission for relatively impersonal sex and partially a difference in cultural permissions for all men.

Nonetheless, as we have indicated previously, relationship quality matters for men as well as women. The lowest rates of reported orgasm during sexual events were found in the 60-year-old-and-up bracket, but these men were significantly more likely to experience an orgasm if the encounter was with a relationship partner (Rosenberger et al., 2011).

Bisexual males are more likely to live alone than people of other sexual orientation-gender combinations (Fredriksen-Goldsen et al., 2013) and even more likely to report their most recent sexual event as involving a new acquaintance than gay men within the same age bracket (Rosenberger et al., 2011). A possible theory would be that older bisexual males have great difficulty finding a

partner (caused by prejudice and fear of bisexuality), making them especially vulnerable to sexual inactivity and lack of an intimate companion. Or they could simply conceal their bisexuality in surveys, preferring to list the sexual orientation in line with their current sexual behaviors.

Lesbians, single and partnered, report sharp declines in sexual frequencies as they age or over the duration of long-term relationships (Blumstein & Schwartz, 1983; Loulan, 1987; Peplau, Cochran, Rook, & Padesky, 1978). Lever (as cited in Garnets & Peplau, 2006) found that after only two years together, lesbian couples have sexual intercourse less frequently than heterosexual couples who have been married for ten years. The sexual behavior throughout the life cycle of younger lesbians remains to be studied. It is possible, however, that these numbers of older and baby boom lesbians reflect the cultural inhibitions of a generation rather than what might be true for lesbians who have come of age more recently and for whom sex in general is less taboo.

Unlike gay males (and heterosexual females), older lesbians are actually more likely to live with a partner or friend than not, helping to counteract social isolation and mental illness (Fredriksen-Goldsen et al., 2011). Lesbians generally have larger support systems and social networks (Fredriksen-Goldsen et al., 2011). They are also less age restrictive towards whom they will date. A culmination of various studies shows that lesbians are much more open towards cross-generational relationships than are heterosexual women or gay males but show some preferences towards women around their own age or older (Kehoe, 1986; Schope, 2005; Silverthorne & Quinsey, 2000). With this considered, it is fairly safe to say that, in terms of age, single lesbians have a larger pool of eligibles than many heterosexual women of their age.

3 Physiological Changes Later in Life

Older bodies face sexual challenges. However women and men have both congruent and different issues. Both may need additional

stimulation for arousal and climax but obviously erectile issues, or fragile tissue issues are sex specific. Recent findings indicate that the orgasm stage of aging females' sexual response cycle is less defined and peak sexual pleasure can be obtained without necessarily reaching climax (Basson, Brotto, Laan, Redmond, & Utian, 2005; Kingsberg, 2016; Nusbaum, Lenahan, & Sadovsky, 2005). Men face issues such as erectile and ejaculatory disorders (Nusbaum, Lenahan, & Sadovsky, 2005; Rao, Ismail, Darshan, & Tandon, 2015; Waite, Laumann, Das, & Schumm, 2009; Zhao, Su, & Seftel, 2014). These changes acknowledged, it is important to note that capacity to experience pleasure from sexual activity does not decrease with age in either gender (Penhollow, Young, & Denny, 2009).

3.1 Erectile Dysfunction

AARP's *Survey of Midlife and Older Adults* found that 30% of male respondents over 45 reported some degree of ED and 27% had actually been diagnosed with the disorder (Fisher et al., 2010). The psychosocial impact from the loss of easy or any erectile capacity can be devastating to men and to their partners because it has been so associated with virility and over-all masculinity in men's lives (Wiley & Bortz, 1996). While stroking a non-erect penis can result in arousal and climax, lack of ability to have an erection is highly associated with the cessation of all sexual activity (Hinchliff & Gott, 2011).

3.2 Menopause

Menopause is medicalized in western cultures, but often psychosocial variables are ignored (Hartmann, Philippsohn, Heiser, & Ruffer-Hesse, 2004). Hartmann et al. (2004) found the impact of hormonal changes during menopause was "relatively weak," while relationship factors, body image, and severity of symptoms were much more pertinent for predicting sexual behavior and satisfaction. Bancroft, Loftus, and

Long (2003) found that issues often associated with middle age such as difficulty with orgasm, arousal, and lower lubrication were “poor predictors” of sexual satisfaction. In contrast, emotional well-being and emotional connection with partners during intercourse were far more effective predictors of sexual satisfaction (Bancroft et al., 2003). This is not to say that the physiological shifts caused by menopause do not impact women’s sexual longevity. But research indicates that menopausal bodily changes may coalesce with other age-related physical and psychosocial variables that encroach on a woman’s ability to desire and enjoy sexual intercourse. Therefore it is not unlikely that menopause is often blamed as the overall cause of sexual decline post-midlife rather than seen as only one facet of age-related sexual decline.

4 Psychosocial Changes Later in Life

We need to note that not all factors that affect aging and sexuality are physical or sexual issues. Death of a spouse, for example, is far more likely to occur after 50 than earlier in the life cycle, and it can have unanticipated consequences. Using the Medicare claims data of 420,790 couples between 67 and 99 years of age, researchers found a positive correlation between men losing their spouse and subsequently being diagnosed with an STD within less than a year of separation between both events (Ball, 2010). Ball (2010) notes however that this correlation was non-existent for women; even though they had a higher likelihood of having an STD overall, their likelihood of catching an STD post-widowhood was less than their risk pre-widowhood.

This difference may be due to demographic shifts. When Sasson and Umberson (2014) analyzed Health and Retirement Study data between 1994 and 2008, they found that women face a 30% chance of ever being widowed, compared to the 10.4% chance their male cohorts held. Additionally, nearly 19% of men remarry within 14 years of their spouse’s passing while only around 7% of women do (Sasson & Umberson,

2014). These trends, when taken together, also indicate that men are much more likely to actively seek out new sexual partners, or even a new committed relationship, after bereavement than most women would. Not all of this is due to gender ratios: women are very likely to have spent their last years of marriage before widowhood being caregivers and those women often do not want to face those kinds of emotional and physical demands again (Hunt & Reinhard, 2015).

Depression is another important psychological factor affecting sexual interest and activity (Baldwin, 2001; Cohen et al., 2007; Fröhlich & Meston, 2002). Popular beliefs assume that with age comes increased risk of developing some form of depressive mood disorder, however evidence is mixed. Women do have a higher risk of developing depression later in life, but for the most part, depression in the elderly is primarily situational (Cole & Dendukuri, 2003).

4.1 Attractiveness and Body Image

The immense value placed on youthful aesthetics presents a universal challenge for those aging out of their physical prime. Women worry about their looks as they age, but fortunately, these aesthetic changes don’t impede the psychological happiness of women as much as they had anticipated prior to menopausal status. Barrett and Toothman (2016) found that women 50 plus report greater emotional well-being than women in younger age brackets.

Still, even with a better physical image than expected, aging women consistently have negative views towards their own attractiveness. When McCarthy (1991) asked women and men between the ages of 65 and 75 to rate their own sexual desirousness, the mean rating for both sexes was within the “neither desirable nor undesirable” range. Not only does this indicate relatively low body image, but those sampled didn’t seem to be attracted to their peers—rather they found younger potential partners more desirable (McCarthy, 1991). Poor body image can severely undermine sexual satisfaction

(Holt & Lyness, 2007; Masters & Johnson, 1970), yet it is the norm for many older women. This overall impact of cultural disapproval of aging appearances or “imperfect” bodies at any age has been recently referred to as body shaming (Sanchez & Kiefer, 2007). These judgments affect body image (a psychological conceptualization of attractiveness) and can be responsible for anxiety about sexual and personal worthiness. Poor body image is correlated with lower sexual satisfaction, increased sexual self-consciousness during intimacy, and lower arousability (Sanchez & Kiefer, 2007).

Men, unaffected by the body changes that women have from pregnancy, and having a more gradual change in hormones than women do, have a physiological advantage which, in combination with less harsh judgments about their looks, gives them a psychological advantage when it comes to body image. Armed with cultural preferences that women (and other men) have for men with prestigious biographies or economic resources, they are more able to remain critical of other’s attractiveness while still being able to shore up their own marketability using factors other than physical attributes. Men have consistently been shown to become more critical of attractiveness and more attracted to youth as they age, and—unlike women—they are more likely to mate with younger partners and state more marital happiness if they rate their partner as highly attractive (England & McClintock, 2009; Margolin & White, 1987; Meltzer, McNulty, Jackson, & Karney, 2014; Teuscher & Teuscher, 2007). Most heterosexual women are well aware of men’s desire for youthful and attractive partners, which places serious pressure on older women to appear as youthful or as attractive as possible. If they fail to meet his expectations, the sexual consequences are real: some research indicates that male sexual desire is the primary determinants of whether a couple stays sexually active (Beckman, Waern, Gustafson, & Skoog, 2008).

One method that women have increasingly utilized in order to slow the appearance of aging is plastic surgery. The annual report conducted by the American Society of Plastic Surgeons

(2015) continually shows that the number of procedures performed per year is steadily increasing and the vast majority of these patients are middle-to-older aged women (American Society of Plastic Surgeons, 2014; Brooks, 2010). Modern advertisements for plastic surgery often treat aging as a medical condition, appropriately addressed by doctors in order to prevent its progression. New comparison levels enabled by looking at a woman who has had a “face lift” next to a woman who has not, have placed aging women in a bind: to look like you have not aged in twenty years you must endure expensive, probably painful, and often dangerous surgery and if you choose not to follow that path, you are likely to look much older than aged peers who have had surgical interventions. In an era when people over the age of 50 have a higher likelihood of divorce, women can legitimately worry about whether or not they will stay sexually compelling to their partner, even if he is not attracted to women half his age.

While women remain primary targets for the shifts in cosmetic upkeep as gender inequality has led to women’s definition of worth being tied to their attractiveness, a contemporary change in societal attitudes towards male attractiveness later in life is steadily gaining ground. In past generations men avoided harsh media critiques about their bodies and faces, but the male physique is increasingly coming under more requirements for leanness and muscularity (McCabe & Ricciardelli, 2004). A content analysis conducted between 1958 and 1998 found that the prevalence of the naked male body in magazines has sky rocketed (Pope, Olivardia, Borowiecki, & Cohane, 2001). Exposure to the increased saturation of idealized male figures in media positively correlates with men being dissatisfied with their physical appearance, having low body image, and experiencing body shame (Agliaia & Tantleff-Dunn, 2004; Hatoum & Belle, 2004; Pope et al., 2001; Sanchez & Kiefer, 2007). Furthermore, Meana and Nunnink (2006) found that low body image in men is correlated with distracting thoughts about appearance and performance during sex, reducing sexual satisfaction. Due to the relative newness of

mainstream male body objectification, it may be that men who are presently young (and already report higher rates of body dissatisfaction than older males) will experience higher levels of body shame as they age (Peat, Peyerl, Ric Ferraro, & Butler, 2011).

Lesbian women, gay men, and bisexuals. It is also important to remember that both men and women in the LGB population face most of the same standards of beauty that heterosexuals do in addition to the stigma attached to their sexuality. Still, there are some serious differences between gay men and lesbians when we speak about bodies. Lesbians are much less age and body conscious than gay men. Schope (2005) observed that lesbians also show better body image and less fixation on weight and appearance in general than heterosexual women and certainly homosexual males (Alvy, 2013; Bergeron & Senn, 1998; Owens, Hughes, & Owens-Nicholson, 2002; Wagenbach, 2004). Lesbians also seem to find higher BMIs preferable (Swami & Tovee, 2006). In essence, though they must cope with heteronormative standards around aging and beauty, the lesbian community is much more supportive of their members (even in terms of age and body type) than the heterosexual female community or the gay male community.

Unlike lesbians, older gay men, have been portrayed as isolated, depressed, undesirable, and lonely characters (Morrow, 2001; Pugh, 2005). However, while it is true older gay men are more likely to live alone, living alone has not meant an unsatisfactory sex life; recall that half of the older gay men Lyons et al. (2013) sampled were currently in a relationship (regardless of age) and 40% of men over 60 years of age reported they were “very satisfied” with their sex life.

Gay males’ proficiency in maintaining relatively high sexual satisfaction and growing social support systems later in life is actually impressive in the face of current literature regarding their conceptualization of age—specifically in regards to the rising theory of *accelerated aging* within the gay community. Accelerated aging theory asserts that homosexual men perceive themselves as older at any given age than a heterosexual male would of the same age

(Schope, 2005). Schope (2005) also found that the average age gay men labeled as turning old fluctuates within the late thirties, with younger gay males perceiving it to be earlier than older males. Accelerated aging forces early adult and middle-aged gay men to face age-related stigma much sooner and more strongly than heterosexual males or females. Not helping this unfortunate slant on age are findings that indicate younger gay males are much more critical towards age and determining what ages are viable for dating (Schope, 2005). And although younger gay males are generally uninterested in perusing older members of their community, older gay men continually show stronger preferences towards younger partners (Conway, Noë, Stulp, & Pollet, 2015) and to a larger degree than heterosexual men (Conway et al., 2015; Hayes, 1995; Silverthorne & Quinsey, 2000).

This pattern of internalized ageism may stem from the intense value placed upon appearance in the gay sub culture, allowing youthful features to be synonymous with sexual attraction.

There is very little research on bisexuals’ psychosocial well being. However, Fredriksen-Goldsen et al. (2013) found higher rates of internalized stigma paired with lower levels of social support systems among both male and female bisexuals. Derogatory attitudes towards bisexuality, referred to as biphobia among some researchers (see Welzer-Lang, 2008), may inhibit the formation of social networks thus, it is not terribly surprising that bisexuals are less likely to be partnered in their later years and more likely to suffer from higher levels of stress than their homosexual equivalents. It is also plausible that the majority of older bisexuals simply do not reveal their sexual fluidity in many relationships or identify as heterosexuals or homosexuals regardless of their behavior or history.

5 Discussion

With medical advances, and the stickiness of baby boom cultural values of “sex, drugs, rock and roll,” social support for life long sexuality

seems greater than perhaps at any other moment in history. Still, the relative paucity of research on sex after seventy constrains our ability to say as much as we would like about the lived experience of men and women in the last third of the life cycle. This is particularly true when we try to zero in on sexual, racial, and gender minorities. In addition, with the rise of medical innovations that enhance ability and desire (e.g. Viagra), a primacy of medical interpretations of sexual behavior has eclipsed a more social constructionist analysis of gendered sexual lives. Differences within gender performance or arousal are most often attributed to biological causes and differences between genders are not often attributed to culturally institutionalized values and life histories. We would have liked some more nuanced researched descriptions of how the social construction of gender creates our sexual feelings and lives but the enumeration of acts and problematizing of sexual functions far outstrips the literature on social factors that affect men's and women's sexual feelings and desires in aging populations.

Overall, our vision of what the cultural mandates have been for men and women from middle age onward show that Americans conceptualize growing old based on societal schemas of aging which diverge from the lived experience of many older people. Men and women often subscribe to more generous and individualistic constructs of sexual expression throughout the latter half of the life cycle than is acknowledged, or in fact, believed. Yet, lesbians, while not exactly defeating age stereotypes of beauty, have relegated them to more modest effects on mating and relationship maintenance. Even if we compare lesbian concepts of aging versus those held by gay males—who are more constrained by linking youth, beauty, and attraction—we see that the everyday expression of those prejudices is muted by the experience of everyday life and opportunities. When we look at the data, the majority of older gay men have vivid sex lives and many have lifelong partners who are peers. Yes, the socio-biologists give a reproductive rationale for why lifelong obsession with youth is in our genetic make-up, but that

does not obviate the fact that our media emphasizes youth and beauty in a much more exacting way than the average person utilizes. Modern movies are mostly about the pairings of youthful couples, or in the case of age disparity, it is almost always an older man with a much younger woman. Some older female stars have been able to cross the age pairing lines but it is rare. The same constriction might be said for sexual identities. While we believe that there is plenty of evidence to support the presence of non-binary sexual desires and behaviors, almost all the research is categorical. In fact, in depth research on any kind of bisexuality or gender flexibility or transsexual data among older populations is almost impossible to find.

What is made clear by our overview of the research literature is that sexuality does not simply fade away with age. There is no necessary withering of desire. Many men and women remain sexually aware and active far into old age, but cultural reinforcement of their feelings and desires is still modest—or in some places—missing. This is especially true for women, and we think one of the consequences of that cultural dismissal of older women's sexuality is that many women absorb that description of the sexless older woman and thus expect and possibly create an attitude wherein sexual vitality and sexual expression is allowed to subside or disappear. Cultural models of sexy women over 50 (Meryl Streep or Helen Mirren for example) may seem modest in impact being one of only a few leading older ladies allowed to have romance and sexual encounters on screen but they are extremely important for older women who have few, if any, social permissions for a sexy old age. Many minorities have had to have public relations campaigns to help counter ugly stereotypes and perhaps this is also needed for older men and women. Say what you will about Viagra and other medical boosts to sexual longevity, but their advertisements of gray haired lovers is a bright star on a bleak media horizon for sexualities at older ages. We have hope that in the years to come, we may see a de-stigmatization of the elderly and a pro-sex mentality towards all aging demographics heterosexual, LGBTQ, or fluid.

Age is, in part, a state of mind and with the right mindset sexual satisfaction and age need not be considered mutually exclusive.

Some progressive changes have been already surfaced. Phrases such as “60 is the new 40” and the increasing number of online dating sites dedicated to the 50-and-up market, acknowledge and create a sexual marketplace for older people. Even the rising divorce rates within this population show a re-envisioning of what age means to older men and women who feel they now have an avenue to seek out emotional and/or sexual intimacy. Transgendered and transsexual individuals are the latest beneficiaries of a more nuanced acknowledgement of minority populations whose ratification and sexual civil rights need validation. Almost completely unacknowledged by the public fifty years ago, this population is reaching the attention of masses with media endorsements like the critically acclaimed Amazon series *Transparent* and celebrity trans spoke persons (e.g. Laverne Cox and Chaz Bono). *Transparent* is particularly significant to our discussion since it presents the sexual life of an older transwoman.

These dramatic shifts illustrate an ongoing narrative that stands in stark contrast to that which existed for the Baby Boom’s parental generation and those before them. Sex, intimacy, and love finally have importance and validation. Women and men are beginning to see their opportunity to live sexually liberated lives regardless of their generational status. Who knows what the sexual desire and behaviors of a woman in her 70s will look like once she feels entitled to be sexual at *every* stage in her life cycle. The obstacles are many—gendered scripts of what sexuality must look like have dominated visions of acceptable sexual experiences later in life, making it harder for erotic images of older people (but particularly women) to become mainstream. This in itself depresses the ability for young as well as old people to reimagine a template of sexuality whereby older women can be seen as sexual beings. It is no surprise then, that older women look for ways to create more youthful appearances. For example, rising plastic surgery rates among older women are in great

part an effort to both increase their marketability as sexual partners and also to increase their own belief in themselves as objects of men’s (and sometimes women’s) desires. Men may seek similar methods to retain their youthful looks, but the reality is that these changes that men make rarely are based on the ability to remain sexually viable to heterosexual women. These scripts not only generate differential behaviors between men and women, they often become part of an individual’s self-concept and alter the trajectory of their sexual life from relatively open in young adulthood through middle age to restrictive during older years.

On the individual level, women have been socialized to be sexually monogamous, inherently linking sexual activity with the presence of a stable and emotionally fulfilling partner. Throughout history, the barriers to non-mongamous sex for women included not only social adversity, but for many it entailed physical retribution. Today there are still a handful of countries where a woman can face litigation and/or brutal punishment should she be found unfaithful. Even in the US and other Western countries, women face marginalization if their sexual behavior is non-monogamous or more active than community norms allow. Words like “slut” or “whore” or “promiscuous” may be hurled at her. In response to such a hostile environment, women themselves often embrace values that advocate strict monogamy not only for themselves but for other women. Their monogamous behavior is hardly based solely on their biology (as many evolutionary psychologists would argue) but out of the immense risk they ran should they violate the strict expectations of female monogamy. Throughout history, men have not had such severe constraints. Although some societies have punished men for extramarital sex, the vast majority of cultures wink at it. In fact, there is some support for men to be sexually active whether it is inside or outside of marriage or cohabitation. Even in our own culture, many men and women feel that it is unnatural for a man to only feel sexual attraction to one partner whereas women are expected to be more naturally monogamous and

ultimately devolve into child-focused matriarchs, or later into very unsexy grandmother roles. These dramatic gender differences have permitted males to be perceived as having a lifelong robust sexuality until extreme old age, whereas older sexuality agentic women are lampooned or seen as acting inappropriately. This cultural presumption of male sexual prowess is taken to an extreme in gay males. Rather than mature into the favorite gay uncle (analogous to the matronly older woman), gay men are expected to experience high levels of sexual activity and often with many sexual partners well into their oldest years.

On the macro level, these views of women's diminished sexuality in the second half of the life cycle, plus the demographic realities of many more women than men in older age have encouraged many women to exit the dating and mating market. If women felt permitted to engage in more casual sex, and have less strict definitions about what was appropriate sexual behavior (for example, dating younger men) the demographics would likely be less punishing. However, if our research has shown us anything it is that our norms and values about aging and sexuality are changing. This is something we can observe with more older men and, notably, more older women utilizing online dating, women post-50 wearing trendy clothing in lieu of the traditional grandmotherly garments, and in the few but growing number of older women on television that stray from the conventional (e.g. Jane Fonda and Lily Tomlin in their hit Netflix series *Grace and Frankie*). Granted, this progression towards gender equality remains at a slow pace. But as we see younger men and women act unconstrained by gendered sex roles, it seems to us that in future years, sexuality for older men and women will be far less stigmatized and far more active. We also expect increasing changes among today's older populations. Present and future medical innovations improve both sexual and overall health, providing a possibility that sexual experiences will become less

gendered sooner and allow both men and women to pursue an erotic future well into old age in a way that has not yet happened in the past. It may be that Baby Boomer's steadfast determination to stay young may provide new models for sexual behavior as this group reaches the 70s and beyond.

References

- Agliata, D., & Tantleff-Dunn, S. (2004). The impact of media exposure on males' body image. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 23*(1), 7–22.
- Alvy, L. M. (2013). Do lesbian women have a better body image? Comparisons with heterosexual women and model of lesbian-specific factors. *Body Image, 10*(4), 524–534. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bodyim.2013.06.002>.
- American Society of Plastic Surgeons. (2014). *2014 Plastic surgery procedural statistics*.
- American Society of Plastic Surgeons. (2015). *Plastic surgery statistics report*.
- Armstrong, E., England, P., & Fogarty, A. (2012). Accounting for women's orgasm and sexual enjoyment in college hookups and relationships. *American Sociological Review, 77*(3), 435–462.
- Averett, P., Yoon, I., & Jenkins, C. L. (2011). Older lesbians: Experiences of aging, discrimination and resilience. *Journal of Women & Aging, 23*(3), 216–232. <https://doi.org/10.1080/08952841.2011.587742>.
- Averett, P., Yoon, I., & Jenkins, C. (2012). Older lesbian sexuality: Identity, sexual behavior, and the impact of aging. *Journal of Sex Research, 49*(5), 495–507. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00224499.2011.582543>.
- Baldwin, D. (2001). Depression and sexual dysfunction. *British Medical Bulletin, 57*, 81–99.
- Ball, H. (2010). Death of a spouse may be associated with increased STD diagnosis among older men. *Perspectives on Sexual & Reproductive Health, 42*(1), 64. https://doi.org/10.1363/4206410_1.
- Bancroft, J., Loftus, J., & Long, J. (2003). Distress about sex: A national survey of women in heterosexual relationships. *Archives of Sexual Behavior, 32*(3), 193–208. <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023420431760>.
- Barrett, A., & Toothman, E. (2016). Explaining age differences in women's emotional well-being: The role of subjective experiences of aging. *Journal of Women & Aging, 28*(4), 285–296. <https://doi.org/10.1080/08952841.2015.1017426>.
- Basson, R., Brotto, L. A., Laan, E., Redmond, G., & Utian, W. H. (2005). Assessment and management of

- women's sexual dysfunctions: Problematic desire and arousal. *Journal of Sex Medicine*, 2(3), 291–300. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-6109.2005.20346.x>.
- Beckman, N., Waern, M., Gustafson, D., & Skoog, I. (2008). Secular trends in self reported sexual activity and satisfaction in Swedish 70 year olds: Cross sectional survey of four populations, 1971–2001. *British Medical Journal*, 337(7662), 151–154. <https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.a279>.
- Benson, J., & Coleman, M. (2016). Older adults developing a preference for living apart together. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 78(3), 797–812. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jomf.12292>.
- Bergeron, S. M., & Senn, C. Y. (1998). Body image and sociocultural norms. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 22(3), 385–401. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.1998.tb00164.x>.
- Blumstein, P., & Schwartz, P. (1983). *American couples: Money, work and sex* (1st ed.). New York: William Morrow.
- Brooks, A. (2010). Aesthetic anti-ageing surgery and technology: Women's friend or foe? In K. Joyce & M. Loe (Eds.), *Technogenarians* (pp. 64–82). Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Brown, S. L., Bulanda, J. R., & Lee, G. R. (2012). Transitions into and out of cohabitation in later life. *Journal of Marriage & Family*, 74(4), 774. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-3737.2012.00994.x>.
- Brown, S. L., & Kawamura, S. (2010). Relationship quality among cohabitators and marrieds in older adulthood. *Social Science Research*, 39(5), 777–786. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2010.04.010>.
- Brown, S. L., & Lin, I.-F. (2012). The gray divorce revolution: rising divorce among middle-aged and older adults, 1990–2010. *Journals of Gerontology Series B: Psychological Sciences & Social Sciences (J Gerontol B Psychol Sci Soc Sci)*, 67(6), 731–741. <http://dx.doi.org.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/geronb/gbs089>.
- Call, V., Sprecher, S., & Schwartz, P. (1995). The incidence and frequency of marital sex in a national sample. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 57(3), 639–652. <https://doi.org/10.2307/353919>.
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2002). *Cohabitation, marriage, divorce, and remarriage in the United States*. Hyattsville, Maryland: Department of Health and Human Services.
- Cohen, S., Kühn, K. U., Bender, S., Erfurth, A., Gastpar, M., Murafi, A., et al. (2007). Sexual impairment in psychiatric inpatients: Focus on depression. *Pharmacopsychiatry*, 40(2), 58–63.
- Cole, M., & Dendukuri, N. (2003). Risk factors for depression among elderly community subjects: A systematic review and meta-analysis. *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 160(6), 1147–1156.
- Conway, J., Noë, N., Stulp, G., & Pollet, T. (2015). Finding your soulmate: Homosexual and heterosexual age preferences in online dating. *Personal Relationships*, 22(4), 666–678. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pere.12102>.
- Das, A., Waite, L. J., & Laumann, E. O. (2012). Sexual expression over the life course: Results from three landmark surveys. In *Sex for life: From virginity to viagra, how sexuality changes throughout our lives* (pp. 236–259). New York: New York University Press.
- Delamater, J., & Koepsel, E. (2015). Relationships and sexual expression in later life: A biopsychosocial perspective. *Sexual and Relationship Therapy*, 30(1), 37–59. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14681994.2014.939506>.
- Delamater, J., & Sill, M. (2005). Sexual desire in later life. *Journal of Sex Research*, 42(2), 138–149. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00224490509552267>.
- England, P., & McClintock, E. (2009). The gendered double standard of aging in US marriage markets. *Population and Development Review*, 35(4), 797–816. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2009.00309.x>.
- Fisher, L., Anderson, G., Chapagain, M., Montenegro, X., Smoot, J., & Takalkar, A. (2010). Sex, romance, and relationships: AARP survey of midlife and older adults.
- Fredriksen-Goldsen, K. I., Emlet, C. A., Kim, H. J., Muraco, A., Erosheva, E. A., Goldsen, J., et al. (2013). The physical and mental health of lesbian, gay male, and bisexual (LGB) older adults: The role of key health indicators and risk and protective factors. *The Gerontologist*, 53(4), 664–675. <https://doi.org/10.1093/geront/gns123>.
- Fredriksen-Goldsen, K., Kim, H. J., Emlet, C., Murano, A., Erosheva, E., Hoy-Ellis, C., et al. (2011). *The aging and health report: Disparities and resilience among lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender older adults*. Seattle, WA: Institute for Multigenerational Health.
- Fröhlich, P., & Meston, C. (2002). Sexual functioning and self-reported depressive symptoms among college women. *The Journal of Sex Research*, 39(4), 321–325. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00224490209552156>.
- Gagnon, J., Giami, A., Michaels, S., & De Colomby, P. (2001). A comparative study of the couple in the social organization of sexuality in France and the United States. *Journal of Sex Research*, 38(1), 24–34. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00224490109552067>.
- Garnets, L., & Peplau, L. A. (2006). Sexuality in the lives of aging lesbian and bisexual women. In D. C. Kimmel, T. Rose, & S. David (Eds.), *Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender aging: Research and clinical perspectives* (pp. 70–90). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Gillespie, B. J. (2016). Correlates of sex frequency and sexual satisfaction among partnered older adults. *Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy*, 1–21. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0092623x.2016.1176608>.
- Gottman, J. M., Coan, J., Carrere, S., & Swanson, C. J. (1998). Predicting marital happiness and stability from newlywed interactions. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 60(1), 5–22. <https://doi.org/10.2307/353438>.

- Gottman, J. M., & Levenson, R. W. (2000). The timing of divorce: Predicting when a couple will divorce over a 14-year period. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 62(3), 737–745. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-3737.2000.00737.x>.
- Hartmann, U., Philippsohn, S., Heiser, K., & Ruffer-Hesse, C. (2004). Low sexual desire in midlife and older women: Personality factors, psychosocial development, present sexuality. *Menopause*, 11(6), 726–740.
- Hatoum, I., & Belle, D. (2004). Mags and abs: Media consumption and bodily concerns in men. *Sex Roles*, 51(7), 397–407. <https://doi.org/10.1023/B:SERS.0000049229.93256.48>.
- Hayes, A. F. (1995). Age preferences for same- and opposite-sex partners. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 135(2), 125.
- Hensel, D. J., & Fortenberry, J. D. (2014). Life-span sexuality through a sexual health perspective. In D. Tolman & L. Diamond (Eds.), *APA handbook of sexuality and psychology* (pp. 385–413). USA: American Psychological Association.
- Hinchliff, S., & Gott, M. (2011). Seeking medical help for sexual concerns in mid- and later life: A review of the literature. *Journal of Sex Research*, 48(2–3), 106–117. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00224499.2010.548610>.
- Holt, A., & Lyness, K. (2007). Body image and sexual satisfaction: Implications for couple therapy. *Journal of Couple & Relationship Therapy*, 6(3), 45–68. https://doi.org/10.1300/j398v06n03_03.
- Hunt, G., & Reinhard, S. (2015). Caregiving in the U.S.: The national alliance for caregiving AARP Public Policy Institute.
- Kehoe, M. (1986). Lesbians over 65: A triply invisible minority. *Journal of Homosexuality*, 12(3/4), 139–152.
- King, V., & Scott, M. E. (2005). A comparison of cohabiting relationships among older and younger adults. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 67(2), 271–285. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-2445.2005.00115.x>.
- Kingsberg, S. A. (2016). The impact of aging on sexual function in women and their partners. *Archives of Sexual Behavior*, 31(5), 431–437. <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019844209233>.
- Kleinplatz, P. J., Kleinplatz, P. J., Dana Ménard, A., Paquet, M. P., Zuccarino, D., Mehak, L., et al. (2009). The components of optimal sexuality: A portrait of “great sex”. *Canadian Journal of Human Sexuality*, 18(1–2), 1–13.
- Lindau, S. T., & Gavrilova, N. (2010). Sex, health, and years of sexually active life gained due to good health: Evidence from two US population based cross sectional surveys of ageing. *British Medical Journal*, 340. <https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.c810>.
- Loulan, J. A. (1987). *Lesbian passion: Loving ourselves and each other* (1st ed.). San Francisco: Spinsters.
- Lyons, A., Pitts, M., & Grierson, J. (2013). Growing old as a gay man: Psychological well-being of a sexual minority. *Research on Aging*, 35(3), 275–295. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0164027512445055>.
- Manning, W. D., & Brown, S. L. (2011). The demography of unions among older Americans, 1980–present: A family change approach. In R. A. Settersten & J. L. Angel (Eds.), *Handbook of sociology of aging* (pp. 193–210). New York, NY: Springer.
- Manning, W. D., & Brown, S. L. (2015). Aging cohabiting couples and family policy: Different-sex and same-sex couples. *Public Policy & Aging Report*, 25(3), 94–97. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ppar/prv012>.
- Margolin, L., & White, L. (1987). The continuing role of physical attractiveness in marriage. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 49(1), 21–27. <https://doi.org/10.2307/352666>.
- Marsiglio, W., & Donnelly, D. (1991). Sexual relations in later life: A national study of married persons. *Journals of Gerontology*, 46(6), S338–S344.
- Masters, W., & Johnson, V. (1970). *Human sexual inadequacy*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Matthias, R. E., Lubben, J. E., Atchison, K. A., & Schweitzer, S. O. (1997). Sexual activity and satisfaction among very old adults: Results from a community-dwelling medicare population survey 1. *The Gerontologist*, 37(1), 6–14. <https://doi.org/10.1093/geront/37.1.6>.
- Mccabe, M., & Ricciardelli, L. (2004). Body image dissatisfaction among males across the lifespan: A review of past literature. *Journal of Psychosomatic Research*, 55(6), 675–685.
- McCarthy, S. (1991). Sexual desirability, dating, and sexual intimacy as influenced by age, income, and physical attractiveness in older adults: Does the double standard of aging apply?.
- Mcfarland, M., Uecker, J., & Regnerus, M. (2011). The role of religion in shaping sexual frequency and satisfaction: Evidence from married and unmarried older adults. *Journal of Sex Research*, 48(2–3), 297–308. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00224491003739993>.
- Meana, M., & Nunnink, S. (2006). Gender differences in the content of cognitive distraction during sex. *Journal of Sex Research*, 43(1), 59–67. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00224490609552299>.
- Meltzer, A. L., McNulty, J. K., Jackson, G. L., & Karney, B. R. (2014). Sex differences in the implications of partner physical attractiveness for the trajectory of marital satisfaction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 106(3), 418–428. <https://doi.org/10.1037/t14088-000>.
- Morrow, D. (2001). Older gays and lesbians: Surviving a generation of hate and violence. *Journal of Gay & Lesbian Social Services*, 12(3/4), 151.
- Musick, K., & Bumpass, L. (2012). Reexamining the case for marriage: Union formation and changes in well-being. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 74(1), 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-3737.2011.00873.x>.
- Northrup, C., Schwartz, P., & Witte, J. (2012). *The normal bar: The surprising secrets of happy couples*

- and what they reveal about creating a new normal in your relationship. New York: Harmony Books.
- Nusbaum, M. R. H., Lenahan, P., & Sadovsky, R. (2005). The psychiatric consultant. Sexual health in aging men and women: addressing the physiologic and psychological sexual changes that occur with age. *Geriatrics*, 60(9), 18–23.
- Owens, L., Hughes, T., & Owens-Nicholson, D. (2002). The effects of sexual orientation on body image and attitudes about eating and weight. *Journal of Lesbian Studies*, 7(1), 15–33. https://doi.org/10.1300/j155v07n01_02.
- Peat, C. M., Peyerl, N. L., Ric Ferraro, F., & Butler, M. (2011). Age and body image in caucasian men. *Psychology of Men & Masculinity*, 12(2), 195–200. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021478>.
- Penhollow, T. M., Young, M., & Denny, G. (2009). Predictors of quality of life, sexual intercourse, and sexual satisfaction among active older adults—proquest. *American Journal of Health Education*, 40(1), 14–22.
- Peplau, L. A., Cochran, S., Rook, K., & Padesky, C. (1978). Loving women: Attachment and autonomy in lesbian relationships. *Journal of Social Issues*, 34(3), 2–27. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1978.tb02611.x>.
- Pope, H., Olivardia, R., Borowiecki, J., III, & Cohane, G. (2001). The growing commercial value of the male body: A longitudinal survey of advertising in women's magazines. *Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics*, 70(4), 189–192. <https://doi.org/10.1159/000056252>.
- Pugh, S. (2005). Assessing the cultural needs of older lesbians and gay men: Implications for practice. *Practice*, 17(3), 207–218. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09503150500285180>.
- Rao, T. S. S., Ismail, S., Darshan, M. S., & Tandon, A. (2015). Sexual disorders among elderly: An epidemiological study in south Indian rural population. *Indian Journal of Psychiatry*, 57(3), 236–241. <https://doi.org/10.4103/0019-5545.166618>.
- Risman, B. (2016). Gender as a social structure: Are millennials cracking the foundation?
- Rosenberger, J. G., Reece, M., Schick, V., Herbenick, D., Novak, D. S., Van Der Pol, B., et al. (2011). Sexual behaviors and situational characteristics of most recent male-partnered sexual event among gay and bisexually identified men in the United States. *The Journal of Sexual Medicine*, 8(11), 3040–3050. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-6109.2011.02438.x>.
- Sanchez, D., & Kiefer, A. (2007). Body concerns in and out of the bedroom: Implications for sexual pleasure and problems. *Archives of Sexual Behavior*, 36(6), 808–820. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-007-9205-0>.
- Sasson, I., & Umberson, D. J. (2014). Widowhood and depression: New light on gender differences, selection, and psychological adjustment. *The journals of gerontology*, 68(1), 135–145. <https://doi.org/10.1093/geronb/gbt058>.
- Schick, V., Herbenick, D., Reece, M., Sanders, S. A., Dodge, B., Middlestadt, S. E., et al. (2010). Sexual behaviors, condom use, and sexual health of americans over 50: Implications for sexual health promotion for older adults. *The Journal of Sexual Medicine*, 7 (Suppl. 5), 315–329. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-6109.2010.02013.x>.
- Schope, R. (2005). Who's afraid of growing old? *Journal of Gerontological Social Work*, 45(4), 23–39. https://doi.org/10.1300/J083v45n04_03.
- Schwartz, P., Diefendorf, S., & McGlynn-Wright, A. (2014). Sexuality in aging. *APA handbook of sexuality and psychology*, 1, 523–551. <https://doi.org/10.1037/14193-017>.
- Silverthorne, Z., & Vernon, Q. (2000). Sexual partner age preferences of homosexual and heterosexual men and women. *Archives of Sexual Behavior*, 29(1), 67–76. <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1001886521449>.
- Swami, V., & Tovee, M. J. (2006). The influence of body mass index on the physical attractiveness preferences of feminist and nonfeminist heterosexual women and lesbians. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 30(3), 252–257. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.2006.00293.x>.
- Teuscher, U., & Tesuscher, C. (2007). Reconsidering the double standard of aging: Effects of gender and sexual orientation on facial attractiveness ratings. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 42(4), 631–639. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2006.08.020>.
- Tiefer, L. (2004). *Sex is not a natural act & other essays* (2nd ed.). USA: Westview Press.
- Tracy, J. K., & Junginger, J. (2007). Correlates of lesbian sexual functioning. *Journal of Women's Health*, 16(4), 499–509. <https://doi.org/10.1089/jwh.2006.0308>.
- Trudel, G., Villeneuve, L., Préville, M., Boyer, R., & Fréchette, V. (2010). Dyadic adjustment, sexuality and psychological distress in older couples. *Sexual and Relationship Therapy*, 25(3), 306–315. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14681991003702583>.
- Wade, L. D., & Delamater, J. D. (2002). Relationship dissolution as a life stage transition: Effects on sexual attitudes and behaviors. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 64(4), 898–914. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-3737.2002.00898.x>.
- Wagenbach, P. (2004). Lesbian body image and eating issues. *Journal of Psychology & Human Sexuality*, 15(4), 205–227. https://doi.org/10.1300/J056v15n04_04.

- Waite, L., & Gallagher, M. (2000). *The case for marriage: Why married people are happier, healthier, and better off financially*. New York: Doubleday.
- Waite, L. J., Laumann, E. O., Das, A., & Philip Schumm, L. (2009). Sexuality: Measures of partnerships, practices, attitudes, and problems in the national social life, health, and aging study. *Journals of Gerontology, Series B, Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences*, 64B(suppl1), i56–i66. <https://doi.org/10.1093/geronb/gbp038>.
- Weeks, D. J. (2002). Sex for the mature adult: Health, self-esteem and countering ageist stereotypes. *Sexual & Relationship Therapy*, 17(3), 231. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14681990220149031>.
- Welzer-Lang, D. (2008). Speaking out loud about bisexuality: Biphobia in the gay and lesbian community. *Journal of Bisexuality*, 8(1–2), 81–95. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15299710802142259>.
- Wiley, D., & Bortz, W. (1996). Sexuality and aging—usual and successful. *The Journals of Gerontology*, 51A(3), M142.
- Williams, M. (2012). *Same-sex partnerships and the health of lesbian, gay, and bisexual older adults*. USA: Ph.D., School of Social Work, University of Washington.
- Willoughby, B., Farero, A., & Busby, D. (2014). Exploring the effects of sexual desire discrepancy among married couples. *Archives of Sexual Behavior*, 43(3), 551–562. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-013-0181-2>.
- Zhao, P. T., Su, D., & Seftel, A. D. (2014). Geriatric sexuality. *Primer of Geriatric Urology*, 143–200. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-4773-3_11.

Pepper Schwartz is a professor of sociology at the University of Washington. She is the past president of the Society for the Scientific Study of Sexualities, past president of the Pacific Sociology Association and she was the Relationship, Sexuality and Love Ambassador for AARP for more than a decade. She was given an award by the American Sociological Association for public understanding of sociology. She is now on the board of the University of Minnesota program on human sexuality. She is the author and co-author of 25 academic and popular books, including two that were on the New York Times Best Sellers list: *The Normal Bar: The Surprising Secrets of Happy Couples* and *10 Talks Parents Should Have with Children About Sex and Character*. Her most recent books are *50 Great Myths of Human Sexuality* and *Snap Strategies for Couples: 40 Fast Fixes for Everyday Relationship Pitfalls*. She is also the author of more than 50 journal articles and lectures widely, both to academic and general audiences.

Nicholas Velotta is an author and researcher focusing on the fields of sexuality, intimacy, and relationships. While attending the University of Washington, where he got a Bachelors in psychology, Velotta became a student of Professor Pepper Schwartz, Ph.D., who has become a collaborator on various projects and writing endeavors. He lives in Seattle and guest lectures at the University of Washington when he is not reading, writing, or researching.

Part VI

Families and Intimate Relationships



Michele Adams

Abstract

Gender inequality permeates society at all levels and in the context of most social institutions. One institution in which gender inequality remains resistant to change is the family. Over time, various theories have examined the causes of gender inequality generally, including biology, sex roles, and “doing gender,” each of which has also been applied to gender inequality in the family. Critiques of these approaches include their over-determinism, inability to grapple with gender inequality at macro social levels, and failure to theorize about change. The gender as structure approach looks at gender across multiple levels of social reality simultaneously. This dynamic, multi-faceted theoretical approach can be used to address gender inequality in families to the extent that we are able to take advantage of its complexity. After looking at, and critiquing, various historical approaches to gender inequality, this chapter notes that the gender as structure approach is best suited to examine gender inequality in families today, which are themselves characterized by dynamic fluidity and

complexity, and to offer potential avenues for altering that inequality.

1 Introduction

Gender inequality permeates society at all levels and in the context of most, if not all, social institutions. One institution in which gender inequality remains extremely resistant to change is the family, where it is not only a matter of social relations at the individual family level, but also a political matter involving questions of power and hierarchy in the larger society. As feminists have long noted, the basis for gender hierarchy and inequality is the focus on differences between women and men and the perceived essential nature of those differences, which creates a cultural dichotomy that values one sex over the other and asserts the naturalness of that hierarchy (Lorber, 1994).

Gender inequality in the family has mostly, but not exclusively, been studied by social scientists in the context of married heterosexual couples in which men/husbands have more power than women/wives as manifest in the division of household labor, family decision-making, and, in more extreme cases, domestic violence. This chapter examines gender inequality in the family by considering it through the lens of the following questions: What are the historical and conceptual bases for gender

M. Adams (✉)
Tulane University, New Orleans, LA, USA
e-mail: madams2@tulane.edu

inequality in families? What can we learn about gender inequality in families by viewing it through the lens of the gender as structure theoretical approach? How can we draw on and optimize the gender as structure perspective in future research on gender inequality in families?

The chapter begins by venturing briefly into the socio-historical background of gender inequality in the family, and moves on to examine prevalent theoretical justifications for this phenomenon. The section ends with a discussion of the potential of the gender as structure perspective to envision pressure points in previous theories of sex and gender, and, as a result, to disrupt the seeming unavoidability of gender inequality in the family. I then introduce several recent studies that draw creatively on gender as structure to examine elements of the household division of labor, broadly speaking, which has traditionally been used as a proxy for family power and inequality. The chapter ends by noting the increasing complexity of families in the United States and suggests that the multi-faceted and dynamic gender as structure approach is the approach best suited to examine gender inequality in families today and to offer potential avenues for diminishing that inequality.

2 Socio-Historical Background of Gender Inequality in Families

Gender inequality in families has deep roots that are inextricably tied to the history of gendered family hierarchy condoned in the Judeo-Christian creation story, which depicts Eve as the “helpmeet” of Adam, from whose rib she was created (Martos & Hégy, 1998). In accord with this view of women as derivative, men were seen as the intermediaries between humanity and God—with women having divine access only through men’s intervention (Lerner, 1986). Women had their “place” relative to men, and it was both inferior and God-given. When, however, questions started to arise about the “divine basis of social order,” anatomical differences between men and women came to the fore and “destined [women] for an entirely different social life from men”

(Lorber, 1993: 568–569). The difference between women and men, premised largely on reproductive function and capacity, anchored the “biology as destiny” school of thought on gender relations that was institutionalized over time in cultural norms, law, and policy. Biological difference and its social correlates, then, created the basis for seeing men and women in families as not only dissimilar, but as occupying unequal status positions, as well.

Marriage heightened gender inequality by conceptually unifying husband and wife as “one flesh” under the English doctrine of coverture, which institutionalized the husband as his wife’s (and the family’s) representative in all public matters (Basch, 1986). Under this doctrine, at marriage, a woman’s rights became “covered” by those of her husband, and her identity was effectively subsumed under his. Coverture precluded wives from owning or willing away property, entering into contracts, or possessing other markers of individual agency (Blackstone, 1765). While originally intended as a way to “protect” married women, coverture in the United States expanded to incorporate a somewhat broader “coverture ethos” alleging that women were innately fragile, irrational, and less able than men to “comport” themselves in society (Cheu, 2012: 117, referencing Bingham, 1824).

Even as coverture lost its legal standing in the United States in the mid-1800s with the advent of married women’s property laws, it became institutionalized over time in other ways (Hartog, 2000). For instance, while the doctrine of coverture itself did not appear to require a woman to take her husband’s surname at marriage, over the years the practice of doing so became seen as “tradition” and, in certain historical periods, the “practice became so universal...that it brokered no exceptions, which in effect gave it the force of law” (Anthony, 2014: 83–84). Remnants of coverture continue to permeate many of the traditions and rituals of modern weddings, including a bride’s transfer from her father to her new husband (see, for instance, Geller, 2001). Even today, the “coverture ethos” is prevalent in public policy debates over issues such as reproductive rights, where

anti-abortion rhetoric often relies on a logic that assumes women are implicitly unable to make decisions in their own best interests (Cheu, 2012).

3 Theoretical and Conceptual Background for Gender Inequality in Families

Biology and Sociobiology Historically, one of the primary justifications for gender inequality in the family has been based on biological differences between women and men, organized primarily around reproduction. Women have the capacity to bear children and lactate, while men's involvement in the reproductive process ostensibly ends at insemination. Advocates of this particular line of thought suggest that gender differences in behavior are biologically based (Udry, 2000), and evolutionary theory "predicts that gender differences will exist when such differences maximize reproductive success" (Pratto & Hegarty, 2000: 57). The emphasis placed on reproductive difference as destiny has led to the assumption of a biological (i.e., "natural") basis for distinguishing between the "roles" of women and men both inside and outside of the home, and the "brain/womb" distinction, which assumes that women's reproductive capabilities limit their ability to think rationally (Rhode, 1990).

When extended to the social realm, this rationale leads inexorably to the conceptual organization of society through the lens of the ideology of separate spheres, which links women to the private sphere of home and social reproduction, and men to the public sphere of the market and economic production (Laslett & Brenner, 1989). In association with the ideology of separate spheres, the 19th century "cult of true womanhood" connected the characteristics of "piety, purity, domesticity, and submissiveness" with "womanly virtue" (Welter, 1966: 151). These characteristics defined "good women" and conveniently identified them as singularly suited for domestic duties. In this way, the biological focus on reproductive difference merged

effortlessly into social arrangements that conceptually constrained women to the reproductive domain and away from sources of economic power. The separation of spheres was more an ideological divide than a practical or realistic one for women of color and poor whites who were slaves or domestic workers (Dill, 1988). The ideologies of separate spheres and the cult of true womanhood reduced the visibility and perceived import of the productive labor that women did both in the home and the workforce (Bose, 1987) and set the stage for institutionalizing and naturalizing gender inequality in the family.

Functionalism and Sex Roles The biological differences perspective was reframed in the 1950s by Talcott Parsons, whose functionalist approach depicted family as organized around different but complementary roles for women and men. Role specialization, he and his co-author Robert Bales asserted, was adaptive for the family, and was based on a divide between expressive and instrumental tasks. The husband was the instrumental task expert, having "the primary adaptive responsibilities relative to the outside situation," while the wife was seen as the expert in fulfilling the family's expressive needs, being "primarily the giver of love" (Parsons & Bales, 1955: 151). Family and social stability rested on the complementarity of, and lack of competition between, the roles of wives and husbands. This continued focus on difference also ensured gender inequality in the family, as sex role differentiation tended to "remove women from the kind of occupational status which is important for the determination of the status of a family" (Parsons, 1940: 853). In other words, in accord with the notion of coverture, husbands were still seen as representing their wives, and their families, in the public sphere.

During World War II, out of necessity, women were encouraged to enter the paid workforce and assume the manufacturing jobs traditionally held by the then-absent men. Culturally, the larger-than-life image and power of Wonder Woman (Munford & Waters, 2014) and the assured "We Can Do It!" of Rosie the Riveter characterized women's self-confident emergence into the public sphere during the wartime period.

After the war ended, however, while the large majority of employed women wanted to remain in these “traditionally male” jobs, a modernized version of “true womanhood” emerged to coerce women to leave the workforce and return to the home, thus reducing competition for jobs with returning veterans (Bose, 1987). Popular cultural images followed the “updated” idea of true womanhood, as a domesticated Wonder Woman was “diminished in power and size as women ‘returned’ to the home” (Adams, 2016: 553). Although record numbers of women remained in the paid workforce, they generally drifted back into the types of jobs they had held prior to the war (Department of Labor, Women’s Bureau, 1946). As men returning home re-assumed their breadwinner and head-of-household status, the retreat to the familiarity of coverture was complete and women were once again expected to resume financial dependence on their husbands, re-entrenching inequality in the family.

The tension within the 1950s nuclear family caused by the re-emergence of the cult of true womanhood [or what Friedan (1963) would later call the “problem with no name”] was overlaid by a patina of sentimental togetherness, material success, and outward serenity, all of which produced what appeared to be a “golden age of the family” (Coontz, 1992). Marriage rates peaked after the war and remained high through the 1950s as men and women married young and elevated birth rates created a “baby boom” that was to affect the United States for decades to come. The post-war economy provided a solid “family wage” to white husbands that allowed them to provide for stay-at-home wives who cared for children and the home. The growth of the suburbs and the booming economy put the “American Dream” of home ownership within reach of most white middle-class families. Television sitcoms such as “Ozzie and Harriet” and “Leave it to Beaver” played up the harmonious, stable, and highly idealized white nuclear family, and brought this image into most homes as television ownership grew (Coontz, 1992; Spiegel, 1992). Gender-differentiated family roles were part and parcel of this image, promoting the breadwinner dad and the happily homebound

mom who cooked and did housework in a dress and pearls. Even families of color, for whom racial discrimination prevented the family wage, easy access to home ownership, and separation of home and family life, faced the breadwinning dad and stay-at-home mom as the measure of an ideal family. The differentiated gendered roles of many 1950s families in practice often led to the “problem with no name” (Friedan, 1963), a condition of restlessness that led many outwardly content housewives to self-medicate with alcohol and drugs (Coontz, 1992). The undercurrent of female angst that characterized the “golden” 1950s-era nuclear family could be traced largely to dissatisfaction with the inequality that emerged from the rigid cultural expectations for, and in-home enforcement of, differentiated sex roles, inequality experienced most acutely by women (Coontz, 1992; Friedan, 1963).

Conceptually, the inflexible cultural distinction between the “roles” of women and men derived from biological differences that were reified in differentiated personality traits (women were assumed to be nurturing, emotional, and domestically-oriented and men were assumed to be intellectual, rational, and business-oriented) and that prescribed family and social functions (women as homemakers; men as breadwinners). (Re)enforcement of differentiated sex roles arose from socialization practices that taught girls and boys, from a very young age, to follow society’s dictates about what constituted “appropriate” gender behavior and decorum. Accordingly, parents managed their children’s appearance and behavior to replicate society’s gender norms (Cahill, 1989). Children were socialized not only to act in gender-acceptable ways, but also to internalize the relative status positions associated with these gender-differentiated norms. Girls were given dolls, tea sets, and miniature household appliances to play with, frilly dresses to wear, and instruction on ladylike behavior, all designed to guide them towards later becoming wives and mothers. Boys, on the other hand, were given toy trucks, footballs, and firemen’s hats or police badges to play with, and clothed in rugged denim overalls—designed to orient them toward potential occupations and their future as

family breadwinners (Coltrane & Adams, 1997). As girls and boys matured into women and men who married and formed families, this early socialization served to maintain the gender order by (re)constituting and naturalizing the “complementary,” separate-and-unequal statuses of wives and husbands in the family, and of women and men in society that was advocated by social theorists such as Talcott Parsons.

Critiques of the sex role perspective, like those of biological explanations for gender inequality, take aim at the problematic assumption that sex category determines behavior and attitudes early in life that are invariant over the course of an individual’s lifetime. Given these assumptions, gender hierarchy, inequality, and power in the family become largely unassailable as just another piece of the “natural” gender order. While women, men, or even families might individually challenge society’s prevailing sex roles, these perspectives cannot account for accomplishment of collective or institutional change. Moreover, rebellion at an individual level exacts social sanctions, particularly for women, who as mothers tend to be the near-constant targets of cultural judgment and (dis)approbation (see Hays, 1996). Given the assumptions inherent in the sex role perspective, the possibility of changing gender inequality in the family becomes difficult if not impossible.

Doing Gender: The Social Interactionist Approach While biological approaches and sex role perspectives created early justification, premised on gender difference, for gender inequality in families, their weaknesses included an inability to account for personal agency and lack of a theory about how gender inequality could be addressed or altered. With this in mind, feminists and feminist scholars, beginning in about the 1960s, started to actively question the ideology of separate spheres and to focus, in particular, on the nuclear family as a site of women’s oppression. *The Feminine Mystique* (Friedan, 1963), read by millions of discontented housewives, suggested that the angst that they believed to be an individual shortcoming was actually related to the problem of gender inequality in the family, which was itself part of a larger framework of

oppression (see Coontz, 2011). Situating this issue at the individual level clearly limited thinking about how it could be overcome.

Shifting the conversation about gender to the level of interaction, sociologists West and Zimmerman (1987) brought the notion of “doing gender” into everyday parlance. With this shift in perspective, West and Zimmerman (1987) moved agency into the discussion of gender inequality in the family, albeit agency within the structure of gender norms considered socially appropriate. Noting that gender is an interactive accomplishment, performed within a specific temporal and spatial framework of gender expectations that creates boundaries for characterization of an individual’s actions as (un)acceptable, they pointed out how the “accomplishment of gender is at once interactional and institutional” and indicates accountability to what society perceives as “conduct becoming to...a woman or a man” (West & Zimmerman, 2009: 114, also 1987). Doing gender, in this context, is not a choice but a cultural mandate.

Because cultural notions of femininity and masculinity have traditionally been linked with status and power, doing gender in accordance with cultural norms is positively linked with gender inequality in the family. Essentially, as men and women interact in families to produce socially legitimate gendered selves, they also produce and reinforce a gender hierarchy that privileges men. Thus, by performing gender-differentiated family tasks and chores, individuals are not only doing gender but they are also doing inequality. Take, for example, housework, the overwhelming burden of which has consistently fallen on women (Coltrane, 2000, 2010; Lachance-Grzela & Bouchard, 2010). A “doing gender” rationale for the unbalanced division of labor suggests that women do more housework than men in order to demonstrate their femininity; this rationale surfaces in research to explain, at least in part, why women do not automatically regard it as unfair that they do most of the housework (see, for instance, Greenstein, 1996; Lennon & Rosenfield, 1994). It also plays a part in studies analyzing situations where women who earn more than their husbands in the paid labor

force often compensate and try to bolster conventional gender norms in their families by increasing their own housework load (Tichenor, 1999, 2005). Similarly, some studies suggest that unemployed men often do less housework than their employed wives (see, for instance, Legerski & Cornwall, 2010). These couples “do gender” by performing housework in traditionally gendered ways to display their accountability as appropriately feminine or masculine, and, in the process, shore up inequality in families.

The “doing gender” approach encourages social scientists to think more about personal agency in the construction of gender norms and inequality, and, according to West and Zimmerman (2009), in the process creates opportunities for considering how to effect change. The issue is whether this approach goes far enough, even while avoiding the overdetermined aspects of the biological and sex-role socialization perspectives. Questions of power and hierarchy in the larger society are largely overlooked within the perspective’s primary focus on interpersonal relations and interaction, and the gender inequality embedded in social institutions is generally ignored as a frame for these relations. Finally, as cultural beliefs about gender are internalized and then actualized from a subconscious level, “doing gender implies legitimating inequality” (Risman, 1998: 23).

The “doing gender” approach has been highly influential in analyzing the resilience of gender inequality in families; “blaming” this inequality on doing gender has become almost standard to the point where social scientists are calling for more attention not only to how gender is done, but how it is “undone” as well (Deutsch, 2007; Risman, 2011). But does “doing gender” in the context of family go far enough in creating the theoretical foundation for challenging gender inequality in the family? To what extent, for instance, is the way women and men do gender when they are doing (or avoiding) housework structured by the cost and ability to get good childcare or by public policies that institutionalize the ideal worker as male? In order to account for the larger picture in which gender inequality in the family is situated, and thus imagine how

that inequality might be disrupted, we need to think at a different level—at all different levels simultaneously, in fact, which is what the gender as structure perspective allows us to do. By seeing the effects of gender at multiple contextual levels simultaneously and by viewing the effects as recursive between levels and institutional contexts, gender as structure allows us to see where the points of tension lie and lets us think about how to put pressure on family dynamics that continue to facilitate gender inequality.

In the conceptual approaches discussed above, we have, on the one hand, engaged gender as a sex-ascribed or socially-inscribed individual characteristic that drives differentiated behaviors and, on the other, as an interactional accomplishment through which individuals are held socially accountable as members of a particular sex category. These approaches have been used to explain the causes of gender inequality in the family (and in society generally), but they have been unable to explain its resilience, focusing as they do on only one dimension or level of social life at a time. Recognizing this limitation, feminist social theorists began to think “outside of the box” about how all levels could be engaged simultaneously and recursively (Risman, 1998, 2004; Risman & Davis, 2013). The outcome of this engagement is the “gender as structure” approach, discussed below.

Gender as Structure Gender, as feminist sociologist Risman points out (2004), is complicated. The “gender as structure” theoretical perspective accommodates this complexity, taking as its starting point the idea that gender is embedded in and permeates society at all levels. The effects of gender are recursive and multidirectional—gender constraints at one level impact, and are impacted by, gender effects at another, and this perspective allows for, and encourages, complication of notions about causality, resilience, and areas of possible disruption of gender inequality. Unlike previous theories that emphasize either structure or agency, the gender as structure perspective places equal emphasis on how gender acts as a structural constraint at the same time as actors have agency to interpret, manipulate, and potentially resist that structure.

Specifically, socialization practices operate at the individual level to create a gendered lens through which women and men come to see the world; gender-infused cultural expectations shape how men and women interact to account for these expectations, and organizational and institutional norms create the larger context within which gender operates to structure inequality at each of these levels. Family (as a social institution) and families (as individual contexts within which gender norms are perpetuated and changed) are impacted by and impact gender attitudes and behaviors in other social institutions and contexts. Altering gender inequality in the family (and in families) requires theoretical complexity that the gender as structure perspective provides.

Practically speaking, how to look at impacts across multiple recursive levels concurrently is somewhat of a dilemma and requires new ways of thinking about what constitutes gender inequality in families. In the past, division of household labor has often been used as a proxy; and to investigate the potential of the gender as structure approach for use in examining inequality in the family context, I draw on the example set by the extensive body of social scientific research on the unequal distribution of housework (for reviews, see Coltrane 2000, 2010; Lachance-Grzela & Bouchard, 2010). In this regard, a substantial amount of research has focused on individual gender attitudes about who *should* do the housework or on how couples “negotiate” housework based on cultural expectations, time availability, or relative resources, including economic resources and the dynamics of (often hidden) power. Other research has looked at how, for instance, the employment model that fixes the image of the ideal worker as male impacts the performance of domestic chores (see, for instance, Gerson, 2010). In other words, a significant amount of fruitful work on household labor has been done at the individual, cultural/interactional, and institutional levels, but fewer studies have to date attempted to incorporate multiple levels and their interaction simultaneously. Below, I present examples of recent studies that have used the gender as structure perspective to look at gender inequality

in the family through the prism of multiple levels concurrently.

4 Inequality in Families Through the Gender as Structure Lens: Recent Empirical Illustrations

In recent years, social science researchers have become more comfortable with using the gender as structure perspective to analyze gender inequality in society and have created an emergent literature that attempts to account for the simultaneous examination of multiple levels of social reality. Literature on gender inequality in the family is also drawing on the gender as structure perspective, but, on the whole, researchers in this area have been somewhat less pioneering in their efforts to operationalize this approach (see Ferree, 2010), reflecting the difficulty of implementing intersectional approaches in general. Here I introduce three studies that are innovative in using gender as structure to examine power and inequality in the family and which directly or indirectly implicate the unequal division of labor in the home.

Use of the gender as structure model creates opportunities for examining inequality in the family in novel ways. The notion of the “stalled gender revolution” provided a baseline expectation that inequality between men and women in both the home and the workplace would disappear over time with the convergence of gender norms (England, 2010; Gerson, 2010; Hochschild and Machung 1989; Pedulla & Thébaud, 2015). However, as this chapter notes, gender inequality in families remains remarkably resistant to change *in spite of* (or in association with) converging expectations about the abilities of, and opportunities open to, women and men. Using the gender as structure perspective, the research below begins to illuminate why gender inequality in the family remains so resilient.

In 1985, Sarah Fenstermaker Berk famously referred to the American household as a “gender factory” in which the division of household labor both creates and is created by “conjugal” power (Berk, 1985; see also Komter, 1989). Marriage

has long encouraged men and women to “act out gendered identities as wives and husbands, especially in the division of household labor” (Randles, 2016: 244), and a consistent finding over the past decades, both nationally and cross-nationally, in research on heterosexual families has been that wives continue to do significantly more housework than husbands (see, for instance, Coltrane, 2000, 2010). Thus, when the government gets involved in using social policy to promote marriage and the related family scripts of husband and wife, it also becomes implicated in promoting inequality in the family. Although not directly addressing the division of household labor, Randles (2016) hones in on the government’s indirect reinforcement of traditional gendered family roles even as it purports to address the imbalance of power in marriage at the couple level. To do so, Randles examines 20 “government-approved” marriage education programs (and materials from their curricula) instituted under the auspices of the Healthy Marriage Initiative, to interrogate the multi-level and recursive gender impacts at play in challenging and/or reinforcing the gender status quo. Specifically, as described below, she engages the gender as structure perspective to show how gender bias infusing the initial public policy (PRWORA) from which the Healthy Marriage Initiative was spawned limits the potential of derivative marriage education programs to change the gender status quo, even over time.

In 1996, the Clinton administration sponsored reforms to welfare programs in the United States through the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). PRWORA institutionalized a “patriarchal model of family life” (Randles, 2016: 243) by withdrawing state support from poor mothers, pressuring them to turn instead to marriage and husbands for economic support. This act created a patriarchal foundation for the Healthy Marriage Initiative, which was developed in 2002 by the Bush administration, introducing public policy that redistributed funds originally allocated for welfare assistance to finance programs to promote “healthy” marriages. As a result, marriage education programs blossomed throughout the

United States. Randles (2016) analyzes the extent to which these programs reinforce or challenge gendered power in marriage relationships. Her research indicates that these marriage education programs are intrinsically problematic because they fail to address the gender stereotypes embedded in the “larger systems of power, inequality, and state action” rooted in PRWORA (Randles, 2016: 242). Because of PRWORA’s patriarchal grounding on which subsequent marriage promotion efforts are built, any attempts at constituting gender equality at the interpersonal level through these efforts continue to fail. At an abstract level, then, when viewed through the lens of the gender as structure perspective, *if the goal is to promote gender equality in relationships*, then marriage education programs initiated under the umbrella of PRWORA, through the Healthy Marriage Initiative, are inherently flawed and doomed to failure, ultimately reinforcing rather than challenging gender inequality in the family.

A second study that draws on the gender as structure approach to innovatively address inequality in families was undertaken by British Sociologist Parsons (2016). Feeding the family has been at the heart of the practice and ideology of the household distribution of labor since research on housework began. Grocery shopping, cooking meals, and cleaning up afterwards have been discrete tasks evaluated in relation to equality and power in the home. The ideology of “feeding the family” has been addressed as an important consideration of “good mothering” and something that good mothers “want” to do to show love and care for their families (DeVault, 1991). In many ways, as with other unpaid household chores, the ideology of feeding the family as empowering for women comes into tension with the time requirements for putting this ideology into practice. Using an auto/biographical methodological approach that involves email interviews with 75 individuals in the U.K., Parsons (2016) modernizes this tension by addressing the “new” cultural mandate for good mothering that involves putting “healthy” food (as opposed to non-organic, non-homecooked, “convenience” food) oriented to

individual family members' tastes on the table as a sign of love and caring. She draws on the gender as structure model to show how this "updated" version of good mothering involving "healthy foodways" is gender- and class-driven, involves more time and effort from mothers whether they work in the paid labor force or not, and blurs the boundaries between paid and unpaid labor in that women need to think about and plan for making the time to purchase and cook "healthy" food from scratch. At the individual level, Parsons points out that "a commitment to 'healthy' family foodways is a means of reproducing feminine identity" (2016: 384); at the level of cultural interactions, she notes that healthy family foodways "reinforce the cultural expectations of appropriate middle-class mothering," (p. 385), and at the institutional level, "the ideological insistence on 'healthy' family foodways reifies 'the' family as a site for inculcating appropriate 'healthy' family values" (p. 385) (as opposed to "unhealthy" lower-class family values). Using the gender as structure perspective, then, allows us to see how intensive mothering, with its built-in cultural contradictions (Hays, 1996) continues to be updated and recycled to reinforce gendered inequality in the family.

An additional study warranting attention here was conducted by British Sociologist Sullivan (2013), who draws on overviews of cross-national policy, as well as existing time-use data from research in the U.S. (American Heritage Time Use Study) and Britain (Multinational Time Use Study) on the division of household labor, in order to tease out gender differences in performance of routine housework and child care. Taking a multi-level approach to the data through the lens of the gender as structure model, Sullivan suggests that separating routine housework from child care can provide a fresh perspective on power and inequality in the family.

At the individual level, Sullivan finds, not surprisingly, that men and women in both the U. S. and Britain reported that routine housework such as cleaning, cooking, and laundry was less enjoyable than even paid employment, while child care was perceived as "relatively

enjoyable," second only to enjoyment of leisure activities (2013: 75). Sullivan examines family work at the interactional level in two ways: first, she looks at whether partners' enjoyment of household and child care tasks was affected by joint participation in these efforts and, second, she examines trends across countries. In the first instance, she finds that wives, but not husbands, see routine housework and child care as more enjoyable when done in conjunction with their partners, suggesting an interactional effect for them. For husbands, child care appears to be enjoyable whether accomplished jointly with their wives or not—suggesting that they may be doing the more "leisure-oriented" (and thus enjoyable) child care anyway. Similarly, looking at cross-national trends in the amount of time spent on household and child-care tasks, Sullivan points out the persistence of gender in the performance of routine housework across countries, even as the trend in child care tasks is for gender to matter less (p. 75).

Specifically, to evaluate the impact of cultural stereotypes on how gender is done through household labor, Sullivan examined 40-year trends over all 16 of the studied countries in the amount of time men and women spent doing routine housework (such as cooking, cleaning, and laundry—traditionally assumed to be "feminine" chores), care work, and "noncore" housework (such as home maintenance and "outside" work—traditionally assumed to be "masculine" chores). Over this time period, she found that housework followed traditional gender-stereotyped patterns: although the amount of time women spent doing housework dropped and men's increased slightly over time, women continued to do the lion's share of routine housework and care work, while men's household labor performance was focused on non-routine (non-core) work. Her conclusion was that "gender segregation of domestic and care tasks at the cross-national level appeared quite persistent over the countries of the study, even though the gender gap was narrowing" (Sullivan, 2013: 81).

At the institutional level, Sullivan explores the extent to which national social and public policies are associated with the persistent,

cross-national, finding that women, even as they work more in the paid labor force, continue to do the substantial majority of routine household labor and care work. To address this issue, she looks at data from the Multinational Time Use Study from the 1960s to the early 21st century, grouping the study's 16 countries into "policy clusters" based on their public investment in policies that promote social equality, as well as their prevailing gender ideology. Briefly, the "liberal, non-interventionist" cluster generally organizes social policy around market forces and a "modified" breadwinner model in which women are employed but are also expected to perform most of the domestic duties; this cluster included countries such as Great Britain and the United States. In the "social-democratic" or Nordic cluster (Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden), the state takes a larger role in providing social benefits, with the goal of social equality; public policy encourages both men and women to participate in paid labor through state provision of high quality child and elderly care. The "social-capitalist" or "conservative" cluster, including France and Germany, provides services through social policies designed to sustain inequality based on grounding in an ideology that posits men as breadwinners and women as caretakers. Finally, the "southern or Mediterranean" cluster, including Spain and Italy, organizes public policy around traditional gender ideology and relies on family networking to provide "informal" sources of welfare.

Overall, Sullivan found that, while women's relative proportion of routine housework has declined over time in each of the four clusters studied, the decline has been steepest in the "social-democratic" cluster, where gender ideology and social policy have focused on social equality and on encouraging both women and men to participate in paid labor. Relatedly, the decline in women's routine housework participation has been slowest in the "social-capitalist" and "southern" clusters where relatively traditional notions about gender ground public policy around social welfare.

With respect to child-care, however, a somewhat different pattern emerged—which was largely no pattern at all. While the most marked decline in women's participation over time was still in the Nordic or "social-democratic" cluster, other clusters revealed fewer patterned trends. Taken together, these findings at the institutional level suggest that policies promoting gender equality in the workplace are likely to be more directly effective at allowing women to reduce their proportion of routine housework than are policies specifically aimed at reducing care work, a finding which runs counter to much current policy orientation. The empirical understanding that men and women tend to enjoy child care, while few people, men or women, tend to enjoy housework (indicated at both the individual and interactional levels), allows policy makers and other stakeholders who really are interested in gender equality to focus policy on strengthening equal gender access to the paid workforce, knowing that such policy is likely to also affect the relative distribution of routine household labor. This contradicts much current thinking on the relationship of national policy to household labor participation and care work and is a direct result of engaging multiple levels concurrently as advocated by the gender as structure perspective.

The above studies are indicators of how the gender as structure perspective can be used in intriguing ways to study gender inequality in the family. This literature is expanding, and we expect it to continue to develop as researchers become more comfortable with applying this approach. While the studies mentioned address possible ways of evaluating existing data and gathering new data that take advantage of the gender as structure approach, more needs to be done in terms of "thinking outside the box" to examine implications across levels concurrently and recursively. To what extent can family researchers afford to keep thinking in previously framed ways about inequality? What questions do we, as feminist family social science researchers, need to ask to best take advantage of the gender as structure theoretical approach?

5 Discussion and Conclusion

Gender inequality in families has a long history, remaining remarkably resilient over time. This chapter has addressed broad theoretical perspectives that developed in particular historical contexts to examine possible causes for both the emergence and the resilience of this phenomenon. The first two of these perspectives (biology and sex roles) are focused heavily on ascribed differences between women and men, while the third (“doing gender”) is focused on how women and men enact those differences in accord with cultural expectations of femininity and masculinity. While “doing gender” afforded individuals more agency than did prior approaches, it too was ultimately centered around difference. Difference, as feminist social scientists have noted for decades, is the *sine qua non* of inequality, a consideration that has led to a call for elimination of gender as a category of difference (Lorber, 1994). MacKinnon notes that “[g]ender is socially constructed *as difference* epistemologically.... A built-in tension exists between this concept of equality, which presupposes sameness, and this concept of sex, which presupposes difference” (1990: 215; quoted in Lorber, 1994: 282–283). More recently, theorizing about gender inequality has moved toward gender relations theory and gender as social structure. These latter, overlapping, approaches distance themselves from the epistemological acceptance of gender as difference, and move on, instead, to look at gender as a social structure that is deployed at all levels of society to both create and re-create inequality. Inequality in the family through the gender as structure lens involves addressing (1) how gender operates at the individual level through socialization into and internalization of culturally normative assumptions about what husbands and wives are “supposed” to do in families; (2) how gender operates at the level of cultural expectations circumscribing social interactions, expectations that center around the “proper” activities and behaviors of husbands and wives and families generally; (3) how gender operates both precisely and diffusely through all social institutions to structure

gender relations in the family; and (4) how all of these levels act recursively on all other levels. This creates a fluid, dynamic model that not only helps us to determine why gender inequality in the family occurs and how it is sustained, but also allows us to see pressure points where change can occur.

Many social scientists focused on gender and/or families have noted the resilience of gender inequality in the family. Nevertheless, the relative lack of theoretical complexity has made it exceedingly difficult both to understand why gender inequality has remained so resistant to change and to locate potential avenues of change. The gender as structure model has given us a tool to examine the complexity of gender inequality in families, and we need to focus on how to use this tool to greatest effect. The distribution of household labor has been used as a proxy for gender inequality and power in family for decades; nevertheless, few studies to date have explored housework using the gender as structure theoretical model fully—to examine, that is, the household division of labor not only at the individual, interactional, or institutional levels of society, but across those levels as well, also looking at the recursive impact of one level on another. Doing so requires “thinking outside the box” methodologically, as well as theoretically.

To fully explore gender inequality in families, we also need to consider the enormous complexity of today’s families themselves, a trend that shows few signs of abating. Not only has the structure of families experienced rapid change over the latter part of the 20th century and into the 21st, but types of families are proliferating as well. Two biological parent nuclear families, although often represented as the norm, are declining in numbers and are no longer in the majority. Single-parent families (mother-headed and father-headed), step-families, grandparent-headed families, and those created in cohabiting relationships are but a few of the increasing, and increasingly mainstream, “new” family structures that family researchers are exploring with an eye to gender inequality. Besides new family structures, we also need to think about new types of family, such as families created in the context of

same-sex marriages and those, probably most complex with respect to explorations of inequality, created in the context of polyamorous relationships involving multiple adult and child groupings (see Sheff, 2014). How do we assess levels of (in)equality in these families? Does using household labor as a proxy still apply? If so, how do we articulate the division of household labor in, say, a polyamorous family with multiple groupings? If the division of household labor is no longer a valid proxy for (in)equality in the family, what is?

In conclusion, increasing complexity is the hallmark of contemporary families and, as feminist family social scientists, we need to expand our cultural toolkits to evaluate and examine the level of (in)equality with which they operate. The gender as structure model provides an intriguing theoretical tool for our use, allowing us to think about the multi-level and recursive effects of gender on all kinds of families. How to best put this perspective to use is the next frontier for research that allows us not only to examine gender inequality in families, but to disrupt the durability of that inequality as well.

References

- Adams, M. (2016). Review of feminism & popular culture: Investigating the postfeminist mystique. *Gender & Society, 30*(3), 552–554.
- Anthony, D. (2014). In the name of the father: Compulsion, tradition, and law in the lost history of women's surnames. *The Journal of Jurisprudence, 25*, 59–95.
- Basch, N. (1986). The emerging legal history of women in the United States: Property, divorce, and the constitution. *Signs, 12*(1), 97–117.
- Berk, S. F. (1985). *The gender factory: The apportionment of work in American households*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Bingham, P. (1824). *The law of infancy and coverture*.
- Blackstone, S. W. (1765). *Commentaries on the laws of England* (Vol. I).
- Bose, C. E. (1987). Dual spheres. In B. B. Hess & M. M. Ferree (Eds.), *Analyzing gender: A handbook of social science research* (pp. 267–285). Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
- Cahill, S. E. (1989). Fashioning males and females: Appearance management and the social reproduction of gender. *Symbolic Interaction, 12*(2), 281–298.
- Cheu, M. (2012). Now and then: How coverture ideology informs the rhetoric of abortion. *Texas Journal of Women & the Law, 22*(1), 113–130.
- Coltrane, S. (2000). Research on household labor: Modeling and measuring the social embeddedness of routine family work. *Journal of Marriage and the Family, 62*, 1203–1233.
- Coltrane, S. (2010). Gender theory and household labor. *Sex Roles, 63*, 791–800.
- Coltrane, S., & Adams, M. (1997). Children and gender. In T. Arendell (Ed.), *Contemporary parenting: Challenges & issues* (pp. 219–253). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc.
- Coontz, S. (1992). *The way we never were*. New York: Basic Books.
- Coontz, S. (2011). *A strange stirring: The feminine mystique and American women at the dawn of the 1960s*. New York: Basic Books.
- Department of Labor, Women's Bureau. (1946). *Women workers in ten war production areas and their postwar employment plans, Bulletin 209*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Deutsch, F. M. (2007). Undoing gender. *Gender and Society, 21*(1), 106–127.
- Devault, M. (1991). *Feeding the family: The social organization of caring as gendered work*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Dill, B. T. (1988). Our mothers' grief: Racial ethnic women and the maintenance of families. *Journal of Family History, 13*(4), 415–431.
- England, P. (2010). The gender revolution: Uneven and stalled. *Gender and Society, 24*(2), 149–166.
- Ferree, M. M. (2010). Filling the glass: Gender perspectives on families. *Journal of Marriage and Family, 72*, 429–439.
- Friedan, B. (1963). *The feminine mystique*. New York: Norton.
- Geller, J. (2001). *Here comes the bride: Women, weddings, and the marriage mystique*. New York: Four Walls Eight Windows.
- Gerson, K. (2010). *The unfinished revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Greenstein, T. (1996). Gender ideology and perceptions of the fairness of the division of household labor: Effects on marital quality. *Social Forces, 74*, 1029–1042.
- Hartog, H. (2000). *Man and wife in America: A history*. Boston: Harvard University Press.
- Hays, S. (1996). *The cultural contradictions of motherhood*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Hochschild, A., & Machung, A. (1989). *The second shift: Working parents and the revolution at home*. New York: Viking.

- Komter, A. (1989). Hidden power in marriage. *Gender and Society*, 3(2), 187–216.
- Lachance-Grzela, M., & Bouchard, G. (2010). Why do women do the lion's share of housework? A decade of research. *Sex Roles*, 63, 767–780.
- Laslett, B., & Brenner, J. (1989). Gender and social reproduction: Historical perspectives. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 15, 381–404.
- Legerski, E. M., & Cornwall, M. (2010). Working-class job loss, gender, and the negotiation of household labor. *Gender and Society*, 24(4), 447–474.
- Lennon, M. C., & Rosenfield, S. (1994). Relative fairness and the division of housework: The importance of options. *American Journal of Sociology*, 100(2), 506–531.
- Lerner, G. (1986). *The creation of patriarchy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lorber, J. (1993). Believing is seeing: Biology as destiny". *Gender and Society*, 7(4), 568–581.
- Lorber, J. (1994). *Paradoxes of gender*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- MacKinnon, C. A. (1990). Legal perspectives on sexual difference. In D. L. Rhode (Ed.), *Theoretical perspectives on sexual difference* (pp. 213–225). New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Martos, J., & Hégy, P. (Eds.). (1998). *Equal at the creation: Sexism, society, and Christian thought*. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press.
- Munford, R., & Waters, M. (2014). *Feminism and popular culture: Investigating the postfeminist mystique*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Parsons, J. M. (2016). When convenience is inconvenient: 'Healthy' family foodways and the persistent intersectionalities of gender and class. *Journal of Gender Studies*, 25(4), 382–397.
- Parsons, T. (1940). An analytical approach to the theory of social stratification. *American Journal of Sociology*, 45(6), 841–862.
- Parsons, T., & Bales, R. F. (1955). *Family, socialization and interaction process*. New York: Free Press.
- Pedulla, D. S., & Thébaud, S. (2015). Can we finish the revolution? Gender, work-family ideals, and institutional constraint. *American Sociological Review*, 80(1), 116–139.
- Pratto, F., & Hegarty, P. (2000). The political psychology of reproductive strategies. *Psychological Science*, 11(1), 57–62.
- Randles, J. M. (2016). Redefining the marital power struggle through relationship skills: How U.S. marriage education programs challenge and reproduce gender inequality. *Gender and Society*, 30(2), 240–264.
- Rhode, D. (1990). *Theoretical perspectives on sexual difference*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Risman, B. (1998). *Gender vertigo: American families in transition*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Risman, B. (2004). Gender as social structure: Theory wrestling with activism. *Gender and Society*, 18(4), 429–450.
- Risman, B. (2011). Gender as structure or trump card? *Journal of Family Theory & Review*, 3, 18–22.
- Risman, B. J., & Davis, G. (2013). From sex roles to gender structure. *Current Sociology Review*, 61(5–6), 733–755.
- Sheff, E. (2014). *The polyamorists next door: Inside multiple-partner relationships and families*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.
- Spigel, L. (1992). *Make room for tv: Television and the family ideal in postwar America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Sullivan, O. (2013). What do we learn about gender by analyzing housework separately from child care? Some considerations from time-use evidence. *Journal of Family Theory & Review*, 5, 72–84.
- Tichenor, V. (1999). Status and income as gendered resources: The case of marital power. *Journal of Marriage & Family*, 61, 638–650.
- Tichenor, V. (2005). Maintaining men's dominance: Negotiating identity and power when she earns more. *Sex Roles*, 53(3/4), 191–205.
- Udry, J. R. (2000). Biological limits of gender construction. *American Sociological Review*, 65(3), 443–457.
- Welter, B. (1966). The cult of true womanhood: 1820–1860. *American Quarterly*, 18(2), 151–174.
- West, C., & Zimmerman, D. (1987). Doing gender. *Gender and Society*, 1, 125–151.
- West, C., & Zimmerman, D. (2009). Accounting for doing gender. *Gender and Society*, 23(1), 112–122.

Michele Adams is Associate Professor of Sociology at Tulane University in New Orleans, Louisiana. Her research interests include gender, culture, and family, with a focus on their intersections and discursive construction over time. She has published in venues such as *Media, Culture, and Society*, *Journal of Family Issues*, *Sex Roles*, *Family Relations*, and *Family Law Quarterly*, and is co-author with Scott Coltrane of *Gender and Families*. Her current research examines the historical conflation of eugenics discourse and family values rhetoric, and how it has inflected cultural and political debates around women's rights.

Gender (Non) Conformity in the Family

26

Katie L. Acosta and Veronica B. Salcedo

Abstract

This chapter surveys the empirical research on gender (non) conformity in the family with an emphasis on work that provides an intersectional analysis or centers the experiences of marginalized social groups. We offer that masculinities and femininities are performed in culturally specific ways and survey research that illustrates some of these differences. We look at research on men redefining hegemonic masculinity, parent's gender socialization of their children, intimate partners navigating gender in their relationships and sexually nonconforming individuals doing gender within families of choice.

Kazyak, 2009). In this chapter, we survey the scholarship addressing the family's role in shaping gender (non) conformity both in terms of physical presentation and gendered behavior. We use the term gender (non) conformity in order to disrupt the polarization between conformity and nonconformity. Instead, we argue it is a constant negotiation which one achieves to varying degrees at different points in time. We conceptualize family as those individuals of origin who participate in raising one from childhood and those individuals of choice who become a part of one's support networks in adulthood. Thereby, we define family as a person's biological or adoptive relatives, caretakers, friends and community members. Like gender, we see family as negotiated, fluid and achieved in social interactions.

1 Introduction

Scholars have long theorized gender as an achieved process (West & Zimmerman, 1987) and have for some time explored the social agents that teach us how to do gender including peers, schools (Martin, 1998; Pascoe, 2007; Thorne, 1993), and media (Martin, 2005; Martin &

We begin this chapter by laying out the framework for masculinities, femininities and their intersections. This is followed with empirical research on how men redefine masculinity. Next, we survey the empirical research on parents' gender socialization of children. Here, we include scholarship on how parents encourage gender conformity in their children and at times support nonconformity. In the next section, we explore how gender is negotiated within intimate partnerships. This is followed by an analysis of research on gender norms within gay and lesbian communities. Each section weaves together research on racial, ethnic and sexual minority groups in order to present a more intersectional

K. L. Acosta (✉) · V. B. Salcedo
Georgia State University, Atlanta, USA
e-mail: kacosta@gsu.edu

V. B. Salcedo
e-mail: vsalcedo1@student.gsu.edu

analysis. We incorporate research that adopts Collins' (2000) approach to intersectionality—exploring how oppressions are interlinked and organized along a matrix of domination. We also incorporate research that adopts McCall's (2005) *anticategorical* and *intercategorical* methodological approaches to intersectionality. The anticategorical approach emphasizes deconstructing categories in order to dismantle inequalities. The intercategorical approach is focused on comparative relationships of inequality (or lack thereof) among multiple social groups. We conclude with an analysis of how intersectionality has been advanced in research on gender (non) conformity and the family as well as with suggestions for how intersectionality and other theoretical approaches can be advanced in the future.

2 Theorizing Masculinities and Femininities

For Connell (1995) gender is a practice that organizes people's interactions in relation to one another. Connell offers four relationships that distinguish masculinities in a Western context: hegemonic, dominant/subordinate, complicit, and authorized/marginalized. Hegemonic masculinity, a nearly unattainable ideal embodied by a few elite white men, is predicated upon the subordination of all other masculinities and femininity. Emphasized femininity is the basis for yielding to men's interests and needs, while other forms of femininity accommodate and resist subservience at varying levels (Connell, 1987).

Any theorization of masculinities is incomplete without an analysis of femininities and its hierarchies. Schippers (2007) reframes Connell's concept emphasized femininity, arguing it is hegemonic since it embodies the practices assigned to women and reinforces a hierarchical and complementary relationship with hegemonic masculinity. This ensures men's dominant position and women's subordinate position (94). Schippers argues that gender differences and relationality are institutionalized through our social practices and that masculinities and femininities are at the center of gender hegemony.

When women embody social practices of hegemonic masculinity, those practices are stigmatized because they challenge gender hegemony; Schippers terms these practices pariah femininities. Additionally, Schippers notes, men whose practices disrupt gender hegemony embody hegemonic feminine characteristics.

Connell (1995) offers that the interaction of gender, race, and class construct multiple hierarchical masculinities. Further explicating these relationships, Collins' (2004) argues that all masculinities and femininities exist in subordination to the hegemonic as part of a racialized system of sexism. This system relegates racial minorities and women to marginalized masculinities and femininities based on the intersection of race, class, gender and sexual orientation (186). Chou (2012) argues that within this racialized gendered system, the white racial frame relegates Asian American men to effeminacy. Controlling images of Asian Americans span a continuum of hypersexuality and passivity and are used to justify white supremacy (Espiritu, 2008). A racist structure shapes how racial minorities and women experience subordinated femininities and masculinities and in turn their racial/ethnic identities. Pyke and Johnson (2003) argue Asian American women resist the submissive femininities they associate with other Asian women. Instead, they adopt a hegemonic femininity which they attribute with whiteness and distance themselves from their ethnicities.

Missing from most theorizations of masculinity and femininity is an analysis of its cultural specificities. Acosta (2013) argues that hierarchies of femininity can vary by geographic location and that there are different characteristics indicative of dominant and pariah femininities in the United States as opposed to Latin America. González-López (2005) offers that masculinities and femininities are shaped in part by regional patriarchies and expressions of hegemony vary according to rural and urban locations. Fuller (2006) identifies multiple Peruvian masculinities both in public and private spheres that vary by class. These scholars provide nuance to our understanding of marginalized masculinities and femininities as well as

racial and ethnic minority's resistance to gender hegemony. In addition, Shimizu (2012) and Nguyen (2014) argue that passive or effeminate portrayals of Asian American men can provide an alternative to toxic hegemonic masculinity and advocate for more ethical and responsible notions of manhood. In doing so, they challenge the aspiration for hegemonic masculinities and femininities.

In the following sections, we identify how and to what extent families challenge and/or reinforce gendered expectations regarding domestic work, the socialization of children, in interpersonal relationships and within families of choice.

3 Comparing How Men Redefine Masculinities

Recent research on Latino masculinities has critiqued the image of machismo for its culturally reductive and stereotypical representation of Latino men's experiences. For instance, Hurtado and Sinha (2016) find for Latino men, manhood is about having strong ethical values, rejecting hegemonic masculinity, acknowledging gender discrimination and women's subjugation under patriarchy. This study finds Latinos express a stronger feminist ideology than white men which the authors' contribute to differences in how both groups of men experience privilege. For Latino men, they argue, male privilege intersects with oppression resulting in a better understanding of social inequalities and state control than white men for whom privilege intersects with advantage. In research on Mexican fatherhood, González-López (2004) finds that immigration shapes men's expressions of masculinities and the sexual values they instill in their daughters. These men report promoting gender equity in their families and affording their daughters the latitude to experience educational opportunities. While these men express concern with their children's susceptibility to negative influences (drugs, violence) in the United States, they do not assert authoritative, or dominant forms of masculinity in their parenting. Olavarria (2006) finds working-class men in urban Chile struggle to

balance prescriptive notions of patriarchal fathering with their desire for closer affinity to their family. As more women are entering the workforce, Olavarria finds that fathers share more domestic responsibilities, although they do not contribute equally. For some men, this experience leads to an appreciation for their partners. While for others it leads to feelings of helplessness. These studies provide a more complex view of masculinities among heterosexual Latino men: one that explores how they negotiate masculinities that still allow them to support gender equity.

Research on white men in the United States finds that unemployment during the 2008 Great Recession forced men to do gender in less normative ways (Demantas & Myers, 2015). Before unemployment, these men did not participate in many domestic chores; however, most men embrace housework as a fair way to compensate women for their paid labor. These men accept that the decision-making role shifts to their working female partners, whose financial support they appreciate. Many reconceptualize housework as hard, challenging labor appropriate for "real men." Latshaw (2015) argues that in choosing to stay home with their children, fathers resist gender conformity. Latshaw identifies two groups of fathers: *reluctant* and *resolute*. Reluctant fathers are primary caregivers to their children when in transition between jobs. These men assert normative notions of masculinity by avoiding feminized housework. Resolute fathers embrace these responsibilities and reinvent masculinity by blurring the division of gendered work. These fathers choose to stay at home instead of entering the job market. While some men in the United States redefine masculinity to include caring for their family (Demantas & Myers, 2015), others reify normative masculinity when engaging in domestic work by using gendered language to rationalize these tasks (Latshaw, 2015).

This research speaks to the constraints hegemonic masculinity places on men's identities in culturally distinct ways. Hurtado and Sinha's (2016) and González-López's (2004) work suggest that Latino men are not committed to

achieving hegemonic masculinity, preferring instead a more gender equitable way of expressing masculinity. Perhaps the marginalities these men experience in terms of race, class and citizenship foster less oppressive masculinities. Research on white middle-class men in the United States suggests they too are exploring alternative ways of doing gender and establishing stronger emotional bonds in the family. Despite some shifts in power relations, these men continue to view the home primarily as a women's domain even as women contribute financial support for the family. Still, this phenomenon is not unique to the United States as Olavarría (2006) finds Chilean men share similar views.

4 Parental Gender Socialization

Research on parents' gender socialization of children finds that in households where parents intentionally disrupt hegemonic masculinity, children still learn to articulate a gendered self once they reach school age (Risman & Myers, 1997). In a study of preschool age children, Martin (1998) finds children learn to acquire gendered bodily practices through the gendered disciplinary tactics they are subjected to. Research also suggests variations in parent's gender socialization of children according to parent's gender and sexual identity as well as the biological sex of the child. For instance, heterosexual fathers are committed to helping their sons achieve hegemonic masculinity and are motivated by their own desires to obtain and maintain hegemonic masculinity. These fathers view their son's sexuality as a representation of their own and thus privilege heterosexuality (Kane, 2006, 2012). In contrast, heterosexual mothers report societal pressures as their primary motivation for reinforcing gender conformity in their sons (Kane, 2006, 2012). Parents' gender socialization of daughters differs in that as children they are often encouraged to reject celebrated forms of femininity in favor of more masculine assigned attributes.

Some research on nonheterosexual parents suggests that they also often succumb to

pressures to encourage gender conformity in their children. Berkowitz and Ryan (2011), for example, find parents at times overcompensate for their own sexual nonconformity by promoting societally prescriptive gender norms for their children. Still, they find while sexual minority parents largely promote essentialist ideas of appropriate masculinity and femininity, they nonetheless find ways to resist essentialist notions of the relationship between sex and gender roles. Other research indicates that parent's negative childhood experiences with compulsory heterosexuality drive them to encourage their children's gender exploration (Averett, 2016). Parents offer a "gender buffet" with a "variety of gendered options for clothes, toys, and activities and interests including feminine, masculine, and gender-neutral choices" (209–210). Some parents utilize a value-neutral strategy and do not restrict access to any materials or activities. Others curate a gender buffet to actively resist harmful aspects of masculinity. In addition, these parents nurture emotional expression in their sons or self-sufficiency in their daughter.

4.1 Gender Variance and Children

When parents support gender nonconformity for their children their biggest concern is the relationship between doing gender and sexual identity. Parents are motivated to encourage their children's gender conformity because they believe not doing so would make others perceive their children are gay. Parents' ideologies regarding the relationship between gender conformity and heterosexuality are influenced by those to whom they turn for expert parenting advice. Parents who seek advice regarding their children's gender nonconformity are met with books and websites that reinforce the link between gender nonconformity and homosexuality, often in stigmatizing ways (Martin, 2005).

Medical professionals are also complicit in reinforcing the relationship between gender conformity and sexual orientation. For instance, Davis, Dewey, and Murphy (2016) look at the

ways medical professionals approach transgender and intersex bodies, arguing that in both cases doctors expect their medical interventions on transgender and intersex bodies will lead to a heterosexual gendered body. Medical professionals reinforce sex, gender and sexuality binaries and impose their biases for these binaries on the parents of intersex children as well as on transgender individuals.

Research on families with gender variant children names three strategies parents use to support their children: *gender hedging*, *gender literacy*, and *playing along* (Rahilly, 2015). Parents engaging in these strategies deconstruct the assumed link between sex and gender and expand opportunities for their children while retaining a biological understanding of gender variant behavior. Consistent with gendered expectations of parenting, mothers more often than fathers actively participate in on-going negotiations and advocacy for their children's gender expression. Meadow (2011) finds that parents' understanding of their gender variant children's identities is shaped by the scripted narratives society makes possible for them. As such, these parents adopt medical and psychological discourses (that are otherwise used to create rigid biological narratives of gender) to describe their children's gender variance. Both Meadow (2011) and Rahilly (2015) note that race and class privilege makes it feasible for the parents in their studies to support their children's gender nonconformity. These studies make apparent the absence of research on racial minority parents' socialization of children.

4.2 Gender (Non) Conformity in Racial/Ethnic Minority Families

Research exploring the role of race/ethnicity and social class in shaping the values parents' instill in their children suggests that social position and the constraints families experience on account of racism or anti-immigrant sentiment can shape the gendered messages they convey. For instance,

Espiritu's (2001) work on first generation Filipino parents in the United States suggests they turn to gendered discourses of moral superiority and ethnic authenticity by positioning white women as 'promiscuous' and in juxtaposition to 'good' Filipina women. These parents leverage Filipina's sexual and gender agency to bolster ethnic pride against racism in the United States and in an effort to resist cultural subordination via colonization. Similarly, studies of sex and gender socialization within Latina/o families find adolescent daughters report experiencing more restrictions on their freedom than do their brothers (Garcia, 2012; Raffaelli & Ontai, 2004). In an exploration of parent's motivations for restricting their daughters' behavior, Chou (2012) finds East Asian American women attribute their limited social freedom as children to their parent's fear of potential predators who eroticize Asians. South Asian American women approaching young adulthood learn to master domestic chores and are encouraged to find a co-ethnic husband with a high-status profession. These parents are motivated by cultural preservation and a desire to protect daughters from discrimination through economic security. Other research finds significant pressure for girls to conform to societally acceptable forms of femininity as they enter adulthood. For instance, sexually nonconforming Latinas experience more acceptance from their parents if they are gender conforming as parents perceive gender transgressions would make their sexual transgressions visible (Acosta, 2013). By presenting an outward appearance of acceptable femininity, parents believe their sexually nonconforming daughters will minimize this transgression. In another study, African American women report that, as adolescents, their fathers reinforced racialized norms of appropriate black femininity and instilled in them contradictory messages about the importance of being both strong and respectable women (Johnson, 2013). These studies underscore how immigrant and racial minority parents enforce socially acceptable expressions of femininity upon their daughters to buffer the effects of racism, homophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment.

5 Doing Gender and Redefining Family Within Intimate Partnerships

As the complementary relationship between masculinities and femininities has already been established in the research, some scholars explore how this codependence is experienced within couple's partnerships. For instance, Pfeffer (2010) notes that women partners of transgender men conform to socially prescriptive gender roles during the transition process. Similarly, Ward (2010) highlights trans men's desires for their femme partners to embody a "girl" subjectivity while simultaneously celebrating their masculinity: a process Ward terms *giving gender*. Femme partners are tasked with creating the illusion that the labor involved in giving gender is effortless and in some ways silence their own subjectivity for their partner's sake. Further outlining the compromises they make, Pfeffer (2014) notes cis women with trans men partners struggle to adopt a fitting sexual identity (given language limitations) and with being misrecognized as heterosexual when in social settings. Cis women experience discomfort from misrecognition, at times, resisting it by embodying counternormative practices. On the other hand, misrecognition can be validating for trans men partners because in being perceived as heterosexual their gender identity as men is also recognized.

While Ward's work emphasizes the gender labor of trans men's femme partners, Pfeffer explores these women's acts of resistance. Pfeffer (2012) notes, cis women partners of trans men engage in both *normative resistance* (resisting life choices considered socially acceptable such as marriage and parenthood) and *inventive pragmatism* (choosing to manipulate these institutions to gain resources for their families). Structural forces constrain the ways they resist dominant and privileged family forms while simultaneously creating a space for their queer families within these institutions. Still, there is a cost associated with inventive pragmatism, in gaining access to heteronormative privilege these families can also be excluded from LGBTQ

communities (Pfeffer, 2014). These studies highlight the complementary ways that cis women and their trans men partners embody gender and explore the social consequences and advantages families experience in doing gender in complementary ways.

Research on household division of labor can illustrate how power and gender expectations impact heterosexual couples' ability to navigate inequality (Davis & Greenstein, 2013). Risman and Johnson-Sumerford (1998) find postgender couples organize domestic responsibilities in ways that disrupt traditional gender scripts. These couples include women who are not financially dependent on their husbands which allows them to better negotiate power and control in their homes. When meeting the emotional needs of the family, more gendered patterns emerge for some families. Some mothers serve as the emotion expert—establishing stronger bonds with the children and managing the couples' familial needs. Still, more couples either share the emotion work or double their individual efforts to be equally present emotionally in the relationship.

Carrington's (1999) work suggests that both lesbians and gay men publicly present egalitarian family values but ultimately fall subject to gendered constraints in carrying out tasks. Gay men who do domestic work downplay the labor involved in order to preserve a threat to their gender identity. Those who do not routinely participate in domestic work also mitigate their partners' involvement in order to preserve their masculinity and distance them from feminized labor. Still, this pattern may shift for gay couples with children. For instance, rather than distancing themselves from feminized labor, gay stay-at-home fathers challenge and expand masculinity by redefining "accomplishment" in non monetary ways (Goldberg, 2012). Some gay fathers share childcare and feminized domestic tasks more equally than do heterosexual couples (Goldberg, Smith, & Perry-Jenkins, 2012). Some gay fathers adopt a flexible ideology of masculinity that allows for emotional expression and nurturing while creating new norms for their family (Schacher, Auerbach, & Silverstein,

2005). These men engage in *degendered parenting* by blending traditional gendered roles as they shift towards progressive fathering practices.

In her work on black lesbian couples, Moore (2011) delineates the link between care work and one's gender presentation in shaping gender imbalance in these relationships. Partners with a more feminine gender display describe doing more household labor than their less feminine partners. Still while gender imbalances may persist, there are also key instances where socially prescriptive gender roles are disrupted in black lesbian families. For instance, in stepparent families biological mothers leverage power over the family through control of the couple's finances and through performing most of the domestic duties in the home. These families are often formed when a biological mother allows a partner to move into an already established home that she shares with her biological children which inherently creates a power imbalance in favor of the biological mom and leads to a disruption of gender conforming roles.

Research on polyamorous relationships also explores the ways partners reproduce and disrupt hierarchical and gendered dynamics in the family. Sheff (2006) finds that polyamorous men aspire to achieve poly-hegemonic masculinity, resisting normative hegemonic masculinity in favor of a more gender equitable arrangement where power is shared with their female partners. These men recognize a woman's freedom to form intimate bonds with other people, despite the risk of losing control to other potential partners. However, Scheff also notes in some long-term polyamorous relationships men reify hegemonic masculinity by leveraging their race, class, gender and heterosexual privileges to restrict other people's access to their female partners.

These studies provide insight into how gender is negotiated within intimate partnerships for gay, lesbian, poly, heterosexual and queer families. Each study highlights how families simultaneously conform to and resist prescriptive gender scripts. Further, these studies delineate the structural barriers that inhibit their efforts to resist.

6 Gender (Non) Conformity Within Families of Choice

Some research explores the relationship between gender and visibility in sexually nonconforming communities. Because these communities provide important social support for gay men and lesbians, we survey this research as illustrative of the role families of choice play in how they deploy gender. Stein's (1997) work on lesbian communities in the 70s, 80s, and 90s documents lesbians' association of societally acceptable femininities with women's oppression and thus their preference for an androgynous gendered self. Their efforts to blur gender differences were intentional acts to separate lesbian identified women from the dominant society. Esterberg (1997) describes gender among lesbians as performative and in some ways a playful blending of masculinity and femininity. Esterberg finds femme lesbians struggle with wanting to be recognized within the lesbian community as well as within dominant society. Crawley (2001) uses women-seeking-women personal ads to explore class differences in gender preferences. Crawley finds middle-class women are more committed to their gender conformity than working-class women but still seek partners who adopt butch/femme gender displays. Further, the personal ads suggest these women are more likely to describe the partners they seek as having masculine or feminine characteristics, suggesting that while they have clear preferences regarding gender presentation they avoid the language of butch/femme. Crawley suggests this avoidance may be attributable to the feminist stigma associated with butch/femme gender displays.

As women who are socially positioned differently along a racial hierarchy in the United States, black and white lesbians' experience different kinds of oppressions (Moore, 2011). These distinct subjectivities are evident in the variations of gender presentations apparent in different lesbian communities. Moore offers that gender presentation among black lesbians reflects both black culture and lesbian group membership which leads to a gender expression that is culturally unique from that of predominately white

lesbian communities (90). Further, Moore offers three physical gender presentations salient in black lesbian communities: *femmes*, *gender-blenders* and *transgressives*. Like Crawley (2001), Moore captures how social class restricts gender displays for black women, noting middle-class women are more likely to reject gender nonconformity out of concern for the impact it could have on their professional goals. Whereas working-class black lesbians (and middle-class lesbians employed in male dominated professions) are more willing to resist societal gender expectations.

Acosta's (2016) work looks at gender expectations in terms of dress and behavior among Latina lesbians in one social group. She argues these women establish norms around appropriate gender presentation and serial monogamy in order to protect an image of themselves as sexually moral. Acosta notes these women's suspicion of others who embody a masculine gender display and those they perceive to be promiscuous. Further, Acosta notes these rigid expectations fuel Latina lesbians' oppositional consciousness, allowing them to resist racial/ethnic stereotypes and hypersexualization.

Research on gay men's communities offers a nuanced look at the ways gendered behavior is regulated among friends. For instance, Decena (2011) finds that Dominican gay men distance themselves from effeminacy in order to retain legitimacy, social mobility and acceptance. Still, effeminacy which is deployed through playful body movements and language intonation can be expressed among close gay friends which allows for intimacy with one another. Filipino gay men often adopt a Bakla identity which derives from the Tagalog word for homosexuality, effeminacy and cross dressing (Manalansan, 2003). Bakla can be derogatory, suggesting that one is not a "real man" but Bakla is also embraced as an expression of feminine performance. Gaining belonging among Filipino gay men requires the use of *swardspak*, a Filipino gay vernacular that involves the performance of femininity. Baklas see one another as friends or kin in the Diaspora but their sexual and romantic attractions are reserved for "more masculine" men. While this

research does not speak to expectations for gendered dress, it offers a unique analysis of the body as a site of gendered discipline for non white immigrant men.

Collectively, the research on gay and lesbian communities elucidates how individuals are held accountable to adhering to specific gender and sexual ideologies in order to obtain group membership. Thus, even within communities designed to be a respite from the othering that occurs in the dominant society, the limitations imposed by the dominant society continue to shape attempts at gender (non) conformity.

7 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have highlighted research exploring gender constraints as experienced through both interactions and social structures and the integral role of the family in holding us all accountable for doing gender appropriately. Most of the studies surveyed are theoretically motivated by the doing gender paradigm. West and Zimmerman's (1987) work goes beyond Goffman's analysis of gender display in that they delineate the intricacies involved in accomplishing gender; positing that doing gender is not a choice. Even when we resist, others perceive us as men or women and that perception impacts interactions. Despite West and Zimmerman's efforts to make this distinction, it is not uncommon for research to simultaneously draw from Goffman (1959) and/or Butler (1990). While there is always room for researchers to draw from multiple theoretical frameworks, much of the empirical research in this area has blended these three to the point of losing some theoretical precision.

Risman (2009) argues that doing gender has become ubiquitous and advocates that scholars go beyond exploring the changing ways in which people do gender and instead look at the ways that gender is undone. The research surveyed in this chapter illustrates Risman's critique. Gender scholars often limit an analysis to how individuals balance the demands of hegemonic masculinities and femininities or create new

masculinities and femininities within gender hegemony. For instance, Sheff's (2006) work on poly-hegemonic masculinities does exactly this. Rather than providing an analysis of how men in poly relationships resist gender binaries by refusing hegemonic masculinities, Sheff offers that these men adopt a different kind of masculinity in their families. An alternative way to interpret these men's behaviors is to see them as challenging or resisting socially prescriptive gender norms in the interest of loosening the constraints of gender hegemony. Pfeffer (2010, 2012, 2014) and Ward (2010) begin to move us in this direction through analysis of cis women and their transmen partners. Demantas and Myers (2015) approach gender as structure and find that institutional level changes impact men's involvement in the paid labor force resulting in more gender flexibility towards domestic work. Careful analysis of these studies offers an understanding of the limitations of resisting gender and thus aid us in advancing theory.

Most of the research surveyed in this chapter has relied upon a racially homogenous sample of either predominantly white respondents or respondents of one racial minority group. In addition, class diversity is lacking in these samples. These studies adopt multiple intersectional methodological approaches to gender (non) conformity in the family. For instance, Davis et al.'s (2016) research exemplifies McCall (2005) anti-categorical approach in that it points to the social construction of sex and the nuanced ways that medical professionals *give sex* to transgender and intersex bodies based on their preconceived notions of gender. Moore's (2011), Acosta's (2013, 2016), and Chou's (2012) work are all examples of Collins' (2000) approach to intersectionality—centering on one racial or ethnic minority group and exploring their intersecting oppressions. Research adopting McCall's inter-categorical approach is not well represented in the scholarship. This approach requires a systematic comparison of groups in terms of gender, class, race, ethnicity or other social dimensions. While McCall advocates this approach lends itself to quantitative analysis, we also see its potential for qualitative research. For instance,

despite a small sample size, Kane's (2006, 2012) work makes comparisons across social groups and effectively illustrates the differences between mothers' and fathers' gendering practices as well as the differences in their gendering of sons versus daughters. These comparisons in our view contribute to intersectionality's complexity. Some critiques of McCall's categorical approach argue that it reappropriates a theoretical perspective aimed at centering black women's voices, rendering them invisible (Alexander-Floyd, 2012). Still, we believe there is ample room within intellectual discourse for multiple approaches to intersectionality to exist and enrich gender studies scholarship (Choo & Ferree, 2010). Nonetheless, scholars building on intersectionality ought to acknowledge and reflect upon its theoretical origins as a theory for voicing black marginality in meaningful ways.

The research surveyed in this chapter makes an invaluable contribution to the study of gender (non) conformity and the family. It builds upon interactional and structural theoretical approaches to explore the family's role in reifying gender binaries through outward appearances and behaviors. These studies deepen our understanding of gender hegemony through illustrative findings of the limitations to resisting gender conformity and the impact that gender constraints have on our familial roles. In the future, this area can benefit from research that accepts Risman's (2009) invitation for more scholars to adopt a lens of undoing gender so that we can go beyond naming gender as an achievement when it is observed. Furthermore, research that is methodologically informed by McCall's (2005) inter-categorical approach to intersectionality will allow for a better understanding of gender inequality. Perhaps unlike McCall, we do not see the inter-categorical approach to intersectionality as a model primarily informed by large data comparisons. These comparisons can also be achieved with qualitative methods (albeit more rare). The absence of this work limits the comparisons researchers can draw and ultimately the strength with which we can claim racialized gender differences. Lastly, scholars have been slow to develop a nuanced understanding of the

cultural differences that inform socially prescriptive gendered practices. Espiritu (2001, 2008), Acosta (2013, 2016) and others contribute to this goal, a more expansive analysis of these differences awaits theorizing.

References

- Acosta, K. L. (2013). *Amigas y Amantes: Sexually nonconforming Latinas negotiate family. Families in focus*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.
- Acosta, K. L. (2016). Cultivating a lesbiana seria identity. *Sexualities, 19*(5/6), 517–534.
- Alexander-Floyd, N. G. (2012). Disappearing acts: Reclaiming intersectionality in the social sciences in a post-black feminist era. *Feminist Formations, 24*(1), 1–25.
- Averett, K. H. (2016). The gender buffet: LGBTQ parents resisting heteronormativity. *Gender & Society, 30*(2), 189.
- Berkowitz, D., & Ryan, M. (2011). Bathrooms, baseball, and bra shopping: Lesbian and gay parents talk about engendering their children. *Sociological Perspectives, 54*(3), 329–350.
- Butler, J. (1990). *Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity*. New York: Routledge.
- Carrington, C. (1999). *No place like home: Relationships and family life among lesbians and gay men*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Choo, H. Y., & Ferree, M. M. (2010). Practicing intersectionality in sociological research: A critical analysis of inclusions, interactions, and institutions in the study of inequalities. *Sociological Theory, 28*(2), 129–149.
- Chou, R. S. (2012). *Asian American sexual politics: The construction of race, gender, and sexuality*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Collins, P. H. (2000). *Black feminist thought: Knowledge, consciousness, and the politics of empowerment*. New York: Routledge.
- Collins, P. H. (2004). *Black sexual politics: African American, gender, and the new racism*. New York: Routledge.
- Connell, R. W. (1987). *Gender & power: Society, the person and sexual politics*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Connell, R. W. (1995). *Masculinities*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Crawley, S. L. (2001). Are butch and fem working-class and antifeminist? *Gender & Society, 15*(2), 175–196.
- Davis, G., Dewey, J. M., & Murphy, E. L. (2016). Giving sex: Deconstructing intersex and trans medicalization practices. *Gender & Society, 30*(3), 490.
- Davis, S. N., & Greenstein, T. N. (2013). Why study housework? Cleaning as a window into power in couples. *Journal of Family Theory & Review, 5*(2), 63–71.
- Decena, C. U. (2011). *Tacit subjects: Belonging and same-sex desire among dominican immigrant men*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Demantas, I., & Myers, K. (2015). Step up and be a man in a different manner: Unemployed men reframing masculinity. *Sociological Quarterly, 56*(4), 640–664.
- Espiritu, Y. (2001). We don't sleep around like white girls do: Family, culture, and gender in Filipino American lives. *Signs, 26*(2), 415–440.
- Espiritu, Y. (2008). *Asian American women and men: Labor, laws, and love. The Gender Lens Series*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Esterberg, K. G. (1997). *Lesbian and bisexual identities: Constructing communities, constructing selves*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Fuller, N. (2006). The social constitution of gender identity among Peruvian males. In M. C. Gutmann (Ed.), *Changing men and masculinities in Latin America* (pp. 134–152). Durham: Duke University Press.
- Garcia, L. (2012). *Respect yourself, protect yourself: Latina girls and sexual identity*. New York: New York University.
- Goffman, E. (1959). *The presentation of self in everyday life*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company.
- Goldberg, A. E. (2012). *Gay dads: Transitions to adoptive fatherhood*. New York: NYU Press.
- Goldberg, A. E., Smith, J. Z., & Perry-Jenkins, M. (2012). The division of labor in lesbian, gay, and heterosexual new adoptive parents. *Journal of Marriage and Family, 74*(4), 812–828.
- González-López, G. (2004). Fathering Latina sexualities: Mexican men and the virginity of their daughters. *Journal of Marriage and Family, 66*(5), 1118–1130.
- González-López, G. (2005). *Erotic journeys: Mexican immigrants and their sex lives*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hurtado, A., & Sinha, M. (2016). *Beyond machismo: Intersectional Latino masculinities*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Johnson, M. S. (2013). Strength and respectability: Black women's negotiation of racialized gender ideals and the role of daughter-father relationships. *Gender & Society, 27*(6), 889–912.
- Kane, E. W. (2006). 'No way my boys are going to be like that!' Parents' responses to children's gender nonconformity. *Gender and Society, 20*(2), 149–176.
- Kane, E. W. (2012). *The gender trap: Parents and the pitfalls of raising boys and girls*. New York: New York University Press.
- Latshaw, B. A. (2015). From mopping to mowing. *Journal of Men's Studies, 23*(3), 252–270.
- Manalansan, M. F. (2003). *Global divas: Filipino gay men in the diaspora*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Martin, K. A. (1998). Becoming a gendered body: Practices of preschools. *American Sociological Review, 63*(4), 494–511.

- Martin, K. A. (2005). William wants a doll. Can he have one? Feminists, child care advisors, and gender-neutral child rearing. *Gender and Society*, 19(4), 456–479.
- Martin, K. A., & Kazyak, E. (2009). Hetero-romantic love and heterosexiness in children's g-rated films. *Gender and Society*, 23(3), 315–336.
- McCall, L. (2005). The complexity of intersectionality. *Signs*, 30(3), 1771–1800.
- Meadow, T. (2011). 'Deep down where the music plays': How parents account for childhood gender variance. *Sexualities*, 14(6), 725–747.
- Moore, M. R. (2011). *Invisible families: Gay identities, relationships, and motherhood among black women*. California: University of California Press Books.
- Nguyen, T. H. (2014). *A view from the bottom: Asian American masculinity and sexual representation. Perverse modernities*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Olavarria, J. (2006). Men at home? Child rearing and housekeeping among Chilean working-class fathers. In M. C. Gutmann (Ed.), *Changing men and masculinities in Latin America* (pp. 333–350). Durham: Duke University Press.
- Pascoe, C. J. (2007). *Dude, you're a fag: Masculinity and sexuality in high school*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Pfeffer, C. (2010). 'Women's work'? Women partners of transgender men doing housework and emotion work. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 72(1), 165–183.
- Pfeffer, C. (2012). Normative resistance and inventive pragmatism: Negotiating structure and agency in transgender families. *Gender and Society*, 26(4), 574–602.
- Pfeffer, C. (2014). 'I don't like passing as a straight woman': Queer negotiations of identity and social group membership. *American Journal of Sociology*, 120(1), 1–44.
- Pyke, K. D., & Johnson, D. L. (2003). Asian American women and racialized femininities: 'Doing' gender across cultural worlds. *Gender & Society*, 17(1), 33–53.
- Raffaelli, M., & Ontai, L. (2004). Gender socialization in Latino/a families: Results from two retrospective studies. *Sex Roles*, 50(5/6), 287–300.
- Rahilly, E. P. (2015). The gender binary meets the gender-variant child: Parents' negotiations with childhood gender variance. *Gender & Society*, 29(3), 338–361.
- Risman, B. J. (2009). From doing to undoing: Gender as we know it. *Gender and Society*, 23(1), 81–84.
- Risman, B. J., & Johnson-Sumerford, D. (1998). Doing it fairly: A study of postgender marriages. *Journal of Marriage & Family*, 60(1), 23–40.
- Risman, B. J., & Myers, K. (1997). As the twig is bent: Children reared in feminist households. *Qualitative Sociology*, 20(2), 229–252.
- Schacher, S. J., Auerbach, C. F., & Silverstein, L. B. (2005). Gay fathers expanding the possibilities for us all. *Journal of GLBT Family Studies*, 1(3), 31–52.
- Schippers, M. (2007). Recovering the feminine other: Masculinity, femininity, and gender hegemony. *Theory and Society*, 36(1), 85–102.
- Sheff, E. (2006). Poly-hegemonic masculinities. *Sexualities*, 9(5), 621–642.
- Shimizu, C. P. (2012). *Straitjacket sexualities: Unbinding Asian American manhoods in the movies*. Asian America. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Stein, A. (1997). *Sex and sensibility: Stories of a lesbian generation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Thorne, B. (1993). *Gender play: Girls and boys in school*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Ward, J. (2010). Gender labor: Transmen, femmes, and collective work of transgression. *Sexualities*, 13(2), 236–254.
- West, C., & Zimmerman, D. H. (1987). Doing gender. *Gender and Society*, 1(2), 125–151.

Katie L. Acosta Ph.D., is Associate Professor of Sociology at Georgia State University. Her areas of expertise include Latinx Sexualities, Race and Ethnicity, Gender, Immigration, and Family. Her book *Amigas y Amantes: Sexually Nonconforming Latinas Negotiate Family* was published in 2013. She is currently working on a second book project entitled, *Stepping into Queer Parenting*, which explores the legal, social, and interpersonal experiences families face in queer and lesbian stepparent households. In addition to her published book, her research can be found in *Gender & Society*, *Journal of Homosexuality*, *Black Women Gender and Family*, *American Journal of Public Health*, *Sexualities*, and *Family Relations*.

Veronica B. Salcedo is a MA candidate in the Sociology department at Georgia State University in Atlanta, Georgia. Her research focuses on sexually nonconforming Filipina/Filipina American women in the southern U.S. She earned her undergraduate degree at The College of William and Mary and is a native of Virginia Beach, Virginia.

The Gendered Division of Household Labor

27

Oriel Sullivan

Abstract

In this chapter I first define, and then examine the origins of research into, the gendered division of household labor and care. I outline the main theoretical approaches, finishing with the development of multi-level theoretical frameworks that connect the institutional and interactional levels of the gendered construction of labor and care. I follow the logic of these models to describe current configurations and trends. I focus on the factors identified by successive decade reviews as being the most important influences on the gendered division of household labor and care, and describe spousal resources and educational level as examples of individual-level influences. I then discuss cross-national trends in relation to institutional-level policy contexts, comparing evidence for and against the idea of a recent ‘stall’ in progress towards gender equality. I conclude by arguing that it is important to recognize the processes of progressive change that are at work, in order to continue to press

for movement in the direction of greater equality. I outline the most significant barriers that need addressing, emphasizing in particular the persistency of traditional masculinities, and policy directions that fail to address the need for a better work-life balance for both women and men.

1 The Gendered Division of Household Labor

The division of household labor refers to the division of unpaid household tasks between household or family members. In recognition of the importance of distinguishing between housework and care, gender and family scholars prefer to refer to the division of household labor and care. This division of labor and care within the domestic sphere forms part of and is related to the wider division of labor, which describes the division of paid and family work and care between household members. It is a key area of research for scholars of gender and family within the disciplines of sociology, economics and psychology. In this first section I address the motivation for, and origins of, research into the division of household labor and care. What is it that makes the study of housework and care interesting?

O. Sullivan (✉)
University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
e-mail: oriel.sullivan@sociology.ox.ac.uk

2 The Origins of Research in the Division of Household Labor

As Davis and Greenstein have recently asked in the title of their Editor's Introduction to a special issue of the *Journal of Family Theory and Review*: Why study housework? (Davis & Greenstein, 2013). The research which first identified housework—traditionally the preserve of women—as a topic of sociological inquiry described its essentially boring, repetitive and isolated nature (e.g. Oakley, 1974). The traditionally feminine-associated, mundane, tasks of routine housework (i.e. cleaning, clothes care and daily cooking) are things that people do not enjoy, and are unwilling to do. Because of its generally negative perception, the performance of housework by women and men within couples has long been regarded in the sociological literature as an important indicator of marital power; a research tradition dating back to the work of Blood and Wolfe (1960). Put simply, those with less power in the household (however that power is defined) do more housework.

There is strong evidence that the subjective experience of housework and child care is very different. Child care falls into a different category of experience which, at least in some of its aspects, is perceived as enjoyable and rewarding. The importance of the child care provided by parents has been the subject of intense interest in relation to child development and outcomes. Time investments in caring for children have been shown to positively affect child outcomes. Through their daily activities and interactions with children, mothers and fathers directly affect children's psychological wellbeing and cognitive development (Lamb, 2010).

The origins of research into the division of household labor and care can be traced to the second wave of feminism in the 1960s and 1970s. Up to the 1960s there had been little interest in the domestic division of labor within the household, with previous economically-based research treating the traditional normative household as a 'black box'. This box was perceived as rationally organized such that the partner with the highest

potential earnings (assumed to be the husband) went 'out to work', supporting his family economically, while the wife stayed home and cared for the family. Early feminist research interrogated that 'black box', revealing the hidden burden of unpaid 'women's work' within the home. As women began to enter the labor force in increasingly larger numbers, the focus was on trying to understand the reasons for the continuing unequal gender distribution of unpaid work despite the fact that women were doing more paid work (e.g. Berk, 1985; Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Oakley, 1974). The research of Arlie Hochschild—involving the observation of family members as they went about their day-to-day activities—epitomized the feminist project of delving inside the household black box. In *The Second Shift*, published in 1989, Hochschild and Machung described a process whereby women had entered the 'first shift' of the workforce, but noted that this had resulted in surprisingly meager change in who did the domestic 'second shift' (Hochschild & Machung, 1989).

Perhaps because of the origins of this body of research in the attempt to problematize existing economically-based models of the household division of labor, the focus of most empirical analysis has been on (predominantly white) heterosexual couples. However, the same issues clearly apply in relation to couples of different sexuality and race/ethnicity, as I refer to in the section below on current configurations and trends. The relatively few analyses that include different marital statuses and household structures (for examples see Baxter, Hewitt, & Western, 2005; Gershuny & Sullivan, 2014; South & Spitze, 1994) show that the gendered nature of housework and care extends across all such statuses and structures: married women do more housework than women in all other household structures while married men do less; single parents do more unpaid domestic work and care than childless singles; single mothers do more unpaid domestic work and care than single fathers; and adolescent girls do more housework than adolescent boys.

The growing awareness of the contribution of unpaid domestic work to national economies has meant that the valuation of unpaid work and care

within the home is now increasingly being incorporated into national accounting. The value of all non-market household labor and care in the US in 2010 was recently independently estimated at over five thousand billion dollars, which would lead to a 44% upwards estimate of conventional GDP (Suh & Folbre, 2016). Indeed, feminist Marxists have argued that capitalism is predicated on this reservoir of unrecognized reproductive labor.

3 History and Assessment of Main Theories

The main emphasis of research in this area for most of the period up to the first decade of the 21st Century was on trying to understand what goes on inside the home and why the distribution of housework among heterosexual couples remained so unequal. Various theoretical perspectives received support as possible explanations for the continuing gender gap in housework and care—most notably, from an economic perspective, economic dependency (economic exchange) and economic bargaining, and from the feminist perspective, marital bargaining and gender display.

Economic models of household production were predicated on rates of market income, while the value of unpaid labor was estimated as a ‘shadow wage’ calculated according to how much it would cost to employ someone else to do it. Under the assumption of economic rationality, a person whose earning power was worth more than the shadow wage would substitute their unpaid labor for market work. The simple trade theorem that lies at the heart of Becker’s (1981) *Treatise on the Family* holds that both members of a couple may stand to gain by distributing more paid work to the partner with the higher marginal wage, and more unpaid work to the other. This logic formed the basis for economically-based explanations of the division of household labor.

A major contribution of feminist inquiry has been to show that models of economic rationality are not effective for understanding what goes on

inside households, and that gender has to be taken into account in any analysis of the domestic division of unpaid work and care. From an early point in the debate, the marital power framework proposed by Blood and Wolfe combined a theory of power based on individual resources (that were instantiated in bargaining between spouses) with a gender lens which is sensitive to the fact that, in a situation where both institutional and interactive contingencies accord more resources to men than to women, domestic gender power is structurally unequal (e.g., Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Marx Ferree, 1990). This framework provided a more gender-sensitive approach to the understanding of marital bargaining than economic bargaining theory, which accorded primacy to the role of paid employment. In contrast, within the marital power framework, bargaining within couples is conceived of as concerning decisions about paid and unpaid labor made simultaneously. The outcome of this bargaining process reflects both contingent circumstances (e.g., the birth of a child), and the deployment by each spouse of a range of embodied resources (not simply market income) in the process of bargaining over both paid and unpaid work. Nevertheless, in its empirical application in quantitative research, sociological accounts of marital bargaining have also tended to emphasize the primacy of paid employment (market income) in determining who gets to do the household unpaid labor and care.

The doing gender perspective—also focused on marital interaction and negotiation—provided a radical alternative to this approach. The idea of doing gender derives from the concept of ‘gender display’, as originally described by Goffman. It focuses on the processes by which gender is continuously being constructed and negotiated in interaction and behavior, proposing that gender is itself the product and accomplishment of social doings and interactions; a “routine accomplishment embedded in everyday interaction” (West & Zimmerman, 1987, 125). Interaction with a partner in a heterosexual relationship can be seen as one of the most significant locations for this enactment of gender, and the routine performance of housework is regarded as a key

indicator of such enactment. Housework is identified as a site for the interactive performance of gender according to the expected norms of femininity or masculinity. Women do gender by performing the bulk of feminine-defined tasks such as routine housework, while men do gender by doing none or very little of it. In this sense, doing the housework may be regarded, in the words of Butler, as a “performative act” of gender (Butler, 2006). We can find support for both the marital bargaining and doing gender frameworks in the existing literature on the division of household labor and care (see below), and they are not necessarily opposing; rather, they can both represent specific contingencies of interaction in the domestic sphere.

3.1 Multi-level Theoretical Models

The above theoretical perspectives dominated empirical work on the household division of labor for a couple of decades from the 1970s through to the first decade of the 21st Century, generating a large and influential body of literature. As the theoretical lens of this literature was on what went on inside the household, empirical research predominantly focused on the individual characteristics of, and the negotiations occurring between, spouses. However, during the latter part of the 20th Century feminist scholars were also starting to explore the connections between wider-level institutional policy contexts and gendered configurations of the division of labor. Their aim was to provide a more gender-sensitive analysis of the configurations of national welfare policies than that provided by Esping-Andersen’s germinal work *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (1999).

This shift in emphasis in research to incorporate both individual and national level variables occurred hand-in-hand with the development over the 1990s and 2000s of new multi-level theoretical frameworks of gender—there were several examples appearing during this period of models attempting to address the interwoven relationships between the levels of structure and action in relation to gender.

Connell’s concept of ‘configurations of gender practice’ (Connell, 2000) builds on the doing gender perspective (West & Zimmerman, 1987), conceiving of masculinity and femininity as dynamic processes that have the ability to transform gender structures. A major contribution to this theoretical development appeared with Risman’s analysis of the gender structure. In the construction of her gender structure model, Risman focuses on three interpenetrating dimensions: the individual level of gendered identities, gendered cultural meanings and expectations as played out in interaction, and gender-specific institutional constraints and opportunities (Risman, 1998, 2004). The conception of gender as structure enables an approach linking individual factors (including gender ideologies and resource-linked socio-economic and demographic characteristics) through interaction to the wider institutional (social-structural, policy and discursive) sphere.

Various applications of such multi-level theoretical frameworks have been made in relation to the household division of labor and care. Sullivan’s (2006) model of ‘embedded interaction’ in the production of the division of household labor and care describes a recursive process occurring across the levels of (1) individual spousal resources and gender consciousness, (2) marital interaction and negotiation, and (3) the wider discursive sphere (national policies and normative ideologies of gender). Building upon this, and on Gershuny, Bittman, and Brice’s (2005) concept of ‘lagged adaptation’, Sullivan, Gershuny and Robinson (2018) have proposed a multilevel theoretical model that they refer to as ‘lagged generational change’. The new element is the introduction of a longitudinal dimension, with an explicit focus on how the recursive influences of micro and macro-level play out across generations. If we start at the micro-level, a girl’s initial gender socialization in her household of origin in, say the 1970s, occurs in a context in which her parents’ domestic practices can be expected on the average to reflect a previous generation’s gendered expectations. These are already out of step with current real conditions because, for example, of the slow and

imperfect communication of policy changes, as well as her parents' socialization within ideologies and conventions inherited from *their* parents. The educational and employment opportunities for girls in most societies over the latter part of the twentieth century were significantly greater than those available to their mothers—although their brothers' options were, in most cases, not very different from those of their fathers. Therefore, if and when she forms a heterosexual partnership, *her* paid employment, combined with *their* inherited expectations of differential gendered responsibilities and expectations, leads to an unfair accumulation of paid and unpaid work on her shoulders. She experiences these as various specific sorts of disadvantages in the form of reduced life chances in relation to leisure time, restricted choice among family formation options, and restrictions on career development.

At the same time, she is involved in social interactions, negotiations and conflict relating to these issues of work-life balance, particularly with peers and her spouse. As a result of these interactional processes there is a slow build-up of pressure for new forms of regulation (e.g. statutory parental and, more recently, paternal, leave provisions); changes in tax and benefit systems (e.g. allowances for childcare costs); and new public service provision (e.g. improvements in the availability of both public and employment-located childcare services). So the influence that macro-level norms and regulatory systems have on individual-level socialization and interaction is recursively linked to the influence that marital and peer interaction has on the public discourse. And in both directions we would expect to observe a substantial time lag. In the latter case, there is a delay while changes in individual-level gender ideologies and strategies diffuse into the public discourse. In the former case, there is delay while changes in regulatory systems or normative ideologies diffuse in interaction, and while the implications of these changes are articulated in changed individual behavior. This model enables a conceptualization of the slow processes of change influencing the gender division of household labor and care over

the past half-century, in which delays (stalling?—see below) are built into the system.

4 Current Configurations and Trends: Individual Level Factors

In the next sections I turn to describing some of the current configurations and trends in the division of household labor and care. This requires sifting a vast volume of literature, and, inevitably, I have had to be selective. As an organizing principle, I have chosen to describe these configurations and trends in relation to factors identified as being the most influential in the production of household labor and care in successive influential decade reviews of the topic. Following the logic of the multi-level theoretical models described above, I have separated these factors into individual-level influences (focusing on spousal resources such as educational attainment) and institutional-level influences (welfare and social policy). Throughout, of course, the dimension of gender cross-cuts these influences.

A succession of decade reviews (Coltrane, 2000 for the 1990s; Bianchi, Sayer, Milkie, & Robinson, 2012; Lachance-Grzela & Bouchard, 2010, for the 2000s) have outlined the main features and trends in the division of household labor and care in Western countries. Despite equality in educational access and in legal requirements for equality of treatment in the workplace, women still take a primary role in household labor and care, while men are doing somewhat more over time, although primarily in respect of child care and the masculine-defined non-routine household tasks such as shopping and home maintenance (Gershuny, 2000; Kan, Sullivan & Gershuny, 2011). With considerable consistency the most important individual-level influences on the performance of household labor and care have been identified as: (1) Absolute and relative market incomes of spouses (in general, the higher the absolute and relative income of one partner, the less housework they do); (2) Educational level (in general, the higher the level of women's education

the less housework they do, while the opposite is true for men. On the other hand there is a strong positive relationship between child care and educational level for both men and women); and (3) Gender ideology/attitudes (although there is a confounding effect with education, on average the greater an individual's belief that men and women should share career and family responsibilities equally, the more equal is their division of domestic labor and care, even when educational level is taken into account).

Because of the overwhelming focus of the early literature in this area on white heterosexual couples, differences in relation to race and sexuality have been far less studied. However, there is by now a growing volume of literature on differences in relation to the performance of various household work and care tasks by race/ethnicity and sexuality. For example, Cabrera, Hofferth, and Chae (2011) found that, after controlling for other variables, African American and Latino fathers had higher levels of engagement in caregiving and physical play activities with their children than White fathers. Likewise, although women in the UK whose ethnic origin was Indian or Pakistani had the highest share of housework when controlling for other factors, and spent significantly more time on housework than white British women, it isn't necessarily white British couples who are most egalitarian: Indian men and men from East Asian countries spent more hours on housework than their white British counterparts (Kan & Laurie, 2016). In relation to sexuality, the general findings seem to show that same-sex couples share child care and housework more equally than heterosexual couples (Goldberg, Smith, & Perry-Jenkins, 2012), and that, within same-sex couples, lesbian couples share more tasks equally (Kurdek, 2007). As Goldberg (2013) notes what is still very rare is research on how these differences have changed over time.

At the institutional level national policy context is highly influential (national contexts in which female empowerment is greater and in which political structures and policies advocate gender equity tend to show more egalitarian allocations of household labor and care).

Below, I describe the main findings of two of the most influential bodies of literature that have addressed the relationship between individual-level influences and the division of household labor/care. The first of these relates to the debate between the relative importance of spousal resources and doing gender in the performance of housework. The second focuses on the relationship between educational level and child care. I then turn to the literature that has addressed the institutional level of national policy contexts.

4.1 Spousal Economic Resources Versus Doing Gender in the Performance of Housework

Over the past two decades a large and influential body of research has investigated the influence of spousal economic resources on the division of household labor and care within heterosexual couples. One aim has been to test the idea of economic bargaining against gender-based explanations. Earlier papers using quantitative methodologies suggested that there was a strong linear dependence between relative earned incomes (the usual measure of relative spousal economic resources) and the division of housework within couples, supporting the suppositions of economic bargaining theory. In general, the higher the earned income of a member of the couple relative to their spouse, the less housework they performed. However, qualitative research conducted in Britain and the USA during the 1980s had already begun to document behaviors among men that would later be identified as gender display. The British studies were conducted among groups of working class couples, with a specific focus on communities where the recent dramatic decline of traditional sources of employment for men (e.g. coal-mining; steel working) meant that large numbers had lost their jobs, losing along with it their normative role of family breadwinner (Morris, 1985). Morris's conclusions indicated that male redundancy did not in general lead to any renegotiation of the

domestic division of labor. Men in this situation, having been deprived through unemployment both of their identity in the public sphere and of their normative position within the domestic sphere, emphasized their normative role at home through not contributing much to the household chores.

At around the same period, Hochschild and Machung (1989) reported similar findings from their qualitative study of 50 dual-earner couples in the US. They found differences in the sharing of housework between couples where the husbands earned less than their wives, none of whom shared the housework, and those where the husbands earned the same as or more than their wives, among whom between one-fifth to one-third shared housework.

Following these earlier qualitative studies, Brines's (1994) paper, and a follow-up by Greenstein (2000), firmly established the 'gender display' thesis in the quantitative literature on the division of household labor. These studies, based on large-scale national data from the USA, provided support for the idea that both men and women in situations which deviated from the traditional norms of gender reacted by emphasizing their normative identities through (1) contributing less to housework (in the case of men who were economically dependent), or, (2) the over-accomplishment of housework (in the case of breadwinner wives). Bittman, England, Folbre, Sayer, and Matheson (2003) termed this particular manifestation of gender display 'gender deviance neutralization'. These findings seemed to underline the importance of gender as a mediator of economic bargaining theory, and provided one possible answer to the question why it appeared that men were failing to "take up the slack" in the routine performance of housework in a period when women were increasingly entering the primary labor force.

Quantitative studies thereafter did not produce a unanimous verdict on the question of gender deviance neutralization. Further support for the effect in the US and Australia appeared in Bittman et al. (2003), but it was not found in Sweden (Evertsson & Neramo, 2004, 2007). Gupta (2007) and Gupta and Ash (2008)

reassessed the basis of the economic dependency and gender deviance neutralization perspectives, arguing that it is crucial to take into account women's absolute incomes, and that previous findings in relation to relative earnings and relative share of housework can be more simply explained in terms of a relationship between women's absolute earnings and their housework hours. They concluded that an alternative model—the *women's autonomy* perspective—fits the evidence better than either the economic dependency or the gender deviance neutralization models. Using a longitudinal approach, Killewald and Gough (2010) also found no relationship between relative earnings and women's housework. They demonstrated a non-linear association between women's absolute earnings and housework, arguing that previous findings suggestive of gender deviance neutralization could be accounted for by the misspecification of analytic models.

Almost all the papers referred to above used earned income (or functions of it) as their primary independent variable. However, as I have argued, this has the effect of reducing the more nuanced concept of marital bargaining derived from Blood and Wolfe's work on marital power to a more simplistic economic formula that ignores other resources and sources of power within households. It has the effect, for example, of assigning a rating of zero bargaining power to all those without an earned income. Some authors have also included measures of relative spousal education and occupational status (e.g. Davis & Greenstein, 2004; Evertsson & Neramo, 2007). With the intention of taking account of a wider range of economically salient resource measures, Sullivan and Gershuny (2016) used panel data to calculate a lifetime measure of human capital from the accumulation of educational achievement, skills, employment and occupation over the life course. This measure of resources allows the inclusion of those who had no current market earnings, and represents more realistically the bargaining power of those who had current earnings below the level that their human capital would indicate (for example, those who have taken on less skilled employment

because of the need to care for children). Using panel data and a fixed effects model, the key finding was that husbands in couples with the most extreme relative human capital distribution in favor of the woman contribute very substantially to housework. Findings support marital bargaining theory, and there is no evidence for gender deviance neutralization. Indeed, since in such couples wives also do much less housework than others, the division of housework time approaches equity.

4.2 Educational Attainment and Child Care

Educational level has been consistently identified as one of the most significant factors affecting the performance of household labor and care (Coltrane, 2000). Although there are conceptual difficulties with the interpretation of educational level as a variable, in the literature its effect has mainly been perceived in terms of differing values and ideologies. These values have been shown to play a significant role in the performance of household labor and care, independent of other socio-economic factors such as class. One of the most important elements that Risman found to facilitate change in the gender structure was an ‘egalitarian philosophy’ among couples (Risman, 2004), and there is on average a greater commitment to egalitarianism expressed by those with higher levels of education. Findings from attitude surveys show that stronger support for various aspects of gender equality are usually distinguishable first among younger and more highly educated groups, before gaining wider acceptance.

For women, the relationship between educational attainment and employment also plays a critical role in the theoretical link between household labor/care and educational level. Both the economic bargaining model (where the higher her level of education, the more advantaged her position in the primary labor market and the greater power she commands in the

household) and the ‘morale’ model (where greater potential and actual earning power is associated with lower levels of satisfaction derived from the performance of household labor) have been influential.

The main findings from the research literature have been, firstly, that the higher a man’s level of educational attainment, the more household labor and care he is likely to contribute, both in absolute terms and relative to his female partner. On the other hand, more highly educated women tend to do *less* housework than women with lower levels of educational attainment, but (like men) they do more child care. Where a women’s educational attainment is higher than that of her male partner the division of domestic labor is likely to be most equal. In a study examining 30-year changes in the division of household labor and child care among dual earner parents in the US and Britain, Sullivan (2010) showed that in both countries men with lower levels of educational attainment increased their contributions to housework over the period 1960s to the 2000s to equal the contribution of college-educated men. This suggests a ‘catching up’ effect among men with lower levels of educational attainment. In the case of men’s child care, however, the education gap in paternal time investment widened over the same period (see also Altintas, 2016; Ramey & Ramey, 2010). For women there was a consistent pattern in which more highly educated women did proportionately less housework over time than their counterparts with lower levels of educational attainment, while the rising trend in child care time was somewhat less differentiated according to education.

Because of the interest in the contributions of parents to their children’s developmental outcomes, the main focus of research in relation to educational level has been the relationship with rising child care investments. Cross-nationally, there have been increases in child care time for both mothers and fathers across countries with different family policies and regulations on childminding (Bianchi, Robinson, & Milkie, 2006; Gershuny, 2000; Robinson & Godbey,

1999; Sayer, Gauthier & Furstenberg, 2004). It has been argued that these increases are in line with changes in the meaning and nature of childcare, involving a growing emphasis on more caring fathering practices and participation in child-related activities, in particular among the more highly educated middle classes. Bianchi et al. (2006) suggest that parents seek ways to maximize time with their children by including children in their own leisure time. The increase in 'recreative' childcare is particularly relevant to more highly educated parents who may seek to expose children to activities and programs designed to prepare them for college or better working opportunities. By investing in such 'developmental' behaviors, more highly educated parents promote processes of capital formation among their children and further reinforce existing differentials in human and cultural capital (Lareau, 2003).

While both women and men show increases in the time they spend in child care, it is those shown by men that have perhaps received the most attention. Father care has been the focus of a huge amount of both academic and popular interest. The past decades have witnessed a clear across-the-board increase in father care time in those industrialized countries for which we have time use data series (e.g. Gauthier, Smeeding, & Furstenberg, 2004; Gershuny, 2000; Sandberg & Hofferth, 2005; Sayer, Bianchi, & Robinson, 2004). However, these overall trends conceal significant heterogeneity according to men's educational level, as I have described. The overwhelming conclusion from this literature is that fathers with higher levels of educational attainment engage in more child care (and, particularly, in developmental and recreative, as opposed to purely physical, child care).

5 Current Configurations and Trends: The Cross-National Policy Context

In this section I turn to the institutional level. A large body of research has been devoted to investigating the effect of differing policy

contexts on household labor and care (for general recent references see Esping-Andersen, 2009; Kamerman & Moss, 2009; O'Brien, 2009; Orloff, 2009). This literature provides significant evidence of the important constraining effects of institutional settings such as employment and welfare policies on individual decisions regarding the allocation of time and family organization, with targeted policies relating to parental leave and flexible working arrangements leading to a more gender-equal division (Treas & Drobnic, 2010). For example, recent comparative research has documented the importance of relevant policies, ideological and institutional structures for: decisions regarding time spent in paid and unpaid work (Hook, 2010; Knudsen & Waerness, 2007; Pettit & Hook, 2005; van der Lippe & van Dijk, 2001); the domestic division of labor (Cooke & Baxter, 2010; Davis & Greenstein, 2004; Fuwa & Cohen, 2007; Geist, 2005); and men's unpaid work and care (Craig & Mullan, 2010; Hook, 2010; Smith & Williams, 2007). Overall, this body of research has clearly supported the idea that institutional settings governing welfare policies and provisions were highly influential in affecting the individual-level factors determining the gender division of housework and care.

But in addition, policy contexts in which female empowerment is greater and in which political structures advocate gender equity tend to favor egalitarian allocations of household labor. Altintas and Sullivan (2017) show, in support of previous research, that fathers of children aged under 5 in Nordic countries, where the state takes an active role in increasing the labor force participation of both men and women according to a dual-earner family model, contributed substantially more overall to household labor and care than those in southern Mediterranean and central European countries, in which policy has been based on a traditional male-breadwinner/female homemaker family model. However, taking longer-term trends into account, while fathers' contributions started at low levels in southern Mediterranean countries, they showed strong increases in core housework time, particularly relative to fathers from

Anglophone countries (Canada, Australia and the USA). This lends some support to the idea of a social diffusion effect over the past few decades, in which less-traditional gender attitudes and behavior have been diffusing more rapidly in more gender-traditional societies (see Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015). Fathers in central European countries, although starting from high levels in the 1960 and 1970s, made the least change over time. They showed very low time investments and only a modest increase in involvement over time. Fathers in Anglophone countries displayed an interesting polarization; relatively few were involved in child care (to the extent of spending an average of 15 min per day in primary child care), but those who were involved were, by the first decade of 21st Century, spending by far the longest time in childcare, and equaling Nordic fathers in core housework time. It appears that there was an increasing polarization over time between those fathers who were involved, and those who weren't. Fathers who were involved seemed to be becoming more involved over time (i.e. spending more time in housework and, particularly, childcare).

6 Convergence or Not?: The Idea of the Stalled Gender Revolution

The analysis of international trends in the division of household labor and care was facilitated in the first decade of the twenty-first century by the further development of cross-time and cross-national series of time use data. High-profile research appearing in the US showed a widespread decrease in women's housework, with some corresponding, although much smaller, increases in men's housework, and a rather larger increase in men's child care time (Bianchi et al., 2006; Sandberg & Hofferth, 2005; Sayer, 2005). Cross-national data showed that the same trends were also evident across Europe, Canada, and Australia (Gauthier et al., 2004). It became clear that a widespread process of stuttering progress towards gender convergence was occurring across many countries—

men's contributions to housework were slowly increasing, while women's were dramatically decreasing, and both mothers and fathers were increasing their child care time.

Despite these general cross-national trends in the direction of greater equality in the division of household labor and care, much attention recently in the United States has focused on whether the gender transformation of paid and unpaid labor in society has hit a wall, or at least stalled. *New York Times* articles by family historian Coontz (2013) and sociologist Cohen (2014), among others, have drawn widespread attention to this stalled view of the US movement toward gender equality. While women have made wide gains in the public sphere of employment over the past half century, on many fronts the progress made in gender equality appeared to slow in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Stalling has been identified in the areas of women's employment, gender segregation of school subjects, attitudes towards gender equality and the division of unpaid labor (e.g. Cotter, Hermsen, & Vanneman, 2011; England, 2010).

Some of the evidence on which the idea for the stalling of the gender revolution has been based relates to time use data from the late 1990s and 2000s in the US and the UK: various trends in the direction of greater gender equality showed a levelling off during this period. However, there are also indications in the wider cross-national picture of a slowing in the trend towards gender convergence in household labor and care. In illustration, Fig. 1 shows international trends in housework time (minutes per day) for women (in green, at the top of the figure) and men (in blue, at the bottom of the figure) from the 1960s through to the 2000s (Altintas & Sullivan, 2016). Two fitted lines are shown: a standard OLS linear regression line, and a LOESS curve based on a weighted regression algorithm not constrained to a linear form.

Figure 1 illustrates the main points: over a 50-year period steep declines in the time that mothers spend in housework has been the major factor in gender convergence. Over the same period father's average housework time has increased, but much less so than the decrease for




Fig. 1 Average minutes in core housework: women and men 1961–2011 (MTUS data) Source Altintas & Sullivan (2016)

women, so that by the end of the first decade of the 21st Century the gender gap in the performance of housework was still significant. There is substantial cross-national variation evident in the trends for women, and much less so for men. This variation among women is interpretable in relation to existing public policy regimes typologies, reflecting differences in gender ideologies and practice (Esping-Andersen, 2009).

For men, there is little difference between the two fitted regression lines. In contrast, for women the LOESS curve (dotted line) dips in the middle of the period, then straightens out somewhat towards the end. This indicates that cross-nationally there was a period of steeper decline in women’s housework time, lasting up to about 1990, followed by a flattening out of the curve. This flattening lends support at the cross-national level to the idea of a stalling in the process of gender convergence, a stalling that is primarily created by a leveling off of women’s

housework time, without much increase for men. Delving deeper, and using multivariate analysis, it was possible to differentiate 2 broad groups of countries in relation to the apparent levelling off in women’s housework time. Those countries where the gender division of housework was more unequal at the start of the period show steep declines in that inequality in the later part of the period. However, trends for those countries where the gender division of housework was more equal at the start of the period tended to be more curvilinear in shape; steeper in the earlier part of the period, and flattening off gradually towards the later part. This slowing in trajectory occurs approximately from the late 1980s. This feature is characteristic of Anglophone countries, and some northern European countries such as Finland and the Netherlands. The slowing in convergence is particularly clear in the case of the USA, where the trend towards gender convergence dipped to its most equal in the late

1990s before increasing again in the direction of greater inequality.¹

For child care at the cross-national level the picture is quite different (not shown), with a rising trend in child care time evident for both mothers and fathers of children aged under 5 (although country variance is greater than in the case of housework). Two contrasting features for mothers and fathers are of specific note. Although the time mothers spend in child care is higher throughout the week than that of fathers, in several countries there is a steeper average increase in the time that fathers spent in child care at weekends than is the case for mothers, particularly during the later part of the period. For mothers, in contrast, there was a greater increase in child care time during weekdays than at weekends. We observe here a form of time-conditioned gender convergence, which seems to be happening more at weekends, rather than during the week.

In summary, there is some evidence for a stall, or levelling off, of the trend towards gender convergence in household labor and care in certain countries where the process of gender convergence is more advanced. To set against this, there is an argument that progress towards gender equality should always be regarded as a long-term, uneven, process, and we should not necessarily expect to see large changes in the space of only a few decades. Huge changes in women's opportunities have occurred over several generations, but at the same time any long-term process of change is subject to set-backs that are the result of historical contingencies (Ridgeway, 2011). It is evident, for example, that currently neither the institutional context surrounding work-place opportunities to combine employment with family responsibilities, nor normative stereotypes of masculinity, have adapted sufficiently to women's long-term

increasing engagement in the labor force—an issue that I address in the concluding section below.

7 Conclusions and Reflections on Future Research

The slow-down in the rate of gender convergence that we have seen supports the idea that there may be limits to which equality in housework can be achieved under particular constraints of social policy, workplace management culture and gender ideology. However, as argued by Bianchi et al. (2012), this slow-down doesn't necessarily imply an absolute ceiling effect. In Nordic countries, where social policy and gender ideology are more conducive to gender equality, it seems that the move in the direction of gender equality continues—although perhaps at a slower pace (e.g. Evertsson, 2014). Moreover, there is evidence for increases in more gender egalitarian attitudes across European and Anglophone countries (e.g. Braun & Scott, 2009; Pampel, 2011); for a shift away from rigid gender specialization toward more flexible, egalitarian partnerships (Schwartz & Han, 2014); and the suggestion of a catch-up effect in the contributions of fathers to domestic work and childcare in the very low-fertility countries of the southern Mediterranean (Sullivan, Billari & Altintas, 2014—see also Geist & Cohen, 2011). From the 'glass half full' perspective it may be argued that despite short-term stalls, slowdowns, and even reverses, as well as important differences in policy contexts, the overall picture is of a continuing move towards greater gender equality in the performance of housework (see also Stanfors & Goldscheider, 2015).

In contrast to the idea of revolution, connoting a rapid and dramatic moment of change, I have argued for a different metaphor; a slow dripping

¹While this recent movement in the US in the direction of greater inequality has been referred to as evidence for a stall in gender convergence, we would note that several sources over the past decade have questioned the results of the US time use data from the 1980s and 1990s—see, for example, Allard et al. (2007), Bianchi et al. (2012), Egerton et al. (2005).

of change, perhaps with consequences that are barely noticeable from year to year, but that in the end is persistent enough to lead to the dissolution of existing structures (Sullivan, 2006). Linking this back to the multilevel theoretical model of change I described above, the argument runs that daily practices and social interactions at the individual level both reflect and are constitutive of institutional level factors (attitudes, public discourse, regulatory systems), which change as a result of processes that stretch over generations. These progressive changes *are* important, but we should not expect too much from them in a short period of time, nor should we be complacent about the future. Only by recognizing what is changing, and why, and how quickly, and by trying to understand the processes that generate change, will we be in a position to promote it.

7.1 How to Promote Progressive Change?

Regardless of whether we feel that the glass is half-empty or half-full in relation to trends in the gendered division of household labor and care it is clear that there remain substantial and persistent obstacles in the project of achieving gender equality. These obstacles exist at different, although interconnecting, levels.

Various institutional processes operate to maintain the existing gender division in household labor and care. The gendered pattern of work schedules has reinforced the traditional division of household labor, particularly for housework which has to be undertaken on a routine basis and does not match well with long workweek schedules. The development of dispersed work-time schedules characteristic of post-industrial economies are also not in general favorable to progressive change in the division of household labor and care, and the growth of the service sector has made atypical work schedules (shift work, long and/or fragmented hours) more common.

It is sometimes argued that the fact that, on average, men and women do roughly similar

amounts of overall work (taking market work and unpaid labor and care together), means that the division of labor is actually gender equal. This may even be perceived as 'fair'. However, the equal-but-different *composition* of work time implies a situation of evident unfairness in terms of economic life chances. Once a couple adopt an even slightly traditionally gendered work distribution (i.e., men doing more paid work, women more household work)—perhaps following the birth of a first child—the woman subsequently accumulates human capital at a slower rate than does the man, increasing the pressure for further gendered specialization. The combination of post-childbirth biology, essentialist gender ideologies, masculinist workplace attitudes, and policy measures designed to enable women, rather than men, to combine employment with caring means that it is still, generally, the woman in a couple who takes time out of the workforce, or goes part-time following the birth of child. This in turn has knock-on effects on the gender wage gap, the disadvantage women experience in respect of their opportunities for career advancement, earnings and, ultimately, their pensions. So the provision of statutory maternity leave, or even parental leave, is not a simple answer to the problem. In a situation where it is overwhelmingly women who take such leave this has knock-on effects on gendered inequality throughout the life course. So what sorts of policies do we need?

In general, literature on the relationship between specific policies and household labor and care has tended to focus on policies aimed at supporting employed parents through the provision of parental leave, and early childhood education and care ('ECEC'). Much research effort has been directed at trying to show an effect of such policies in large-scale and in qualitative data. However, the direct effects of ECEC policies on progressive change in the division of labor may not be as significant as the effect of policies directly aimed at supporting female engagement in the primary labor market. Of equal importance is the promotion of opportunities for men to take a more active role in household labor and care through the provision

of meaningful periods of paternal leave and supportive workplace environments. Investigation of the role and efficacy of these approaches will be important for future studies in this area. A combination of these policy approaches is likely to be most influential—the first aimed at promoting women’s ease of access to the primary labor market, and the second focusing on increasing the time available to fathers to engage in family care.²

In conclusion, among the central things that remain to be challenged in order to continue to progress towards gender equality in the division of household labor and care are the tenets of traditional masculinity in which household labor and care is still regarded as ‘women’s work’, and where workplace culture is still overwhelmingly masculine in orientation (men who want to take time off work to care for children are often regarded, at best, as less serious and insufficiently dedicated to their jobs). It also needs to be recognized that narrowly-focused policy solutions in which it is overwhelmingly women who end up taking sustained periods out of, or in part time, employment in order to care for children will likely hinder the pace of progress. What is badly needed, therefore, is sustained policy commitment to the availability of a balanced work and family life for both women and men.

References

- Allard, M. D., Bianchi, S. M., Stewart, J., & Wight, V. R. (2007). Comparing childcare measures in the ATUS and earlier time-diary studies. *Monthly Lab Rev.*, *130*, 27–36.
- Altintas, E. (2016). The widening education gap in developmental childcare activities in the United States, 1963–2013. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, *78*, 26–42.
- Altintas, E., & Sullivan, O. (2016). Fifty years of change updated: Cross-national gender convergence in housework. *Demographic Research*, *35*, 455–470.
- Altintas, E., & Sullivan, O. (2017). Trends in fathers’ contribution to housework and childcare under different welfare policy regimes’. *Social Politics*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/sp/jxw007>.
- Baxter, J., Hewitt, B., & Western, M. (2005). Post-familial families and the domestic division of labour. *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, *36*, 583–600.
- Becker, G. (1981). *A treatise on the family*. USA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Berk, S. F. (1985). *The gender factory: The apportionment of work in American households*. New York: Plenum.
- Bianchi, S. M., Robinson, J. P., & Milkie, M. A. (2006). *Changing rhythms of American family life*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Bianchi, S. M., Sayer, L. C., Milkie, M. A., & Robinson, J. P. (2012). Housework: Who did, does or will do it, and how much does it matter? *Social Forces*, *91*, 55–63.
- Bittman, M., England, P., Folbre, N., Sayer, L., & Matheson, G. (2003). When does gender trump money? Bargaining and time in household work. *American Journal of Sociology*, *109*, 186–214.
- Blood, R. O., & Wolfe, D. M. (1960). *Husbands and wives: The dynamics of married living*. New York: Free Press.
- Braun, M., & Scott, J. (2009). Changing public views of gender roles in seven nations, 1988–2002. In M. Haller, R. Jowell, & T. W. Smith (Eds.), *The international global survey programme 1984–2009: Charting the globe* (pp. 358–377). Oxford: Routledge.
- Brines, J. (1994). Economic dependency, gender and the division of labor at home. *American Journal of Sociology*, *100*, 652–688.
- Butler, J. (2006). *Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity*. London: Routledge.
- Cabrera, N. J., Hofferth, S. L., & Chae, S. (2011). Patterns and predictors of father-infant engagement across race/ethnic groups. *Early Childhood Research Quarterly*, *26*, 365–375.
- Cohen, P. N. (2014, November 23). How can we jump-start the struggle for gender equality? *New York Times Opinion Pages*.
- Coltrane, S. (2000). Research on household labor: Modeling and measuring the social embeddedness of routine family work. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, *62*, 1208–1233.
- Connell, R. W. (2000). *The men and the boys*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
- Cooke, L. P., & Baxter, J. (2010). Families in international context: Comparing institutional effects across Western societies. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, *75*, 516–536.
- Coontz, S. (2013, February 16). Why gender equality stalled. *New York Times Sunday Review*.
- Cotter, D., Hermsen, J. M., & Vanneman, R. (2011). The end of the gender revolution? Gender role attitudes from 1977 to 2008. *American Journal of Sociology*, *117*, 259–289.

²This interpretation makes the assumption that there is an underlying demand for such involvement, and the fact that by 2014 25% of all parental leave in Sweden was taken by fathers goes some way to support this (Swedish Institute, 2016: <https://sweden.se/society/sweden-gender-equality/>).

- Craig, L., & Mullan, K. (2010). Parenthood, gender and work-family in the United States, Australia, Italy, France and Denmark. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 72, 1344–1361.
- Davis, S. N., & Greenstein, T. N. (2004). Cross-national variations in the division of household labor. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 66(5), 1260–1271.
- Davis, S. N., & Greenstein, T. N. (2013). Why study housework? Cleaning as a window into power in couples. *Journal of Family Theory & Review*, 5, 63–71.
- Egerton, M., Fisher K., & Gershuny, J. (2005). *American time use 1965–2003: The construction of a historical comparative file and consideration of its usefulness in the construction of extended national accounts for the USA*. Institute for Social and Economic Research Working Paper 2005–28.
- England, P. (2010). The gender revolution: Uneven and stalled. *Gender and Society*, 24, 149–166.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1999). *The three worlds of welfare capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (2009). *The incomplete revolution*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Esping-Andersen, G., & Billari, F. C. (2015). Re-theorizing family demographics. *Population and Development Review*, 41, 1–31.
- Evertsson, M. (2014). Gender ideology and the sharing of housework and child care in Sweden. *Journal of Family Issues*, 35, 927–949.
- Evertsson, M., & Neramo, M. (2004). Dependence within families and the division of labor: Comparing Sweden and the United States. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 66, 1272–1286.
- Evertsson, M., & Neramo, M. (2007). Changing resources and the division of housework: A longitudinal study of Swedish couples. *European Sociological Review*, 23, 455–470.
- Fuwa, M., & Cohen, P. N. (2007). Housework and social policy. *Social Science Research*, 36, 512–530.
- Gauthier, A. H., Smeeding, T. M., & Furstenberg, F. F., Jr. (2004). Are parents investing less time in children? Trends in selected industrialized countries. *Population and Development Review*, 30(4), 647–672.
- Geist, C. (2005). The welfare state and the home: Regime differences in the domestic division of labour. *European Sociological Review*, 21, 23–41.
- Geist, C., & Cohen, P. N. (2011). Headed towards equality? Housework change in comparative perspective. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 73, 832–844.
- Gershuny, J. (2000). *Changing times: Work and leisure in postindustrial society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gershuny, J., Bittman, M., & Brice, J. (2005). Exit, voice, and suffering: Do couples adapt to changing employment patterns? *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 67, 656–665.
- Gershuny, J. & Sullivan, O. (2014). All the housework of all the household. *Review of Economics of the Household*, 12, 7–27.
- Goldberg, A. E. (2013). “Doing” and “undoing” gender: The meaning and division of housework in same-sex couples. *Journal of Family Theory and Research*, 5, 85–104.
- Goldberg, A. E., Smith, J. Z., & Perry-Jenkins, M. (2012). The division of labor in lesbian, gay, and heterosexual new adoptive parents. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 74, 812–828.
- Greenstein, T. N. (2000). Economic dependence, gender, and the division of labor in the home: A replication and extension. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 62, 322–335.
- Gupta, S. (2007). Autonomy, dependence or display? The relationship between married women’s earnings and housework. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 69, 399–417.
- Gupta, S., & Ash, M. (2008). Whose money, whose time? A nonparametric approach to modeling time spent on housework in the United States. *Feminist Economics*, 14, 93–120.
- Hochschild, A. R., & Machung, A. (1989). *The second shift: Working parents and the revolution at home*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hook, J. L. (2010). Gender inequality in the welfare state: Sex segregation in housework, 1965–2003. *American Journal of Sociology*, 115, 1480–1523.
- Kammerman, S. B., & Moss, P. (Eds.). (2009). *The politics of parental leave policies: Children, parenting, gender and the labor market*. Bristol: Polity Press.
- Kan, M. Y., & Laurie, H. (2016). Who is doing the housework in multicultural Britain? *Sociology*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038516674674>.
- Kan, M. Y., Sullivan, O., & Gershuny, J. (2011). Gender convergence in domestic work: Discerning the effect of interactional and institutional barriers from large-scale data. *Sociology*, 45, 234–251.
- Killewald, A., & Gough, M. (2010). Money isn’t everything: Wives’ earnings and housework time. *Social Science Research*, 39, 987–1003.
- Knudsen, K., & Waerness, K. (2007). National context and spouses’ housework in 34 countries. *European Sociological Review*, 24, 97–113.
- Kurdek, L. A. (2007). The allocation of household labor by partners in gay and lesbian couples. *Journal of Family Issues*, 28, 132–148.
- Lachance-Grzela, M., & Bouchard, G. (2010). Why do women do the lion’s share of housework: A decade of research. *Sex Roles*, 63, 767–780.
- Lamb, M. E. (Ed.). (2010). *The role of the father in child development*. New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons.
- Lareau, A. (2003). *Unequal childhoods: Class, race, and family life*. London: University of California Press.
- Marx Ferree, M. (1990). Beyond separate spheres: Feminism and family research. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 52, 866–884.
- Morris, L. (1985). Renegotiation of the domestic division of labour in the context of redundancy. In B. Roberts et al. (Eds.), *New approaches to economic life*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

- Oakley, A. (1974). *The sociology of housework*. London: Martin Robinson.
- O'Brien, M. (2009). Fathers, parental leave policies, and infant quality of life: International perspectives and policy impact. *AAAPSS*, 624, 190–213.
- Orloff, A. S. (2009). Gendering the comparative analysis of welfare states: An unfinished agenda. *Sociological Theory*, 27, 317–343.
- Pampel, F. (2011). Cohort change, diffusion, and support for gender egalitarianism in cross-national perspective. *Demographic Research*, 21, 667–694.
- Pettit, B., & Hook, J. (2005). The structure of women's employment in comparative perspective. *Social Forces*, 84, 779–800.
- Ramey, G., & Ramey, V. A. (2010). The rug rat race. *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, Spring, 129–199.
- Ridgeway, C. L. (2011). *Framed by gender: How gender inequality persists in the modern world*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Risman, B. (1998). *Gender vertigo*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Risman, B. (2004). Gender as social structure: Theory wrestling with activism. *Gender and Society*, 18, 429–450.
- Robinson, J. P., & Godbey, G. (1999) *Time for life: The surprising ways that Americans spend their time* (2nd ed.). Philadelphia: Penn State University Press.
- Sandberg, J. F., & Hofferth, S. L. (2005). Changes in children's time with parents: A correction. *Demography*, 42, 391–395.
- Sayer, L. C. (2005). Gender time and inequality: Trends in women's and men's paid work, unpaid work and free time. *Social Forces*, 48, 285–303.
- Sayer, L. C., Bianchi, S. M., & Robinson, J. P. (2004). Are parents investing less in children? Trends in mothers' and fathers' time with children. *American Journal of Sociology*, 110, 1–43.
- Sayer, L. C., Gauthier, A. H., & Furstenberg, F. (2004). Educational differences in parents' time with children: Cross-national variations. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 66, 1152–1169.
- Schwartz, C. R., & Han, H. (2014). The reversal of the gender gap in education and trends in marital dissolution. *American Journal of Sociology*, 79(4), 605–629.
- Smith, A. J., & Williams, D. R. (2007). Father-friendly legislation and paternal time across Western Europe. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis*, 9, 175–192.
- South, S. J., & Spitze, G. (1994). Housework in marital and nonmarital households. *American Sociological Review*, 59, 327–347.
- Stanfors, M., & Goldscheider, F. (2015). *The forest and the trees: Industrialization, demographic change, and the ongoing gender revolution in Sweden and the United States, 1870–2010*. Stockholm Research Reports in Demography 18. Stockholm: University of Stockholm.
- Suh, J., & Folbre, N. (2016). Valuing unpaid child care in the US: A prototype satellite account using the American Time Use Survey. *Review of Income and Wealth*, 62, 668–684.
- Sullivan, O. (2006). *Changing gender relations, changing families: Tracing the pace of change*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Sullivan, O. (2010). Changing differences by educational attainment in fathers' domestic labour and child care. *Sociology*, 44, 716–733.
- Sullivan, O., Billari, F. C., & Altintas, E. (2014). Father's changing contributions to child care and domestic work in very low fertility countries: The effect of education. *Journal of Family Issues*, 35, 1048–1065.
- Sullivan, O., & Gershuny, J. (2016). Relative human capital and the performance of housework within couples: A longitudinal perspective. *European Sociological Review*, 32, 864–880.
- Sullivan, O., Gershuny, J., & Robinson, J. P. (2018). The gender revolution in paid and unpaid work: Continuing or stalled? *Journal of Family Theory and Review*, 10, 263–279.
- Treas, J., & Drobnic, S. (2010). *Dividing the domestic: Men, women, & household work in cross-national perspective*. Palo Alto, PA: Stanford University Press.
- Van der Lippe, T., & Van Dijk, L. (Eds.). (2001). *Women's employment in a comparative perspective*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- West, C., & Zimmerman, D. H. (1987). Doing gender. *Gender and Society*, 1, 125–151.

Oriel Sullivan is Professor of Sociology of Gender in the Department of Sociology, Oxford University, and Co-Director of the ESRC-funded Centre for Time Use Research, home of the Multinational Time Use Study. Her research focuses on the comparative analysis of changing gender relations and inequalities, including the investigation of cross-national trends in housework and child care time. She has published widely in this area and is author of *Changing Gender Relations, Changing Families: Tracing the Pace of Change* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), a theoretical and empirical investigation of the (stuttering) trend towards increasing gender equality in the domestic sphere.

Emily W. Kane

Abstract

This chapter explores the sociological literature on the many ways in which parenting is both gendered and gendering. That exploration attends to the intersections of gender with other dimensions of inequality and the interconnections among gendered and gendering patterns at the individual, interactional, and institutional levels. Specific topics include definitions of parenthood, paths into parenthood, parenting labor, links between parenting and paid employment, social policy, and parenting as it shapes and is shaped by children's gender. Along with a review of key themes and patterns in the literature related to these specific topics, the chapter offers a discussion and suggestions for future directions. The literature has become more attentive, over time, to intersectionality, queer and trans issues, men and masculinities, and challenges to the gender binary. Future work should continue to deepen these more recent directions, and continue to emphasize power as a central organizing element of intersecting structures of inequality. Ongoing consideration of neoliberalism as a context in which

family and household patterns are constructed is also suggested, as is a commitment to feminist public engagement and social change.

1 Introduction

Parenting, in its many forms, is deeply gendered as a set of culturally-informed practices and deeply gendering in its impact on parents, children and societies. Gendered and gendering patterns are evident at all three interconnected levels of the gender structure identified by Risman (2004), from individual gendered selves to interactional processes to institutional domains. The literature documents a wide range of such patterns, with explicit recognition of their intersections with other structures of inequality. In this chapter, I review and synthesize both foundational arguments and more recent literature, summarizing the state of theory and research on parenting and gender in the United States. I highlight what sociologists of gender have concluded about the topic and sketch directions for future work. Many concepts and patterns that figure centrally in the literature on parenting and gender are addressed more fully in other chapters of this handbook. Of particular note is research on carework, gender in the paid labor force, the division of household labor, gender and the welfare state, domestic violence, family

E. W. Kane (✉)
Bates College, Lewiston, ME, USA
e-mail: ekane@bates.edu

formation patterns, gender socialization of children in families, and interactions between non-normatively gendered youth and their parents. I address these topics briefly given their relevance to parenting and gender, with more detailed considerations available elsewhere in this handbook.

As many scholars have noted, and Coontz (1992) conveyed to a broad audience in her now-classic book The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia Trap, family structures are institutionally shaped and inextricably connected with other social structures, and families have always taken a wide variety of shapes and textures across times and places. Gender is critical as a structure shaping the social institution of family, as influential sociological studies like Berk's (1985) The Gender Factory, Hochschild's (1989) The Second Shift, and Stacey's (1990) Brave New Families established decades ago. More recent work continues to document how inequalities of gender, race, class, sexuality, and disability are reciprocally connected to family structures and family patterns, and throughout this chapter I consider those connections in terms of parenting in particular. Along with attention to mothers and mothering within a heterosexual nuclear household context, the sociological literature on gender and parenting recognizes a much broader array of experiences. Hill Collins (2000) traces a multitude of community-based mothering practices in Black Feminist Thought, while Hansen's (2004) Not-So-Nuclear Families documents the class-differentiated extended care networks rendered invisible by excessive focus on the household level. The gendered and gendering separation of fatherhood from motherhood has been explored extensively in books ranging from Coltrane's (1996) Family Man and Risman's (1998) Gender Vertigo in the 1990s to Edin and Nelson's (2013) Doing the Best I Can, with its focus on fathers in low-income communities, and Kaufman's (2013) Superdads, with its analysis of how fathers from a range of social locations navigate the tensions of work and parenting. The intersectionally gendered and gendering

experiences of queer families are the focus of books like Sullivan's (2004) The Family of Woman and Moore's (2011) Invisible Families, while the importance of transnational parenthood is revealed in works like Parreñas' (2002) Servants of Globalization and Hondagneu-Sotelo's (2001) Domestica.

With attention to all three levels of gender structure and an explicitly intersectional analysis, the sociological literature has established that parenting is shaped by, and simultaneously constructs and refines, gender, race, class, sexuality and nation-based inequalities. From the works noted above, to many other specific contexts, sociologists of gender have documented a range of key patterns. Enos (2001) details the way motherhood is constructed and constrained for incarcerated women, while Natalier and Hewitt (2014) reveal how heterosexual parents construct gender during child support negotiations. Pfeffer's (2012) work explores resistance to dominant constructions of family among transgender parents, and Brush (2011) provides detailed evidence of the role of domestic violence and public policy in constraining low-income mothers. Reich (2014) develops the concept of neoliberal mothering and the way it allows upper-middle class women to reproduce class privilege, while Messner (2009) provides a nuanced account of gendered parenting practices within youth sports programs that reinforce a range of intersecting inequalities. Randles (2013) highlights the very particular social construction of fatherhood imposed by neoliberal public assistance policy for families living in poverty, and Ryan and Berkowitz (2009) document the complex interactions through which gay and lesbian parents seek social recognition. Blum (2015) addresses how neoliberalism shapes the intersectionally gendered constraints faced by mothers parenting children with what she calls "invisible disabilities" like ADHD and autism-spectrum disorders. All of these specific examples in the literature, and many more, have generated fruitful concepts, conclusions and debates, a synthesis of which is the main focus of this chapter. At the end of the chapter, I also offer

some analysis of the state of the field, and consider some of the most promising directions for continued work.

2 Key Topics, Patterns and Concepts in the Literature

2.1 Defining Parenthood and Paths into Parenthood

Hays (1996, 4) offers a nuanced account of the cultural celebration of what she conceptualizes as intensive mothering, an ideology that claims “correct child-rearing requires not only large amounts of money but also professional-level skills and copious amounts of physical, moral, mental, and emotional energy on the part of the individual mother.” This model reveals the deeply gendered, classed and household-level construction of “good” parenting. It defines such parenting as the responsibility of individual women using household-level resources, a privatized endeavor in which individual mothers pass on class privilege to their children while limiting their own capacity to participate fully in the paid labor force. The hegemony of this model obscures many other ideologies and practices of parenting. Collins (2000) differentiates blood-mothers, othermothers and community othermothers as taking on the collective responsibility of raising children in African-American communities. Hondagneu-Sotelo (2001) casts light on the parenting work of transnational mothers, employed in the United States and sending financial support back to children in Latin America. Hoang and Yeoh (2011) explore similar processes for Vietnamese transnational parents, with particular focus on the impact of transnational motherhood on “left behind” fathers. Shows and Gerstel (2009) document the class-differentiated parenting practices of fathers who are physicians versus emergency medical technicians, arguing that the former group leverages its class privilege to reproduce gendered patterns that limit involvement with their children while the latter group reshapes traditionally gendered parenting practices. Haney

(2010) explores the struggles of incarcerated mothers in community-based prisons that house them together with their children, as the carceral state controls their parenting in complex and highly problematic ways. And Edin and Nelson (2013) establish the daily commitments of time, energy and resources that non-residential fathers in low-income communities often devote to their children, in stark contrast to rhetoric about “deadbeat dads.”

While the realities of parenting play out in a wide variety of ways, shaped by and further shaping social inequalities, the hegemony of the intensive mothering model becomes the standard against which other approaches are judged, reinforcing the legitimacy of inequitable outcomes for children and families. As Elliott, Powell and Brenton (2015, 367) report in their analysis of interviews with low-income women of color raising children, many judge themselves against the standards of intensive mothering, even as they struggle to navigate structural conditions that make it impossible to execute that kind of parenting.

The ideology of intensive mothering reflects a version of privatized mothering that is not conducive with the constraints placed on low-income, Black single mothers, and instead increases their burdens, stresses, and hardships even while providing a convenient explanation for these very difficulties: mothers are to blame. This convenient fiction in turn supports and justifies the huge disparities in life opportunities among American families today as social safety nets continue to erode.

Related and overlapping patterns are evident in Frederick’s (2017) analysis of interviews and focus groups with mothers with disabilities, especially in relation to how those women are labelled by others. “Nonnormative mothers, including women of color, poor mothers, queer mothers, and women with disabilities come under particular scrutiny, as they are systematically defined as “risky” mothers who are inadequate for the task of ideal mothering” (Frederick, 2017, 75).

Paths into parenthood are socially complex as well, and sociologists of gender have outlined a variety of constraints shaping those paths.

Though the legalization of same-sex marriage in the United States extends one pathway to second-parent recognition for queer partners, queer and transgender individuals continue to face many obstacles in establishing parenthood (Bernstein, 2015), especially if they prefer not to participate in the institution of marriage (Pfeffer, 2012). Structural changes in the economy and family formation have also complicated paths into parenthood. In a large-scale survey and interview study, Gerson (2010, 12) argues that young adults in the United States have new hopes and expectations for parenting, but, as she puts it, “changing lives are colliding with resistant institutions”:

While institutional shifts such as the erosion of single-earner paychecks, the fragility of modern marriage, and the expanding options and pressures for women to work have made gender flexibility both desirable and necessary, demanding workplaces and privatized child rearing make work-family integration and egalitarian commitment difficult to achieve.

Bass (2015, 362) finds that among heterosexually-coupled young adults, women are “disproportionately likely to think and worry about future parenthood in their imagined work paths.” Even before becoming parents, these women are more likely than their male partners to shape their work aspirations around the anticipated constraints Gerson (2010) points out, in a manner that directs them toward less financially secure occupations and greater dependence on a man’s income.

For those whose transition into parenthood takes place in the context of a heterosexually-partnered household, the literature has long indicated that the transition tends to reinforce gender inequalities within the household and beyond (Sanchez & Thomson, 1997; Moen & Roehling, 2005; Singley & Hynes, 2005; Fox, 2009; Yavorsky, Kamp Dush, & Schoppe-Sullivan, 2015). At the same time, parenting in the United States is increasingly likely to be taken on by single mothers, with or without a non-residential co-parent involved (McLanahan & Percheski, 2008). The increasing share of parenting that takes place in single-parent

households headed by mothers is evident across racial and class categories, but the paths into this gendered trend vary especially by class. Hertz (2008) reports on the intentional decisions of single middle and upper-middle class professional mothers, forging new approaches to motherhood that draw on their class resources to parent on their own. In a comprehensive study of low-income women’s experiences with parenting and partnership, the pattern Edin and Kefalas (2011) uncover often involves an unexpected pregnancy, followed by a thoughtful decision to embrace motherhood but postpone partnership until they believe economic conditions give them a reasonable chance for a lasting and stable marriage.¹

2.2 Parenting Labor

After the transition into parenthood, there are clear divisions by gender in the ongoing labor of parenting. The contours of these divisions are one of the most frequent topics in the sociological literature on gender and parenting. Now a classic, Hochschild’s (1989) *The Second Shift* offered an engaging look at the significant additional parenting and other domestic labor women took on in dual-earner heterosexual households with children. Hochschild popularized recognition of what she called a leisure gap, in the form of the extra month a year of 24-h days these mothers put into employment and household work relative to their male partners. Ten years later, in another influential work, Risman (1998) set out to profile heterosexual couples who more equitably shared that labor. But as she notes early on in *Gender Vertigo*, such couples were harder to find than she expected. Even among couples who considered themselves relatively egalitarian, she rarely found equal division of parenting labor. She explores that pattern to develop a

¹Another relevant pattern in the intersectional inequalities that define paths to parenthood is evident in the literature on infertility, which Bell (2009) argues has long ignored low-income women’s limited access to infertility treatment and the inequitable burden such women face from environmental and occupational hazards that compromise fertility.

theory of the way gendered structures of inequality are reproduced not so much at the level of gender-socialized individual preferences, but through significant interconnected pressures at the interactional and institutional levels. Though she considers the division of labor across a range of families, her particular foci in the book include single fathers and the heterosexual couples who come closest to equity. She uses their experiences to document that gendered inequalities in the family can be reshaped if institutional and interactional circumstances support or compel it.

More recent work documents the reduction of leisure gaps between dual-earner heterosexual parents, but overall those gaps continue to favor fathers (Bianchi, Robinson, & Milkie, 2007; Coontz, 2015). As Craig and Mullan (2013, 1359) note in a comparative analysis of five nations, “parenthood was associated with more total work and a deeper gender division of labor in all of the countries studied,” and especially so in the United States and Australia due to “gender neutral opportunity in the public sphere but little public institutional support to balance work and family.” Parenting labor is gender-differentiated not only in minutes and hours, but in type and accompanying stress levels. For example, Offer and Schneider (2011) document that men in middle-class dual-earner heterosexual households with children spend less time multitasking than their female partners, and that multitasking creates more stress for mothers than fathers in these households. Given both the tasks and everyday accountability demands mothers often face from intensive mothering ideologies (Hays, 1996; MacDonald, 2010; Walzer, 1998), they may feel “particularly stressed when multitasking at home and in public because, being highly visible in their proximate surroundings, their ability to fulfill their roles as good mothers can be easily judged and criticized” (Offer & Schneider, 2011, 829).

Race, class, sexuality, disability, and partnership status are all critical to consider in painting a fuller picture of gender and parenting labor. Some have argued, for example, that intensive mothering labor is often a gendered approach to

reproducing class privilege. Reich (2014) documents the way class-privileged mothers articulate vaccine refusal in a manner that advantages their children while reducing the safety and security of children with fewer economic resources. Sayer (2015) summarizes her extensive time-diary research by noting that “Child care remains a highly gendered activity” but also that child care norms among middle and upper-middle class parents are “influential mechanisms of class reproduction.” Scott (2010) documents the extensive additional burden mothers face in relation to the carework associated with raising children with disabilities, highlighting some of the same neoliberal constraints that Blum (2015) considers in her work on mothers of children with “invisible” disabilities.

And white, upper-middle class mothers can often exploit racial, class and nation-based inequalities to buy their way out of some of this gendered parenting labor gap, by hiring women of color and immigrant women to take on that work at low wages. In *Global Woman*, Ehrenreich and Hochschild (2002) describe the ways “The lifestyles of the First World are made possible by the global transfer of the services associated with a wife’s traditional role—childcare, homemaking, and sex—from poor countries to rich ones” (4). Hondagneu-Sotelo (2001, 25) reveals the complex costs of these arrangements in her interview study with Latina immigrant domestic workers engaged in transnational motherhood: “women raised in another nation are using their own adult capacities to fulfill the reproductive work of more privileged American women, subsidizing the careers and social opportunities of their employers ... (while) denied sufficient resources to live with and raise their own children.” In another study that included both immigrant and non-immigrant in-home childcare workers, MacDonald (2010, 203) emphasizes the conflicts that arise as class-privileged mothers in heterosexual partnerships expect lower-income women to execute the kind of intensive mothering to which they feel accountable: “How the highly gendered work of mothering is enacted in class-based ways generates most of the conflict in these relationships.”

Same-sex partners also navigate complex divisions of parenting labor that carry gendered dimensions. In an interview study of primarily white, middle and upper-middle class lesbian co-parents in the San Francisco Bay area who had conceived through donor insemination, Sullivan (2004) finds that most of her participants divide parenting labor at least somewhat equally. But she also includes attention to the gendered implications for the small number of couples who followed what she calls a “Rozzie and Harriett” pattern of one partner as breadwinner and the other as full-time parent. She also offers a nuanced exploration of the everyday emotion work that the non-biological comothers must take on as they seek to establish themselves as socially-recognized mothers. Moore’s (2011, 178) study of a socioeconomically varied group of Black lesbian coparents in New York City fleshes out the compelling argument that “even in same-sex unions, gender profoundly influences the construction of family life,” because intersectionally-specific gendered social expectations and gendered structures shape participation in everyday interactions as well as institutional settings. From the interactional responses they face in relation to their varying individual gender presentation to gendered institutional constraints shaped by labor market structures, expectations from institutions like their children’s schools, and the feminization of poverty, these lesbian co-parents’ lives are best understood through an intersectional framework that acknowledges gender as a “profound influence.” The same argument is supported by analyses of single mothers, whose experiences are structured by gendered wage gaps, gender segregated carework expectations, the privatization of families, and a host of other gendered constraints (see, for example, McLanahan & Percheski, 2008; Edin & Kefalas, 2011). These scholars and others remind us that gendered structures shape parenting across a wide range of contexts, not only when a comparison of men and women within a household is the focus of the analysis.

2.3 Parenting Labor as Linked to Paid Employment

Closely linked to these gendered variations in parenting labor are gendered and gendering patterns in paid labor. Though addressed more fully in other chapters, a few key patterns are important. The integration of parenting and paid employment is contingent on a set of gendered inequalities that especially burden women also disadvantaged by intersecting inequalities of race, class and citizenship status. These include the wage gap that disadvantages women workers (Hegewisch & DuMonthier, 2016) and the interconnected wage gap that disadvantages those involved in paid carework occupations (England, Budig, & Folbre, 2002). Also relevant are the difficulties mothers face in combining the social expectations of motherhood with the supposedly “gender neutral” demands of the labor force (Hochschild, 1989; Hays, 1996; Moen & Roehling, 2005), as well as the punitive way U.S. social policy treats low-income mothers (Hays, 2004; Collins & Mayer, 2010), undocumented immigrant mothers (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2001), and mothers of children with disabilities (Baker & Drapela, 2010; Scott, 2010).

One concept some scholars have used to capture the economic element of these burdens is the “motherhood penalty.” Budig and England (2001, 204) document a significant “wage penalty for motherhood,” concluding that “While the benefits of mothering diffuse widely—to the employers, neighbors, friends, spouses, and children of the adults who received the mothering—the costs of child rearing are borne disproportionately by mothers.” Focusing on the earnings of white mothers across the income spectrum, Budig and Hodges (2010) find that this penalty is greatest for lower-income women. Glauber (2007) analyzes data for mothers across racial groups, documenting greater motherhood penalties for white women. And Correll, Benard and Paik (2007) use experimental data to document that the motherhood penalty others have studied in relation to earnings is also evident in

hiring decisions, with parenthood either insignificant or positively associated with the likelihood of hiring any given male applicant but negatively associated for female applicants. Along with these variations on a motherhood penalty in income and hiring, parents and especially mothers in the labor force face great difficulty meeting the expectations of increasingly inflexible employers who offer shifting and unstable hours, limited sick leave and family leave that is rarely paid, and who expect some employees to stay connected well beyond the normal workday through technology (Moen & Roehling, 2005). Some class-privileged professional mothers are pushed out of the labor force by these demands, as documented by Stone (2008) in her critique of the flawed assumption these women are “opting out.” Others, as previously noted, attempt to resolve those competing demands by outsourcing the gendered labor of mothering to low-income women. In *For the Family: How Class and Gender Shape Women’s Work*, Damaske (2011) argues that middle and upper-middle class women are more often able to use class resources to maintain steady employment in spite of the demands of family life, while working class women are more often forced to pull back or interrupt their employment as they juggle gendered carework expectations in their families. Scholars have convincingly documented the lifetime earnings cost mothers face for taking on this work (Budig & England, 2001), a gendered cost of parenting that is important to acknowledge. But it is also important to acknowledge the many structures that shape the meaning of women’s parenting labor. As Hill Collins (2000, 46) notes, for example, in some cases “Black women see the unpaid work they do for their families more as a form of resistance to (racial) oppression than as a form of exploitation by men.”

2.4 Gender, Parenting, and Social Policy

Social policy is referenced in many of the patterns within the literature that I have already

noted. But given its crucial role as an institutional-level force shaping gender and parenting, some brief separate consideration of the topic is warranted. Comparative scholars have noted limitations to paid parental leave and publicly-subsidized child care as factors producing gendered inequalities in both employment and parenting labor across nations, and the absence of such paid leave in the United States is particularly striking in comparative perspective (see, for example, Orloff, 2009; Ray, Gornick, & Schmitt, 2010). Along with these examples of the institutional-level construction of gendered constraints on parenting, at the interactional and individual-level scholars have also addressed how gendered expectations and gendered selves impact “uptake” of available policies in ways that can reproduce gender inequalities in parenting (e.g., Rudman & Mescher, 2013). Though women’s greater likelihood of taking parental leaves disadvantages them in the labor force and reinforces their responsibility for the second shift of parental labor, the potential of policy to loosen these gendered constraints is also evident in scholarship documenting that fathers who take parental leaves “come to think about and enact parenting in ways that are more similar to mothers” (Rehel, 2014, 110).

Parental leaves and subsidized child care are common topics of consideration for feminist scholars of social policy, as are a variety of other policy arenas. From broad policy trends that have increasingly privatized families at the household level, considered by Cooper (2014) in her recent book *Cut Adrift*, to more specific policy domains like child welfare policy (Reich, 2005), criminal justice policy for incarcerated mothers (Enos, 2001), policy around queer families (Bernstein, 2015), child support policy (Natalier & Hewitt, 2014), and health and social services policy (Blum, 2015), feminist critics have documented the many ways family policy can disrupt but often reinforces gendered divisions and intersecting inequalities at the institutional level and also at the interactional level and in the shaping of gendered selves. Randles (2013, 864), for example, reveals the way U.S. welfare policy “promotes a highly gendered conception of

paternal caregiving” for low-income fathers participating in federally-funded fatherhood programs, while Pfeffer (2012) analyzes the complex patterns of “normative resistance” and “inventive pragmatism” transgender families employ as they interact with legal and policy constraints.

Public assistance for low-income families has been a particularly frequent target for feminist sociologists critical of the way neoliberal policy reinscribes gendered expectations for parenting in a manner especially harsh for mothers living in poverty. Through punitive work requirements and marriage promotion programs, Hays (2004, 30–31) argues, policymakers “treat the work of raising children, the issues of wages and working conditions, and the problems of gender and race inequality as ‘private’ concerns, appropriately negotiated by individuals in isolation. Our nation’s leaders... simultaneously condemn the ‘dependence’ of poor women and children on the state and celebrate their dependence on miserly employers and men.” Collins and Mayer (2010) refer to the work requirements central to Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) as “tying both hands” for low-income mothers, forcing them into an exploitative labor market without protections as workers and without adequate social provision for the carework they would otherwise provide at home. Brush’s (2011, 16) analysis of the intersection of neoliberal welfare policy and domestic violence policy also highlights privatization, and the way it can make low-income mothers especially vulnerable: “Privatization shifted the burden of arrangements for child care, transportation, housing, and job training to the market or family members instead of the welfare state. As a consequence, some women find themselves relying on men who have abused them or their children in the past for practical help in meeting those requirements.”

2.5 Children’s Gender and Gendering Children

Two related parenting topics that sociologists of gender have considered in detail are how parents

are influenced by their children’s gender and the role parents play in gendering children. Other chapters cover these topics more fully, but their direct relevance to parenting and gender makes them worth addressing here briefly. As I note in a summary of existing scholarship, “A body of literature that includes primarily large quantitative studies but also some qualitative studies documents a general tendency toward preferring sons, especially for fathers and especially in less developed areas of the world” (Kane, 2014). Once children enter a family, a comprehensive review of the literature by Raley and Bianchi (2006) concludes that children’s gender shapes some aspects of parenting in the United States, with parents of sons somewhat more likely to marry and stay married, and fathers somewhat more likely to engage actively with sons than with daughters. Where such variations arise, they are an important reminder that parenting is gendered not only in the expectations surrounding mothers versus fathers, but also in the way those expectations may play out differently as gendered parents interact with sons and daughters. Though definitive statistics are difficult to calculate due to complexities of definition, reporting and interpretation, parental abuse of children also seems to vary by gender of child and parent in the United States: sons are more likely to experience physical abuse and daughters more likely to experience sexual abuse, and fathers are more likely to perpetrate physical and sexual abuse while mothers are more likely to perpetrate emotional abuse and neglect (Coltrane & Adams, 2008, 275–277).

The role parents play is constructing children’s gender has also received considerable attention from sociologists of gender. In my book *The Gender Trap* (Kane, 2012), I draw on gender structure theory and interviews with parents of preschool-aged children from a broad range of backgrounds, to explore the way institutional, interactional and individual level processes constrain parents. I find that those constraints often lead parents to reproduce the gender binary, heteronormativity, traditionally gendered childhoods, and gender and other intersecting inequalities, even when they are trying to open a

broader range of possibilities for their children. But I also consider a smaller group of parents who are explicitly and intentionally working to resist gendered childhoods, who in my study were often parents located within at least one subordinated position within the intersecting matrices of gender, race, class and sexuality-based inequalities. Given that other chapters of this handbook address gender socialization within the family and how parents respond to gender non-conforming children in detail, I will not offer additional coverage of the extensive literature on these topics here.

3 Discussion and Future Directions

As the literature presented in this chapter indicates, sociologists of gender have documented that parenting is both deeply gendered and deeply gendering. And they have documented this while attentive to intersecting inequalities and to all three levels of the gender structure identified by Risman (2004). From our definitions of parenthood and parenting to the way the labor of parental carework is executed and its connections to paid employment in the labor market to social policy and children's gender, parenting is shaped by gendered selves, gendered interactions and gendered institutions. At the same time, parenting acts as a gendering force that reinforces, shapes and potentially disrupts the gender structure in ways that can only be understood accurately through an intersectional lens.

The literature reviewed here has been influenced by trends in the broader fields of the sociology of gender and interdisciplinary gender studies: increasingly consistent recognition of intersectionality, queer and transgender issues, transnational approaches, men and masculinity, and critical interrogation of the gender binary. From a literature once more often anchored in topics like the division of childcare among heterosexual couples and the impact of single motherhood, a much wider range of experiences, theoretical perspectives and approaches have joined these topics in constituting the overall body of sociological research on gender and parenting. Moving beyond a

household-based definition of parenting, moving beyond a focus on women and then further beyond a binary approach to gender, and theorizing intersectionally and without heteronormative assumptions, are all movements that expand the literature. These are important expansions that advance our understanding of gender and parenting not only by studying a greater diversity of experiences and structures, but also more accurately understanding the common topics that once dominated the literature. Future scholarship on parenting within the sociology of gender should continue to consider, and continue to deepen its consideration of, this broader range of approaches and experiences. And it should do so with consistent recognition of power as a central organizing element of intersecting structures of inequality. Scholars of gender and parenting should also respond to developments in the mainstream visibility of trans and non-binary genders, with newly supportive laws and policies but also problematic backlash raising new and critical questions.

Like the sociology of gender in general, the literature on gender and parenting has addressed all three levels of the gender structure, with increasingly prominent attention to their interconnections. As Risman (2004, 435) notes, "Change is fluid and reverberates throughout the structure dynamically." Changes at any of the levels she differentiates—individual, interactional and institutional—have implications for and impacts on the other levels, and a holistic approach that considers those levels and their dynamic links is critical for further deepening our understanding of gendered and gendering patterns related to parenthood. One particularly noteworthy example of institutional level patterns is the relative hegemony of neoliberal frameworks in the contemporary West. As various scholars cited in this chapter have pointed out, neoliberal social policy has reshaped families and communities with consequences that vary tremendously by class, race, gender, sexuality, gender identity, and nation. Sociologists focused on gender and parenting should continue to pay close attention to neoliberalism as a context within which family and household patterns are constructed. Examples include the punitive

impact of the prison-industrial complex and welfare reform, diminished funding for health care and social services, public infrastructure and public education, and the ongoing lack of adequate funding for child care and parental leave. These are all aspects of an increasingly privatized family and the increasing privatization of care-work and social reproduction that are critical to recognize. An adequate analysis of any question related to gender and parenting requires that recognition. Even instances which might at first appear isolated from these harsh social forces are often instances in which class resources have allowed some parents and children to buy their way out of the additional burdens neoliberalism places on most people. Like the more general claim that an intersectional analysis is critical to any investigation of gender and parenting, the particular impact of neoliberalism at the institutional level and its reverberations at the individual and interactional levels is critical to consider throughout the literature as it continues forward.

But as Risman (2004) highlights, the change that can reverberate across levels can also disrupt inequalities and structural constraints. A variety of the studies considered in this chapter address that possibility, and explore the way institutions can be pushed in new directions, interactional spaces can be opened up to new configurations of practice, and individual selves can be crafted with fewer limits and constraints. This potential for change is often addressed in the literature, and it is important not to isolate that potential inside self-referential academic discourses. Public engagement should remain a key goal of sociological scholarship on gender and parenting. Many, probably even most, of the authors cited here have committed themselves to addressing gender inequalities and other intersecting inequalities with the explicit intention to contribute to progressive social change. From accessibly written books to blogs that summarize more technical articles for a broader audience, from legal briefs to policy analysis to white papers, from raising awareness in classrooms to direct feminist organizing, sociologists focused on gender and parenting have engaged local, regional, national and international communities.

The scholarship reviewed in this chapter includes examples of systematic documentation of structural constraints, partnerships with a variety of organizations and entities to craft research questions and share analyses, debunking myths and revealing the regressive impact of policies and practices. Dedication to feminist public engagement has been a distinguishing feature of much of the literature within the sociology of gender, including literature focused on parenting and parenthood. Given the many crises, tensions, and injustices evident in our communities, nations and world, continued dedication to that kind of engagement is essential.

References

- Baker, D. L., & Drapela, L. A. (2010). Mostly the mother. *Social Science Journal*, 47, 578–592.
- Bass, B. C. (2015). Preparing for parenthood. *Gender & Society*, 29, 362–385.
- Bell, A. V. (2009). It's way out of my league. *Gender & Society*, 23, 688–709.
- Berk, S. (1985). *The gender factory*. NY: Plenum.
- Bernstein, M. (2015). Same-sex marriage and the future of the LGBT movement. *Gender & Society*, 29, 321–337.
- Bianchi, S. M., Robinson, J. P., & Milkie, M. A. (2007). *Changing rhythms of American family life*. NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Blum, L. (2015). *Raising generation Rx*. NY: NYU Press.
- Brush, L. (2011). *Poverty, battered women and work in U.S. public policy*. NY: Oxford University Press.
- Budig, M., & England, P. (2001). The wage penalty for motherhood. *American Sociological Review*, 66, 204–255.
- Budig, M. J., & Hodges, M. J. (2010). Differences in disadvantage: Variation in the motherhood penalty across white women's earnings distribution. *American Sociological Review*, 75, 705–728.
- Collins, J. L., & Mayer, V. (2010). *Both hands tied*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Collins, P. H. (2000). *Black feminist thought*. NY: Routledge.
- Coltrane, S. (1996). *Family man*. NY: Oxford University Press.
- Coltrane, S., & Adams, M. (2008). *Gender and families*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Coontz, S. (1992). *The way we never were*. NY: Basic Books.
- Coontz, S. (2015). CCF symposium on housework, gender and parenthood: Overview. *Council on Contemporary Families Online Symposium on Housework, Gender and Parenthood*. <https://contemporaryfamilies.org/housework-symposium-overview/>. Accessed July 22, 2016.

- Cooper, M. (2014). *Cut adrift*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Correll, S., Benard, S., & Paik, I. (2007). Getting a job: Is there a motherhood penalty? *American Journal of Sociology*, *112*, 1297–1338.
- Craig, L., & Mullan, K. (2013). Parental leisure time: A gender comparison in five countries. *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society*, *20*, 329–357.
- Damaske, S. (2011). *For the family?*. NY: Oxford University Press.
- Edin, K., & Kefalas, M. (2011). *Promises I Can Keep*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Edin, K., & Nelson, T. (2013). *Doing the Best I Can*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Ehrenreich, B., & Hochschild, A. (2002). *Global woman*. NY: Henry Holt.
- Elliott, S., Powell, R., & Brenton, J. (2015). Being a good mom: Low-income, black single mothers negotiate intensive mothering. *Journal of Family Issues*, *36*, 351–370.
- England, P., Budig, M., & Folbre, N. (2002). Wages of virtue: The relative pay of carework. *Social Problems*, *49*, 455–474.
- Enos, S. (2001). *Mothering from the inside*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Fox, B. (2009). *When couples become parents: The creation of gender in the transition to parenthood*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Frederick, A. (2017). Risky mothers and the normalcy project. *Gender & Society*, *31*, 74–95.
- Gerson, K. (2010). *The unfinished revolution*. NY: Oxford University Press.
- Glauber, R. (2007). Marriage and the motherhood wage penalty among African Americans, Hispanics, and Whites. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, *69*, 951–961.
- Haney, L. A. (2010). *Offending women*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hansen, K. (2004). *Not-so-nuclear families*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Hays, S. (1996). *The cultural contradictions of motherhood*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Hays, S. (2004). *Flat broke with children*. NY: Oxford University Press.
- Hegewisch, A., & DuMonthier, A. (2016). *The gender wage gap: 2015*. www.iwpr.org/publications/pubs/gender-wage-gap2015. Accessed October 30, 2016.
- Hertz, R. (2008). *Single by chance, mothers by choice*. NY: Oxford University Press.
- Hoang, L. A., & Yeoh, B. S. (2011). Breadwinning wives and “left-behind” husbands: Men and masculinities in the Vietnamese transnational family. *Gender & Society*, *25*, 717–739.
- Hochschild, A. (1989). *The second shift*. New York: Viking.
- Hondagneu-Sotelo, P. (2001). *Domestica*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kane, E. W. (2012). *The gender trap*. NY: New York University Press.
- Kane, E. W. (2014). The social construction of parental gender preferences. In H. Montgomery (Ed.), *Oxford bibliographies in childhood studies*. NY: Oxford University Press.
- Kaufman, G. (2013). *Superdad*. NY: New York University Press.
- MacDonald, C. (2010). *Shadow mothers*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- McLanahan, S., & Percheski, C. (2008). Family structure and the reproduction of inequalities. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *34*, 257–276.
- Messner, M. (2009). *It's all for the kids*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Moen, P., & Roehling, P. (2005). *The career mystique*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Moore, M. (2011). *Invisible families*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Natalier, K., & Hewitt, B. (2014). Separated parents reproducing and undoing gender through defining legitimate uses of child support. *Gender & Society*, *28*, 904–925.
- Offer, S., & Schneider, B. (2011). Revisiting the gender gap in time-use patterns. *American Sociological Review*, *76*, 809–833.
- Orloff, A. S. (2009). Gender the comparative analysis of welfare states. *Sociological Theory*, *27*, 317–343.
- Parreñas, R. (2002). *Servants of globalization*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Pfeffer, C. (2012). Normative resistance and inventive pragmatism. *Gender & Society*, *26*, 574–602.
- Raley, S., & Bianchi, S. (2006). Sons, daughters, and family processes. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *32*, 401–421.
- Randles, J. M. (2013). Repackaging the package deal. *Gender & Society*, *27*, 864–888.
- Ray, R., Gornick, J. C., & Schmitt, J. (2010). Who cares? Assessing generosity and gender equality in parental leave policy designs in 21 countries. *Journal of European Social Policy*, *20*, 196–216.
- Rehel, E. M. (2014). When dad stays home too. *Gender & Society*, *28*, 110–132.
- Reich, J. (2005). *Fixing families*. NY: Routledge.
- Reich, J. A. (2014). Neoliberal mothering and vaccine refusal. *Gender & Society*, *28*, 679–704.
- Risman, B. J. (1998). *Gender vertigo*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Risman, B. J. (2004). Gender as a social structure. *Gender & Society*, *18*, 429–450.
- Rudman, L. A., & Mescher, K. (2013). Penalizing men who request a family leave. *Journal of Social Issues*, *69*, 322–340.

- Ryan, M., & Berkowitz, D. (2009). Constructing gay and lesbian parent families 'beyond the closet'. *Qualitative Sociology, 32*, 153–172.
- Sanchez, L., & Thompson, E. (1997). Becoming mothers and fathers. *Gender & Society, 11*, 747–772.
- Sayer, L. (2015). *The complexities of interpreting changing household patterns*. <https://contemporaryfamilies.org/complexities-brief-report/>. Accessed July 22, 2016.
- Scott, E. K. (2010). I Feel As If I Am the One Who Is Disabled. *Gender & Society, 24*, 672–696.
- Shows, C., & Gerstel, N. (2009). Fathering, class, and gender. *Gender & Society, 23*, 161–187.
- Singley, S. G., & Hynes, K. (2005). Transitions to parenthood. *Gender & Society, 19*, 376–397.
- Stacey, J. (1990). *Brave new families*. NY: Basic Books.
- Stone, P. (2008). *Opting out*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Sullivan, M. (2004). *The family of woman*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Walzer, S. (1998). *Thinking about the baby*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Yavorsky, J. E., Kamp Dush, C. M., & Schoppe-Sullivan, S. J. (2015). The production of inequality: The gender division of labor across the transition to parenthood. *Journal of Marriage & Family, 77*, 662–679.

Emily W. Kane is Professor of Sociology, and a member of the Program in Gender and Sexuality Studies, at Bates College in Lewiston, Maine. Her teaching, research, and public engagement focus on inequalities of race, class, gender, and sexuality, with particular attention to family and childhood. She received her B.A. from Oberlin College and her M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Michigan, all in sociology.



Jennifer Randles

Abstract

This chapter summarizes the state of research and theory on how social policies related to family life in the United States reflect and reinforce the gender structure. First, I discuss how feminist theories of social policy explain how gender ideologies and inequalities influence the policy-making process and policy implementation. I then summarize theorizing on dominant gender paradigms of policy and how they have shaped family members' abilities to utilize and benefit from social provisions. Contemporary U.S. family policies reinforce the gender structure largely through legislation that still assumes a married male breadwinner/female caregiver family model. I offer critiques of each paradigm and discuss how gendered assumptions of family life embedded in social policies limit our political abilities to help family members balance their care and paid work responsibilities. This discussion highlights how policies perpetuate the gender structure by not accounting for women's and men's overall different socioeconomic and political positions, especially as they intersect with class

and race inequalities. This pretext of gender neutrality is a policy problem that points to necessary directions for future research by gender scholars, particularly empirical and theoretical work on the gendered and heteronormative effects of social policies.

In 1996, Congress overhauled United States welfare policy and claimed that: "Marriage is the foundation of a successful society," and that the "Promotion of responsible fatherhood and motherhood is integral to successful child rearing and the well-being of children" (U.S. Congress, 1996). Based on the assumption that welfare encouraged single parenthood by financially enabling women to raise children without men who deliberately avoid their parenting obligations (Hays, 2003), Congress earmarked federal funding for programs promoting heterosexual marriage and "responsible" fatherhood. As part of these provisions, the law required single custodial parents, who are mostly women, to work in exchange for benefits after two years of aid; it required noncustodial parents, mostly men, to financially support their children through mandatory paternity establishment and child support payments.

Twenty years later, these gendered provisions of welfare reform remain in effect. What has changed dramatically in the past two decades is the size of welfare rolls. By turning welfare into a state block grant program, states have significant

J. Randles (✉)
California State University, Fresno, 5340 N. Campus
Drive M/S SS97, Fresno, CA 93740, USA
e-mail: Jrandles81@gmail.com

discretion in the use of funds and can even opt to deny cash assistance to eligible families and instead fund activities such as marriage education programs. Consequently, welfare rolls nationwide are down 75% since 1996, but not because poverty rates and the need for welfare have declined; rather, it is because most states have severely restricted their cash assistance programs. More families, disproportionately single mother-headed families of color, live in deep poverty (Edin & Shafer, 2015).

The work, marriage, and fatherhood provisions of welfare reform reflected and reinforced racialized gendered stereotypes of parents in poverty, especially those about “promiscuous” and “lazy” single mothers who purposely have children outside of marriage and deliberately avoid employment (Hays, 2003) and “deadbeat” dads who evade child support payments they can afford (Gavanas, 2004). Despite policy attempts to prevent poverty by promoting work and marriage, single mothers’ employment rates have not continuously increased (Cohen, 2016), and government-funded relationship programs have had no impact on marriage or poverty rates (Wood, Moore, Clarkwest, & Killewald, 2014). Yet, these provisions continue a long history of U.S. policies that assume a single-wage earner/two-parent family, stigmatize single parenthood, and make it prohibitively difficult for one parent to combine paid work and care responsibilities (Abramovitz, 1996; Reese, 2005). Welfare reform is thus a primary example of the reciprocal relationship between the gender structure and social policies.

Gendered expectations of women’s and men’s responsibilities as family members strongly influence policies and how much people utilize and benefit from them. Presumptions that men are heads of households and primary wage earners and that women are economic dependents, wives, and caregiving mothers have been central to social policies in the United States (Cott, 2000). Likewise, policies such as the 1996 welfare reform law shape gender ideologies of family responsibility, specifically what it means to be a good partner and parent and which relationships count as family. According to Barbara Risman (1998), policies are

a key part of the gender structure that exists at the individual, interactional, and institutional levels of social life. By creating a structure of institutionalized opportunities and constraints, policies influence how individuals interact with one another as family members, shape gendered identities of partners, parents, caregivers, and workers, and justify sexual stratification (Lorber, 1994). Policies, especially those governing family, are therefore a primary “gender factory” (Berk, 1985) that (re)produces gender in modern social life (Ridgeway, 2011; Risman, 1998).

This chapter provides an overview of empirical research and theories explaining how family policies in the United States reflect and reinforce the gender structure. I begin by describing how family responsibilities have been defined and contested based on gender in the policy arena. Next, I summarize dominant gender paradigms that shape social policy and the implications of different models of family life for addressing gender inequality. I conclude with a discussion of how these approaches to understanding the gendered consequences of policy point to much-needed reforms in U.S. social policy and recommendations for how future research by gender scholars should inform these changes.

1 Gender Ideologies and Family Policies

Feminist theories of social policy attend to how ideologies, discourses, and the gender structure influence the policy-making process, use of policies, and policy outcomes (Orloff & Palier, 2009). Given its role in structuring sex, procreation, childrearing, care, and provisioning, family structures many of the material conditions and cultural beliefs that perpetuate contemporary gender inequality (Ridgeway, 2011). Social policies legislate certain definitions of “proper” families and norms of appropriate behaviors among women and men as partners, spouses, and parents. Law and policy have often specifically

codified caregiving expectations for women and heteronormative assumptions of family, despite the lack of empirical evidence that biological or sex-based capacities render women better-suited for caregiving and heterosexual couples best-suited for parenting (Biblarz & Stacey, 2010; Risman 1998).

Many family policies are informed by an ideology of heteronormative gender difference premised on the notion of separate spheres and heterosexual gender complementarity. As Judith Lorber (1994) theorized, though the roles that female and male bodies play in human sexual reproduction are nearly universal, the unequal gender statuses of women and men as mothers and fathers are not. Procreative and parenting statuses are largely rooted in policy, not biology. That female bodies get pregnant and lactate does not create gender inequality in families. “Mother” as a socially and economically devalued parenting status is politically constructed vis-à-vis policies that cast women primarily as caregivers while simultaneously limiting their access to contraception and abortion (Luker, 1984), paid parental leave (Albiston, 2010), and affordable childcare (Palakow, 2007). Similarly, the stigma attached to non-heterosexual parents is rooted in laws, such as restrictions against adoption by gay men, lesbians, and same-sex couples and the now unconstitutional 1996 Defense of Marriage Act that defined marriage as only between one man and one woman. These policies are products of the gender structure that support ideologies of sex-based parental responsibilities and assumptions that all families need both a mother and a father who will provide the right “parenting equation” for children (Gavanas, 2004).

These ideologies have prevented family law and policy from keeping pace with evolving definitions of family and changes in family-formation trends, especially the growing number of non-married and same-sex families, working mothers, and caregiving fathers (Cherlin, 2009). Many policies support the heterosexual nuclear family by creating a structure of opportunities that primarily benefit two-parent, married families in which one parent is a primary

caregiver and the other is a primary wage-earner. Despite an official commitment to gender equality, many current family policies maintain gender and sex inequalities because they ignore how most adult family members of all genders must juggle paid work and unpaid care in a political context that does not equally recognize all family relationships.

The gendered division of family labor fundamentally shifted throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. While the public imagination idealized heterosexual, two-parent “traditional” families epitomized in television shows such as *Leave it to Beaver*, in reality many women of color and poor and working-class white women were already in the paid labor force (Coontz, 1992). For the white middle-class, the 1950s nuclear family with a stay-at-home mother was a historical anomaly enabled by unprecedented economic prosperity of the post-war period and class and racial privilege. As Stephanie Coontz (2005) has shown, shifting economic trends had a profound impact on marital experiences and gender arrangements within families. Fewer men were able to earn a family wage sufficient to support an entire family; women, especially middle-class whites, entered the paid labor force in record numbers (Hochschild, [1989] 2012). Now mothers, even those with very young children, are significantly more likely than those of previous generations to work outside the home for pay to compensate for men’s falling wages as the cost of living rises (Hochschild, [1989] 2012). Policy has failed to adequately respond to these changes in family life in the U.S. Social commentators often decry a “family crisis” that policy seeks to address by promoting, either explicitly or implicitly, the heterosexual, married, two-parent family form. But many of the social problems attributed to family structure are actually a result of inequality and poverty, social problems that policies often ignore or exacerbate by legislating anachronistic understandings of how families work and who comprises them.

Private solutions—such as working more hours and outsourcing childcare—are inadequate to address the gendered work-family conflicts

generated by policies and workplaces that emphasize long, inflexible hours and assume that all paid workers have a full-time caregiver at home. Joan Williams (2000) theorized how this “ideal worker” norm contributes to gender inequality primarily through the economic marginalization of women. Now that most families have all their adult members in the paid labor force, two-parent families must perform three jobs—two paid jobs and the “second shift” of unpaid childcare and housework (Hochschild, [1989] 2012)—with little public support. Single parents must do it all alone.

Arlie Russell Hochschild ([1989] 2012) described how the “stalled revolution” in gender norms at home, work, and in the policy arena presents many problems for the growing number of single-parent and dual-earner families. Despite incremental change in the gendered division of family labor, men’s contributions have not kept pace with those of women who still perform most of the second shift (Sullivan, 2004). Workplaces and social policies are still based on a family model that assumes the “ideal worker”—and that the worker is a man. Family and reproductive policies reflect how, as Joan Acker (1990) argued, men’s bodies and emotions shape work and organizational processes. This is evidenced by how women’s greater biological role in procreation is treated as a disability in state and employer policies regarding maternity leave (Albiston, 2010). Despite greater gender convergence in family responsibilities, there is still no concerted national policy agenda intended to help family members balance care and paid work. The United States lacks a national childcare system, and existing federal and state childcare policies are woefully insufficient. The federal Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG) Act, most recently reauthorized in 2014, was intended to improve the quality and offset the enormous cost of care for working families. Yet, though the national cost of care for one child averages over \$10,000 annually, the average annual CCDBG subsidy is only \$4,900 (United States DHHS, 2014). Moreover, only about one in ten children who meet the federal requirements for childcare subsidies receives

them, due primarily to long waiting lists, inadequate federal and state funding, and restrictive state eligibility policies (United States GAO, 2016). Childcare shortcomings disproportionately disadvantage women who are expected to prioritize childrearing and are more likely to be lone parents and raise children on low wages. By failing to account for these real needs of families, social policies perpetuate the gender structure.

Gender ideologies also intersect with political ideologies of individual parental responsibility and nuclear family self-sufficiency. Individuals are tasked with meeting all their families’ practical and emotional needs with little public support. The federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, for example, provides some employees up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave for qualified family and medical reasons, including the birth or adoption of a child or to care for a sick parent or spouse. However, because it is unpaid and only available to workers with at least a year of employment at workplaces with 50 or more employees, not all are eligible or financially able to utilize it. Those who do are typically women who have higher-earning men as partners whose wages enable them to take leave (Albiston, 2010; Prohaska & Zipp, 2011). This law has also prohibited those not legally defined as “spouse” from taking leave to care for a non-married partner, which disqualified same-sex partners who were not recognized as “family” by the FMLA until 2015. Equalizing access to such policies has significant benefits for families and the economy. Families in the few individual states that offer paid family leave have experienced greater use of maternity leave, increased work hours, and higher wages for mothers of young children (Rossin-Slater, Ruhm, & Waldfogel, 2013). Though still rare in the United States, some jurisdictions, including Vermont and San Francisco, have “right to request” laws that allow employees to request flexible work arrangements to accommodate personal and care responsibilities. In countries that have right to request laws as part of a larger package of family-supportive policies, such as paid leave and publicly funded childcare, women’s labor force participation is

greater than that of women in the United States, most of whom do not have access to paid leave or flexible schedules (Hegewisch & Gornick, 2011).

Normative views of the “ideal worker” intersect with gender ideologies of hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 1995) to prevent men from using family leave and requesting family-supportive work schedules (Berdahl & Moon, 2013). How men feel about work-family policies depends on their views of normative masculinity and how they think other men will judge their decision to use them (Thébaud & Pedulla, 2016). This is a case of how policies intended to support families and gender equality often fall short of both goals because gender is rarely viewed as central to the policy-making process (MacKinnon, 1989; Orloff, 1993).

When policies do directly address gender, they typically reinforce how gender and family statuses intersect to create advantages for men and disadvantages for women. Women suffer from a “motherhood penalty” in earnings and occupational advancement (Budig & England, 2001; Correll, Bernard, & Paik, 2007), especially if they are single, while married fathers tend to benefit from a marital wage premium (Killewald, 2013) and “daddy bonus” in earnings (Hodges & Budig, 2010). Marriage promotion and responsible fatherhood programs try to capitalize on these advantages for men by teaching couples that marriage is good for families because married men earn more (Randles, 2017). This reinforces the gendered ideology of the ideal worker norm that underlies wage discrimination benefiting married fathers.

Policies that instead focus on helping families balance care and work responsibilities, such as subsidized education and childcare, promote higher labor force participation rates among women and a more egalitarian division of unpaid household labor (Hegewisch & Gornick, 2011; Noonan, 2013). Even when partners share egalitarian ideas, they often find it prohibitively difficult to put them into practice in the absence of supportive policies. To promote gender equality,

policies must account for the growing number of families that do not conform to the married male breadwinner/female caregiver model. This will necessitate a rethinking of political definitions of good parenting founded on hegemonic and essentialist understandings of femininity, masculinity, and heterosexuality. For example, government-funded responsible fatherhood programming promotes the idea that children need an involved mother and father, preferably married, to avoid negative social outcomes such as poverty and incarceration (Randles, 2017). Basing family policies on assumptions that men and women parent in fundamentally different ways due to sex-based differences and that children need access to parents with both essential male and female qualities erroneously attributes problems of socioeconomic inequality to gender and sexuality. Teaching men that they are valuable as caring parents is a worthy policy goal and challenges the political and economic devaluation of carework. Teaching them that they are valuable as men who role model masculinity as part of a heterosexual couple merely reinforces empirically unsupported ideologies that parents’ gender and sexual orientation matter more than their abilities to nurture and provide for children (Biblarz & Stacey, 2010).

Young adults in the United States desire to have egalitarian marriages and committed partnerships in which they and their partners equally share paid work and unpaid family labor (Gerson, 2010; Pedulla & Thébaud, 2015). Ideological and political stagnation make it difficult to realize these goals. The unfinished revolution at home and work will require a restructuring of paid work and caregiving (Gerson, 2010) and will involve what Barbara Risman (1998) calls *gender vertigo*, a reconceptualization of families that does not depend on gender as a central organizing framework. Gender scholars who study social policies have described how particular family models infuse policy paradigms and reinforce the gender structure. This work points to how more equitable models of gender and family are necessary to create a political context

in which individuals and families can realize these egalitarian aspirations.

2 Gender and Family Policy Paradigms

Feminist scholars of the welfare state have theorized how gendered policy regimes shape outcomes of social provision, including who can make demands on the state to increase their power, opportunity, and autonomy (O'Connor, Orloff, & Shaver, 1999). These regimes differ in how they codify models of family life and to whom they assign responsibility for meeting family members' needs. Three primary gendered policy regimes that have shaped family policy in the United States are: the patriarchal paradigm, the individual responsibility paradigm, and the social responsibility paradigm.

2.1 Patriarchal Paradigm

The patriarchal policy paradigm (Eichler, 1997) envisions the family as an administrative unit founded in legal marriage between a husband as the undisputed legal, social, and economic head of household and a wife who has caregiving obligations for children and elders. Family members in non-legal unions are not recognized as having social, legal, or economic obligations to one another. Historically, based on this patriarchal model, responsibility for an individual's well-being was assigned to their family, and under the subsidiary principle, families with an able-bodied man could not receive economic support from the state (Eichler, 1997). Many U.S. laws and policies regulating marriage and family life have reflected this paradigm, including coverture laws that rendered women the economic dependents and legal subordinates of their husbands. Throughout most of U.S. history, family law codified marriage as an economic and social contract through which wives consented to serve and obey their husbands, and husbands accepted a legal obligation to protect and support wives and their children (Cott,

2000). As a form of gendered governance, marriage converted a woman's property, legal personhood, and identity into those of her husband. Marriage laws also constructed social understandings and experiences of racial difference and hierarchy. Slaves were not allowed to enter into marital contracts, and individuals from different racial groups could not legally marry one another in all U.S. states until 1967 (Cott, 2000).

The patriarchal paradigm assumes gender complementarity, that is, that women and men should perform complementary gendered "roles" within families (Johnson, Duerst-Lahti, & Norton, 2007). According to Mary Blair-Loy (2003), the hegemonic cultural schema of motherhood is that of family devotion, an ideology that construes a good mother as one whose commitment to family care is her deepest moral obligation and practical responsibility. The parallel masculine cultural schema is that of the father as financial provider. These gender schemas anchor expectations of parents' behaviors and assume heterosexual complementarity of family roles based on essentialist beliefs that children thrive most when they have access to a caregiving mother and a wage-earning father. Even if individual women and men desire more egalitarian relationships, their behaviors are still held accountable to these larger gendered cultural referents (Ridgeway, 2011). U.S. policies reveal a consistent pattern of legislation enacted to provide incentives to marry and conform to the male breadwinner/female caretaker family form (Abramovitz, 1996). Despite significant changes in understandings of fatherhood that recognize men's equal abilities to care for their children (LaRossa, 1997), some contemporary family policies, such as responsible fatherhood policy, are still based on this idea of gender complementarity in parenting. By stressing that fathers are essential for children's well-being, especially due to their unique ability to be male role models, such policies ideologically devalue any family that does not fit the married, two-parent, heterosexual model (Randles, 2017).

By using public policy to influence family-formation patterns, the welfare state regulated the lives of poor, single mothers and

sought to reinstitutionalize marriage as the legal and economic foundation of patriarchal families. These attempts to “strengthen” the heterosexual married family have mostly served to strengthen the gender structure and the racialization and feminization of poverty (Hays, 2003; Reese, 2005; Roberts, 1998). Welfare reform in the 1990s, for example, focused more on reducing welfare rolls, promoting heterosexual marriage, and increasing fathers’ financial contributions than it did on improving low-income mothers’ labor market position and ability to combine care and paid work (Hays, 2003; Randles, 2017). It assumed a single-wage earner/two-parent family form and that poverty is the direct result of wage-earner joblessness. Yet, most single mothers already worked in low-wage jobs without access to adequate childcare, healthcare, or job security. Poor, single mothers of color comprise a large share of adult recipients, have lower earning potential in the paid labor market, and are more likely to have sole custodial responsibility for children. These factors combine to perpetuate the gender structure and how it intersects with racial inequalities. In 2015, white women earned only \$.82 for each \$1 earned by white men (Hegewisch & DuMontier, 2016); Black women and Latinas fared even worse with respective earnings of \$.65 and \$.58 for every \$1 white men earned (Patten, 2016). Requiring work in exchange for meager assistance in the absence of affordable childcare has exacerbated women’s and children’s economic hardship, especially as the economy declined with the 2008 recession (Cohen, 2016; Edin & Shaefer, 2015). By legislating a family model that failed to account for these effects of the gender structure, welfare reform encouraged women’s financial dependence on men, particularly through marriage (Abramovitz, 1996). This increased the deep poverty of many mother-headed families, particularly those of color, as what was once a government entitlement became a time-limited discretionary program that has been all but dismantled by many states (Edin & Shaefer, 2015).

2.2 Individual Responsibility Paradigm

Officially known as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, U.S. welfare reform also reflected the individual responsibility (Eichler, 1997) or individuality paradigm (Johnson et al., 2007) by codifying the idea that, after a limited period of time, parents alone are responsible for meeting children’s needs. Though it presents a model of family life that is gender equal in theory, it has paradoxical implications for efforts to reduce gender inequality. As Margrit Eichler (1997) argued, since both men and women are presumed capable of providing care and money under this paradigm, it follows that both mothers and fathers can do either and that single parents should be able to do both. “The ideological ground is therefore prepared for an erosion of public entitlements for substantial numbers of families, particularly lone-parent families, because of the lack of recognition that one parent needs extra support in the absence of the second parent” (Eichler, 1997, 13). The earliest U.S. welfare programs, Mothers’ Pensions, were created as subsidies to allow white women without husbands, primarily widows, to care for their children, reflecting the idea that raising children was a public service worthy of state support (Reese, 2005). However, as never-married and non-white women started to comprise a larger share of welfare recipients, calls to reform welfare to encourage paid work as a form of individual responsibility followed; a major provision of welfare reform in 1996 was thus to require work in exchange for benefits after two years of aid (Hays, 2003). With few exceptions, in U.S. social policy, the care of one’s own children, an activity disproportionately performed by women, is no longer politically defined as work. Even the exceptions are not universally available; though the Comprehensive Assistance for Family Caregivers for veterans wounded after 9/11 is a federal program available in all states, the Medicaid Cash and Counseling Program for children with chronic

illnesses and disabilities is state specific and only accessible to some caregivers.

Many policies, such as those related to unemployment, welfare, and family leave, involve treating both women and men mainly as workers based on a male breadwinner model (O'Connor, Orloff, & Shaver, 1999). This denies how state-market and state-family linkages shape how one's family status affects their market status. O'Connor, Orloff, and Shaver (1999) argued that the gendered family status of mother as caregiver, to the extent that it is politically recognized at all, is often conceptualized in social policy as a temporary barrier to labor market participation. This barrier is construed as an individual problem, a personal market failure for which the government can only offer market-based solutions, such as tax credits to purchase childcare or employer incentives to provide on-site care facilities. These policies reflect a logic of gender sameness based on income maintenance and labor market participation. By failing to recognize or remunerate parenting as both a political and economic activity, these limited policy interventions fail to account for how the unpaid work of caregiving is necessary to produce future workers that sustain the economy. This undermines public support for those with care responsibilities that might interfere with work. As Catherine MacKinnon (1989, 169) claimed, sexual and family politics "institutionalize male power over women through institutionalizing the male point of view in law." The guise of gender neutrality in social policy ultimately results in legislated discrimination by disregarding how individual responsibility for unpaid care falls mostly on women.

The individual responsibility paradigm thus perpetuates gender inequalities because it assumes that the goal of social policy is to create self-sufficient, hard-working citizens who are not dependent on the state. This codifies the "atomistic man as the standard" in policy and obscures how family members' individual choices and autonomy are constrained or enhanced by family relationships and the needs of dependents (Johnson et al., 2007, 24). Though such policies may not compel women and men to

assume particular family responsibilities because of biological sex, it prioritizes autonomy as a political ideology within a socio-political context where men are still more economically and socially autonomous and therefore have greater opportunities for self-sufficiency. For example, work and marriage programs created in the wake of welfare reform similarly focused on promoting economic self-sufficiency for poor parents by teaching skills for self-regulation, such as time management, stress-reduction, and budgeting; these strategies obscure how gender and racial inequalities sustain poverty and the need for welfare (Randles & Woodward, 2018).

Even if they avoid assumptions of patriarchy and gender complementarity, seemingly gender-neutral policies based on the individuality paradigm rarely have gender-equal effects. Catherine MacKinnon (2005, 1) argued that gender inequality is built into "sex equality law's oscillation between denying the sexes are human equals and pretending that they are social equals." That is, social policies often further codify gender inequality by ignoring that the gender structure exists. For example, Prohaska and Zipp (2011) found that discussions of gender equality and the policy's effects on women played a minor role in the formative stages of the bill that would eventually become the FLMA in 1993. Debates over the policy's potential impacts on families were couched in the language of personal choice and parents' rights to decide which partner would "choose" to use leave. The Act reinforced gender inequality by emphasizing individual choice without accounting for cultural schemas that favor women as caretakers and women's greater tendency to work in lower-paying jobs. Policies need not explicitly promote patriarchy or gender complementarity to perpetuate women's subordination; they need only to ignore women's devalued statuses as low-paid workers, unpaid caregivers, and emotional nurturers in families.

Like the FMLA, policies typically assume that solutions to family problems result from interpersonal negotiation and choice based on the personal motivation, preferences, and skills of the individuals involved. When these solutions

fail, they are attributed to individual deficiencies or interpersonal incompatibilities, not how the gender structure and other axes of inequality, including race and class, create differential positions from which people negotiate family- and work-related challenges. Relationship education programs funded via the marriage promotion provisions of welfare reform, for example, focused on teaching interpersonal strategies for communication and conflict-resolution. This approach obscures how gender differences in marital power rooted in social, economic, and political inequalities between wives and husbands restrain individuals' abilities to develop agency and pursue interests within marriage, even if couples share gender egalitarian beliefs (Randles, 2016). Gender inequality will persist as long as policies, despite being gender-neutral on their face, value reproductive labor within the family less than "productive" work outside it (Lorber, 1994). This reinforces women's economic dependence on men, men's greater economic position relative to women, and ultimately men's increased bargaining power within marriages and families.

2.3 Social Responsibility Paradigm

Policies informed by a third paradigm focus on social responsibility for meeting families' needs and help create a structure where care is more highly valued and equitably distributed among family members (Eichler, 1997; Johnson et al., 2007). This model recognizes that the public should share the costs of care and promotes gender equality in the workplace, household, and political arena. By focusing on inequality, including the gender structure, and not just individual autonomy and personal responsibility, the social responsibility paradigm prioritizes equal opportunities for women and men across family types and challenges gendered and heteronormative models of family life. This paradigm encourages us to consider how policies that seem to recognize care as a gender-neutral responsibility can perpetuate gender and other forms of inequality, especially when policies link

economic support for care directly to employment.

The FMLA granting access to unpaid leave for qualifying employees is officially gender neutral and seems to be a governmental endorsement of the value of care; however, utilizing it is dependent on individual and household resources, especially employment, rather than universally available public supports, which has gendered effects. During the past two decades, despite overall rapid economic growth and a rise in women's paid employment, the number of women taking parental leave has stalled. Moreover, fewer than half of parents were paid at all during leave, and those who did receive some compensation were significantly more likely to be men. Those who took leave were also relatively privileged; mothers who were white, married, and college educated were the most likely group to utilize leave policies (Zagorsky, 2017). Fathers' use of parental leave tripled during this time, but still lagged significantly behind that of mothers; in 2015, for every 10 women who took leave, only one man did (Zagorsky, 2017). Tax-payer supported paid leave, especially policies that offer incentives for use by caregivers of all genders, would enable more families to utilize both public and private leave policies.

Tax credits for families in the United States are also primarily tied to employment rather than unpaid caregiving. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), a refundable tax credit for low- and moderate-income working families, allows both individuals and couples to increase their annual income by claiming qualifying children on their federal taxes. As more families time out on cash assistance under 60-month lifetime limits on welfare receipt passed as part of welfare reform, the EITC has become an important part of poor families' new work-based safety net (Halpern-Meekin, Edin, Tach, & Sykes, 2015). Though the maximum 2016 annual credit of \$3,373 for a single child represents a significant increase in income for many U.S. families, it is still often not enough to promote upward mobility for women and children. Instead of policies that offer tax credits in the form of child

subsidies that are solely dependent on raising residential children, such as those in other countries, the EITC is directly tied to paid work in the absence of living wage laws and affordable childcare for all qualifying families.

Policies informed by the social responsibility paradigm would decouple public support for care from paid work. They could include direct child subsidies for parents and guardians that are not tied to income-based tax credits, childcare subsidies for all eligible families, and paid family leave for any caregiver, not just those in legally recognized family relationships. Most importantly, they would need to be universally available and tax funded. Such policies would codify the idea that women and men can have interchangeable family responsibilities but not the superhuman ability to meet all their family members' needs alone.

The main problem with this paradigm is that, by recognizing care as a fundamental political practice and economic activity (Tronto, 1993), it directly conflicts with dominant U.S. political ideologies that only paid workers are deserving of public provisions. Given its focus on the social redistribution of resources, the social responsibility model has historically encountered the most resistance in the U.S. (Johnson et al., 2007). The U.S. economy benefits greatly from caregivers' economically valuable, yet unremunerated, reproductive labor. This puts caregivers, especially mothers—who disproportionately make investments that allow children to become future workers whose earnings will be taxed—in a precarious situation. They are expected to care intensively for children and other dependents whom our economic system and social policies assign no market value (Folbre, 2008). Making care central to social provision will therefore be necessary to dismantle the gender structure and to empower women, especially low-income women and women of color, who have been socially and economically marginalized because of their association with carework. This will require making gender central to policy-making and the study of policy implementation, specifically by accounting for how women and men are

differentially affected due to their distinct positions in the gender structure.

3 Directions for Future Research

Future research should address how social policies are informed by these distinct paradigms and how policy interventions can dismantle the gender structure. Empirical work will need to analyze how policy is translated into practice and the impacts, both intended and unintended, on family members' experiences, gender ideologies, and abilities to meet responsibilities. Specifically, research must explore how social policies reinforce or challenge the gender structure and to what extent they allow family members to make decisions in accordance with egalitarian ideas given gendered differences in power, autonomy, and opportunities. Social scientific research is especially well-suited for understanding to what extent legislators' intentions are realized in policy implementation and why policy efforts often fail to produce intended results, such as with the marriage promotion provisions of welfare reform.

There is also a need for theoretical work that enhances our understandings of how policies legislate different models of family life. This work should focus on how these models limit or enhance our abilities to create policies that meet the diverse needs of individuals and families, including the majority who do not fit the heterosexual, married two-parent family form and who, therefore, face different opportunities and constraints than those reflected in existing policies. Under what conditions do social policies—or their absence—strengthen gendered schemas of family life? Which policies have been most successful in undermining them? We need to push our empirical and theoretical work as gender scholars to inform how family policies can create interventions and social supports that reflect a political ethic of care and collective responsibility for those in need. This agenda would especially benefit from additional comparative cross-national analyses of countries that

support families through policy and social provision much more effectively than we do in the United States.

References

- Abramovitz, M. (1996). *Regulating the lives of women: Social welfare from Colonial times to the present*. Boston: South End Press.
- Acker, J. (1990). Hierarchies, jobs, bodies: A theory of gendered organizations. *Gender & Society*, 4(2), 139–158.
- Albiston, C. R. (2010). *Institutional inequality and the mobilization of the Family and Medical Leave Act: Rights on leave*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Berdahl, J. L., & Moon, S. H. (2013). Workplace mistreatment of middle class workers based on sex, parenthood, and caregiving. *Journal of Social Issues*, 69(2), 341–366.
- Berk, S. F. (1985). *The gender factory*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Biblarz, T. J., & Stacey, J. (2010). How does the gender of parents matter? *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 72(1), 3–22.
- Blair-Loy, M. (2003). *Competing devotions: Career and family among women executives*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Budig, M. J., & England, P. (2001). The wage penalty for motherhood. *American Sociological Review*, 66(2), 204–225.
- Cherlin, A. J. (2009). *The marriage-go-round: The state of marriage and the family in America today*. New York: Knopf.
- Cohen, P. (2016). *Welfare reform attitudes and single mothers' employment after 20 years*. Council for Contemporary Families Briefing Paper. <https://contemporaryfamilies.org/tanf-attitudes-at-20/>. Accessed January 23, 2017.
- Connell, R. W. (1995). *Masculinities*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Coontz, S. (1992). *The way we never were: American families and the nostalgia trap*. New York: Basic Books.
- Coontz, S. (2005). *Marriage, a history: From obedience to intimacy, or how love conquered marriage*. New York: Viking Press.
- Correll, S., Bernard, S., & Paik, I. (2007). Getting a job: Is there a motherhood penalty? *American Journal of Sociology*, 112(5), 1297–1338.
- Cott, N. (2000). *Public vows: A history of marriage and the nation*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Edin, K. J., & Shaefer, H. L. (2015). *\$2.00 a day: Living on almost nothing in America*. Boston: Mariner.
- Eichler, M. (1997). *Family shifts: Families, policies, and gender equality*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Folbre, N. (2008). *Valuing children: Rethinking the economics of the family*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Gavanas, A. (2004). *Fatherhood politics in the United States: Masculinity, sexuality, race, and marriage*. Urbana, IL: Illinois University Press.
- Gerson, K. (2010). *The unfinished revolution: Coming of age in a new era of gender, work, and family*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Halpern-Meekin, S., Edin, K., Tach, L., & Sykes, J. (2015). *It's not like I'm poor: How working families make ends meet in a post-welfare world*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Hays, S. (2003). *Flat broke with children: Women in the age of welfare reform*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hegewisch, A., & DuMonthier, A. (2016). *The gender wage gap 2015: Annual earnings differences by gender, race, and ethnicity*. Institute for Women's Policy Research. <http://www.iwpr.org/publications/pubs/the-gender-wage-gap-2015-annual-earnings-differences-by-gender-race-and-ethnicity>. Accessed November 6, 2016.
- Hegewisch, A., & Gornick, J. C. (2011). The impact of work-family policies on women's employment: A review of research from OECD countries. *Community, Work, and Family*, 14(2), 119–138.
- Hochschild, A. R., with Machung, A. ([1989] 2012). *The second shift: Working families and the revolution at home* (Revised ed.). New York: Penguin.
- Hodges, M. J., & Budig, M. J. (2010). Who gets the daddy bonus? Organizational hegemonic masculinity and the impact of fatherhood on earnings. *Gender & Society*, 24(6), 717–745.
- Johnson, C. M., Duerst-Lahti, G., & Norton, N. H. (2007). *Creating gender: The sexual politics of welfare policy*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Killewald, A. (2013). A reconsideration of the fatherhood premium: Marriage, residence, biology, and the wages of fathers. *American Sociological Review*, 78(1), 96–116.
- LaRossa, R. (1997). *The modernization of fatherhood: A social and political history*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lorber, J. (1994). *Paradoxes of gender*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Luker, K. (1984). *Abortion and the politics of motherhood*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- MacKinnon, C. A. (1989). *Toward a feminist theory of the state*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- MacKinnon, C. A. (2005). *Women's lives, men's laws*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Noonan, M. (2013). The impact of social policy on the gendered division of housework. *Journal of Family Theory and Review*, 5(2), 124–134.

- O'Connor, J. S., Orloff, A. S., & Shaver, S. (1999). *States, markets, families: Gender, liberalism and social policy in Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Orloff, A. S. (1993). Gender and the social rights of citizenship: The comparative analysis of gender relations and the welfare state. *American Sociological Review*, 58(3), 303–328.
- Orloff, A. S., & Palier, B. (2009). The power of gender perspectives: Feminist influence on policy paradigms, social science, and social politics. *Social Politics*, 16(4), 405–412.
- Palakow, V. (2007). *Who cares for our children?: The child care crisis in the other America*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Patten, E. (2016). *Racial, gender wage gaps persist in U.S. despite some progress*. Pew Research Center. <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/01/racial-gender-wage-gaps-persist-in-u-s-despite-some-progress/>. Accessed January 25, 2017.
- Pedulla, D. S., & Thébaud, S. (2015). Can we finish the revolution?: Gender, work-family ideals, and institutional constraint. *American Sociological Review*, 80(1), 116–139.
- Prohaska, A., & Zipp, J. F. (2011). Gender inequality and the Family and Medical Leave Act. *Journal of Family Issues*, 32(11), 1425–1448.
- Randles, J. M. (2016). Redefining the marital power struggle through relationship skills: How United States marriage education programs challenge and reinforce gender inequality. *Gender & Society*, 30(2), 240–264.
- Randles, J. M. (2017). *Proposing prosperity?: Marriage education policy and inequality in America*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Randles, J., & Woodward, K. (2018). Learning to labor, love, and live: Shaping the “good neoliberal citizen” in state work and marriage programs. *Sociological Perspectives*, 61(1), 39–56.
- Reese, E. (2005). *Backlash against welfare mothers: Past and present*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Ridgeway, C. L. (2011). *Framed by gender: How gender inequality persists in the modern world*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Risman, B. J. (1998). *Gender vertigo: American families in transition*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Roberts, D. (1998). *Killing the Black body: Race, reproduction, and the meaning of liberty*. New York: Vintage.
- Rossin-Slater, M., Ruhm, C., & Waldfogel, J. (2013). The effects of California’s paid family leave program on mothers’ leave-taking and subsequent labor market outcomes. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, 32(2), 224–245.
- Sullivan, O. (2004). Changing gender practices within the household: A theoretical perspective. *Gender & Society*, 18(2), 207–222.
- Thébaud, S., & Pedulla, D. S. (2016). Masculinity and the stalled revolution: How gender ideologies and norms shape young men’s responses to work-family policies. *Gender & Society*, 30(4), 590–617.
- Tronto, J. C. (1993). *Moral boundaries: A political argument for an ethic of care*. New York: Routledge.
- United States Congress. (1996). *The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act*. (Public Law 104-193). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
- United States Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). (2014). *Average monthly subsidy paid to provider by age group and care type*. Office of Child Care. <https://www.acf.hhs.gov/occ/resource/fy-2013-ccdf-data-tables-preliminary-table-15>. Accessed January 24, 2017.
- United States Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2016). *Child care: Access to subsidies and strategies to manage demand vary across states*. GAO-17-60 Report to Congressional Committees. <http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/681652.pdf>. Accessed January 24, 2017.
- Williams, J. (2000). *Unbending gender: Why family and work conflict and what to do about it*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wood, R. G., Moore, Q., Clarkwest, A., & Killewald, A. (2014). The long-term effects of Building Strong Families: A program for unmarried parents. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 76(2), 446–463.
- Zagorsky, J. L. (2017). Divergent trends in US maternity and paternity leave, 1994–2015. *American Journal of Public Health*. <http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2016.303607>. Accessed January 26, 2017.

Jennifer Randles is an associate professor of sociology at California State University, Fresno. She studies low-income parenthood, gender, and family policies. Her previous research focused on government marriage education and fatherhood programs, and her current work is an qualitative study of diaper need and policy responses. In each of these projects, Randles analyzes how family policies and social programming shape poor parents’ abilities to meet their partnering and parenting goals in the context of social and economic constraints.



Carissa Froyum

Abstract

Arlie Hochschild's work shifted sociological attention to how emotions are not just felt but *managed*. She argued we cultivate emotional experiences in ourselves and others, what she termed "emotion work," in gendered and classed ways. Critical to emotion work are the "feeling rules" or the social scripts for what we should feel, how we should express our feelings, how much feeling to express, and for how long in a given social context. This chapter examines how we gender emotions through the socialization of gendered feeling rules and performing and policing gendered emotion work. It also examines the institutionalization of feeling rules and emotion work within families, schools, and workplaces. In each case, emotions are not just a byproduct and constituent of the gender social structure but also race, class, and sexuality. The chapter ends with a call for more research on the intersection of gendered emotions with disabilities and a thorough accounting of the role of the beneficiaries of emotion work in policing feeling rules.

1 Introduction

Since Arlie Hochschild's (1983) ground breaking study on emotional labor, research on emotions in general and the gendering of emotions in particular has experienced a surge within sociology. Hochschild's study examined how women airline attendants and men debt collectors cultivate emotional experiences in others as a condition of their employment, in order to help their employers be profitable, in gendered ways. By extending the work of Goffman (1961), Hochschild showed that we engage in emotion work, or managing our own and others emotions in interaction. Her work also turned a critical eye to the power dynamics around emotion work: demonstrating how employers convey emotion-based interaction scripts to employees and the gendered expectations of those scripts. Since then, Hochschild's framework has been applied, extended, and challenged in studies in an assortment of social settings and among a variety of workplaces: from the NICU to the salon to fast food restaurants (Barber, 2016; Kang, 2003; Leidner, 1999; Lewis, 2005).

Risman's gender structure theory (2018) provides an especially powerful framework for understanding how emotion work is gendered across dimensions of social life. As Risman points out, gender is organized throughout the social world along three dimensions: the individual, interactional, and institutional. Here, I

C. Froyum (✉)
University of Northern Iowa, Iowa, USA
e-mail: carissa.froyum@uni.edu

approach emotions through the cultural lens of each dimension, focusing on how we socialize, manage, and institutionalize emotions in gendered ways that build off and uphold gender inequality.

In this chapter, specifically, I argue that emotion work is gendered in three ways, which draw on Hochschild's original insights and apply them within the gender structure framework. First, we learn and reinforce racialized- and classed-gendered feeling rules so that girls/women and boys/men learn to suppress and express particular feelings. While we learn these rules from our families in childhood, schools reinforce them as a form of emotional capital. Second, organizational contexts are gendered and produce gendered expectations for managing feelings. I look explicitly at workplaces and families as critical sites. Third, gendered oppression creates unique emotional burdens for women to manage. Together, these processes recreate inequality across the gender structure. I begin the chapter by more fully explaining Hochschild's theory and end by calling for more research on gendered emotions as they intersect with other social structures of inequality and are policed in interaction.

2 Emotion Management

Hochschild (1979, 561) defines emotion work as "the act of trying to change in degree or quality an emotion or feeling." Emotion work comes in two forms: "'getting in touch with' feeling" and "'trying to' feel" by evoking desired emotions or suppressing undesired ones (Hochschild, 1983, 17). How people are supposed to feel in a given situation, and how long and deeply those feelings should be felt, are dictated by collectively held "feeling rules." Feeling rules are scripts or moral stances toward feeling (Hochschild, 1983). They specify the appropriate extent, direction, and duration of a feeling in a given social setting (Hochschild, 1979), and they "guide emotion work by establishing the sense of entitlement or obligation that governs emotional exchanges" (Hochschild, 1983, 56).

Broad gendered cultural beliefs stereotype emotions as the purview of girls/women but rationality as the purview of boys/men (Ridgeway, Stets, & Turner, 2006; Simon & Nath, 2004). Gender scholars have tied the management of emotions to the ways we do femininity and masculinity. Sattel argued that we learn gendered ways to express feelings which provide boys/men with power, while diminishing that of girls/women (Sattel, 1976). Men, for example, can display their manhood by controlling emotions which denote weakness—fear, sadness—while expressing those which demonstrate their control and power over others—anger at subordinates, disgust at losing—or within other cultural contexts which bolster manhood, like on the ball field or Mixed Martial Arts cage (Schwalbe, 2015; Vaccaro, Schrock, & McCabe, 2011). Girls and women, on the other hand, Hochschild argued (1983, 163), "are more likely to be presented with the task of mastering anger and aggression in the service of 'being nice.'" Cultural beliefs dictate that nurturing, caretaking, and emotional deference are the purviews of girls and women: they are to monitor other people's emotional states and place their emotional needs above their own (Froyum, 2010a, b).

People make gendered feeling rules stick by holding each other accountable for them in interaction. Jocelyn Hollander (2013, 2018, Chap. 13 in this volume) argues there are three dimensions to accountability: orientation, assessment, and enforcement. Orientation is when we redirect our attention to a particular way of thinking and acting. People assess us when they determine how closely we follow an interaction order. They enforce scripts when they judge us according to our compliance, tell us to do things differently, or criticize or hurt us into changing our ways. Hochschild identified "rule reminders," which make people account for their emotions, as one way that people police feeling rules. In Froyum (2010a, b) and Cox (2016), teachers, mentors and after-school workers policed black and Latino girls' expressions of "attitudes" so that girls signified their competence and willingness to achieve in school by being silent, responsive to demands, and still. Another common form of

accountability is to associate boys'/men's caring and caretaking with femininity and being gay (Cottingham, Johnson, & Taylor, 2016; Froyum, 2007; Pascoe, 2011). Even common sayings such as "nice guys finish last" act as a form of accountability (Talbot & Quayle, 2010). Over time, we may come to orient, assess, and enforce ourselves simply by imagining how others would react to us. These forms of accountability, thus, transform loose gendered feeling rules into social standards which reinforce gendered emotion work and expressions (Rogers, Schröder, & Scholl, 2013). Accountability further genders an interaction when people police the expressions of an emotion by one group but not another.

3 Gendered Socialization of Feeling Rules and Emotional Capital

Children learn the gendered rules of emotion management early. Hochschild argued that families train children to feel and manage emotions in ways which matter throughout their lives. Hochschild's theory focused on the classed nature of primary emotional socialization and its connection to power: while adults control working-class children through rules, they control middle-class children through *feeling* rules. Middle-class children learn that feelings, including their own, are important and ought to be controlled and managed in order to get ahead. Through this socialization, children develop emotional capital (Andrew, 2015; Cottingham, 2016; Froyum, 2010b; Reay, 2004), or the emotional "skills and habits that people translate into social advantages" (Froyum, 2010a, b, 39). Cottingham (2016, 454) emphasizes that emotional capital includes "emotion-based knowledge, emotion management skills, and feeling capacities" (p. 454), which are "trans-situationally available regardless of its use in practice" (p. 460).

Research demonstrates that parents and other adults socialize children in gendered feeling rules, and these processes are infused with power. Parents foster niceness among girls by restricting or dismissing girls' expressions of

anger but rewarding their expressions of sadness, fear, anxiety, and distress (Chaplin, Cole, & Zahn-Waxler, 2005; Garside & Klimes-Dougan, 2002; Root & Rubin, 2010), including for neuro-diverse girls (Blum, 2015). Additionally, adults teach girls to be emotionally deferent to others in order to gain the acceptance of higher status individuals. They socialize girls to be sensitive to other people's emotional needs and to accommodate them.

Schools reinforce deferent, pleasing emotional capital among girls. Brown (2005, 155) finds girls' emotional accommodation to be a central component of niceness within schools: "Nice girls are kind, caring; they listen; they do not hurt others, get in trouble, or cause scenes; they do not express anger openly or say what they want directly; they do not brag or call attention to themselves." Teachers, parents, and other adults focus on teaching girls to "be nice" or submissive "ladies" (Bettie, 2000; Hill, 2005; Luttrell, 2003; Morris, 2005b, 2007; Tyson, 2003). Nice girls, in turn, are easier to manage. Teachers better evaluate girls who are quiet rather than questioning, accommodating rather than obstinate (Gansen & Martin, 2018, Chap. 6 in this volume), teaching girls to suppress anger and frustration.

On the flip side, masculinity dictates that emotional control, especially of emotions which make boys vulnerable, is a central part of displaying manhood (Schwalbe, 2014). In turn, parents expect boys to feel and express less anxiety, fear, and sadness and more anger (Root & Rubin, 2010), although research shows that parents problematize and punish boys' expressions of anger (Klimes-Dougan et al., 2007; Nelson, Leerkes, O'Brien, Calkins, & Marcovitch, 2012). Some research suggests a broadening of emotional socialization for boys. In a diverse sample of 42 parents of preschool children in Kane (Kane, 2006), parents responded positively to play which fostered nurturing and empathy among boys. Parents, especially mothers, wanted boys to be able to care for their children and viewed boys playing at domesticity as training to do so. Nonetheless, some parents, especially fathers, fretted over their son's crying and excessive emotionality.

Emotional control and independence is so strongly associated with manhood that many men practice stoicism and staying strong in the face of stressful life events (Schwab, Addis, Reigeluth, & Berger, 2016) and consider help seeking even in the face of cancer to be feminine and uncomfortable (Wenger, 2013).

3.1 Intersections with Racism and Class

The gendering of emotional socialization intersects with race, ethnicity, and social class. Recent research, for example, emphasizes the racialized and classed nature of gendered cultural beliefs (Collins, 2004; Penner & Saperstein, 2013; Ridgeway & Kricheli-Katz, 2013), some of which relate to feeling rules and emotional capital. Deeply entrenched racial stereotypes frame black men and Latino men as criminals and troublemakers, who are angry and emotionally out of control, while Asian men are stereotyped as submissive, asexual model minorities (Ridgeway & Kricheli-Katz, 2013). Black women face stereotypes that they are sexually loose and angry (Collins, 2004), while Latinas and Asian women contend with images of themselves as docile and compliant (Ridgeway & Kricheli-Katz, 2013). These stereotypes influence not only gendered feeling rules but how others hold each other accountable for feeling expressions in interaction.

Thus, what research often presents as racially or ethnically neutral gendered feeling rules are actually based on white cultural standards. Whether black and Latino men can establish manhood through emotional control, suppression of emotions and expression of anger, for instance, depends on the class context in which interactions happen. On the one hand, controlling emotions and minimizing vulnerability are essential pieces of the “code of the street” which establish respect for low-income black boys and Latinos in certain urban contexts (Anderson, 1999; Carter, 2005).

On the other hand, upwardly-mobile and middle-class boys/men of color or those in white

social contexts face controlling images which lead to feeling rules based in the suppression of anger, which more closely resembles the gendered feeling rules for girls/women. Adults who raise and teach youth and young men of color contend with these stereotypes when they socialize feeling rules. They recognize that many white gatekeepers fear and resent assertive black children and young adults, who are perceived as disrespectful and belligerent. Teachers, for example, often punish emotional willfulness among boys of color (Carter, 2003; Dance, 2002; Ferguson, 2000; Lewis, 2003; MacLeod, 1995; Morris, 2005a, 2007; Suizzo, Robinson, & Pahlke, 2008; Tolman, 1996). In Morris (2005b), teachers were especially concerned with Latino boys taking on gang-affiliated cultural capital. Adults of color also worry about preparing black youth, especially boys, for encounters with police (Dow, 2016).

In these instances adults foster a deferential, respectability-based form of emotional capital so to demonstrate respect for positions of authority and to protect children from discrimination (Froyum, 2013b). Black parents and class-conscious teachers and mentors try to teach black youth to distance themselves from stereotypes of black boys as dangerous, angry, or “full of attitude” (Cox, 2016; Dow, 2016; Froyum, 2010a; Froyum, 2013b). Black mothers, for example, are less likely to view the expression of anger, fear, and sadness in public as appropriate for children than their white counterparts do, and they view the displaying of these emotions as having negative consequences for boys (Nelson et al., 2012). Nelson et al. also found that black mothers actively encouraged less expression of anger, fear, and sadness than white parents. They were also more punitive and minimizing of them, especially for boys. Cox (2016) studied the feeling rules at Launch, a program which prepares high achieving low- and moderate-income Latino and black students for boarding school. She found that mentors and administrators socialized students to follow two feeling rules: “a mildly pleasant demeanor and the self-disciplined acquiescence to authority” (p. 493). Mentors checked their behavior with either

“Room for Repair” or “Boxed In” “rule reminders.” Room for Repair reminders allowed students to correct their emotion display and continue their interaction without embarrassing them, while Boxed In reminders demanded students immediately comply in front of their peers. When students responded to Boxed In reminders with reluctance or frustration, gatekeepers determined they were ready for boarding school. An after-school program taught black boys to distance themselves from street manhood by controlling emotional reactions and making rationalistic, instrumental decisions in their place (Froyum, 2013b). Additionally in Froyum (2013b), after-school workers, especially men, emphasized boys’ entitlement to have fun and taught boys that being tough brings authority and respect from others. Dow (2016) found black middle- and upper-class mothers were particularly concerned with images that their sons were “thugs.” They taught boys how to navigate this thug controlling image through emotional control.

The lessons of emotional control and suppression of anger continue into adulthood, as men of color attend college, strive to become upwardly mobile, and work in white-dominated spaces. Jackson and Wingfield (2013), for instance, studied how black men in a student organization on a predominantly white campus taught other black men to be calm, emotionally restrained, and humble in public, in order to distance themselves from racial stereotypes and display brotherhood with each other. Ironically, they policed each other *through* anger. Other research on black men demonstrates that they do in fact develop emotional restraint, especially of anger, as a way to protect themselves in white-dominated spaces (Wilkins, 2012; Wingfield, 2010).

For status-seeking black and Latino men in particular, then, feeling rules more closely resemble those for girls and women: they are based in emotional deference and accommodation. The feeling rules in Cox’s (2016) study applied equally to blacks, Latinos, different classes, boys and girls. In Morris (2005a, 2007), teachers viewed black girls as assertive

“loudies,” even when they were strong academically. They disciplined them to become more deferential “ladies.” Froyum (2010a, 2010b) found that staff at an after-school program taught black girls to be “good girls” who suppressed their supposedly bad “attitudes” and exercised emotional self-restraint. In each of these cases, feeling rules for girls tie emotional suppression to displaying femininity and gendered respectability. Research on Latinas, additionally, highlights sexual restraint as a way to emphasize ethnic heritage and distancing from white cultural norms (Bettie, 2000; Le Espiritu, 2001).

The connection to cultural heritage is evident among Latino boys, too. While Latino boys are subject to many of the same stereotypes as troublemakers and thus the same control of anger and demeanor as black boys (Cox, 2016), they also engage in emotional socialization in order to maintain ethnic ties. Vasquez (2015) found, for example, that Latino families and peers passed on “disciplined preferences” for Latinos to marry within their ethnic group by surveilling their dating, advising them to date Latinos, and threatening them if they dated non-Latinos. Because Latino men face harsh discipline when dating white women, they especially developed an in-group dating preference.

Thus, research demonstrates the continued association of anger, aggression, and emotional control with manhood and emotional caretaking and deference with womanhood. Families pass along gendered feeling rules in childhood, and schools reinforce them as a form of emotional capital. Research also demonstrates that gendered feeling rules are deeply entrenched in racial inequality, including cultural stereotypes about blacks being overly emotional and expressive of anger.

4 Gendered Institutions of Emotions

Emotion management is also gendered in that feeling rules are embedded within gendered institutional contexts. Above, we saw, for example, how teachers in schools often reinforce

racialized and classed gendered feeling rules among students. Even more research has been conducted on workplaces, the original contexts of Hochschild's work. Hochschild criticized that companies provide feeling rules, which are oppressive for workers who have to fabricate emotions and repress their true emotions. The feelings rules for Hochschild's women flight attendants were extensive: they were to represent the company in public, to treat work like home, to refer to customers as "guests," to appear sincere, to use passive voice when confronting passengers. The purpose was to inflate fliers' sense of importance as a form of customer service. Men bill collectors, on the other hand, deflated their clients' status in order to more readily collect money. When emotions are displayed according to employers' prescriptions and for employers' benefits, Hochschild argued, workers are prevented from acting on their own emotions and interests. They struggle to distinguish between their self and their role as worker. Workers experience "emotive dissonance" because feeling scripts conflict with their own authentic feelings so that they feel phony or robotic.

In fulfilling jobs where workers feel congruence between their authentic feelings and those required by their employers, *employees* control the form, content, and use of their own emotional labor, not employers. They act on their emotions as they see fit so there is little conflict between what employees are *supposed* to feel and what they actually *do* feel, as Hochschild theorized. The worker, rather than a supervisor, monitors emotion work so that the worker role is an extension of the authentic self. Bolton (2000) recognizes this difference when differentiating between prescriptive emotional labor, dictated by employers, and philanthropic emotional labor, where workers themselves define helping others as part of a valued identity.

Workplace feeling rules are gendered when occupational statuses overlap with gender (Collett & Lizardo, 2010; Husso & Hirvonen, 2012; Ragins & Winkel, 2011; Simon & Nath, 2004; Sloan, 2004). Workplaces which promote employee control over feeling rules are often

white male-dominated or male-identified (Johnson, 1997), such as for physicians, attorneys, police, professors, athletes, or the military (Harlow, 2003; Harris, 2002; Martin, 1999; Matthews, 2016; Monaghan, 2002; Persson, 2012; Smith, 2008; Vaccaro et al., 2011). While these mostly male workers perform emotional labor in the course of their work within the "male preserve" (Matthews, 2016), they rather than clients control the interactions and they have more flexibility to express emotions which lead to control, such as anger and frustration. Even in male-dominated professions which require lots of interactions with others, these workers often have authority *over* the client or public—reinforced by a title or badge—and the client/patient and lower-status coworkers are usually deferent to them. So while workers within masculine workplaces may suppress their own emotions (outside of anger) as part of their work, they are not deferent to others. In fact, their emotion work often serves the purpose of garnering power and control over others. Insofar as these occupations continue to be dominated by men and associate emotional control with manhood, emotion work continues to be gendered.

When women do work in male-dominated positions, coworkers, bosses, clients, and customers evaluate their expressions of male-identified emotions (e.g., anger) more negatively. Women are often evaluated as cold when they perform masculinized emotional detachment, even when it is regarded as "professional" behavior. In Pierce (1995), supervisors considered these women "uncooperative" (Wharton, 1999; Wharton & Erickson, 1995). More recent research (Tufail & Polletta, 2015) demonstrates that women's expressions of anger are better received when sandwiched between positive, more traditionally feminine emotions.

Philanthropic emotional labor, on the other hand, is especially common in female-dominated helping professions and largely regarded as the purview of women. The vast majority of research on emotional labor has focused on female- and minority-dominated service professions with lots of interactive labor, such as nursing, fast food, paralegal work, childcare, salon work, modeling,

victims advocacy, teaching, and retail work (Barber, 2016; Froyum, 2013a; Gruys, 2012; Kang, 2003; Kolb, 2011; Kosny & MacEachen, 2010; Lewis, 2005; Mears & Finlay, 2005). Employers consider providing comfort, friendliness, and emotional availability essential in helping or low-status service work, although they are often not part of the formal review process by employers and so remain invisible and uncompensated. Some research finds emotional labor gives workers, usually women, feelings of accomplishment and importance. Abortion clinic workers in Wolkomir and Powers (2007), for example, chose their employment because of their desire to “help others.” Their emotional labor resulted from and reaffirmed the self they were committed to rather than detracting from it. These workers were able to develop authentic senses of self—and, in fact, their work was central to it. It is not unusual either for women workers to frame worker-client/public relationships as “like family” (Dodson & Zinavage, 2007; Froyum, 2013a; Erickson, 2004). Familial-like emotional cultures become problematic for women workers when the emotional labor is unreciprocated or used to exploit workers by juxtaposing “working for love” to “working for money” (Froyum, 2013a). In Romero’s (2002) research on Latino domestics, for instance, white employers hired domestics who reaffirmed their view of themselves as nonracist. They considered friendly and accommodating domestics to be “one of the family” when they loved their children (even when they were away from their own), provided companionship to employers, and cooked ethnic food for them. Being part of the family, in turn, fostered a sense of loyalty so that Latinas would be willing to engage in underpaid work.

Thus, emotion work reinforces the (racialized and classed) gender structure not just based on the gender-differentiated feeling rules but when bosses and clients require women workers or femininized work cultures in support and service roles to perform unreciprocated emotional deference. That is, when the boss or customer is “always right,” as it so often is in female-dominated work. In a classic study by

Pierce (1995), female paralegals did deferent and caretaking emotional labor for male attorneys who pushed them to pay special attention to them and be “cheerful” and “nice” (see also, Lively, 2000). Even though they did much the same work as attorneys and male paralegals, on top of being paid less, female paralegals often felt devalued and forced to mother others.

4.1 Families and Intimate Relationships

Families and intimate relationships are sites where women perform a disproportionate share of emotion work for the benefit of others (Minnotte, Stevens, Minnotte, & Kiger, 2007), including in same sex families (Biblarz & Stacey, 2010) and transgender families (Pfeffer, 2010). While people continue to expect women to be caretakers in relationships (see Armenia 2018, Chap. 34 in this volume; Kane 2018, Chap. 28 in this volume) in general, women are especially responsible for emotion work with children and family members with medical needs (Bianchi, 2011; Biblarz & Stacey, 2010; Blum, 2015; Hays, 1998). Mothers, for example, are subject to expectations that they be self-sacrificing and intensively focused on rearing their children at nearly all costs (Hays, 1998). Despite the increasing contributions of fathers to childcare and changing standards for “involved fathers,” mothers still disproportionately manage emotions within families (Bianchi, 2011; Minnotte, Pedersen, Mannon, & Kiger, 2010). Denham, Bassett, and Wyatt (2010), for example, described mothers as the “emotional gatekeepers and fathers as loving playmate” (45).

The expectation that women be self-sacrificing in their care for others, including putting their own emotional needs aside, creates a unique emotional burden, especially in single-parent-headed families and families with children with disabilities, aging parents, or physical separation (Bianchi, 2011; Blum, 2015; Klimes-Dougan et al., 2007). Mothers of children with disabilities, for example, advocate for children through complicated bureaucratic mazes to fulfill their children’s school and medical needs,

shielding their children from harm and giving them access to resources (Blum, 2015). Stacey and Ayers' (2012) studied caregivers using California's In Home Supportive Services (IHSS). IHSS pays a meager wage to family members who care for their sick, disabled, or elderly family members via Medicaid Waiver programs. In their sample of mostly female, racially diverse, poor care providers, women family care workers felt "shame, discomfort, and embarrassment" (p. 57) about being paid for their work because people expected them to care for family members out of love rather than for money. Many women even hid from others that they were paid.

Migration, deployment, and imprisonment separate families, creating unique emotional burdens shouldered by women (Green, Ensminger, Robertson, & Juon, 2006; Ryan, 2008; Wildeman, Schnittker, & Turney, 2012). Mothers of children whose fathers were recently incarcerated, for example, have an increased risk of depression and dissatisfaction with life (Wildeman et al., 2012). For Mexican parents who are separated from their children in order to migrate, the emotional role of the mother and financial role of fathers remain intact (Drbey, 2006). Mothers performed emotional care work from a distance and experienced guilt over leaving their children, while fathers did not (Dreby, 2006). When migrant or deported fathers were unable to financially support their children, their emotional ties also faded, while mothers faced the resentment of children who felt abandoned by them (Dreby, 2006, 2012).

Some of emotional burdens of separation are lessened by strong support systems or extended families. Research on Vietnamese migrants found fathers and not just mothers maintained an emotional connection to children, while kinship networks alleviated some of the emotional burden on children left behind (Hoang & Yeoh, 2012). Spatial separation may even diminish some of the emotion work demands on some women. Carework is part of daughter-in-laws' duties in India, but distance prevented migrating women from caring for their in laws' physical and emotional needs, which some women found freeing (Mehrotra & Calasanti, 2010).

Emotion work in relationships is not restricted to parenting (Fahs & Swank, 2016). In a study of sexual experiences with a diverse (across age, sexual identity, and race and ethnicity) sample, women performed two types of emotion work during sexual encounters: around desiring sex and satisfaction during sex (Fahs & Swank, 2016). In encounters with men, women, for example, tolerated sexual pain and faked orgasm so that men felt sexually skilled and powerful. In encounters with women, women reported performing emotion work around giving and receiving orgasms (Fahs & Swank, 2016, 61).

Thus, the research on workplaces and families reveals that emotions are deeply entrenched within the cultural expectations of actors, with women bearing the emotional brunt and benefits of responsibility for others both at work and at home.

5 Unique Emotional Toll of Oppression

Finally, emotion work is gendered because being oppressed brings unique emotional experiences and burdens, which require additional management. Survey research consistently finds that women experience more anger and depression than men (Simon & Lively, 2010). In the previous section, we saw how such family separation due to migration or imprisonment strains women. Rape, sexual harassment, "forcible interaction" (Dunn, 2014), and microaggressions provide additional examples of interactions which are grounded in the gender structure and exact a toll on women (Boyle & McKinzie, 2015; Harlow, 2003; Kolb, 2011; McCabe, 2009; McLaughlin, Uggen, & Blackstone, 2012). In Williams' (2003) study of flight attendants, for example, women encountered "demanding publics" who sexually harassed or degraded them, which required additional emotion management to fulfill professional expectations. In Froyum (2013a), women after-school program workers did substantially more emotional labor than their male counterparts because of the microaggressions they experienced at the hands of administrators

and board members and yet were paid less. Other studies have pointed out the emotional toll caretaking takes (Lewis, 2005). Indeed, perceptions of inequity are closely tied to emotions (Kemper, 1978). Within families, individuals who perceive themselves as doing more than their fair share of housework, for instance, experience more distress, anger, and rage and less excitement than those who do not have that perspective (Lively, Steelman, & Powell, 2010).

6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have demonstrated how emotions are part of the gender structure of our lives. Not only do gender stereotypes about emotions continue but they are deeply entrenched in our socialization of children, our interactions with others, and important social institutions, such as school, work, and family. Arlie Hochschild's research spurred numerous studies on the gendered nature of feeling rules and emotion work, while later studies focused on policing emotions as a capital resource. Together, these bodies of research illustrate three ways in which emotions are gendered and fundamental to reproducing gender inequality. First, women and men are taught and held accountable to different feeling rules. These racialized- and classed gendered feeling rules make anger and frustration the purview of men, especially white, middle-class men. Alternatively, women and some men of color face interactional expectations that they be emotional caretaking, deferent, and available to people with authority. Families teach children these feeling rules, which are reinforced in interactions and in schools so to produce gender-based emotional capital.

Second, the emotional contexts of prominent institutions are gendered and people within them face gendered expectations for managing their own and other people's feelings. Male-dominated workplaces and those with masculine-typed cultures foster and reward the free expression of anger and frustration, while policing emotional vulnerability among men. For women in them, expression of anger brings risks, which they minimize by expressing more

traditionally feminized emotions before and after. In helping work, dominated by women and feminine cultures, employers and publics expect mostly women and minority workers to foster positive emotional experiences and preference the emotional needs of others over their own. These findings are echoed in research on families, where women still face expectations that they be primary caretakers and place the needs of others above their own. Emotion management at work and home is often fulfilling to women and tied to their identities as good workers and mothers. However, emotion work continues to be invisible and unpaid and can lead to burnout and resentment.

Finally, research shows that experiences rooted in the gender structure—such as sexual harassment or microaggressions—lead to negative emotional experiences that women must manage. Thus, navigating the world with the unique risks of being victimized and harassed by others creates an additional layer of emotion work for women.

6.1 Future Research

Despite the research attention that gendered emotions have garnered over the last several decades, several areas of study need further elaboration. Several additional intersections of inequality need examination, particularly for people with disabilities and Asians. We know, for example, that women disproportionately care for family members with disabilities, but we know less about how feeling rules themselves intersect with disabilities. Linda Blum (2015), for example, links the vulnerability of boys with emotional-behavioral disorders to gender policing. How does this work? To what consequence for the gender structure? How do disabilities create uniquely gendered feeling rules? Similarly, racialized gender stereotypes for Asians differ from those of other racial minority groups. How do the expectations for docility, for example, play out in classrooms?

Additionally, we need more research demonstrating the accountability processes around

emotions. Recent research has emphasized thinking of emotion work comprehensively and as shifting during the same interactions. Andrew (2015), for example, emphasizes that importance of emotional resiliency and flexibility. How people translate these into social advantages deserves more inquiry. Feeling-rule violations (in Hochschild as well as Cox, 2016) and Goffman's (1959) concept of "saving face" offer examples of ways people might enforce or deal with being held accountable to feeling rules. But we need much more research to understand *how* we enforce gendered feeling rules in order to understand how to change them.

Finally, little research examines the effect of emotion management on the interactant/benefactor in interactions. How do customers or patients think about and respond to various forms of emotion work? What do they expect? What happens when their expectations are not met? And how do they respond to feeling rules directed *at them*? Only by examining interactions in their totality will we better understand the gendered nature of emotion work and its consequences.

References

- Anderson, E. (1999). *Code of the streets: Decency, violence, and the moral life of the inner city*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Andrew, Y. (2015). 'I'm strong within myself': Gender, class and emotional capital in childcare. *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 36(5), 651–668.
- Barber, K. (2016). "Men wanted": Heterosexual aesthetic labor in the masculinization of the hair salon. *Gender & Society*, 30(4), 618–642. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0891243216637827>.
- Bettie, J. (2000). Women without class: Chicas, cholas, trash, and the presence/absence of class identity. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture & Society*, 26(1), 1–35.
- Bianchi, S. M. (2011). Family change and time allocation in American families. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 638(1), 21–44.
- Biblarz, T. J., & Stacey, J. (2010). How does the gender of parents matter? *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 72(1), 3–22.
- Blum, L. M. (2015). *Raising generation Rx: Mothering kids with invisible disabilities in an age of inequality*. New York City: New York University Press.
- Bolton, S. C. (2000). Emotion here, emotion there, emotional organisations everywhere. *Critical Perspectives on Accounting*, 11, 155–171.
- Boyle, K. M., & McKinzie, A. E. (2015). Resolving negative affect and restoring meaning: Responses to deflection produced by unwanted sexual experiences. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 78(2), 151–172. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0190272514564073>.
- Brown, L. M. (2005). In the bad or good of girlhood: Social class, schooling, and white femininities. In L. Weis & M. Fine (Eds.), *Beyond silenced voices: Class, race, and gender in United States schools* (pp. 147–162). Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Carter, P. L. (2003). 'Black' cultural capital, status positioning, and schooling conflicts for low-income African American youth. *Social Problems*, 50(1), 136–155.
- Carter, P. L. (2005). "Black" cultural capital, status positioning, and schooling conflicts for low-income African American youth. *Social Problems*, 50(1), 136–155.
- Chaplin, T. M., Cole, P., & Zahn-Waxler, C. (2005). Parental socialization of emotion expression: Gender differences and relations to child adjustment. *Emotion*, 5(1), 80–88.
- Collett, J. L., & Lizardo, O. (2010). Occupational status and the experience of anger. *Social Forces*, 88(5), 2079–2104.
- Collins, P. H. (2004). *Black sexual politics: African Americans, gender, and the new racism*. New York: Routledge.
- Cottingham, M. D. (2016). Theorizing emotional capital. *Theory and Society*, 45(5), 451–470. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-016-9278-7>.
- Cottingham, M. D., Johnson, A. H., & Taylor, T. (2016). Heteronormative labour: Conflicting accountability structures among men in nursing. *Gender, Work & Organization*, 23(6), 535–550. <https://doi.org/10.1111/gwao.12140>.
- Cox, A. B. (2016). Correcting behaviors and policing emotions: How behavioral infractions become feeling-rule violations. *Symbolic Interaction*, 39(3), 484–503.
- Dance, L. J. (2002). *Tough fronts: The impact of street culture on schooling*. New York: Routledge.
- Denham, S. A., Bassett, H. H., & Wyatt, T. M. (2010). Gender differences in the socialization of preschoolers' emotional competence. *New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development*, 2010(128), 29–49. <https://doi.org/10.1002/cd.267>.
- Dodson, L., & Zincavage, R. M. (2007). "It's like a family" caring labor, exploitation, and race in nursing homes. *Gender & Society*, 21(6), 905–928.
- Dow, D. M. (2016). The deadly challenges of raising African American boys: Navigating the controlling image of the "thug". *Gender & Society*, 30(2), 161–188. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0891243216629928>.
- Dreby, J. (2006). Honor and virtue: Mexican parenting in the transnational context. *Gender & Society*, 20(1), 32–59.

- Dreby, J. (2012). The burden of deportation on children in Mexican immigrant families. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 74(4), 829–845.
- Dunn, J. L. (2014). What love has to do with it: The cultural construction of emotion and sorority women's responses to forcible interaction*. *Social Problems*, 46(3), 440–459. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3097109>.
- Erickson, K. (2004). To invest or detach? Coping strategies and workplace culture in service work. *Symbolic Interaction*, 27(4), 549–572.
- Le Espiritu, Y. (2001). 'We don't sleep around like white girls do': Family, culture, and gender in Filipina American lives. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture & Society*, 26(2), 415–440.
- Fahs, B., & Swank, E. (2016). The other third shift? Women's emotion work in their sexual relationships. *Feminist Formations*, 28(3), 46–69.
- Ferguson, A. A. (2000). *Bad boys: Public schools in the making of black masculinity*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press.
- Froyum, C. M. (2007). 'At least i'm not gay': Heterosexual identity making among poor black teens. *Sexualities*, 10(5), 603–622.
- Froyum, C. M. (2010a). Making 'good girls': Sexual agency in the sexuality education of low-income black girls. *Culture, Health & Sexuality*, 12(1), 59–72.
- Froyum, C. M. (2010b). The reproduction of inequalities through emotional capital: The case of socializing low-income black girls. *Qualitative Sociology*, 3(1), 37–54.
- Froyum, C. M. (2013a). 'For the betterment of kids who look like me': Professional emotional labour as a racial project. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 36(6), 1070–1089. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2011.644309>.
- Froyum, C. M. (2013b). Leaving the street alone: Contesting street manhood as a gender project. *Journal of Gender Studies*, 22(1), 38–53.
- Garside, R. B., & Klimes-Dougan, B. (2002). Socialization of discrete negative emotions: Gender differences and links with psychological distress. *Sex Roles*, 47(3/4), 115–128.
- Goffman, E. (1959). *The presentation of self in everyday life*. Garden City, AT: Doubleday.
- Goffman, E. (1961). *Encounters: Two studies in the sociology of interaction*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc.
- Green, K. M., Ensminger, M. E., Robertson, J. A., & Juon, H.-S. (2006). Impact of adult sons' incarceration on African American mothers' psychological distress. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 68(2), 430–441.
- Gruys, K. (2012). Does this make me look fat? Aesthetic labor and fat talk as emotional labor in a women's plus-size clothing store. *Social Problems*, 59(4), 481–500. <https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2012.59.4.481>.
- Harlow, R. (2003). "Race doesn't matter, but ...": The effect of race on professors' experiences and emotion management in the undergraduate college classroom. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 348–363.
- Harris, L. C. (2002). The emotional labour of barristers: An exploration of emotional labour by status professionals. *Journal of Management Studies*, 39(4), 553–584.
- Hays, S. (1998). *The cultural contradictions of motherhood*. Yale University Press.
- Hill, S. A. (2005). *Black intimacies: A gender perspective on families and relationships*. Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press.
- Hoang, L. A., & Yeoh, B. S. A. (2012). Sustaining families across transnational spaces: Vietnamese migrant parents and their left-behind children. *Asian Studies Review*, 36(3), 307–325.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1979). Emotion work, feeling rules, and social structure. *American Journal of Sociology*, 551–575.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1983). *The managed heart: Commercialization of human feeling*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hollander, J. A. (2013). I demand more of people: Accountability, interaction, and gender change. *Gender & Society*, 27(1), 5–29.
- Husso, M., & Hirvonen, H. (2012). Gendered agency and emotions in the field of care work. *Gender, Work & Organization*, 19(1), 29–51.
- Jackson, B. A., & Wingfield, A. H. (2013). Getting angry to get ahead: Black college men, emotional performance, and encouraging respectable masculinity. *Symbolic Interaction*.
- Johnson, A. G. (1997). *The gender knot: Unraveling our patriarchal legacy*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Kane, E. W. (2006). "No way my boys are going to be like that!": Parents' responses to children's gender nonconformity. *Gender & Society*, 20(2), 149–176. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0891243205284276>.
- Kang, M. (2003). The managed hand: The commercialization of bodies and emotions in Korean immigrant-owned nail salons. *Gender & Society*, 17(5), 820–839.
- Kemper, T. D. (1978). *A social interactional theory of emotion*. New York: Wiley.
- Klimes-Dougan, B., Brand, A. E., Zahn-Waxler, C., Usher, B., Hastings, P. D., Kendziora, K., et al. (2007). Parental emotion socialization in adolescence: Differences in sex. *Age and Problem Status. Social Development*, 16(2), 326–342. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9507.2007.00387.x>.
- Kolb, K. H. (2011). Sympathy work: Identity and emotion management among victim-advocates and counselors. *Qualitative Sociology*, 34(1), 101–119.
- Kosny, A., & MacEachen, E. (2010). Gendered, invisible work in non-profit social service organizations: Implications for worker health and safety. *Gender, Work and Organization*, 17(4), 359–380.
- Leidner, R. (1999). Emotional labor in service work. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 561, 81–95.
- Lewis, A. E. (2003). *Race in the Schoolyard: Negotiating the color line in classrooms and communities*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

- Lewis, P. (2005). Suppression or expression: An exploration of emotion management in a special care baby unit. *Work, Employment & Society, 19*(3), 565–581.
- Lively, K. J. (2000). Reciprocal emotion management. *Work and Occupations, 27*(1), 32–63.
- Lively, K. J., Steelman, L. C., & Powell, Brian. (2010). Equity, emotion, and household division of labor. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 73*(4), 358–379. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0190272510389012>.
- Luttrell, W. (2003). *Pregnant bodies, fertile minds: Gender, race, and the schooling of pregnant teens*. New York: Routledge.
- MacLeod, J. (1995). *Ain't no makin' it*. Boulder, Boulder: Westview Press.
- Martin, S. E. (1999). Police force or police service? Gender and emotional labor. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 561*(1), 111–126.
- Matthews, C. R. (2016). The tyranny of the male preserve. *Gender & Society, 30*(2), 312–333.
- McCabe, J. (2009). Racial and gender microaggressions on a predominantly-white campus: Experiences of black, latina/o and white undergraduates. *Race, Gender & Class, 133*–151.
- McLaughlin, H., Uggen, C., & Blackstone, A. (2012). Sexual harassment, workplace authority, and the paradox of power. *American Sociological Review, 77* (4), 625–647.
- Mears, A., & Finlay, W. (2005). Not just a paper doll: How models manage bodily capital and why they perform emotional labor. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 34*(3), 317–343.
- Mehrotra, M., & Calasanti, T. M. (2010). The family as a site for gendered ethnic identity work among Asian Indian immigrants. *Journal of Family Issues, 31*(6), 778–807.
- Minnotte, K. L., Pedersen, D. E., Mannon, S. E., & Kiger, G. (2010). Tending to the emotions of children: Predicting parental performance of emotion work with children. *Marriage & Family Review, 46*(3), 224–241.
- Minnotte, K. L., Stevens, D. P., Minnotte, M. C., & Kiger, G. (2007). Emotion-work performance among dual-earner couples: Testing four theoretical perspectives. *Journal of Family Issues, 28*(6), 773–793.
- Monaghan, L. (2002). Hard men, shop boys and others: Embodying competence in a masculinised occupation. *Sociological Review, 50*(3), 334–355.
- Morris, E. W. (2005a). “Tuck in that shirt!” Race, class, gender, and discipline in an urban school. *sociological perspectives, 48*(1), 25–48.
- Morris, E. W. (2005b). “Tuck in that shirt!” Race, class, gender, and discipline in an urban school. *Sociological Perspectives, 48*(1), 25–48. <https://doi.org/10.1525/sop.2005.48.1.25>.
- Morris, E. W. (2007). ‘Ladies’ or ‘loudies’? Perceptions and experiences of black girls in classrooms. *Youth & Society, 38*(4), 490–515.
- Nelson, J. A., Leerkes, E. M., O’Brien, M., Calkins, S. D., & Marcovitch, S. (2012). African American and European American mothers’ beliefs about negative emotions and emotion socialization practices. *Parenting, 12*(1), 22–41. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15295192.2012.638871>.
- Pascoe, C. J. (2011). *Dude, you’re a fag: Masculinity and sexuality in high school, with a new preface*. Univ of California Press.
- Penner, A. M., & Saperstein, A. (2013). Engendering racial perceptions: An intersectional analysis of how social status shapes race. *Gender & Society, 27*(3), 319–344. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0891243213480262>.
- Persson, A. (2012). An unintended side effect of pepper spray: Gender trouble and “repair work” in an armed forces unit. *Men and Masculinities, 15*(2), 132–151. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184x11429596>.
- Pfeffer, C. A. (2010). “Women’s work”? Women partners of transgender men doing housework and emotion work. *Journal of Marriage and Family, 72*(1), 165–183. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-3737.2009.00690.x>.
- Pierce, J. L. (1995). *Gender trials: Emotional lives in contemporary law firms*. Berkeley, CA: University of Berkeley Press.
- Ragins, B. R., & Winkel, D. E. (2011). Gender, emotion and power in work relationships. *Human Resource Management Review, 21*(4), 377–393.
- Reay, D. (2004). Gendering bourdieu’s concept of capitals? Emotional capital, women and social class. In *Feminism after Bourdieu* (pp. 57–74). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Ridgeway, C. L., & Kricheli-Katz, T. (2013). Intersecting cultural beliefs in social relations: Gender, race, and class binds and freedoms. *Gender & Society, 27*(3), 294–318. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0891243213479445>.
- Ridgeway, C. L., Stets, J. E., & Turner, J. H. (2006). Expectation states theory and emotion. In *Handbook of the sociology of emotions* (pp. 347–367). Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research: Springer US.
- Rogers, K. B., Schröder, T., & Scholl, W. (2013). The affective structure of stereotype content: Behavior and emotion in intergroup context. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 76*(2), 125–150. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0190272513480191>.
- Romero, M. (2002). *Maid in the U.S.A.* New York: Routledge (Second Aufl).
- Root, A. K., & Rubin, K. H. (2010). Gender and parents’ reactions to children’s emotion during the preschool years. *New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development, 2010*(128), 51–64. <https://doi.org/10.1002/cd.268>.
- Ryan, L. (2008). Navigating the emotional terrain of families “here” and “there”: Women, migration and the management of emotions. *Journal of Intercultural Studies, 29*(3), 299–313.
- Sattel, J. W. (1976). The inexpressive male: Tragedy or sexual politics? *Social Problems, 23*(4), 469–477.
- Schwab, J. R., Addis, M. E., Reigeluth, C. S., & Berger, J. L. (2016). Silence and (in)visibility in men’s accounts of coping with stressful life events. *Gender & Society, 30*(2), 289–311. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0891243215602923>.

- Schwalbe, M. (2014). *Manhood acts: Gender and the practices of domination*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
- Schwalbe, M. (2015). *Manhood acts: Gender and the practices of domination*. Routledge.
- Simon, R. W., & Lively, K. (2010). Sex, anger and depression. *Social Forces*, 88(4), 1543–1568.
- Simon, R. W., & Nath, L. E. (2004). Gender and emotion in the united states: Do men and women differ in self-reports of feelings and expressive behavior? 1. *American Journal of Sociology*, 109(5), 1137–1176.
- Sloan, M. M. (2004). The effects of occupational characteristics on the experience and expression of anger in the workplace. *Work and Occupations*, 31(1), 38–72.
- Smith, A. T. (2008). Passion work: The joint production of emotional labor in professional wrestling. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 71(2), 157–176.
- Stacey, C. L., & Ayers, L. L. (2012). Caught between love and money: The experiences of paid family caregivers. *Qualitative Sociology*, 35(1), 47–64.
- Suizzo, M.-A., Robinson, C., & Pahlke, E. (2008). African American Mothers' socialization beliefs and goals with young children: Themes of history, education, and collective independence. *Journal of Family Issues*, 29(3), 287–316.
- Talbot, K., & Quayle, M. (2010). The perils of being a nice guy: Contextual variation in five young women's constructions of acceptable hegemonic and alternative masculinities. *Men and Masculinities*.
- Tolman, D. L. (1996). Adolescent girls' sexuality: Debunking the myth of the urban girl. In B. J. R Leadbeater & N. Way (Eds.), *Urban girls: Resisting stereotypes, creating identities* (pp. 255–271). New York: New York University Press.
- Tufail, Z., & Polletta, F. (2015). The gendering of emotional flexibility why angry women are both admired and devalued in debt settlement firms. *Gender & Society*: 0891243215569050.
- Tyson, K. (2003). Notes from the back of the room: Problems and paradoxes in the schooling of young black students. *Sociology of Education*, 76(4), 326–343.
- Vaccaro, C. A., Schrock, D. P., & McCabe, J. M. (2011). Managing emotional manhood: Fighting and fostering fear in mixed martial arts. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 74(4), 414–437.
- Vasquez, J. M. (2015). Disciplined preferences: Explaining the (re) production of latino endogamy. *Social Problems*, 62(3), 455–475.
- Wenger, L. M. (2013). Moving through Illness with strong backs and soft fronts: A substantive theory of men's help-seeking during cancer. *Men and Masculinities*, 16(5), 517–539. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184x13501177>.
- Wharton, A. S. (1999). The psychosocial consequences of emotional labor. *The annals of the american academy of political and social science*, 561(1), 158–176.
- Wharton, A. S., & Erickson, R. J. (1995). The consequences of caring: Exploring the links between women's job and family emotion work. *Sociological Quarterly*, 36, 273–296.
- Wildeman, C., Schnittker, J., & Turney, K. (2012). Despair by association? The mental health of mothers with children by recently incarcerated fathers. *American Sociological Review*, 77(2), 216–243.
- Wilkins, A. (2012). "Not out to start a revolution" race, gender, and emotional restraint among black university men. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 41(1), 34–65.
- Williams, C. (2003). Sky service: The demands of emotional labour in the airline industry. *Gender, Work and Organization*, 10(5), 513–550.
- Wingfield, A. H. (2010). Are some emotions marked 'whites only'? Racialized feeling rules in professional workplaces. *Social Problems*, 57(2), 251–268.
- Wolkomir, M., & Powers, J. (2007). Helping women and protecting the self: The challenge of emotional labor in an abortion clinic. *Qualitative Sociology*, 30, 153–169.

Carissa Froyum is an associate professor of sociology at the University of Northern Iowa. She is a former deputy editor of the *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, and co-editor of *Inside Social Life*, 7th edition, and *Creating and Contesting Social Inequalities*, both with Oxford University Press. Her research appears in *Qualitative Sociology*, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, and *Sexualities* among other places. Her work focuses on how emotions and identities reproduce inequalities.

Part VII
**Gendered Contexts in Social
Institutions**

Contemporary Approaches to Gender and Religion

31

Jennifer McMorris and Jennifer Glass

Abstract

Religious messages, mores, and laws profoundly shape the gendered lives of men and women. Religious engagement has been found to influence sexual practices, family formation, workforce engagement, and a host of other life domains. The influence of institutional religion on these elements of lived experiences is often treated as detrimental to women and religious institutions regarded as inherently patriarchal. However, women are often substantially more engaged in religious institutions and invested in religious identities than men. In this chapter we begin by reviewing theories explaining women's high rates of religious engagement and belief. We then evaluate common religious ideologies about gendered behaviors and examine the effects of such ideologies on the political, societal, economic, and familial experiences of men and women. We conclude by

summarizing the state of current research into the intersection of religion and gender and providing recommendations for future approaches.

A seeming paradox lies at the heart of research into the intersection of religion and gender. While religions often impose restrictive gender ideologies on congregants and have been criticized as inherently patriarchal or anti-female by many feminist thinkers, they often simultaneously have more female than male congregants and women within religious communities are often the most active and engaged worshippers. Explaining this apparent contradiction lies at the heart of much of the theoretical research conducted into the relationship between gender and religion. We begin by discussing the research attempting to explain women's greater religiosity overall, then turn to the perplexing question of how they reconcile their spiritual needs with the often negative depictions of women or restrictive behavioral codes applied to them by religious authorities. We move next to contemporary trends in religious observance, which show increasing bifurcation of the population in industrialized countries into observant or fundamentalist believers on the one hand and those who have disaffiliated from any formal religion on the other. How this impacts men and women's lives, especially given the entanglement of religious conservatives in politics and law-making, is an understudied area within the sociology of religion.

This research was supported by the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development Award (#5R24 HD042849) to the Population Research Center at The University of Texas at Austin. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors. Please do not cite without permission of the author. Direct correspondence to Jennifer Glass, Department of Sociology, University of Texas, Austin, TX 78712. E-mail: jennifer-glass@utexas.edu.

J. McMorris · J. Glass (✉)
University of Texas at Austin, Austin, USA
e-mail: jennifer-glass@utexas.edu

1 Gender Differences in Religious Affiliation and Participation

One major theory explaining the gendered gap in religious involvement relies in part on the philosophical concept of ‘Pascal’s Wager’ (Miller & Hoffmann, 1995). Pascal’s Wager contends that, given the unknowable existence of a God, individuals are presented with two possible choices: believe in God and risk having wasted some time, or chose not to believe in God and risk eternal consequences. Thus the safest choice appears to be belief in God. Supporters of this theory argue that women are, on average, more risk-averse men and thus more likely to ‘hedge’ their spiritual bets. Some theorists supporting this risk-aversion explanation have argued that socialization encourages risk-aversion in women. Collett and Lizardo (2009) suggest a renewed focus on power-control theory (PCT). They argue that the differential power structures of patriarchal households, with their strong impact on daughters, socialize girls to greater levels of risk aversion than boys and, consequently, greater levels of religiosity. Many have critiqued this usage of PCT to explain gender differences in religiosity, arguing that both PCT and the risk aversion hypothesis often conflate biological sex with gender characteristics (Cornwall, 2009; Freese & Montgomery, 2007; Hoffmann, 2009). These authors, among others, call for greater engagement with such issues as intersectionality and a more nuanced understanding of gender theory.

Some proponents of this theory suggest that women are biologically predisposed to be more averse to risk, saying that only sex-specific biology could explain the cross-cultural and historical prevalence of female piety (Miller & Stark, 2002; Stark, 2002). Stark (2002) specifically linked testosterone, a hormone present in greater concentration in men, to this proposed biological sex difference in religiosity. Ellison and Bradshaw (2009) suggest something of a middle ground, contending that, as is evidenced in many other areas of scholarship, biology and socialization likely interact to influence the complex association between gender and religious engagement. In

this way, they tie the phenomenon of high rates of female religiosity into a larger body of literature evaluating the interplay of environment and genetics.

Critics have pointed to limitations of this risk-aversion explanation for the gendered gap in religiosity. Carroll (2004) critiqued the premise that women were universally more religious than men across time and culture. He points to evidence of the “feminization of piety” beginning around the 19th century in both Catholic and Protestant European and American traditions. He cites multiple scholarly attempts to explain this process, including evidence that European and American women began to see churches as a place to address and challenge the gendered norms of the era. Some suggest not only that the claim that women have always been more religious than men contentious, but that women in the United States in the modern era are not uniformly more religious than men. Schnabel (2015), analyzing the GSS, found instead that female piety was neither dominant across all religious traditions nor all religious measures. Sullins (2006) used the World Values Survey to also question the universality of feminine piety, finding that women were no more religious than men in a third of surveyed countries. Likewise, Ellis, Hoskins, and Ratnasigam (2016), in a study of both American and Malaysian college students found that, while women in both nations did report higher rates of religiosity on many measures, these higher rates were not consistent or statistically significant in all cases.

While the risk-aversion explanation for female religiosity has absorbed a great deal of academic attention and theoretical debate, many other explanations for high rates of female religiosity have also been proposed. Iannaccone (1990) proposed a structural explanation, arguing that women were often socialized to be religious in the same way that they were socialized to take on most responsibilities within the home. He tied religious engagement to this set of familial responsibilities and argued that, as consequence of this association, women are better at obtaining ‘religious rewards’ for themselves and the members of their household.

Many others have likewise focused on family roles as key forces shaping women's religious engagement (Becker & Hofmeister, 2001; Roozen, McKinney, & Thompson, 1990; Vaus & David, 1984). These theories are often explicitly or implicitly tied to Bahr's Family Life Cycle which argues that religious service attendance follows a distinctive life-cycle pattern, increasing after marriage and after parenthood of elementary school-aged children before declining when children leave home (Bahr, 1970; Chaves, 1991). This theory does not itself offer explanations for the gender gap in religious service attendance, but others have expanded upon it to argue that the primacy women place on roles as mothers may be a key force in shaping their heightened religious engagement (Becker & Hofmeister, 2001; Stolzenberg, Blair-Loy, & Waite, 1995).

Finally, a growing body of research suggests that gender characteristics, rather than biological sex may be a key force shaping differences in religious involvement. Many studies have found that men with personality traits or worldviews generally defined as 'feminine' were more likely to be religious than their counterparts and that similar within-gender effects held for women as well (Frances & Wilcox, 1998; Thompson, 1991; Thompson & Remmes, 2002). These studies use multiple different measures of gender identity including the Bem Sex Role Inventory to find correlations between such feminine characteristics and heightened religious engagement. Proponents of this theory often assume such characteristics to arise as a consequence of socialization rather than hormones or biology. However, such studies have generally been cross-sectional and incapable of speculating on causation.

Much of the research into the gendered gap in religiosity focuses on women or feminine characteristics as the drivers of higher participation; but in a sense this presupposes that women are 'more' religious rather than that men are 'less' religious. While some work, like Stark's testosterone theory, makes arguments which focus on both genders, the majority of theories, which appear to operate on the presupposition that women, rather than men, are the outliers, focus on various aspects of women's lives,

personalities, and experiences in order to explain the gendered gap in religiosity.

This plethora of contradictory theories coupled with a lack of standardization in the measurement of multiple variables, including risk-aversion and religiosity among others, points to the importance of conducting more empirical and theoretical work to explicate these complex relationships. The lack of attention to gender theory in this area is particularly noticeable, and could be remedied with a deeper elucidation of the role of biological (including hormonal), psychological, and social structural aspects of gender in women's greater religious participation. For example, smaller physical stature or strength (biological), bullying at school or home (social psychological), and responsibility for young children's care (social structural) may all predispose women to greater religious affiliation and participation. But these all represent different elements of a particular gender system common in many societies but not ubiquitous in all of them. Gender scholars have spent a great deal of time unpacking the distinctions between biological sex, psychological gender identity, and social structural position in a gendered division of labor, all of which could be fruitfully used to improve our understanding of the relationship between gender and religiosity. Moreover, scholars have done little to unpack the specific elements of religiosity that attract female congregants—is it social support for a shared moral order, practical help and support with childrearing or other tasks of daily life, psychological comfort and solace, or desire to identify with a larger purpose? Do women accept restrictive ideologies and social roles within their religious tradition because they believe in their virtue, or because they accept them in order to obtain other spiritual rewards?

2 Religious Ideologies About Gender

We turn now to the ideologies about gender, sexuality, and procreation within various religious traditions themselves, and their impact on

the women and men who affiliate with those traditions. Although social influences on individuals' gender ideology may come from a variety of sources, religious institutions serve as important transmitters of information about how to organize and conduct family life and child-rearing. Conservative religious groups, in particular, promote a family structure in which married women concentrate on homemaking rather than paid work, especially when their children are young (Bartkowski, 1999; Sherkat, 2001; Smith, 2000), and reify husbands' patriarchal "headship" and moral authority in the household. These groups have been growing in size and influence (Brooks, 2002; Hout, Greeley & Wilde, 2001), both in the U.S. and abroad (Chong 2008; Hawley, 1994; Jeffery & Basu, 2012; Mahmood, 2005). This emphasis on male authority extends to the religious organization itself, where women are denied access to religious leadership or the right to be ordained as religious leaders.

Importantly, while Christianity within the U.S. and Latin America has experienced a growing renaissance of conservative and evangelical Protestants, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, and even Buddhism all have their particular fundamentalist versions expanding in other regions of the world as well (Almond, Appleby, & Sivan, 2003; Emerson & Hartman, 2006; Hawley, 1994; Lehman, 1998; Sen & Wagner, 2009). This rise in fundamentalisms often occurs as a rebellion against modernity and secular moral systems. Many scholars believe it flows from the economic and family upheavals wrought by global capitalist incorporation of nations into a world economy where entire groups (of mostly men) lose their traditional sources of security, support, and authority. As consequence, they focus particularly strongly on ideologies of gender and family behavior. Despite the many theological differences among these religious traditions, fundamentalism within each is often defined by a consistent set of characteristics (Almond et al., 2003; Bruce, 2000; Emerson & Hartman, 2006; Lawrence, 1989; Riesebrodt, 2000). Across the world's major religions, fundamentalist groups

emphasize heterosexuality, the procreative purpose of sex, sexual purity before marriage and modesty of dress and behavior (particularly for women), rigid gender differentiation of roles and responsibilities, and patriarchal household structures (Almond et al., 2003; Chong, 2008; Emerson & Hartman, 2006; Koopmans, 2015; Mahmood, 2005). Both the global spread of religious fundamentalisms and religious intolerance, as well as the similarity in gender ideologies across these otherwise disparate theological movements, suggest that their origins lie in similar processes of social dislocation and rest on similar fears of moral disorder that place unusually burdensome restrictions on women because of their role in procreation and family care.

Given this primacy of family obligations, fundamentalist groups often have higher fertility rates than other religious groups. Among fundamentalist Christians, this focus on fertility is best embodied in the Quiverfull Movement, with its rejection of all forms of birth control and emphasis on children as gifts from God. In practice, many fundamentalist groups, regardless of which broader religious traditions they adhere to, vocally reject various methods of birth control as interfering with divine plans. Women's fertility, in particular, thus becomes deeply bound to their religious devotion and sense of personal worth.

Given this focus on gendered household roles, male headship, and fertility, it is not surprising that many fundamentalist groups are particularly discouraging of and in some cases openly hostile toward the LGBT population (Barton, 2010; Emerson & Hartman, 2006; Fulton, Gorsuch, & Maynard, 1999; Lalic & McLaren, 2010; Ross & Anderson, 2014; Wong & Angela, 2013). Same-sex attraction is regarded as inherently sinful and to be overcome or ignored. In American Protestantism, this discouragement of homosexuality may be most visible in the rise of so called 'conversion therapy' programs designed to uncover and correct the psychological 'illness' of same-sex attraction (Erzen, 2006; Robinson & Spivey, 2007) Such programs often include an emphasis on rigid gender hierarchies

in which 'healthy' men must assert their authority over submissive 'healthy' women. This focus on heteronormative sexuality can have devastating consequences for both men and women. Those who participate in 'conversion' or 'reparative' therapy often experience bouts with depression and stress (Erzen, 2006). Gay Conservative Protestant men who chose to marry women, perhaps in response to pressure to conform to religious norms, can later experience family unrest when they act out their sexual preferences through extramarital affairs (Wolkomir, 2004). Conservative Protestant wives of gay men often report focusing on their own lack of 'femininity' or failures as wives as explanations for their husband's sexual preferences (Wolkomir, 2004). Many Conservative Protestants have held firm to this treatment of homosexuality as a psychological or spiritual disorder even as a growing number of western countries and states within the US have prohibited the practice of conversion or 'ex-gay' therapies. This legal rejection of conversion therapy is a reflection of consensus of mental health practitioners who have come to regard such treatments as unethical and ascientific. The American Psychological Association and the American Pediatric Association along with many other medical groups oppose conversion therapy and, in response, many insurance companies refuse to subsidize such religion-based treatment programs.

While fundamentalist traditions often encourage purity for both men and women, the emphasis on female sexual purity is stronger. In much fundamentalist theology, female desire is stigmatized as inappropriate, and opportunities for men and women to spend time alone together are carefully restricted to preserve this idealization of female virginity. Such focus on female sexuality often includes an implicit assumption about male sexuality, namely that men are vulnerable to sexual temptation, and unable to control their impulses, so the responsibility of regulating male desire falls heavily on women. As consequence, many fundamentalist organizations rely on either codified or implicit rules about appropriate female dress. Women are discouraged from displaying various parts of their

anatomy because doing so might bring on male desire and male attention, which should be restricted to a husband within marriage. Women who violate such dress codes are thus seen as inviting male sexual aggression. The Muslim hijab is often the focus of Western academic and popular discourse on religious dress codes for women, but it is far from anomalous. Multiple Protestant groups including the Mormons, Amish, and Mennonites dictate modest dress for women. Religious schools also institute strict dress codes for students in their halls. Other Orthodox, conservative or fundamentalist groups in a host of faith traditions impose similar restrictions. Such dress codes are often markedly similar, focusing on the length of skirts and sleeves and some form of head covering.

This rise of fundamentalism has not occurred without pushback from secular society. Legislation in many European countries has banned or restricted the wearing of burkas and niqabs in public venues. This legislation is often framed as a protection of women's rights and a symbolic rejection of the conservative gender ideologies associated with fundamentalist religions (Billaud & Castro, 2013; Burchardt, Grier, & García-Romer, 2015a, 2015b; Spohn, 2013). However, many feminist thinkers contend that such laws are themselves deeply problematic, hearkening back to the worst of colonialist racist arguments (Billaud & Castro, 2013; Spohn, 2013). Others argue that such laws, with their focus on female dress are just as problematic for their restriction of 'excessive' clothing as they would be if they required modest dress (Spohn, 2013). Men in fundamentalist groups often also have dress codes tied to their devotion, but failure to adhere to such requirements does not bring the same assumptions of sexual promiscuity or immorality.

Fundamentalist groups across multiple religious traditions often also adhere to codes regarding the physical separation of unmarried men and women. Such codes may apply only to worship services, or they may prohibit unmarried non-related men and women from interacting without chaperones in any environment. For example, as an evangelical Conservative Protestant. Vice President Mike Pence refuses to have

dinner alone with women who are not his wife, or to attend events where alcohol will be served without his wife. These sorts of behavioral codes, much like the dress-codes discussed above, are based on the notion that women are inherently a form of sexual temptation. Because women are an ever-present source of sexual temptation within the fundamentalist community, their bodies and behaviors must be regulated.

Conservative and fundamentalist religious groups are not representative of all religious groups' approach to modernity and reaction to changing social norms, however. Mainline and liberal groups across religious traditions often emphasize strong but more forgiving sexual ethics, accept family planning, reject patriarchal, authoritative households in favor of egalitarianism and an equitable division of household labor, and make space in religious organizations for women's and other disenfranchised groups' participation. The seminary for many mainline and liberal Protestant Christian traditions is often a socially engaged and politically liberal institution. This may be why in the last few decades, we have seen many prominent instances of Episcopalian, Presbyterian, and Methodist religious leaders defying official rules of their denominations in order to appoint gay leaders or officiate at same-sex marriage ceremonies, as well as anoint women leaders, until denominational rules themselves sometimes change towards greater inclusion. Similar processes have occurred in Reform Judaism and "liberation theology" within Catholicism.

Such liberal and mainline leaders do not have free rein in their efforts to reinterpret their faiths in a modern era. Western Protestant leaders in international denominations have had difficulty changing religious rules and teachings on issues of female leadership or homosexuality because they cannot reach consensus with the large proportion of Protestant leaders from more politically and socially conservative nations. Some denominational leaders have also been afraid to push liberal Western religious ethics too aggressively for fear of denominational fracturing both on the international and national levels. This desire to keep peace has led some

denominations to heavily control international organizational meetings in order to keep discussions over such controversial issues from happening. Such caution is likely exacerbated by the shifting demographics of religious adherents with mainline and liberal religious groups shrinking and greater proportions of worshipers globally being born in gender-conservative cultures (Hout et al., 2001; Norris & Inglehart, 2004).

In addition to demographic and organizational challenges, more socially liberal mainline and liberal Protestant leaders have expressed concerns about preaching to the political left of their congregations. There is often something of a political divide between religious leaders and the average congregation member, particularly in southern, rural, or low SES communities (Olson & Cadge, 2002; Cadge et al., 2007; Cadge, Olson, & Wildeman, 2008). For some mainline Protestant leaders this concern about within-congregation difference leads them to conceal not only their religio-political leanings but aspects of their identity as well. Gay and lesbian religious leaders in mainline or liberal churches likewise express deep concerns about discussing their sexuality with congregation members for fear that they will not be accepted (Comstock, 2002).

In open and affirming mainline and liberal denominations where religious leaders and congregants are in concordance in their acceptance of LGBT congregants, religious mores and expectations about gender and relationships are still often both visible and 'traditional' (Adler, 2012; Anderson, 1997; Buzzell, 2001; McQueeney, 2009; Rodriguez and Ouellette, 2000; Scheitle, Merino, & Moore, 2010; Whitehead, 2013). Congregations often implicitly and explicitly discourage sex outside of committed relationships, emphasize the importance of religiously sanctioned marriage, and encourage child-rearing.

Discomfort with the perceived restrictions of life in open and affirming congregations and the rise of the internet as a medium to connect previously isolated individuals or communities has led to the rise of specifically gay and lesbian churches and congregations (Luckenbill, 1998; Anderson, 1997). Because such groups do not

adhere to one particular denominational affiliation and because little research has been done specifically examining such congregations it is difficult to make affirmative statements about their structures, doctrines, or sexual ethics and mores. Greater, perhaps qualitative, research into these groups might produce a rich literature on how stigmatized individuals within a community seek to simultaneously reject such stigma and embrace the broader ideology of the community itself.

3 Contemporary Trends in Religious Observance: Bifurcation and Its Consequences for Gender Systems

While the global rise of religious fundamentalisms has been the most important contemporary religious trend, a simultaneously decline in religious observance in most Western industrialized countries has tempered the impact of resurgent fundamentalism in modernized societies. Indeed, some evidence suggests the growth of secularism in developed countries may be in part a reaction to the rightward movement in the world's major religions (Lugo et al., 2012). Young adults, who are on average more political and socially liberal, are also substantially less likely to affiliate with evangelical Christianity than older generations (Lugo et al., 2012). Whether a cause or an effect of religious fundamentalism, secularism has clearly been ascendant in Western Europe for several generations (Norris & Inglehart, 2004). More noteworthy is the recent spread of secularism in the United States, an environment in which religiosity has traditionally been strong and linked with national identity. Perhaps as a result, secularism in the U. S. has taken the form of identification with a generic "spiritual" label rather than a complete rejection of religious belief (Lugo et al., 2012). But these disaffiliators nevertheless reject the theology and behavioral dictates of organized religion in favor of a more personal and diffuse relationship with the divine that comports more closely with their personal morality.

This group of unaffiliated, many of whom identify as "spiritual but not religious" now represent almost 20% of all Americans and an astounding 32% of Millennials and younger adults (Lugo et al., 2012). The majority of the unaffiliated report objections to religious institutions, including the belief that religious institutions are corrupt or hypocritical as their primary reason for disaffiliation. The unaffiliated are also significantly more politically liberal than their counterparts, suggesting that this rejection of religion in the United States may partially be driven by a symbolic rejection of the conservative values of the Religious Right (Hout & Fischer, 2002). Recent immigration trends have also encouraged the spread of secularism and religious pluralism, with streams increasingly coming from non-Judeo-Christian countries such as China, Korea, and India.

While many secularists will remain so over the life course, the concentration of the "spiritual but not religious" among young people suggests that at least some may return to the religion of their youth as they form their own families (Glass, Sutton, & Fitzgerald, 2015). Additionally, those who remain irreligious throughout their lives tend to have lower fertility rates than fundamentalists or others, suggesting a theoretical peak of unaffiliation (Skirbekk, Kaufmann, & Goujon, 2010). None of this suggests a resurgence of the religious marketplace however, as all western faith traditions find themselves facing increasing obstacles in transmitting religious affiliation across generations (Smith & Sikkink, 2003). Instead, fertility and migration patterns have become key forces shaping a religious landscape that is increasingly bifurcated in religious belief with religious conservatives on one side and the disaffiliated "spiritual but not religious" on the other.

We turn now to the impact of this religious bifurcation on gendered family and labor market behavior, remembering that religious fundamentalisms promote particularly tight linkages between sexuality, reproduction, and marriage. Evidence suggests this bifurcation in religious affiliation closely corresponds to differences in family formation behavior that impact overall

gender equality and women's empowerment. Cahn and Carbone (2010) label this religiously-based coupling of sexual morality and family obligation a "red family" system in contrast to the "blue family" system promoted by the disaffiliated "spiritual but not religious." These models structure the transition to adulthood for young people, especially young women, by shutting off or opening up avenues of achievement and the development of human capital.

In the red family system of religious conservatives, premarital sexual relations, cohabitation, and nonmarital childbearing are eschewed (as are all homoerotic attachments). This strong moral code governing sexual activity and the reification of childbearing as the goal of sexual partnering also lead to strong ideological views about birth control and abortion. Planning for sexual relations when unmarried by visiting doctors or purchasing contraceptives is inappropriate because it suggests that any subsequent sin of promiscuity was both premeditated and intentional (Regnerus, 2007). In addition, some highly effective contraceptives (certain pills and IUD's, for example) are avoided among religious conservatives even after marriage because they are believed to be abortifacents. Abortion is viewed as an attempt to escape the natural consequences of sexual activity through the killing of human life. Not surprisingly given these constraints and the powerful lure of adolescent sexual attraction, red family logic produces either an incredibly strict system of sexual segregation and surveillance as seen in some Middle Eastern societies or a substantial number of nonmarital pregnancies that result in live birth as seen in the U.S. and Latin America, though many are subsequently "legitimated" by engagement or marriage (Pearce & Davis, 2006). Avoiding children in the pursuit of material gain is viewed as both selfish and ungodly, as is the general acquisitiveness of contemporary life.

The blue family system more widely espoused by the disaffiliated "spiritual but not religious", by contrast, does not vilify early sexual involvements and treats adolescent sexual behavior as something to monitor and control for reasons of personal well-being and public health.

Marriage is seen as unsuitable for young people until they have acquired the maturity, life experience, and financial stability to sustain a lifelong commitment and the costs of parenthood. Childbearing and rearing are viewed as serious tasks better eschewed by young people still learning about intimate relationships and still developing their human capital and marketable skills. Within blue family logic, nonmarital coupling is unremarkable as long as protection is used, and nonmarital childbearing is nonproblematic unless it is unplanned by youth who are not yet capable of becoming good parents. The pursuit of human capital and the development of solid interpersonal and relational skills are considered the major tasks of young adulthood, while early family formation is considered a tragedy for both parents and children, leading to more tolerant views of both birth control and abortion to control the timing and spacing of children. Abstinence is neither praised nor condemned, and sexual learning is presumed to occur through early experiences before adult commitments are formed.

It is easy enough to see how the red family system encourages early transitions to adulthood while the blue family system discourages them. If sexual expression is limited to marriage, and educational attainment and the pursuit of material wealth are not to stand in the way of moral commitments to self and others through marriage, then early school leaving, marriage, and parenthood are not only permissible but perhaps preferred. If sexual impulses and attractions are dangerous and sinful outside of the context of marriage, early marriage can be the most parsimonious solution to the threat of promiscuity, nonmarital childbearing, and sexually transmitted diseases. Moral failure is defined most strongly as the refusal to accept children as the natural consequence of sexual partnering—nonmarital births are far less shameful than abortion and can always be neutralized through marriage. Within blue family logic, however, the most important criteria for marriage and parenthood are emotional maturity and financial stability, which are very difficult to develop early in the life course in a modern postindustrial economy. Many,

especially young men, will not achieve these milestones until their late 20's or even early 30's. Within blue family logic, it is unreasonable to expect abstinence from sexual activity for so many years following puberty, and thus sexual partnering and cohabitation before marriage must be tolerated, if not actively encouraged, as the means to keep young people engaged in higher education and early career investments. Moral responsibility is instead lodged in protecting oneself and one's partner from sexual disease and pregnancy through effective contraception, including abortion when necessary. Moral failure includes bringing a child into the world without two functioning parents in a stable middle-class environment.

But religious fundamentalism does more than structure early school leaving and family formation; it also supports a particular household division of labor after children arrive. The idea that men and women have different intrinsic natures and sensibilities that lead to separate but complementary roles in family life comes directly from scriptural authority believed to be inerrant on the subject. This impacts gender inequality in powerful ways. Not only are women discouraged from acquiring human capital in their own right, they are actively encouraged to prioritize family care and avoid labor force participation when children are young, leaving them with few resources to bargain for autonomy or respectful treatment within their household.

How powerful are these ideological forces in women's lives? Empirical research on youth raised in conservative Protestant households in the U.S. suggests that these forces are significant and impactful, even after controlling for region and class background. Conservative religious affiliation accelerates childbearing by several years and shortens schooling by over a year among young white and Hispanic women, and subsequently hinders their capacity to maximize their income and their children's development (Chandler, Kamo, & Werbel, 1994; Glass & Jacobs, 2005). The large and significant effects of childhood religious conservatism on later gender role ideology and paid work also indicate that

religious conservatism helps produce a familial division of labor that discourages women's labor market attainment (Glass & Kanellakos, 2006).

While women bear the brunt of these negative effects on the transition to adulthood, young men raised in conservative Protestant households also find themselves with about a year's less education and lower wages controlling for their human capital (though not the earlier age at reported first birth). Young people who experience accelerated transitions to adulthood, especially women, find themselves with higher total fertility and fewer resources for caring for those children through their own diminished earnings and their inability to stably partner with high-earning spouses. They are limited to job opportunities available to workers with low levels of education and job experience, rely more on kin and extended family for support, have less geographic mobility to take advantage of opportunities outside their immediate county or state of residence, and develop "accumulated disadvantage" over the life course in both financial and physical well-being. While religious participation can and often does help ameliorate some of the disadvantages of early transitions to adulthood, conservative churches themselves do little to support the young families created through "red family logic" (Regnerus, 2007). Not surprisingly, the divorce rate is paradoxically higher in areas of concentrated religious conservatism (Glass & Levchak, 2014).

Perhaps the most visible symbol of 'red state' logic within the United States has been the recent rise of hyperfertility movements among fundamentalist Protestants. These movements, begun in the 1980s, are often broadly referred to as "Quiverfull" though not all practitioners of hyperfertility explicitly associate with the label. The Quiverfull movement, taking its name from a biblical verse likening children to arrows within a quiver, regards hyperfertility as a religious obligation. Movement practitioners explicitly reject the ideologies of feminism as an evil inversion of godly order and instead glorify male household headship (Harrison & Rowley, 2011). This emphasis on patriarchal leadership, with husbands making all final decisions and taking responsibility for earning all funds to support

large families, can be tremendously stressful for both partners.

Members of hyperfertility movements eschew not only abortion or birth control but any form of ‘interference’ with the power of god to determine life, including fertility treatments (Harrison & Rowley, 2011). Adherents to hyperfertility movements often engage in homeschooling and build tightly knit communities of believers through online media and in-person meetings (Kunzman, 2010). It is not clear, despite the stated goals of practitioners of hyperfertility and public fascination with adherents, that such groups are destined to become a large proportion of the western religious landscape. They have not thus far demonstrated high degrees of success in recruiting outsiders into their belief communities, and not all children born into such movements will have either the interest or ability to find spouses interested in participating in such practices.

If this particular form of religious fundamentalism is often treated as both benign and entertaining, the sexual mores preached by fundamentalists more broadly can often erupt into serious violence. Among a subset of American fundamentalist Protestants and Catholics, adherence to a sexual and religious ethic which regards life as inherently sacred (and the provision of abortion as an act of murder) has been used to justify the bombing of abortion-providing clinics, and the murder of clinic staff and doctors on numerous occasions (Jacobson and Royer, Jacobsen & Royer, 2011; Juergensmeyer, 1998). These attacks have led to widespread fear among health professionals and caused many medical practitioners to refuse to train in or offer abortion services, reducing access across the board.

Religious violence justified through restrictive sexual mores is not limited to attacks on medical personnel, of course, but often targets individual men and women themselves accused of violating these restrictive codes. This violence often takes the form of homicide against women accused of having lost their virginity outside of wedlock or having engaged in adultery, and of men accused of homosexuality (Awwad, 2001; Chesler, 2009; Yurdakul & Korteweg, 2013). These men and

women are often regarded as having acted in a ‘modern’ or ‘western’ fashion and having brought shame to their entire families. Male heads of household are then frequently pressured by the community at large and other family members to commit violence against perceived offenders to restore familial honor and reaffirm sexual mores (Awwad, 2001; Odeh, 2010).

While honor killings have some legal protection in parts of the Middle East and North Africa, it would be a mistake to assume they occur only within that region. Honor killings of men and women accused of sexual misconduct occur throughout the world, though many western nations have failed to recognize the existence of such acts within their own communities or engaged in any form of tracking instances of such violence (Chesler, 2009). While honor killing is often tied to fundamentalist Islam and is generally supported via religious arguments, it is also a cultural phenomenon, an implicit rejection of the perceived attack of Western secular values and practices on local cultural norms. But honor killings are not restricted to Islam or the Middle East—violent acts against gays and lesbians within the United States are often motivated by religiously based intolerance and justified by scriptural authority, as well as lesser acts of discrimination and exclusion (such as refusals of service for gay weddings).

4 Conclusions and Recommendations for Research

More and better research on gender and religion is necessary to understand the overlooked role of religious institutions and religious ideologies in two crucial arenas: (1) the role of personal religious belief in the life choices and family behaviors of women and men that may advantage or disadvantage them and their children, and (2) the shaping of social institutions (schools, governments, health care organizations, and workplaces) in ways that support and extend patriarchal control of women’s lives. Some of our recommendations benefit research in both

areas. For instance, it's time to cast off religious typologies that center on denominational label or irrelevant religious dogma, rather than the measurable characteristics of religious belief such as the level of religious embeddedness in everyday life, social conservatism, and gender/ethnic exclusionary beliefs or practices. These are likely to be the characteristics that directly affect behavioral choices. Precise theological differences in dogma may matter less than the ways in which those differences are embedded or not into everyday practices and social institutions.

For this reason, we urge researchers to stop the balkanized study of religious groups (i.e. isolated studies of Islam, Christianity, or any other faith tradition), and pay more attention to the varieties of religious experience within each major faith group. One could easily argue, for example, that faith traditions based on literalist interpretations of ancient texts (fundamentalisms) are more similar to each other across major religions (Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, etc.) than they are to the moderate or liberal branches of their own faith, for reasons like those underlined above. Indeed, it is the striking theological similarities in the treatment of women and religious/ethnic minorities across the fundamentalist branches of major world religions that requires explanation, not their differences with respect to worship and sources of divine power. By closely theorizing the dimensions of religious experience or participation that affect individual and institutional behavior, we will be better poised to understand when and why religion matters in the explanation of social behaviors, inequalities, and life chances. It may not be holy texts that impact behavior as much as the different implications for the organization of the social world that flow from those texts.

We are not arguing that theological differences do not impact gender attitudes and behaviors; indeed, religious beliefs directly dictate courses of action in some cases. But it behooves researchers to carefully clarify which beliefs matter and why, and to explore similarities of belief across major religions rather than assuming that religious typologies capture these similarities and differences accurately. Thus we

urge greater precision in theorizing and measuring linkages between religious affiliation and gendered behaviors, by directly specifying and measuring the beliefs (e.g. "women require moral guidance from men") that lead to behavioral choices no matter which religion they come from.

With respect to research on personal affiliation, demographers and social psychologists would benefit from a better theorized connection between affiliation and individual agency that focuses on the dimensions of religiosity that matter—level of theological liberalism (especially around gender and sexuality), salience of religion in personal identity formation, and ability to enact or resist religious dictates within household structures. In particular, we lack strong theories explaining how religious affiliations become integrated into gender and personal identities that motivate personal and political behavior. A crucial first step is to create a more useful theoretical frame to explain why women overall are more religious than men; one that explains both the intensity and selectivity of women's religious behavior (e.g. fewer women than men are prone to religious violence or religious repression). Too often, women are treated as a biological category rather than a socially disempowered group whose recourse to the divine might be motivated by that powerlessness. Like African-Americans in the United States, women have used religion as a tool to organize, get practical help and support, articulate legitimate grievances, and seek redress for moral wrongs.

With regard to the religious shaping of social institutions, we advocate greater attention to the rise of religious fundamentalisms during periods of rapid social change and dislocation. In particular, the appropriation of religion in dictatorial regimes whose goals are to preserve an otherwise changing social order needs better articulation, since the repression of women and sexual minorities is often central to this goal. What purpose does the suppression of women's rights serve, and which social groups' allegiance will be solidified by supporting extreme gender differentiation in rights and responsibilities?

How do women (and men) respond to these radical reinterpretations of scripture, especially when they identify as religious themselves? In addition, we recommend scholars recognize the central role of religious fundamentalism in political polarizations both in the U.S. and abroad. These political polarizations, and the policies promoted by fundamentalist ideologies, can result in the radical transformation of existing institutions.

We conclude by advocating for more attention to the central issue of *how* religious ideologies become embedded in the operation of social institutions (schools, governments, health care organizations, workplaces, etc.). Are there differences in the ways that fundamentalist versus moderate or “symbolic” theologies get incorporated into social institutions? What community and political processes lead to the incorporation of religious rules into institutional operations, especially in ways that solidify women’s disempowerment and loss of control over their lives? And finally, what happens to those women and men who do not themselves adhere to any particular religious philosophy, but live in a community whose institutions are strongly oriented around a religious paradigm? We hope that renewed emphasis on these questions will help us understand both the repressive and liberatory potential of religious belief systems and institutions on gendered inequalities.

References

- Adler, G. (2012). An opening in the congregational closet? Boundary-bridging culture and membership privileges for gays and lesbians in Christian religious congregations. *Social Problems*, 59(2), 177–206.
- Almond, G. A., Scott Appleby, R., & Sivan, E. (2003). *Strong religion: The rise of fundamentalisms around the world*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Anderson, J. D. (1997). The lesbian and gay liberation movement in the Presbyterian Church (USA), 1974–1996. *Journal of Homosexuality*, 34(2), 37–65.
- Awwad, A. M. (2001). Gossip, scandal, shame and honor killing: A case for social constructionism and hegemonic discourse. *Social Thought and Research*, 24(1/2), 39–52.
- Barton, B. (2010). “Abomination”—Life as a Bible belt gay. *Journal of Homosexuality*, 57(4), 465–484.
- Bartkowski, J. P. (1999). One step forward, one step back: “Progressive traditionalism” and the negotiation of domestic labor in evangelical families. *Gender Issues*, 17(4), 37–61.
- Bahr, H. M. (1970). Aging and religious disaffiliation. *Social Forces*, 49, 59–71.
- Becker, P. E., & Hofmeister, H. (2001). Work, family, and religious involvement for men and women. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 40(4), 707–722.
- Bradshaw, Matt, & Ellison, C. G. (2009). The nature-nurture debate is over, and both sides lost! Implications for understanding gender differences in religiosity. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 48(2), 241–251.
- Brooks, C. (2002). Religious influence and the politics of family decline concern: Trends, sources, and US political behavior. *American Sociological Review*, 191–211.
- Bruce, S. (2000). *Fundamentalism*. Maiden, MA: Blackwell.
- Burchardt, M., Griera, M., & García-Romeral, G. (2015a). Narrating liberal rights and culture: Muslim face veiling, urban coexistence and contention in Spain. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 41(7), 1068–1087.
- Billaud, J., & Castro, J. (2013). Whores and Niqabées: The sexual boundaries of French nationalism. *French Politics, Culture, and Society*, 31(2), 81–101.
- Burchardt, M., Griera, M., & García-Romeral, G. (2015b). Narrating liberal rights and culture: Muslim face veiling, urban coexistence and contention in Spain. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 41(7), 1068–1087.
- Buzzell, T. (2001). Gay and lesbian activism in American protestant churches: Religion, homosexuality, and the politics of inclusion. *The Politics of Social Inequality*, 9, 83–114.
- Cadge, W., Day, H., & Wildeman, C. (2007). Bridging the denomination-congregation divide: Evangelical lutheran church in america congregations respond to homosexuality. *Review of Religious Research*, 48(3), 245–259.
- Cadge, W., Olson, L. R., & Wildeman, C. (2008). How denominational resources influence debate about homosexuality in mainline Protestant congregations. *Sociology of Religion*, 69(2), 187–207.
- Carroll, M. P. (2004). Give me that ol’time hormonal religion. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 43(2), 275–278.
- Collett, J. L., & Lizardo, O. (2009). A power-control theory of gender and religiosity. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 48(2), 213–231.
- Comstock, G. D. (2002). *Unrepentant, self-affirming, practicing: Lesbian/bisexual/gay people within organized religion*. New York: The Continuum Publishing Company.

- Cornwall, M. (2009). Reifying sex difference isn't the answer: Gendering processes, risk, and religiosity. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 48(2), 252–255.
- Erzen, T. (2006). *Straight to Jesus: Sexual and christian conversions in the ex-gay movement*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press.
- Ellis, L., Hoskin, A. W., & Ratnasingam, M. (2016). Testosterone, risk taking, and religiosity: Evidence from two cultures. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 55(1), 153–173.
- Cahn, N., & Carbone, J. (2010). *Red families v. blue families: Legal polarization and the creation of culture*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Chandler, T. D., Kamo, Y., & Werbel, J. D. (1994). Do delays in marriage and childbirth affect earnings? *Social Science Quarterly*, 75(4), 838–853.
- Chaves, M. (1991). Family structure and protestant church attendance: The sociological basis of cohort and age effects. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 30(4), 501–514.
- Chesler, P. (2009). Are honor killings simply domestic violence? *The Middle East Quarterly*, 16(2), 61–69.
- Chong, K. H. (2008). *Deliverance and submission: Evangelical women and the negotiation of patriarchy in South Korea* (Vol. 309). Harvard East Asia Monographs.
- Vaus, D., & David, A. (1984). Workforce participation and sex differences in church attendance. *Review of Religious Research*, 25(3), 247–256.
- Emerson, M. O., & Hartman, D. (2006). The rise of religious fundamentalism. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 32, 127–144.
- Freese, J., & Montgomery, J. D. (2007). The devil made her do it? Evaluating risk preference as an explanation of sex differences in religiosity. *Social Psychology of Gender*, 187–229.
- Frances and Wilcox. (1998). Religiosity and femininity: Do women really hold a more positive attitude toward Christianity? *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 37, 462–469.
- Fulton, A. S., Gorsuch, R. L., & Maynard, E. A. (1999). Religious orientation, antihomosexual sentiment, and fundamentalism among Christians. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 14–22.
- Glass, J., & Jacobs, J. (2005). Childhood religious conservatism and adult attainment among black and white women. *Social Forces*, 84, 555.
- Glass, J., & Kanellakos, L. (2006). Religious conservatism and women's market behavior following marriage and childbirth. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 68(3), 611–629.
- Glass, J., & Levchak, P. (2014). Red states, blue states, and divorce—Understanding the impact of conservative protestantism on regional variation in divorce rates. *American Journal of Sociology*, 119, 1–44.
- Glass, J. L., Sutton, A., & Fitzgerald, S. T. (2015). Leaving the faith: How religious switching changes pathways to adulthood among conservative Protestant youth. *Social Currents*, 2(2), 126–143.
- Harrison, L., & Rowley, S. B. (2011). Babies by the bundle: gender, backlash, and the quiverfull movement. *Feminist Formations*, 23(1), 47–69.
- Hawley, J. S. (1994). *Fundamentalism and gender*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hoffmann, J. P. (2009). Gender, risk, and religiousness: Can power control provide the theory? *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 48(2), 232–240.
- Hout, M., & Fischer, C. S. (2002). Why more Americans have no religious preference: Politics and generations. *American Sociological Review*, 165–190.
- Hout, M., Greeley, A., & Wilde, M. J. (2001). The demographic imperative in religious change in the United States. *American Journal of Sociology*, 107(2), 468–500.
- Iannaccone, L. R. (1990). Religious practice: A human capital approach. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 29, 297–314.
- Jacobsen, M., & Royer, H. (2011). Aftershocks: The impact of clinic violence on abortion services. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 3(1), 189–223.
- Jeffery, P., & Basu, A. (Eds.). (2012). *Appropriating gender: Women's activism and politicized religion in South Asia*. New York and Great Britain: Routledge.
- Juergensmeyer, M. (1998). Christian violence in America. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 558(1), 88–100.
- Koopmans, R. (2015). Religious fundamentalism and hostility against out-groups: A comparison of Muslims and Christians in Western Europe. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 41(1), 33–57.
- Robert, K. (2010). Homeschooling and religious fundamentalism. *International Electronic Journal of Elementary Education*, 2(1).
- Lalich, J., & McLaren, K. (2010). Inside and outcast: Multifaceted stigma and redemption in the lives of gay and lesbian Jehovah's witnesses. *Journal of Homosexuality*, 57(10), 1303–1333.
- Lawrence, B. B. (1989). *Defenders of god: The fundamentalist revolt against the modern age*. San Francisco: Harper & Row.
- Lehman, E. C., Jr. (1998). Ordaining women: Culture and conflict in religious organizations. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 37(4), 757–758.
- Lukenbill, W. B. (1998). Observations on the corporate culture of a gay and lesbian congregation. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 37(3), 440–452.
- Lugo, L., Cooperman, A., Funk, C., Smith, G., O'Connell, E., & Stencell, S. (2012). *Nones' on the rise*. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center <http://www.pewforum.org/2012/10/09/nones-on-the-rise>.

- Mahmood, S. (2005). *Politics of piety: The Islamic revival and the feminist subject*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- McQueeney, K. (2009). We are god's children, y'all: Race, gender, and sexuality in lesbian-and gay-affirming congregations. *Social Problems*, 56(1), 151–173.
- Miller, A. S., & Hoffmann, J. P. (1995). Risk and religion: An explanation of gender differences in religiosity. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 34(1), 63–75.
- Miller, A. S., & Stark, R. (2002). Gender and religiousness: Can Socialization explanations be saved? 1. *American Journal of Sociology*, 107(6), 1399–1423.
- Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2004). *Sacred and secular: Religion and politics worldwide*. Cambridge University Press.
- Odeh, L. A. (2010). Honor killings and the construction of gender in Arab societies. *The American Journal of Comparative Law*, 58(4), 911–952.
- Olson, L. R., & Cadge, W. (2002). Talking about homosexuality: The views of mainline Protestant clergy. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 41(1), 153–167.
- Pearce, L. D., & Davis, S. N. (2006). Religion work-family gender ideology and fertility. [Unpublished] 2006. Presented at the population association of America 2006 annual meeting Los Angeles California March 30–April 1.
- Regnerus, M. (2007). *Forbidden fruit: Sex and religion in the lives of American teenagers*. Oxford University Press.
- Riesebradt, M. (2000). Fundamentalism and the resurgence of religion. *Numen*, 47(3), 266–287.
- Robinson, C. M., & Spivey, S. E. (2007). The politics of masculinity and the ex-gay movement. *Gender and Society*, 21(5), 650–675.
- Rodriguez, E. M., & Ouellette, S. C. (2000). Gay and lesbian Christians: Homosexual and religious identity integration in the members and participants of a gay-positive church. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 39(3), 333–347.
- Roozen, D. A., McKinney, W., & Thompson, W. (1990). The "big chill" generation warms to worship: A research note. *Review of Religious Research*, 31(3), 314–322.
- Ross, M., & Anderson, A. M. (2014). Relationships between importance of religious belief, response to anti-gay violence, and mental health in men who have sex with men in East Africa. *Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion*, 25, 160–172.
- Scheitle, C. P., Merino, S. M., & Moore, A. (2010). On the varying meaning of "open and affirming". *Journal of Homosexuality*, 57(10), 1223–1236.
- Schnabel, L. (2015). How religious are American women and men? Gender differences and similarities. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 54(3), 616–622.
- Sen, R., & Wagner, W. (2009). Cultural mechanics of fundamentalism: Religion as ideology, divided identities and violence in post-Gandhi India. *Culture and Psychology*, 15(3), 299–326.
- Sherkat, D. E. (2001). Tracking the restructuring of American religion: Religious affiliation and patterns of religious mobility, 1973–1998. *Social Forces*, 79(4), 1459–1493.
- Skirbekk, V., Kaufmann, E., & Goujon, A. (2010). Secularism, fundamentalism, or Catholicism? The religious composition of the United States to 2043. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 49(2), 293–310.
- Smith, C. (2000). *Christian America? What evangelicals really want*. University of California Press.
- Smith, C., & Sikkink, D. (2003). Social predictors of retention in and switching from the religious faith of family of origin: Another look using religious tradition self-identification. *Review of Religious Research*, 45(2), 188–206.
- Spohn, U. (2013). Sisters in disagreement: The dispute among French feminists about the "Burqa Ban" and the causes of their disunity. *Journal of Human Rights*, 12(2), 145–164.
- Stark, R. (2002). Physiology and faith: Addressing the "universal" gender difference in religious commitment. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 41(3), 495–507.
- Stolzenberg, R. M., Blair-Loy, M., & Waite, L. J. (1995). Religious participation in early adulthood: Age and family life cycle effects on church membership. *American Sociological Review*, 84–103.
- Sullins, D. P. (2006). Gender and religion: Deconstructing universality, constructing complexity. *American Journal of Sociology*, 112(3), 838–880.
- Thompson, E. H., Jr., & Remmes, K. R. (2002). Does masculinity thwart being religious? An examination of older men's religiousness. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 41(3), 521–532.
- Thompson, E. H. (1991). Beyond the sex difference: Gender variations in religiousness. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 30, 381–394.

- Whitehead, A. L. (2013). Religious organizations and homosexuality: The acceptance of gays and lesbians in American congregations. *Review of Religious Research, 55*(2), 297–317.
- Wolkomir, M. (2004). “Giving it up to god” negotiating femininity in support groups for wives of ex-gay christian men. *Gender and society, 18*(6), 735–755.
- Wong, W. C. A. (2013). The politics of sexual morality and evangelical activism in Hong Kong. *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 14*(3), 340–360.
- Yurdakul, G., & Korteweg, A. C. (2013). Gender equality and immigrant integration: Honor killing and forced marriage debates in the Netherlands, Germany, and Britain. *Women’s Studies International Forum, 41*(3), 204–214.

Jennifer McMorris received her doctorate in Sociology from the University of Texas at Austin in 2016. Her areas of interest include the intersection of religion, gender, and education. She currently works as an instructor for the University of Texas extension office.

Jennifer Glass is the Barbara Bush Professor of Liberal Arts in the Department of Sociology and the Population Research Center of the University of Texas, Austin. She has published over 50 articles and books on work and family issues, gender stratification in the labor force, and the impact of religious conservatism on women’s economic attainment. She is currently the Executive Director of the Council on Contemporary Families.



Gender, Race, and Crime: The Evolution of a Feminist Research Agenda

32

Kenly Brown and Nikki Jones

Abstract

Over the last several decades, feminist scholars have advanced our understanding of the relationship between race, gender and crime. This body of work illustrates how gender inequality makes women more vulnerable to incarceration and punishment. Feminist criminologists who examine crime and victimization through the lens of intersectionality, especially women of color, have also worked to shift the scholarly focus from intersections of gender, race, and crime, which often focus on offending, to a consideration of the intersection of gender, race, and *justice*, which critically interrogates not only disparities in the distribution of justice, but also the ways that structural violence shapes the vulnerability of women of color to various forms of violence and punitive sanctions. New research and theorizations in this area, including Black feminist and intersectional research and writings, encourage us to move beyond gender binaries to examine the interrelationship between institutions (e.g., police, prisons,

etc.) and gendered vulnerabilities to punishment and violence.

1 Introduction

Since the start of the second wave of the feminist movement in the U.S., feminist scholars have worked to interrogate the relationship between gender and the criminal justice system (Chesney-Lind & Dalym, 1988). Some of the earliest scholarship developed by feminist criminologists critiqued overtly masculinist perspectives on crime and punishment and pushed for the need to develop gender-specific theoretical frameworks and empirical studies (Chesney-Lind & Daly, 1988; Bertrand, 1969; Heidensohn, 1968). This scholarship was a departure from early literature in criminology, which relied heavily on essentialist understandings to explain crime and deviance among women and girls; defined sexual deviance as a crime; and provided explanations for women and girls' participation in crime that were often inaccurate and oppressive (Chesney-Lind & Daly, 1988; Jones & Flores, 2012).

An organizing priority of the anti-violence against women movement aimed to produce research and push legislation to protect women and girls from violence (Brownmiller, 1975; MacKinnon, 1982). An eventual victory of these efforts included new laws that mandated the

K. Brown (✉) · N. Jones
University of California, Berkeley, USA
e-mail: kenly@berkeley.edu

N. Jones
e-mail: njones@berkeley.edu

arrest of perpetrators of domestic violence and abuse by police (Chesney-Lind & Daly, 1988). Feminist scholars also critiqued sentencing reforms that proposed equitable treatment in sentencing among men and women without consideration of the role that gender inequality plays in offending (Blumstein, Cohen, Martin, & Tonry, 1983; Chesney-Lind & Daly, 1988). Although feminist scholarship produced new empirical studies and theoretical frameworks within criminology that challenged sexist assumptions and reflected gender-specific concerns, it is also true that this wave of scholarship typically centered the experiences of (white) women, especially those who had survived intimate violence and rape.

As new legislative victories were won, Black, Latina, Native, and other feminist of color scholars illuminated the ways that experiences of women of color and issues of class, sexuality, nation/ethnicity, and many other defining identities of women, were overlooked in second wave feminism in general and the study of gender, race and crime in particular (Potter, 2015; Riche, 2012; Chesney-Lind, 2006; Burgess-Proctor, 2006). In the early and mid-20th century, feminist movements were both racist and classist in their failure to address the specific oppressive regimes Black women, poor women, and women of color faced (Davis, 1981; Richie, 2012). Issues of race, class, and gender were brought to the forefront of activism and scholarship in this area by “third wave” feminist scholars (Potter, 2015). As Hillary Potter writes, third wave feminism allowed for “a move away from *colorblind* feminism, and toward greater attention to anti-essentialism” (Potter, 2015, 62).

One of the most important concepts in third wave feminism, intersectionality, emerged as a theoretical framework that helped to illuminate the relationship between discrete and overlapping identities and the criminal justice system. Kimberlé Crenshaw’s foundational article, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics” (1989), introduced the term intersectionality and built upon work in Black feminist

theory that spanned over a century (e.g. Ana Julia Cooper, Gloria Hull, and Angela Davis). In her analysis of anti-racist policies in anti-discrimination law (Crenshaw, 1989), Crenshaw illustrates how race and sex are often studied and applied as mutually exclusive categories, which results in the distortion of Black women’s experiences in the eyes of the law (1989). Crenshaw expands her discussion of intersectionality in “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color,”¹ a major contribution to violence against women discourse (1991). Crenshaw critiques assumptions that naturalize violence among women from low income communities rather than look at how systemic oppression structures their vulnerability to violence (1991). Her argument illustrates how race and gender intersect in ways that make Black women and women of color uniquely vulnerable to violence in certain structural, political and representational contexts (Crenshaw, 1991).

Similar to the work of Crenshaw, Patricia Hill Collins’ *Black Feminist Thought* emphasized the power of intersectional identities in relation to power structures (1990). Hill Collins introduces the concept of a “matrix of domination” where “structural, disciplinary, hegemonic, and interpersonal domains of power reappear across quite different forms of oppression” (Collins, 2000, 21). Essentially, the ways multiple identities intersect with structures of power create discrete conditions of oppression and suppression. Together, Crenshaw and Collins reconstructed how scholars imagined and understood the relationship between power, institutions, and intersectional identities. Their writings provide the theoretical foundation for a range of scholars who use intersectionality as theory, application, and praxis (Cho, Crenshaw, & McCall, 2013).

In the following pages, we further examine how contemporary scholars in feminist criminology use intersectionality to discuss how

¹Kimberlé Crenshaw’s “Mapping the Margins” pioneered a critical and intersectional examination of race, gender, and violence against women. She argues how violence against women is racialized and gendered through structural, political, and representational contexts.

power, institutions, and social identities co-construct each other. We highlight important empirical works that apply an intersectional framework to analyses of victimization, criminalization, and offending. We then turn to studies that theorize gender, violence, and the carceral state in ways that illuminate the intimate relationship between institutions of punishment and social identities. We conclude with a call to go beyond gender binaries in order to theorize “intersectional vulnerabilities” as a way describe the relationship between state violence and interpersonal violence.

2 Intersectionality and Feminist Criminology

In *Intersectionality and Criminology*, Hillary Potter interrogates the purpose and utility of intersectionality as a theory, perspective, and methodology in criminological scholarship (2015). According to Potter, intersectionality can be classified as a perspective (e.g. multiply positioned women experience structures of power and interpersonal relationships that directly shape their positions) and theory (e.g. explain and test a phenomenon of interest in a systematic way) that can be used to demonstrate the ways that “individuals have multiple intertwined identities that are developed, organized, experienced, and responded to within the context of the social structure and its dis/advantaged ordering” (2015, 76). Intersectionality reveals how the social construction of multiple identities is mediated through dynamic power relations across the legal system, definitions of criminality, and the distortion of punishment (Potter, 2015). An intersectional perspective and theory seeks to rupture how we essentialize identities and generalize social positions of women, and aims to consider differences in power and oppression as a given when looking at the relationship between multiple identities, structures, and power (Potter, 2015; Cho et al., 2013).

Although intersectionality has gained prominence in scholarly and mainstream discussions, recent scholarship has also problematized the use

of intersectionality across disciplines. A common critique is that the concept is now used in ways that actually reproduce essentialist understandings of multiple identities. In one powerful critique, Alexander (2012) highlights how much of mainstream contemporary scholarship on intersectionalities continues to overlook Black women and women of color in their analysis of how power dynamics shape the lives of women differently based on race, gender, and class. Additionally, Alexander argues, some studies have reduced theoretical and empirical applications of intersectionalities to static characterizations of multiple identities and overlook structural forces of inequality (Alexander, 2012). Alexander makes the point that intersectional theory is not merely a way to talk about social identities. An intersectional analysis reveals how the dynamics of power, institutions, and constructions of social identities are simultaneously constructed and consequential for how individuals are perceived and treated by others and institutions. In the next section, we provide examples of important empirical studies that applied an intersectional analysis in this way.

3 Intersectional Analyses of Gender, Race, and Crime

Recent work that adopts an intersectional analysis helps to reveal the ways that victimization, offending, and institutional processes of legal criminalization along with hegemonic and local masculinities and femininities are socially constructed and situationally defined. Recent examples include Nikki Jones’ *Between Good and Ghetto: African American Girls and Inner-City Violence* (2010) and Victor Rios’ *Punished: Policing the Lives of Black and Latino Boys* (2011). These works show how the construction of gender, race, and crime co-currently inform each other and position people differently in relationship to violence and the criminal justice system.

In *Between Good and Ghetto*, Jones draws on Sarah Fenstermaker and Candace West’s discussion of “Doing Difference” (1995), Elijah

Anderson's *Code of the Street* (1999) and Patricia Hill Collins' *Black Sexual Politics* (2004) to make sense of the ways that intersections of race, gender and class shape the strategies that girls use to navigate inner-city settings where threats of interpersonal violence are encountered regularly, and the consequences of these strategies for girls in their everyday lives (2009). In this work, Jones challenges stereotypical assumptions about Black girls, aggression and violence by illustrating how Black girls negotiate the constraints of "the code of the street" and the "controlling images" of Black femininity while negotiating interpersonal and gender-specific violence. In explaining how race and gender and class shift in significance in the lives of Black women and girls, moving toward or receding from the forefront, depending on the situation, Jones complicates discussions of the use of violence among Black girls.

As Jones writes, girls' accounts of how they navigate violence in their neighborhoods and negotiate conflict and violence in their interpersonal relationships, including, at times, by using violence, reveal that they "embrace, challenge, reinforce, reflect and contradict normative expectations of femininity and Black respectability as they work the code" (Jones, 2009, 11). This discussion of how Black girls navigate their social worlds is also consistent with the work of Joyce Ladner, who, in her study of over one hundred preadolescent, adolescent, and adult Black women in the city of St. Louis, pushed scholars to conceptualize social issues as a problem of the social structure, rather than of particular groups or types of people (1971). While Ladner did not use the term intersectionality, her work illustrates how the sociohistorical constructions of gender and race conditioned the life chances, coping mechanisms, and survival tactics among Black girls and women in the inner city.

In *Between Good and Ghetto* (2009) and Joyce Ladner's, *Tomorrow's Tomorrow*, we see how structural forms of violence shape the choices and actions of Black women and girls and how institutions and individuals respond to their actions. Jody Miller's *Getting Played: African American Girls, Urban Inequality, and*

Gendered Violence (2008) also illustrates how structural forces (e.g. concentrated poverty and lack of institutional support) make Black girls vulnerable to gender-specific violence at the hands of those in their community and informs how neighborhood residents and institutional actors respond to violence experienced by girls. Miller found that Black girls and women were subject to both public (e.g. street) and semi-private (e.g. house parties) forms of violence by men and boys in their lives. Further, Miller finds that the troubled relationship between young Black women and girls and the criminal justice system, including how law enforcement interacted with Black and Latino boys and men, often prevented them from calling upon law enforcement for assistance.

Victor Rios also brings an intersectional analysis to the study of Black and Latino boys and their relationship to the criminal justice system. In *Punished: Policing the Lives of Black and Latino Boys* (2011), Victor Rios explains how the interaction between gender and crime defines and criminalizes boys and men of color. Expanding upon the work of Messerschmidt's *Masculinities and Crime* (1993) and Elijah Anderson's *Code of the Street*, Rios (2011) studies how a group of 40 boys are surveilled, criminalized, and controlled by the state through the criminal justice system. He describes how the adolescent lives of young people are constructed within "the youth control complex," systems that control and criminalize the everyday behaviors of young people of color including in schools, police departments, and community centers. Rios labels this experience *hypercriminalization* where behaviors are understood as criminal, violent, and risky (Rios, 2011). The perceptions of Black and Latino boys and young men as dangerous and criminal results in their behaviors (e.g. hanging out with friends in public spaces, dress, speech) taken up as crimes that need to be controlled, surveilled, and ultimately incarcerated. Access to mainstream constructions of masculinity such as full-time employment are not as available to them due to the lack of institutional support and resources found within communities where jobs are limited and social resources are

depleted. Rios' analysis is consistent with the work cited above in its understanding of the ways in which structural circumstances shape individual actions.

The works above show how gender, race and crime are co-constructed and inform how gendered roles, racialized stereotypes, and definitions of crime create the structural system of criminal justice. Intersections of gender, race, and crime complicate common understandings of crime. By focusing on the way crime is gendered and racially coded in its enforcement, we shed light on the way that the criminal justice system can reify gendered and racialized stereotypes of men and women of color as a way to justify their punishment and imprisonment. Scholars now describe the disproportionate number of people of color who are incarcerated, surveilled, and punished by the legal system as the *carceral state* (Simon, 2007; Wacquant, 2009). The following section reviews key works that explore the relationship between gender, violence, and the carceral state.

4 Theorizing Gender, Violence and the Carceral State

Recent scholarship examines the ways that violence is constructed and experienced within, and as a consequence of, the carceral state (e.g. prison, court, probation). Feminist scholars have also expanded our understanding of the ways that harsh forms of punishment have (and continue to) shape the lives of Black women and girls. The treatment of women of color in the criminal justice system and their vulnerability to imprisonment and punitive punishment is connected to the too-often silenced history of women in the penal system during the Jim Crow era. In *No Mercy Here* (2016), Sarah Haley interrogates the criminalization and sentencing of Black women to chain gangs in Georgia as a way to examine the intersectional relationship between gender, race and punishment. Haley interrogates how womanhood is defined through the antagonistic relationship between Black women and white

women. For example, the chain gang, specifically in Georgia, sustained this oppositional relationship by harshly and violently punishing Black women and girls while rehabilitating and lightly sentencing white women and girls for similar crimes (Haley, 2016). This work exemplifies how the carceral state does not distribute justice for all crimes equally. In fact, social identities are consequential to the type of punishment one receives at the hands of the state.

The work of Beth Richie also illustrates how Black women's outsider status from normative expectations of gender results in their increased vulnerability to arrests and incarceration. In *Compelled to Crime* (1996), Richie investigates how Black women from low-income neighborhoods are made more vulnerable to violence and punishment. Black women and girls who live within concentrated poverty and are exposed to interpersonal and institutional forms of violence are open to criminalization by the legal system (Richie, 1996), which, as was the case in the late 19th and early 20th century, punishes their survival (Haley, 2016). Richie calls this contradictory tension "gender entrapment." Informed by the legal term entrapment (e.g. someone who is compelled to engage in an illicit act), gender entrapment illustrates how, "gender, race/ethnicity, and violence can intersect to create a subtle yet profoundly effective system of organizing women's behaviors into patterns that leave women vulnerable to private and public subordination, to violence in their intimate relationships, and in turn, to participate in illegal activities" (4). Richie identifies six stigmatized identities that make Black women who live in poor neighborhoods more prone to this trap: being women, African American, low income, battered, criminals, and incarcerated. Gender entrapment shows how Black women's vulnerability to violence can lead to their incarceration and involvement in the criminal justice system. From this perspective, criminal offending is understood as a product of institutional abdication from low-income areas and the lack of resources and opportunities for Black women to turn to for support within their communities.

Intersections of race, gender and class also shape the ways that women are viewed and treated while incarcerated, including in rehabilitative programs. In *Breaking Women: Gender, Race, and the New Politics of Imprisonment* (2013), Jill McCorkel explores how a rehabilitative program in prison is used to surveil, harshly punish, and sustain racialized cultural tropes about drug addicted imprisoned women as perpetual social problems (e.g. “crack ho” and “dope fiend”). Racist and sexist rhetoric conditioned the alternative program and contributed to its 85% drop out rate (McCorkel, 2013). Even though this program was created to lower recidivism rates, it reduced problems of addiction to the actions of individuals rather than understanding how being structurally disenfranchised (e.g. coming from low-income neighborhoods with limited resources to offer including employment opportunities and safe housing) also impacted their addiction. The particular significance of McCorkel’s work is that it illuminates how prisons frame women, especially women who are most vulnerable to violence, addiction, and displacement from their homes, as problems that need fixing, which leads to individualized rather than structural interventions. Once released, “rehabilitated” women of color from low-income neighborhoods are often forced back into a cycle of incarceration, addiction, and poverty. In this way, structural systems of disadvantage (re)produce interlocking systems of oppression through penal institutions.

In the final section of this chapter, we turn to a discussion of how Black men and women experience discrete forms of violence that are enacted under a shared vulnerability to structural violence.

5 Beyond Gender Binaries: Theorizing Intersectional Vulnerabilities

The works highlighted in the previous section challenge commonsense and stereotypical representations of violence as individual problems that require punitive sanctions. Each scholar draws on

an intersectional framework in their representation of the relationship between structural circumstances and individual actions. Future work should continue to clarify our understandings of violence by highlighting the ways that structural forms of violence act on and move through people’s minds and bodies in ways that encourage violence and, in turn, legitimize the oppression of people of color, especially those who live in poverty. In this work, we encourage scholars to move beyond gender binaries to examine and represent the ways that “intersectional vulnerabilities”² co-construct gender, violence and punishment.

Kimberlé Crenshaw has used the term *intersectional vulnerability* to explain how men and women are made vulnerable to victimization within the criminal justice system, by law enforcement, and interpersonal violence. Intersectional vulnerability and power structures operate in tandem to systematically marginalize and oppress people of color occupying a diverse range of identities (e.g., race, gender, class, sexuality, nationality, religion, and various identities). Such a framework also encourages feminist scholars to examine the relationship between interpersonal violence and institutional violence, as well as the feminist movement’s relationship to the state.³ The need for the latter effort is argued for in Beth Richie’s *Arrested*

²At the American Sociological Association conference of 2016, a plenary session on Lives “Protesting Racism” was given on the ascension of the Black Matter Movement and public awareness on police brutality and racism. The panel included Kimberlé Crenshaw, Black feminist legal scholar, Charlene Carruthers, the national director of the Black Youth Project, and Mariam Kaba, founding director of Project Nia. The panel centered on their work to address, illuminate, and disrupt the violence inflicted by the state and suggested resolutions to alleviate the brutal and inhumane treatment of the Black community in the United States.

³Intersectional vulnerabilities speaks to what Dana Britton (2000) argued feminist criminology needs to rethink the significance of the state, “Finally, one of the most important issues facing activists in the discipline during the coming years will undoubtedly lie in rethinking feminist criminology’s relationship with the state. Those working on issues connected to women offenders have already recognized the perils of the liberal strategy of strict legal equality. Such policies, when imposed in an

Justice (2012), where she introduces the concept of the “violence matrix.”

In her work, Richie documents the ways that the feminist movement, especially second wave feminism, pushed for equitable legal treatment, council, and protection for women (Daly & Chesney-Lind, 1988; Richie, 2012). As Richie explains, the anti-violence movement made demands of the criminal justice system, to punish and protect women from men who perpetrated violence against them (Chesney-Lind, 2006; Richie, 2012). Once grassroots efforts were institutionalized, leadership shifted from women who experience(d) violence to professionals who were more interested in legal reforms that would protect women from violence. Ultimately, the relationship between the anti-violence movement and law and order rhetoric put women who fell outside of normative constructions of femininity in a precarious position (e.g. Black, working class and poor) (Richie, 2012). Richie defines this relationship as a *matrix of violence*, an intersectional formation between violence and ideologies of race, gender, and sexuality that makes Black women vulnerable to various kinds of abuses (2012). One of the examples she uses in her book is of a group of young Black lesbian women who were verbally and physically accosted by a Black man on the street in New York City’s Greenwich Village. The group of women defended themselves against their assailant, but they were charged with assault and found guilty of second-degree gang-assault (Richie, 2012). Richie argues that these six women could not access the protections of the state, protections that exist for some women, because they were framed in the media as a “gang of killer lesbians.” Their race, gender presentation, and sexuality were perceived as a threat; a threat that would presumably be contained by incarceration. The matrix of violence described by Richie not only makes Black women vulnerable to violence by limiting access to protection, it also structures the ways that

young men and boys of color are made vulnerable to violence, specifically state violence.

The work of Angela Harris encourages us to complicate our conceptualization of gender violence to include how men are also vulnerable to violence by other men (2000). She argues the construction of masculinity is mediated through violence: “some men routinely use violence or the threat of violence as a way of presenting themselves as masculine” (Harris, 2000, 788). Masculinity and violence are co-constructed and stratified in ways that reflect race, gender, and class hierarchies. For example, Harris argues, white men symbolize hegemonic masculinity because they can access institutional power; whereas, Black men are perceived as inferior and emasculated by white supremacy. As a consequence, white men are more likely to achieve mainstream masculinity through employment and normative expectations of success while some Black men may access a rebellious masculinity grounded in physical strength and violence (Harris, 2000). Masculinities also shape criminal justice actors such as law enforcement and the justification to use violence as a way to subdue violence. Harris (2000) states,

[P]olice brutality is not random. It follows the vectors of power established in the larger society in which white dominates nonwhite and rich dominates poor. Police often, and not without justification, understand their charge as the protection of “nice” neighborhoods and “decent” people against those perceived to be a threat. In practice, this often means that male power and state power converge on the black and Latino ‘underclass’. (797)

According to Harris, violence reinforces law and order because police work is defined as a masculine occupation and its job is to contain threats. Harris argues that the criminal justice system in particular shapes the relationship between masculinity and violence via social norms and institutional values and practices. To make gender violence an inclusive term means to simultaneously analyze violence against men *and* women as a way to understand intersectional vulnerability to violence, not only by individuals

already unequal and gendered context, have almost invariably disadvantaged women” (73).

but also institutions like law enforcement. The recent work of Nikki Jones further illuminates the relationship between gendered violence, shared vulnerability and the criminal justice system.

In “The Gender of Police Violence,” Jones argues, “the experiences of black women and girls with street harassment, and of black men and boys with police aggression, are both similar and interconnected” (2016, 26). Similar in structure in that both forms of gendered violence rely on physical dominance for control and interconnected in that increased police aggression holds the potential to “send ripples of aggression through a community” (Jones, 2016, 27) and onto the bodies of Black women (cis-gender, trans, and gender non-conforming). This articulation of violence complements the work of Harris, Richie and Crenshaw and complicates conventional literature and media sources where the issues that Black women, girls, and gendered outsiders face in relation to street harassment and police violence are often framed as distinct from discussions of violence that Black men and boys experience at the hands of the state. Building on the work of Patricia Hill Collins in *Black Sexual Politics*, Jones finds both types of violence operate under the same racialized and oppressive institutional power that renders both Black men and women powerless. In this way, Black men and women experience a “shared vulnerability to dominance and violence” (Jones, 2016, 27). Poor Black men are coerced into invasive bodily searches and similarly Black women are subjected to verbal assaults and unwanted touching in public streets; both bodies “can be accessed, penetrated, and controlled at will and without recourse” (Jones, 2016, 27). Intersectional vulnerability reveals how state violence and interpersonal violence are consequential for both Black men and women.

Understood in this way, the criminal justice system is a dubious solution to resolve neighborhood violence or violence against women. Systems of the carceral state have historically used violence to punish and incarcerate people of color, particularly Black youth, men, and women (Davis, 1981; Richie, 2012; Haley, 2016), as

scholarship within interdisciplinary fields (e.g. African American Studies) and Black scholarship in sociology has shown. The lack of consideration and dismissal of early Black researchers like Oliver Cromwell, W.E.B. Dubois, and St. Clair Drake in the study of mainstream sociology (Bhambra, 2014; Duneier, 2016) has resulted in a deficit of theoretical and empirical studies on crime, race, and violence. Mainstream scholars typically examine violence and crimes committed among racially different groups rather than looking at how the institution of criminal justice criminalizes and violently punishes groups of people who fall out of normative constructions of femininity, masculinity, sexuality, class, and race. For future feminist research, it is necessary to apply an interdisciplinary approach to the study of gender, race, and criminal justice as a way to incorporate the historical significance of crime and punishment. This will strengthen contemporary analyses of how violence, criminal justice, and identities operate in tandem at the interpersonal and state levels.

6 Conclusion

Theorizing intersections of race, gender and justice in the ways outlined above provides an analytical and organizing framework that does not privilege one group or set of identities over another. This approach also centers the ways in which various forms of structural violence—like the aggressive policing of Black men in poor neighborhoods—is consequential for other members of a community. Future feminist research should continue to explore the ways that state violence (co)constructs interpersonal violence, particularly among those who are most vulnerable to both forms of violence.

References

- Alexander-Floyd, N. G. (2012). Disappearing acts: Reclaiming intersectionality in the social sciences in a post-Black feminist era. *Feminist Formations*, 24, 1–25.

- Bertrand, M. A. (1969). Self-image and delinquency: A contribution to the study of female criminality and woman's image. *Acta Criminologica*, 2, 71–144.
- Bhambra, G. (2014). A sociological dilemma: Race, segregation and US sociology. *Current Sociology*, 62(4), 472–492.
- Blumstein, A., Cohen, J., Martin, S. E., & Tonry, M. H. (1983). *Research on sentencing: The search for reform*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
- Britton, D. M. (2000). Feminism in criminology: Engendering the outlaw. *The annals of the American academy of political and social science*, 571, 57–76.
- Brownmiller, S. (1975). *Against our will: Men, women and rape*. New-York: Simon & Chuster.
- Burgess-Proctor, A. (2006). Intersections of race, class, gender, and crime future directions for feminist criminology. *Feminist criminology*, 1, 27–47.
- Chesney-Lind, M. (2006). Patriarchy, crime, and justice feminist criminology in an era of backlash. *Feminist criminology*, 1, 6–26.
- Cho, S., Crenshaw, K. W., & McCall, L. (2013). Toward a field of intersectionality studies: Theory, applications, and praxis. *Signs*, 38, 785–810.
- Collins, P. H. (1990). *Black feminist thought: Knowledge, consciousness, and the politics of empowerment*. Routledge.
- Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: A black feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics. *U Chi Legal F*, 1, 139–167.
- Crenshaw, K. (1991). Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color. *Stanford law review*, 1241–1299.
- Daly, K., & Chesney-Lind, M. (1988). Feminism and criminology. *Justice Quarterly*, 5, 497–538.
- Davis, A. Y. (1981). *Women, race, & class*. Vintage.
- Duneier, M. (2016). *Ghetto: The invention of a place, the history of an idea*. Macmillan.
- Haley, S. (2016). *No mercy here: Gender, punishment, and the making of jim crow modernity*. North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press.
- Harris, A. P. (2000). Gender, violence, race, and criminal justice. *Stanford Law Review*, 777–807.
- Heidensohn, F. (1968). The deviance of women: A critique and an enquiry. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 19, 160–175.
- Jones, N. (2009). *Between good and ghetto: African American girls and inner-city violence*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.
- Jones, N. (2016). The gender of police violence. *Tikkun*, 31, 25–28.
- Jones, N., & Flores, J. (2012). At the intersections: Race, gender and violence. *Routledge International Handbook of Crime and Gender*, 73–84.
- MacKinnon, C. A. (1982). Feminism, marxism, method, and the state: An agenda for theory. *Signs*, 7, 515–544.
- McCorkel, J. A. (2013). *Breaking women: Gender, race, and the new politics of imprisonment*. New York: NYU Press.
- Potter, H. (2015). *Intersectionality and criminology: disrupting and revolutionizing studies of crime*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Richie, B. (1996). *Compelled to crime: The gender entrapment of battered black women*. Taylor: Psychology Press.
- Richie, B. (2012). *Arrested justice: Black women, violence, and America's prison nation*. New York: NYU Press.
- Rios, V. M. (2011). *Punished: Policing the lives of Black and Latino boys*. New York: NYU Press.
- Simon, J. (2007). *Governing through crime: How the war on crime transformed American democracy and created a culture of fear*. Oxford University Press.
- Wacquant, L. (2009). *Punishing the poor: The neoliberal government of social insecurity*. Duke University Press.

Kenly Brown is a Ph.D. candidate in African American Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, with a designated emphasis in Women, Gender, and Sexuality. Her research examines the intersection of Black girlhood, institutional violence, and alternative schooling.

Nikki Jones is an Associate Professor of African American Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. She is the author of *Between Good and Ghetto: African American Girls and Inner-City Violence* and a forthcoming book, *The Chosen Ones: Black Men and the Politics of Redemption*.



Cheryl Cooky

Abstract

Despite the seeming affinity between gender in sports contexts and the theoretical and methodological orientations of the field of sociology of gender, research studies of sport have, for the most part, been marginalized. With few exceptions, most edited collections and anthologies on sociology of gender do not include a chapter on sport (Malcolm in *Sport and Sociology*. Routledge, London, 2012). In this chapter, I offer insights into several factors that explains the marginalization of sport within the field of sociology of gender despite sport's relevance to gender scholars. Next, I provide a brief overview of key thematic trends in the research relevant to sociology of gender scholars, and offer a discussion and critique of the relevant approaches. I conclude with a few comments regarding future directions in the field of sociology of sport and gender.

1 Introduction

I began writing this chapter during a number of high-profile stories in the world of sports, each of which pertain to topics considered the “main-stay” of conventional feminist sociological inquiry: workplace discrimination, the wage gap, unequal media coverage, and sexual assault. In March of 2016, the United States national women's soccer team filed a wage discrimination suit with the Equal Opportunity Commission against U.S. Soccer (the governing body that oversees both the national men's and women's teams). The women's team claimed they were paid less than their male counterparts, despite having the same work requirements. In fact, as the American women won the 2015 World Cup and returned home to ticker tape parades, media appearances, and sold out crowds, the team struggled with low compensation and access to the resources they had so clearly earned and deserved. The U.S. women's team earned \$2 million from FIFA in their 2015 World Cup win while the U.S. men's team received \$9 million for their 2014 World Cup performance, despite being eliminated in a very early round of the tournament (Cooky, 2016a). A year later, the U.S. women's national hockey team threatened to boycott the International Ice Hockey Federation world championship games. The U.S. women's hockey team claimed USA Hockey (the governing body that oversees the men's and

C. Cooky (✉)
Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA
e-mail: ccooky@purdue.edu

women's national teams) unfairly treated the women's team, devoting higher wages and better resources to the men. Both the U.S. soccer and hockey teams were successful in settling their disputes out of court. While the terms of the settlements have not been publicized, in the case of the women's hockey team, USA Hockey has agreed to devote more resources to the talent development of the sport in the youth leagues, a key component to their success and longevity.

During the summer of 2016, at ESPN's annual ESPY (Excellence in Sport Performance Yearly) Awards ceremony former University of Connecticut (UConn) women's basketball center and 4-time National Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA) champion Breanna Stewart, received the "Best Female Athlete" award. During her acceptance speech, Stewart observed that while at UConn she "received an enormous amount of media attention," however now that she is playing in the Women's National Basketball Association (she was the number one draft pick in 2016 for the Seattle Storm) she is struck by how professional female athletes do not receive anywhere near the "amount of fame." Her statement, "This has to change!" was received by generous audience applause. She concluded her speech with the following declaration, "Equality for all, takes each of us." This was a loud and clear call for gender equality in the sport media coverage of men's and women's sports (Cooky, 2016b).

That summer was also the year of the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio, Brazil. While female athletes and women's sports tend to receive more equitable coverage during Olympic years than non-Olympic years, and in some cases the media coverage of women's sports exceeds that of men's (Coche & Tuggle, 2016), the broadcast coverage of the 2016 Games was rife with overt sexism. For example the *Chicago Tribune* referred to the Olympic bronze medal trap shooter Corey Cogdell as "wife of Chicago Bears' lineman." World record breaker in a number of swimming events, Katie Ledecky, was referred to as "the next Michael Phelps" and her athletic dominance was attributed to the fact she "swims like a man." John Miller, the Director of

Marketing at NBC (the television network who purchased the rights to broadcast the Olympic games), explained the network's coverage of the Games, which focused less on the competitive events and more on the backstories of American athletes: "More women watch the Games than men, and for the women, they're less interested in the result and more interested in the journey" (for a discussion see: Cooky, 2017a, b). While sexism in sports media coverage is not a new phenomenon, indeed a longitudinal study attests to that fact (see: Cooky, Messner, & Musto, 2015), what was surprising and different about the 2016 Olympics, was the "call out" culture on social media. Moreover, it was not only alternative, progressive, and feminist media that presented a critique of sexism in the broadcast and news media coverage, but mainstream print and online news media incorporated this feminist critique into their own coverage of the 2016 Games. Headlines exclaimed, "Media around the world condemned for sexist coverage," "The most sexist moments from the Olympics, so far," and "How sexism is harming young girls." Surprisingly, a dominant framing of the Rio Olympics was sexism in the media coverage itself!

There has also been increased media attention to sexual assault in sports, including the high-profile case against Baylor University, where over the course of several years, members of the university's football team raped and assaulted a number of undergraduate students while the football coach and Baylor administrators, including the infamous Ken Starr, former special investigator in the Bill Clinton/Monica Lewinsky sex scandal and Baylor's now-former president, covered up the assaults and failed to comply with Title IX regulations. USA Gymnastics (the governing body for the USA Olympic teams) is also embroiled in a sexual abuse scandal. An investigative report by the *Indianapolis Star* published in August of 2016 found a pattern of silencing of victims whereby USA Gymnastics failed to report allegations of abuse by its coaches, often transferring suspected coaches to other gyms without informing athletes. The *IndyStar* investigation uncovered 368 gymnasts to alleged sexual abuse over the course

of twenty years. In March of 2017, sixteen U.S. senators introduced a bipartisan bill titled, “Protecting Young Victims from Sexual Abuse Act of 2017,” that would make it a federal crime for Olympic governing bodies to fail to promptly report child sexual abuse allegations to authorities. The bill has the support of well-respected Senators Diane Feinstein (D-California) and Marco Rubio (R-Florida).

These examples illustrate the relevance of sport as a fruitful site of inquiry in sociology of gender. Moreover, while these are contemporary examples, the broader concerns regarding workplace discrimination, unequal media coverage, and sexual violence in sports have historically plagued women’s sports; consider the activism in the 1970s of Billy Jean King, who, along with other women tennis players, protested their unequal treatment by the U.S. Tennis Association (USTA) creating their own tennis association, the Women’s Tennis Association (WTA) and tour, The Virginia Slims tour. Moreover, the unequal media coverage of women’s sports has been an ongoing concern among women’s sports advocacy groups and feminist academics (see: Messner, Duncan, & Jensen, 1993; Cooky, Messner, & Musto, 2015).

Yet, despite the seeming affinity between gender in sports contexts and the theoretical and methodological orientations in the field of sociology of gender, research studies of sport have, for the most part, been marginalized. A recent search in the journal *Gender & Society*, the top ranked peer-reviewed academic journal both in the disciplinary fields of sociology and women’s studies, produced only twelve research articles where sport is the focus. With few exceptions, most edited collections and anthologies on sociology of gender do not include a chapter on sport (Malcolm, 2012). This chapter provides a rationale for the study of sport in sociology of gender. I offer insights into several factors that explain the marginalization of sport within the field of sociology of gender. Next, I provide a brief overview of key thematic trends relevant to sociology of gender scholars and offer a discussion and critique of the relevant approaches. I conclude with a few comments regarding

possible future directions for research in the field of sociology of sport and gender.

2 Sport, Where for Art Thou?

Research on gender and sport, and many of the scholars who produce this research, reside along the disciplinary intersections of sociology, kinesiology, and women’s studies. As a self-described *feminist sports sociologist*, whose formal academic training includes degrees/academic certificates in each of the above disciplines, I find myself occupying liminal and intersectional spaces: within the field of sociology, sport is marginalized (consider there is no division within the American Sociological Association on sport); within the field of kinesiology, feminism and sociology are both marginalized (kinesiology tends to be dominated by the biomedical and natural sciences, and particularly as of late, the social sciences and humanities have been eliminated from many kinesiology departments in the USA, see: Andrews, 2008), and within women’s studies/feminism, sports have not been viewed as a central area of inquiry unlike other social institutions, such as workplace organizations, politics, the family, religion and so on (Cooky, 2017a, b). As M. Ann Hall, feminist sports scholar, noted in the early 1990s, “women’s studies programs in general have not embraced sports and leisure, nor have they been perceived as particularly inviting to physical education and sports studies students.” (Hall, 1993, p. 54). For Hall, “the problem ... is that those with either a background in cultural studies or just entering the field ... are not interested in sport, whereas those interested in sport have neither the theoretical preparation nor methodological expertise to do the work.” (1993, p. 58). Within the field of sociology of sports, many do not have formal academic training in sociology, rather they may have degrees in kinesiology, physical cultural studies, history, American Studies, sports management, communication, and so on. The obvious exception are those trained in the “Southern California School” by Michael Messner,

including Shari L. Dworkin, Faye L. Wachs, Sohaila Shakib, Jeff Montez de Oca, Nicole Willms, James McKeever, Jeff Sacha, Michela Musto, Chelsea Johnson, myself, and others. Moreover, research on sport, and specifically as it relates to gender, has typically been disseminated and published in the sociology of sport field (i.e. *Sociology of Sport Journal*, *Journal of Sport and Social Issues* or in journals of other sub-disciplinary fields, such as *Journal of Sports History*, *Journal of Sport Management*, *Quest*, *Communication & Sport*, etc.). In addition, at the beginning of the development of the sub-field of the sociology of sport in the 1960s and 1970s, feminist inquiry and research on women's issues in sport was relatively obscure, in part due to the link between the empirical focus of the research (women/gender) and the theoretical framework (feminism), as well as institutional sexism (Malcolm, 2012; Messner & Sabo, 1990). It has been only the past 20–30 years that feminist scholarship in the sociology of sport has gained legitimacy. By the 1990s, Jay Coakley, one of the founders of the North American Society for the Sociology of Sport (NASSS), claimed that gender was the most popular topic in the field of sociology of sport (Malcolm, 2012). Yet, while Messner & Sabo raised doubts regarding the presence of feminist analyses of sports prior to the 1980s, Malcolm (2012) suggests one could argue little has changed. Indeed, despite the increased popularity of gender as an object of inquiry in the sociology of sport in the 1980s and 1990s, sport continues to remain at the margins in sociology of gender. Yet, some indicators suggest this trend may be changing. Nearly half of the articles on sport in *Gender & Society* (5 of 12) have been published between 2011 and 2016, signaling perhaps a recognition of sport as a central social institution among the journal editors and reviewers, as well as a recognition among feminist sports sociologists that *Gender & Society* is a “home” for their scholarship.

The field of gender and sport is quite diverse and includes not only the sociology of sport, which since the 1990s has been heavily dominated by feminist cultural studies of sports (Malcolm, 2012; Birrell & Cole, 1990/1994),

informed by postmodern and post-structuralist theories, but also other sub-fields in kinesiology such as sports psychology, sports management, sports communication, sports psychology, sports history, among others. Indeed, there have been discussions within the North American Society for the Sociology of Sport to consider a name change so as to better capture the multiple disciplinary perspectives that often fall under the umbrella of sociology of sport; not to mention the field includes studies on health, fitness, leisure, exercise, physical cultures such that “sport” fails to capture the diversity of scholarship presented at the conference and published in the journal, *Sociology of Sport Journal*. Moreover, there are hundreds, perhaps thousands of books, journal articles, book chapters, edited collections on “gender and sport.” As such, to make this task somewhat manageable and given the Handbook's focus and objective, I will focus on key thematic trends in gender and sport, articulated by sociologists or those drawing on a sociological perspective, to evaluate and assess what topics and theories have currency in this field. Given my positionality, located at the liminal spaces in between the disciplinary boundaries of kinesiology, sociology, and women's/gender studies in the USA, I hope to offer insights into how these trends may mirror topics and theories outside of the sociology of gender.

3 Key Thematic Trends in Sociology of Gender and Sport

3.1 Sports as a Site for Male Domination, Sports as the Last Male Preserve

One of the significant developments and contributions in the sociology of gender resides in the conceptualization of sports as a social institution and cultural practice that both constitutes and is constituted by gender. More importantly, similar to many social institutions, sports are not gender neutral. In fact, sports serve to maintain gendered power relations and hierarchies, and in particular masculine hegemony, in ways not possible in

other social institutions. This is because sports are one of the remaining if not the last social institution by which girls and boys, women and men are sex segregated. It is this sex segregation, in conjunction with the salience of the body and its attendant ideologies that situate sports as an important social and cultural site for the reproduction of masculine superiority and feminine inferiority. Some of the first sociological analyses of gender and sport were published in the 1980s. These analyses, discussed below, continue to resonate in the 21st century given the relevant insights regarding contemporary gender dynamics and institutional arrangements in sport, and the unevenness of social change in sports (see: Cooky & Messner, 2018).

One of the first articles written in the sociology of gender and sport was “Women, Sports and Ideology” by Paul Willis (1982/1994), author of the classic sociological theory text, *Learning to Labor: How working class kids get working class jobs*. The article itself has been cited nearly 250 times according to CAB Direct.¹ In the opening statement, Willis offers the reader a caveat.

What follows is an essay in ideas. It is only a fragment towards the final critical mapping of sport within the social totality. It provides no proper empirical basis for analysis, provides no history of women in sport, and does not develop an inclusive theory of ideology. (...) My limited aim is to explore one of the crucial questions within the larger operation of ideological processes in the specific area of women in sport: how a set of ideas which bear a particular “guilty” relation to support and formation to dominant groups and dominant ideas nevertheless appear “freely” on the market place of ideas: unbiased, neutral and the property of any independent mind prepared to use “common sense” and “work things out for itself.” (Willis, 1982/1994; p. 31).

In this essay, Willis examines sports’ ideological function in reproducing and reaffirming masculine privilege. For Willis, sports are uniquely positioned to do this ideological work given the ways in which, “sport and biological

beliefs about gender difference combine into one of the few privileged areas where we seem to be dealing with unmediated ‘reality,’ where we know ‘what’s what’ without having to listen to the involved, self-serving analyses of theorists, analysts, political groups, etc.” (p. 31). Sports performances are physical, objective, and achieved in and through the body. Given the “natural” differences between men’s and women’s physical capabilities and capacities, any difference we observe in sports performances are thus presumably the result of these “natural” gender differences. As Willis observes, “The natural is one of the grounds of ideology because of its apparent autonomy from ‘biased’ interpretation (p. 32).”

Yet, even if researchers (often in the biomedical sciences) are able to empirically find gender differences in sport performances, according to Willis, this alone does not offer much insight. Instead, he wishes to articulate an approach to women in sport, an *analytic cultural criticism*. From this approach, the social and cultural factors by which these gender differences occur, and moreover, why these gender differences come to matter in the first place must be considered. The goal is “not to measure these differences precisely and explain them physically, but to ask *why* some differences, and not others, are taken as so important, become so exaggerated, are used to buttress social attitudes or prejudice” (pp. 33–340). Often defenders of the ideological framework of natural difference (what we may term today, gender essentialism) use sports to explain, justify, and legitimate gender inequalities, especially as they manifest in sports; for example, the lack of media coverage of women’s sports is not because of sexism, rather because women’s sports performances are less than men’s—women cannot run as fast, jump as high, etc.—and therefore less interesting to watch.

Willis outlines several basic characteristics on how sports are seen in our society and how patriarchal ideology informs our popular views on women in sport. These characteristics include how women’s achievements are compared to male achievement, which is the norm or referent,

¹CAB Direct is a database of bibliographic database for the social and life sciences. See <https://www.cabdirect.org/>.

how the female athlete is rendered a sex object—“a body which may excel in sport, but which is primarily an object of pleasure for man” (p. 35), and the linkages between physical achievement and masculinity. Moreover, what is critical here for Willis is that these ideologies become “common sense,” appearing as natural, inherent, and inevitable. In the conclusion, Willis offers a quite radical statement regarding the unmet potential regarding the purpose of sport ... “sport could be presented as a form of activity which emphasizes human similarity and not dissimilarity.” (p. 44). As we continue to see, particularly with issues regarding sex testing of athletes in women’s competitions or in debates regarding trans inclusion in sex segregated sports, sports in the 21st century certainly continue to emphasize human dissimilarity, particularly as it exists along sex/gender/sexuality.

In a highly influential article titled, “Sport and the Maintenance of Masculine Hegemony,” Lois Bryson, an Australian sociologist (1987/1994) noted the lack of feminist inquiry of sports and encouraged women’s studies/sociology of gender scholars to consider sport as an important topic, one crucial to understanding women’s oppression. She wrote, “... if we are to understand the processes of our domination, we ignore sport at our peril.” (1994, p. 47). Writing at a time when girls and women’s sports were highly marginalized, Bryson centered sport in modern gender arrangements and argued sport is “basic to maintain masculine hegemony in that sport crucially privileges males and inferiorizes women” (ibid. p. 48). Drawing upon a diversity of examples, including the way sport is defined (in ways that engage boys/men, not girls/women) and the direct control of women’s sports by men (the lack of women in key decision making/leadership positions in sports organizations, governing bodies such as the International Olympic Committee, and in sports media), Bryson illustrated how the organization of sports is such that boys and men are encouraged in their participation (Bryson, 1987/1994). Bryson argued that even when women are able to successfully challenge male

definitions and male control of sport, the result is that women’s sport is either ignored or trivialized. Bryson explains,

...it does become clear that where women do achieve what men see as significant performances, these are likely to be ignored and forgotten. If threat is too great they may be excluded from the arena entirely. Only in this way can men maintain their power and sustain the view...that ‘virtually all women’s sport is second rate’.” (Clancy, 1985: 2; as cited in Bryson, 1994; p. 57). Thus, we must recognize the ignoring of women’s sport as not merely a passive and inadvertent act. It is a dynamic process and one which is invoked to protect hegemonic masculinity.

In other words, participation, whether it be as athletes, as coaches, as leaders, or as sports reporters/producers, itself alone does not challenge masculine domination; women’s sports talents and achievements become marginalized through these other mechanisms.

Michael A. Messner, an American sociologist and gender studies scholar (and founding scholar of what I refer to as the “Southern California School”) offers important insights into how sports developed in ways intricately tied to dominant articulations of masculinity. In his classic and influential essay (740 citations according to Human Kinetics publishing), “Sports and Male Domination: The Female Athlete as Contested Ideological Terrain”² Messner (1988/1994) outlines the “crisis of masculinity and the rise of organized sports” to illustrate, “... gender relations, along with their concomitant images of masculinity and femininity, change and develop historically as a result of interactions between men and women within socially structured limits and constraints.” (1994, p. 76).

In the United States, modern sports emerged during the late 19th/early 20th century, a time characterized by massive social changes to key social structures, including the economy/work, family, education, among others, precipitated by urbanization and industrialization, coupled with shifting gendered power relations. Tracing the historical trajectory of sports in the U.S.,

²This discussion of Messner (1988) can be found in the forthcoming book, *Feminisms in Sport, Leisure and Education* (Palgrave).

Messner notes how the rise of organized sports during the 20th century corresponded with two crises of masculinity, the first occurred during the turn of the 20th century and the second, during the post-World War II era. During the first crisis, sport developed as a “male-created homosocial cultural sphere that provided men with psychological separation from the perceived feminization of society while also providing dramatic symbolic proof of the ‘natural superiority’ of men over women.” (Messner, 1988, 2007, p. 35). During the second crisis, Messner notes that the rise of mass spectator sports corresponded with an economic shift from entrepreneurial capitalism to corporate capitalism which produced the docile consumer. There was also a decline in the centrality of physical prowess in the labor market and military; a decline that was not accompanied by a similar decline in the psychological need for ideological gender difference. As such, spectator sports, which symbolically illustrated the strength, virility, dominance, and power of the male body, rose in prominence to culturally reassert and reaffirm “natural” gender differences and men’s dominance over women (Messner, 1988). Thus, “women’s movement into sport represents a genuine quest by women for equality, control of their own bodies and self-definitions, and as such it represents a challenge to the ideological basis of male domination. Yet, (...) this quest for equality is not without tension...” (Messner, 1988, 2007, p. 32). For Messner, the social meaning of the muscle/performance gap and the framing of female athletes by the sports media threaten to subvert any counterhegemonic potential posed by female athletes. Thus, the female athlete as “contested ideological terrain.”

Messner outlined the media’s role as more than just a conduit for gender ideologies; the media provide frameworks of meaning that offer interpretations of sports events, athletes, and sports controversies. Given that historically sport has served as a site for the ideological legitimization of male superiority and dominance, Messner argued it was imperative to examine the media frameworks for female athletes. In the context of American organized sports, those frameworks, as

noted above, are the marginalization of women’s sports by not covering women’s sports events or female athletes, the trivialization of women by sexualizing female athletes, or framing female athletes in gendered domestic roles of wives or mothers. Messner argued this type of framing of female athletes as sexual objects or sexual/gender deviants, thus explaining the prevalence of representations of female athletes as wives and mothers, was unsustainable if the sport media were to retain their legitimacy. Indeed, Messner (1988) suggested women’s sports were increasingly being covered by “objective” reporting that did not engage in trivialization and sexualization. Instead, the sport media were treating female athletes as “equal” to male athletes in their coverage while neglecting the reality of the historical and ideological development of sports wherein sports were organized to display and celebrate the extreme abilities and capabilities of the male body. Thus, the media’s treatment of female athletes “equal” to their male counterpart, in other words the same, and “objectively” reporting on the statistics regarding and outcomes of sports performances (such as finish times in a marathon, the distance of a tee shot in golf, the speed at which a tennis player serves the ball, the length by which a long jumper can travel or the distance a high jumper can jump, how much weight a weightlifter can lift, and so on), the sport media “provides support for the ideology of meritocracy while at the same time offers incontrovertible evidence of the ‘natural differences’ between males and females” (ibid. p. 42). Stated simply, gender ideologies are quite often simultaneously reaffirmed and challenged in sport media coverage of female athletes and women’s sports.

4 Southern California School

While these pivotal studies were published in the 1980s, the field of gender and sport, specifically feminist cultural studies of sports, would explode in the 1990s and 2000s, with much of this research published by scholars who resided in departments/disciplines outside of sociology of

gender (for a thorough summary of key developments in the broader field of gender and sport see: Malcolm, 2012). A key exception was the Southern California School. The School originated in the research by Michael A. Messner. The School would continue to gain prominence through Messner's mentorship of graduate students who would go on to produce influential and highly respected scholarship (winning book awards, journal article awards, and so on) in the field of sociology of gender and sport. As influenced by Messner, the roots which are evident in the "Female athlete as contested ideological terrain" essay discussed above, the Southern California School produced a body of scholarship that explored and examined the following thematic areas: hegemonic masculinity as it is reproduced and contested in sports contexts (Shari Dworkin & Faye Wachs would extend this analysis to fitness and health contexts); media coverage of women's sports/female athletes and symbolic/cultural representations of sports, and specifically how that coverage is gendered; and qualitative research (participant observations, interviews, ethnographies) on the experiences of sports participants, both in co-ed and single-sex sports contexts, and how participant experiences in sports are informed by gender as it manifests on the structural, cultural, and interactional levels, an important theoretical framework Messner (2002) articulated in his award winning book, *Taking the Field*.

5 Conclusion and Future Directions

Given both historical and contemporary dynamics, sports are understood as an important site for the reproduction of and challenge to gendered practices and interactions, structural/institutional arrangements, and ideologies. Scholars argue sports cannot be understood outside of an analysis of gender relations and gendered power dynamics. The historical foundation of modern sports in the Global North, along with organizational structure by which sports are sex segregated, positions sociological theories of gender

as particularly salient to explaining sports contexts. The key themes and perspectives discussed have been influential in shaping the scholarship, both within the field of sociology of gender and sport, as well as in gender and sport more broadly defined. Moreover, what is of particular interest is the way in which scholars today continue to find utility in the conceptual frameworks and arguments put forth by Willis, Bryson, and Messner (among others) over thirty years later. In our book, *No Slam Dunk*, (Cooky & Messner, 2018) we argue for the need to consider the unevenness of social change in sports and provide the reader with several theoretical and empirical insights to explain why we see progress in some areas and stagnation or even backlash in others. Future research should continue to explore the "both/and," the complexity and nuance of gender in sports, while taking care not to neglect the very real ways sports continues to reproduce the ideologies Willis, Bryson, and Messner outlined thirty years ago.

Moving forward, while intersectionality is a dominant theoretical perspective in the sociology of gender, it is less so in the realm of gender and sport. This may be due in part to the prevalence and influence of feminist cultural studies in the broader field of gender and sport, and the post-modern/post-structuralist approaches within feminist cultural studies. Since the 1990s, there is an increasing number of studies in gender and sport that consider multiple axes of difference in their work, and even examine "race, class, and gender (and/or sexuality/religion/disability, and so on)," we must also consider the other facets of intersectionality theory, as articulated by Patricia Hill Collins, including how "both/and perspectives," rather than "either/or perspectives," of social locations are used to understand the ways in which individuals (and social institutions) are situated within interlocking forms of privilege/dominance and oppression/subordination. This framework has been of particular utility in discussing diverse topics from the mainstream print news media coverage of women's sports (see: Cooky, Wachs, Messner, & Dworkin, 2010) as well as the

experience of cheerleaders at historically black colleges and universities (Johnson, 2015).

Rather than articulate specific topics or research questions sociologists of gender should consider in their future research, in conclusion I would like to issue a call for sociologists of gender to consider sports contexts as an important site for the exploration of gendered dynamics. Sports intersects with most if not all major social institutions and as such can be a ripe area for new research trajectories for scholars. Indeed, the inclusion of a chapter on sports in a Handbook on the sociology of gender speaks to the increased visibility and viability of inquiry into sports within the discipline, as well as the recognition among feminist scholars of the importance of sports as a site from which to examine and explain broader gender dynamics and inequalities.

References

- Andrews, D. L. (2008). Kinesiology's *Inconvenient Truth* and the Physical cultural studies imperative. *Quest, 1*, 45–62.
- Birrell, S., & Cole, C. L. (1990/1994). Double fault: Renee Richards and the construction and naturalization of difference. In S. Birrell & C. L. Cole (Eds.), *Women, sport, and culture* (pp. 373–397). USA: Human Kinetics Publishers.
- Bryson, L. (1987/1994). Sport and the maintenance of masculine hegemony. In S. Birrell & C. L. Cole (Eds.), *Women, sport, and culture* (pp. 47–64). USA: Human Kinetics Publishers.
- Coche, R., & Tuggle, C. A. (2016). The women's Olympics?: A gender analysis of NBC's coverage of the 2012 London Summer Games. *Electronic News, 10*(2), 121–138.
- Cooky, C. (forthcoming). Gender, sport, and media: Developments, trajectories, and transformations. In L. Mansfield, J. Caudwell, R. Watson, & B. Wheaton (Eds.), *Feminism in Sport, Leisure, and Education*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cooky, C. (2017). Women, sports, and activism. In H. McCammon, L. V. Yaylor, J. Reger & R. Einwohner (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of US Women's Social Movement Activism*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Cooky, C. (2017). "We cannot stand idly by": A necessary call for a public sociology of sport. *Sociology of Sport Journal, 1*–32.
- Cooky, C. (2016a). Striking goals for pay and prize parity in sport. *Gender & Society* blog. <https://gendersociety.wordpress.com/2016/06/29/striking-goals-for-pay-and-prize-parity-in-sport/>.
- Cooky, C. (2016b). "This has to change!": News media coverage of women's sports. *Contexts: Understanding People in their Social Worlds*. <https://contexts.org/articles/making-sports-more-sporting/#cooky>.
- Cooky, C., & Messner, M. A. (2018). *No slam dunk: Gender, sport and the unevenness of social change*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.
- Cooky, C., Messner, M. A., & Musto, M. (2015). "It's dude time!: A quarter century of excluding women's sports in televised news and highlight shows. *Communication & Sport, 3*, 261–287.
- Cooky, C., Wachs, F. L., Messner, M. A., & Dworkin, S. L. (2010). It's not about the game: Don Imus, race, class, gender and sexuality in contemporary media. *Sociology of Sport Journal, 27*, 139–159.
- Hall, M. A. (1993). Gender and sport in the 1990s: Feminism, culture and politics. *Sport Science Review, 2*(1), 48–68.
- Johnson, C. M. E. (2015). "Just because I dance like a ho I'm not a ho": Cheerleading at the intersection of race, class, and gender. *Sociology of Sport Journal, 32*(4), 377–394.
- Malcolm, D. (2012). *Sport and Sociology*. London: Routledge.
- Messner, M. A. (1988/1994). Sports and male domination: The female athlete as contested ideological terrain. In S. Birrell & C. L. Cole (Eds.), *Women, sport, and culture* (pp. 65–80). USA: Human Kinetics Publishers.
- Messner, M. A. (2002). *Taking the field: Women, men and sports*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Messner, M. A. (2007). *Out of play: Critical essays on gender and sport*. USA: SUNY Press.
- Messner, M. A., & Sabo, D. F. (1990). *Sport, men, and the gender order: Critical feminist perspectives*. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics Publishers.
- Messner, M. A., Duncan, M. C., & Jensen, K. (1993). Separating the men from the girls: The gendered language of televised sports. *Gender & Society, 7*, 121–137.
- Willis, P. (1982/1994). Women in sport in ideology. In S. Birrell & C. L. Cole (Eds.), *Women, sport, and culture* (pp. 31–45). USA: Human Kinetics Publishers.

Cheryl Cooky is an associate professor in the American Studies program at Purdue University. She is co-author of the book, *No Slam Dunk: Gender, Sport, and the Unevenness of Social Change*.



Amy Armenia

Abstract

For all the attention paid to wage labor and the market, it is only in recent decades that scholars have begun to focus on care, the work that we do to nurture and support each other in our society. The study of care is a distinctively feminist endeavor, as it highlights a body of labor that is critically important to society, commonly devalued as “women’s work,” and considered a central mechanism in the reproduction of gender inequalities in our society. In this chapter, I review the background of carework theory and research, including the definition of care, social and economic impact of care, exploration of paid and unpaid care work, and global dimensions of care. I conclude with some attention to the limitations of current research, and directions for future work.

For all the attention paid to wage labor and the market, it is only in recent decades that we have begun to focus on care, the work that we do to nurture and support each other in our society. Care work precedes and follows market activity. It is done in the home and the market, paid and unpaid, for relations, friends, and strangers. Care

is ubiquitous and inevitable. Every member of our society needs care, due to age, illness or disability; every member also gives care. Care transcends all social divisions, and to study care is to challenge some of the most pervasive dichotomies in society: work and family, public and private, dependence and autonomy, skill and emotion.

The study of care is an interdisciplinary, and distinctively feminist, endeavor, as it highlights a body of labor that is critically important to society, commonly devalued as “women’s work,” and considered a central mechanism in the reproduction of gender inequalities in our society. Research on care stretches across numerous disciplines: sociology, economics, political science, philosophy, education, public health, and others. In all of these disciplines, studying and valuing care—traditionally women’s work—means using a feminist perspective as a central mode of analysis.

In this chapter, I review the background of carework theory and research, including the social and economic impact of care, exploration of paid and unpaid care work, and global dimensions of care. I conclude with some attention to the limitations of current research, and directions for future work.

A. Armenia (✉)
Rollins College, Winter Park, USA
e-mail: aarmenia@rollins.edu

1 What Is Care? and Why Should We Study It?

Like other topics that are associated with women and the privacy of family and home, scholars have struggled to elevate and conceptualize care as an important research topic. In the introduction to one of the first collections on the topic, Abel and Nelson (1990) highlight the importance of “feminist reformulation” in bringing attention to the often ignored, but growing, needs of care givers and receivers in contemporary society.

The first challenge of revaluing care is contesting the lay definition of care as primarily an emotion. Scholarly conceptions of care are rooted in an understanding of care as work, rather than just an emotional response. Tronto (1993) sees care as both an interest—a “reaching out to something other than the self,”—but also as action, as the taking on of a burden (102). In their classic piece on care, Fisher and Tronto (1990, 40) define care as “a species activity that includes everything we do to maintain, continue, and repair our world so that we can live in it as well as possible.”

Fisher and Tronto (1990) allow for a more careful consideration of care giving and receiving by elaborating four components of care: caring about, taking care of, caregiving, and care-receiving. *Caring about* is the process of noticing care needs. *Taking care* refers to the taking of responsibility for initiating and maintaining care. The hands-on work of care is *caregiving*, and *care-receiving* is the response to that care by the recipient. The delineation of these aspects of care allows for examination of how they can be shaped by the availability of time, economic resources, emotional and social connections, and societal expectations. In her more recent work, Tronto (2013) has added a fifth dimension of care, *caring with*, that moves issues of care beyond the interpersonal, into the public and political realm and considers how to make care consistent with “democratic values of justice, equality and freedom” (p. 23).

Fisher and Tronto’s definition also alludes to the importance of care work in its role as “re-productive labor” that makes “productive

labor”—in the formal labor market—possible (Laslett & Brenner, 1989). The slave, unpaid, or underpaid care work of women of color has supported white families throughout US history (Thornton-Dill, 1988; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2001; Glenn, 2010, 2015). Glenn (2010, 2015) shows how coercing slaves, Native American girls, female prisoners, European immigrants, Mexicans, Chinese laborers, and Indians to perform care work facilitated settler colonialism and westward expansion. For these women, care work blurred the lines between reproduction and production.

Despite the importance and ubiquity of care work, mainstream economists have often trivialized or ignored the role of such labor. Feminist economists have fought this exclusion by highlighting the contribution and magnitude of “the other economy” (Razavi, 2007a), which includes home production (especially significant in developing economies) and unpaid care work done by family and friends.¹ Other scholars have underscored the importance of care work by conceptualizing it as part of the “human infrastructure” of society, a formulation that highlights its social value and also suggests a significant role for the state in supporting such activity, as it does for roads and schools (Duffy, Albelda, & Hammonds, 2013).

Definitions of care have examined the position of the care recipient as well. Some have distinguished “care” from other personal service work by focusing on the dependency of recipients, suggesting that recipients of care are those who are unable “by normal social standard [to] provide for all of their own care because of age, illness, or disability” (Duffy et al., 2013). Folbre and Wright (2012) dispute the idea that care is only about providing what one cannot provide for oneself. Instead, they argue that we all give help and rely on others for help, and that this

¹Care work is not, however, synonymous with unpaid labor. Care work is distinguished by the type and objective of the tasks performed, typically defined as the meeting of physical, social, and emotional needs of others, rather than by the location of the work, remuneration (or lack thereof), or the relationship between care giver and recipient.

interdependence and exchange of care is central to our well-being as individuals and as a society. They do, however, recognize the unique social importance of caring for dependents—those who cannot provide for their own needs—as a form of investment in others’ capabilities.

Care is work, to be sure, but it is not *just* work, and conceptualizing care also means grappling with the role of emotion. Service jobs increasingly require workers to do “emotional labor,” defined by Hochschild (2012) as “the management of feeling” that is “sold for a wage and therefore has exchange value” (p. 7n). Care work similarly involves emotional labor but goes beyond this, entailing “genuine emotional engagement” with the recipient, rather than just the performance of emotion (Folbre & Wright, 2012, 6). This emotional engagement can motivate care, and enrich the quality of care, as it may enable care givers to better understand the unique needs of care recipients over time.

2 Prior Research on Care

The broad conceptualization of care outlined above leads to some difficulty in constructing a coherent review of literature on the topic. Relevant research on care includes vast literatures on specific types of care work within families (e.g., mothering, fathering, care for elderly relatives, parental leave, disability studies) and in the market (e.g., child care, health care, social work, elder care, education).

Similar to early second wave feminism (and its associated scholarship), the early work on care focused largely on the ways that marriage and family responsibilities contributed to the oppression of women. Black feminist critiques of this movement and scholarship drew attention to the race and class bias inherent in this viewpoint, and the ways that poor women and women of color fought to be able to care for their families, rather than to escape care responsibilities (Zinn, 1994). Care scholarship has followed this point and counterpoint, beginning with the highlighting of care responsibilities, then re-valuing of those contributions, and progressing into a more

intersectional view of care, which necessarily included paid care work and global views of care work.

The push to build bridges between these separate literatures is recent and still in development. In addition to silos of scholarship defined by sector, much of this research has necessarily been country-specific, given vast differences in the structure and resources of the care sector across nations. Few scholars have managed to conduct inclusive, qualitative studies of care work, broadly defined. However, some have invited comparisons and connections with the use of edited collections of such research (see, for example, Abel & Nelson, 1990; Harrington Meyer, 2000; Duffy, Armenia, & Stacey, 2015). These collections have pulled together research across occupation and sector to highlight commonalities and contrasts in the ideologies, conditions, and challenges of different types of care workers in different settings: home and institutions, care for elders, children, or the ill/disabled, paid and unpaid care work.

With the availability of large-scale time use and labor market data over time, quantitative researchers have made considerable progress in looking at these different types of work and workers under the conceptual umbrella of care. Duffy (2011) uses a century of data from the U.S. Census Bureau, and looks across child care, health care, social work, and education, to trace the changes in who provides care as it relates to changes in the definition of good care. Central to her analysis, she highlights the existence of a large sector of domestic workers who do much of the paid care work in the early 20th century. This sector shrinks over the course of the 20th century, as more specialized workforces develop to handle child care, health care, elder care, and mental health needs. To ignore this shift is also to ignore the changing demographics of the care workforce, from a domestic service workforce that was predominantly made up of African-American women, to a bifurcated workforce where newly-professionalized care jobs are filled by white women, and women of color continue to do the lowest-paid care jobs.

Duffy et al. (2013) use data from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) on unpaid care activities, American Community Survey (ACS) data on paid labor activities, and government budget documents on public investment to measure the size of the entire “care sector” in one state, Massachusetts. They find that care labor makes up approximately one-fifth of the average residents’ daily time, 22% of the labor force, and 57% of state and local government spending.

Much of the current research on care tends to focus on either paid or unpaid labor, and these are addressed separately below. However, it should be noted that the line between paid and unpaid labor can be fuzzy, as argued by feminists of color (Thornton-Dill, 1988; Zinn, 1994; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2001; Glenn, 2010, 2015) and demonstrated by wage replacement policies which compensate family caregivers (Stacey & Ayers, 2012).

3 Unpaid Care

Lay conceptions of care often romanticize an ideal of unpaid care as a “labor of love.” In this dominant historical narrative, married women were the traditional managers and providers of care, and this care was based in responsibility and love, rather than pay (Hays, 1996). Even in the nations with more developed economies, like the United States, where paid care sectors are the largest and most developed, the majority of care work is done within families, without pay, and overwhelmingly by women.

Bianchi, Folbre and Wolf (2012) use ATUS data to estimate the prevalence and distribution of unpaid care in the United States. Most adults (more than 75% of both men and women) provide some unpaid care, including both direct “interactive” care and “support” care (activities like cooking, shopping, cleaning that support interactive care, but do not necessarily involve interaction). On average, women provide more hours of care (averaging 4.4 h per day, compared to men’s 2.7 h), with the biggest gender differences in support care. The gender difference in

unpaid care is larger for child care than for adult care, in terms of both likelihood of providing any care, and the amount of care provided.

Unpaid caregiving is not without cost, however. Abel (2000) reviews the burdens of caregiving borne by unpaid caregivers of the frail elderly “including physical, emotional, social and financial problems” (67). Bianchi, Folbre, and Wolf (2012) summarize a considerable literature on the stresses of caregiving that find elevated risks of depression and other adverse mental health consequences, as well as physical health risks, like immune responses and coronary heart disease.

Unpaid caregivers also face opportunity costs as they may be compelled to reduce their paid employment or leave the workforce altogether to meet care needs. Crittenden (2010) uses the concept “mommy tax” to refer to the lower lifetime earnings for mothers who leave the workforce, even briefly. Glauber (2007), however, finds that this motherhood penalty is moderated by race and marital status, such that the penalty is the largest for white mothers, married mothers of any race, and unmarried mothers with 1 or 2 children. Much less research has been conducted on the employment and earnings effect of caring for others besides children. Empirical evidence of an earnings penalty for those who care for elders is mixed; because this care tends to happen later in life, it may have fewer repercussions on lifetime earnings (Bianchi et al., 2012).

While some policies exist in the United States to provide support or wage replacement for unpaid caregivers, the resulting safety net is fragmented and incomplete. The primary federal policy in the United States to address caregiving is the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), which provides 12 weeks of unpaid job-protected leave for qualifying employees of qualifying employers to provide care for a newborn or newly-adopted child, or a seriously ill child, spouse, or parent. This policy fails to meet the needs of many families in the U.S., due to gaps in coverage and eligibility, workers’ inability to afford unpaid time off, or outright non-compliance by employers (Armenia, Gerstel,

& Wing, 2014). Some states now provide paid leave for FMLA reasons, and some private employers offer paid parental leave to their employees, but this patchwork of programs covers only a minority of the workforce. Public programs for care of the elderly and disabled are more likely to provide support for paid care or institutional care, rather than compensating family members through wage replacement (Gornick, Howes, & Braslow, 2012).

The lack of support for unpaid care is at odds with a romanticized view of unpaid care as the gold standard, and increasingly makes the opportunity to provide unpaid care a luxury for married-couple families with a high-earning breadwinner who can afford to have an unpaid spouse at home. Furthermore, there are ideological consequences for those who can neither opt-out of the paid workforce to provide care nor buy-out of caregiving responsibilities with paid substitutes. These women—disproportionately working-class and of color—are then judged inadequate or dysfunctional compared to an ideal of upper-class white women’s domesticity (Zinn, 1994).

4 Paid Care

While traditionalists see having a woman specialize in unpaid care work as an ideal family arrangement, early second wave feminists saw this as a feature of patriarchal oppression (as noted above), and feminists of color challenged its reliance on exploiting women of color. Nonetheless, the narrative continues by suggesting that women’s increasing presence in the labor force has reduced their availability to provide this unpaid care in the home and community (again, at the expense of families, or as a boon for women, depending on who you ask). The response to this “crisis in care” has been the rapid growth of a paid care sector.

Care scholars have increasingly challenged this “outsourcing narrative,” by disproving the assumption that paid care is a recent historical phenomenon. They also seek to understand the challenges faced by care workers and their

disadvantages compared to similar workers in other occupations and industries. In addition, these scholars have engaged in debates about the relationship between love and money as motivators of caregiving and determinants of care quality.

Duffy (2011) challenges the “outsourcing” narrative with an examination of U.S. Census data from the 20th century. The outsourcing narrative, she argues, assumes the dominance of unpaid care only by ignoring the substantial presence of domestic servants as paid carers in the early 20th century (also Dill, 1988; Glenn, 2010). Furthermore, the focus on change in where care happens (the home vs. institutions) and whether it is paid, ignores the monumental changes in what is expected from care, as we move to more reliance on expert-guided care.

One of the most discussed aspects of paid care in the U.S. has been the “care penalty,” the lower wages earned by workers in caring occupations. England, Budig, and Folbre (2002) found a 5–6% wage penalty for care workers compared to similarly educated and experienced workers in other occupations. This penalty is experienced by both men and women in care work, but because more women are care workers (23% of employed women vs. 5% of employed men are in carework occupations) the care penalty is disproportionately experienced by women workers overall. The penalty manifests not just in wages, but in meager benefits, high job instability, and limited opportunity for mobility, in a growing sector of these “bad jobs” in the U.S. (Morgan & Farrar, 2015). Indeed, Dwyer’s (2013) analysis of BLS data from 1983 to 2007 suggests that the growth of the care sector is not just a symptom of job polarization in the U.S., but is a major driver of this trend in the U.S. economy.

Numerous theories have been put forward to explain (but not justify) the wage penalty for care workers. England (2005) outlines these theories and their connected debates. First, the “devaluation perspective” suggests that low wages of care work are likely connected to the larger trend of devaluing women’s work. Care is not just a job done disproportionately by women, but the work itself is associated with femininity, and seen as the result of natural inclinations and talents,

rather than skill. Second, the “public good” framework suggests that the low wages are the results of the market’s failure to appreciate and compensate for the benefits of care work beyond the recipient to the larger society. Other scholars note that paid care work cannot benefit from economies of scale or increased productivity due to technology or speed-up, the way other industries have (Razavi, 2007a; England et al., 2002). Attempts to increase the “output” of care workers quickly results in care of substandard quality (Razavi, 2007a).

England (2005) and others also interrogate the influence and possible consequences of emotion in paid care work. Some argue that care workers are influenced by compensating differentials, in that emotional gratification may function as a “nonpecuniary amenity” that lowers the amount that employers must offer to find willing workers. Care workers are then positioned as “prisoners of love” (Folbre 2001 in England, 2005) who are penalized for developing the emotional connections that are endogenous to their work.

Scholars also speculate about the tension between the “hostile worlds” of love and money in care work (England, 2005). This includes those who worry that the commodification of emotion might lead to the degradation of the work and workers (Hochschild 2003 in England 2005), and those who urge us to challenge the dichotomy between love and money (Zelizer, 2002; Folbre & Nelson, 2000).

Certainly, emotional engagement can be a mixed blessing for care workers. In her study of home care aides, Stacey (2011) suggests that people build up a substantial reserve of “emotional capital” prior to entering paid care work, and that this emotional capital is both a resource for building an identity as a “caring self” and a mechanism for reinforcing inequality, as employers rely on it to sustain a low-wage workforce. Similarly, other research suggests that interpersonal connections with care recipients are among the more gratifying aspects of care work for these workers (Price-Glynn & Rakovski, 2015). However, we also need to be mindful of the ways that these emotional connections are oppressive or exploitative. Numerous scholars

have documented the ways that these emotional connections prevent paid care workers from advocating for their needs, including economic needs (Uttal & Tuominen, 1999; Little, 2015), time and freedom from verbal abuse and racial insults (Dodson & Zinavage, 2007), and safety from injury and violence (Zelnick, 2015).

The debate about the hostile worlds of love and money reflects a scholarly focus on what Duffy (2011) refers to as nurturant care jobs. Nurturant care jobs involve face to face interaction while non-nurturant jobs are those done in support of care provision, but without direct interaction, for example, hospital janitors, cafeteria workers, nursing home administrative workers. Duffy argues that the privileging of nurturant care jobs obscures the importance of non-nurturant work to the care sector, and the extent to which non-nurturant care workers face even worse work conditions. In addition, non-nurturant workers in caring industries are often pulled into emotional labor, simply by their proximity. For example, cafeteria workers show care for school children, and hospital janitors interact with patients. Finally, non-nurturant care jobs are disproportionately likely to be done by women (and men) of color, and immigrants. When they are excluded from analysis, we construct an incomplete vision of who is in the care workforce and what they experience.

Indeed, researchers uncover stratification and inequalities, not just in comparisons of care sector versus other sectors, but within the care sector itself. Care workers of color, immigrants, and those with little education are overrepresented in care jobs that have the worst conditions, the highest physical and psychological risks, and the lowest wages (Duffy et al., 2015).

Poor conditions for paid care workers are consequential for care recipients as well. Care worker movements have stressed the extent to which care worker struggles affect turnover and quality of care (Little, 2015). Folbre and Nelson (2000) and Razavi (2007a) argue that poor labor conditions and tradeoffs between love and money prevent the development of “rich markets” of care, where those who need care can choose from a variety of high quality options.

5 Global Dimensions of Care

The study of care has been enriched by increasing attention to its global dimensions. One aspect of this literature focuses on identifying and explaining variation between nations in paid and unpaid care and care policy. In addition, an emerging literature examines the relational nature of care across nations.

There is a great deal of variation among other nations in care and care policy. The distribution of and support for care is central to considerations of gender equality and social welfare across countries, and scholars have often used the welfare regime literature as a jumping-off point. Despite this connection, early literature on welfare regimes—the examination of typologies of nations with similar orientations to social welfare policy—relied more strongly on the ways that policy could foster independence than in how they dealt with dependence. Razavi (2007a, b) provides a thorough overview of feminist challenges to Esping-Andersen’s original welfare regime models that incorporate concerns around care as a responsibility and also a burden for women within these systems. She goes on to formulate a conception of a “care diamond” as a way of representing the social architecture for the provision of care within a society, with the four points representing families/households, markets, the not-for-profit sector, and the state (federal/local). This formulation gives a framework for understanding variation between nations as well as changes in the management of care needs in a society across time. Similar to Duffy’s critique of the “outsourcing narrative” above, Razavi also critiques the idea of linear trend from family to market as countries become more developed.

Developed nations have addressed care provision with different goals, including increasing women’s labor force attachment, ameliorating gender inequality in paid and unpaid work, and social investment in children and other dependents. Razavi (2007b) suggests that most recent European policy initiatives have assumed a de-familialization strategy of care (providing more publicly funded care options), but that these

policies ignore the ways that gender inequalities in paid and unpaid work continue in practice. Nordic states, she notes, place a higher value on care by reducing the penalties for providing unpaid care (with generous leaves, for example), and make an effort to equalize the distribution of care (with policies that provide use-it-or-lose-it leave for fathers, for example).

While women continue to do more unpaid care work than men in virtually all nations (Razavi & Staab, 2010), these different constellations of social policy—and their consequences—do challenge what seems inevitable in U.S. studies: the motherhood penalty and the care penalty in paid work. In an examination of twenty-two countries, Budig, Misra, and Boeckmann (2012) found that the motherhood penalty was reduced in nations with parental leaves and public child care when there was also broad ideological support for maternal employment. In the absence of such cultural attitudes, the effect of policy was more muted.

Similarly, the wage penalty for paid care workers varies greatly by nation, including some countries where care workers earn a bonus over similarly skilled workers in other sectors. Budig and Misra (2010) find wage bonuses for men and women in Sweden, and for women in the Netherlands and Germany. Furthermore, they find that the labor and policy context shapes wage bonuses, such that bonuses are more likely for care workers when “income inequality is low, union density is high, the public sector is large, and public spending on care is high” (p. 459).

Global research on care work does not just compare between nations, however. In recent decades, scholars have highlighted the relational nature of care and care work across nations. The concept of “global care chains,” coined by Hochschild, and critically examined by Yeates (2004), refers to the “series of personal links between people across the globe based on the paid or unpaid work of caring” (cited in Yeates, 2004, 369–370). While care work is done locally for those who need care, we increasingly see families in developed countries hiring workers from less developed countries to provide care for children, the elderly, and the sick or disabled.

These workers must then assign their own care responsibilities (care of their own children, for example) to other family members or even to lower-paid care workers in their home country. Hondagneu-Sotelo (2001) and Parreñas (2001) provide rich descriptions of these workers and the contradictions they face in their qualitative studies of migrant domestic workers. In the introduction to a special issue of the *Journal of European Social Policy* on “Care, Markets and Migration in a Globalising World,” Williams and Brennan (2012) suggest that three trends—the development of care provisions, the promotion of market mechanisms to meet these needs, and global migration—are becoming increasingly entwined with each other. As such, states have begun to rely on migration (and migrant workers) to make marketization of welfare services a viable option.

6 Discussion and Critique of Approaches to Carework Research

In recent decades, the growth of research and theory on care work has been immense, providing increased attention to this critical social resource. This body of research is notable for its breadth, attention to diversity and inequalities, and inclusion of feminist perspectives. This body of research contains the potential to expand our understanding of work and family in coming decades.

One of the biggest limitations of carework research is related to one of its biggest strengths. The variety of types of care, and locations of care work, have often lead to carework research being contained in many different disciplinary silos, without much interaction across these chasms. For example, labor economists, sociologists, occupational health researchers, gerontologists, and nursing scholars have done substantial work on care, but found rare opportunities to interact and collaborate.

Similarly (and likely related to this), there is little connection or collaboration between those who study of different parts of the care sector.

Researchers (and their work) are often grouped by care recipient (e.g., children, elderly, sick or disabled) or type of care (education, health, social services, paid vs. unpaid), without recognition of the commonalities and differences across this care work.

Conducting research across these diverse groups of workers and recipients would not be easy to accomplish, however. Future research efforts will need be collaborative, connecting researchers in different sectors or sites. Meta-analyses are also a potentially useful method for creating these connections.

The broadening of research connections also needs to happen globally. Where comparative work exists, it has tended to focus on the U.S. and Western Europe, like early welfare regime research, with some recent expansion into developed countries in Central/South America and Asia.

Another weakness in the body of care research is its lack of inclusion of the voices of care recipients. Certainly, the care needs of children, the elderly, and the disabled are measured and considered, but we know less about their perspectives on the availability and quality of care, as well as the relational aspects of care receiving. We hear more often from those who are arranging care for others, despite the fact that the recipients themselves may have something to contribute. Disability studies scholars, who have a better track record of amplifying the voices of people with disabilities, have much to contribute in this way to the larger body of care research.

To be sure, these limitations slow down the scholarly progress we can make in understanding care and care work. Just as importantly, they impede our ability to advocate for social and political change. As Razavi (2007a, b) notes, revaluing care is about increasing the capabilities of women in society, as well as evening out the burdens of providing care. Tronto (2013) stresses that our ability to advocate for care is critical not just in the maintenance of our well-being, or in ensuring just distributions of care work, but is also important for maintaining our democracy by strengthening the voice of every one—including care workers and receivers. Working towards this

vision means strengthening connections across these sectors to enable a diverse coalition of care workers and recipients to work together to revalue care in an increasingly market-driven society.

References

- Abel, E. K. (2000). A historical perspective on care. In M. H. Meyer (Ed.), *Care work: Gender, class, and the welfare state* (pp. 2–14). Routledge: New York.
- Abel, E. K., & Nelson, M. K. (1990). Circles of care: An introductory essay. In E. K. Abel & M. K. Nelson (Eds.), *Circles of care: Work and identity in women's lives* (pp. 4–34). Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Armenia, A., Gerstel, N., & Wing, C. (2014). Workplace compliance with the law: The case of the family and medical leave act. *Work and Occupations, 41*, 277–304.
- Bianchi, S., Folbre, N., & Wolf, D. (2012). Unpaid care work. In N. Folbre (Ed.), *For love and money: Care provision in the United States* (pp. 40–64). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Budig, M. J., & Misra, J. (2010). How care-work employment shapes earnings in cross-national perspective. *International Labour Review, 149*, 441–460.
- Budig, M. J., Misra, J., & Boeckmann, I. (2012). The motherhood penalty in cross-national perspective: The importance of work-family policies and cultural attitudes. *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society, 19*, 163–193.
- Crittenden, A. (2010). *The price of motherhood: Why the most important job in the world is still the least valued*. New York: Picador.
- Dill, B. T. (1988). Our mother's grief: Racial ethnic women and the maintenance of families. *Journal of Family History, 13*(4), 415–431.
- Dodson, L., & Zinbavage, R. M. (2007). "It's Like a Family" caring labor, exploitation, and race in nursing homes. *Gender & Society, 21*, 905–928.
- Duffy, M. (2011). *Making care count a century of gender, race, and paid care work*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Duffy, M., Albelda, R., & Hammonds, C. (2013). Counting care work: The empirical and policy applications of care theory. *Social Problems, 60*, 145–167.
- Duffy, M., Armenia, A., & Stacey, C. L. (2015). *Caring on the clock: The complexities and contradictions of paid care work*. *Families in Focus*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.
- Dwyer, R. E. (2013). The care economy? Gender, economic restructuring, and job polarization in the U.S Labor Market. *American Sociological Review, 78*, 390–416.
- England, P. (2005). Emerging theories of care work. *Annual Review of Sociology, 31*, 381–399.
- England, P., Budig, M., & Folbre, N. (2002). Wages of virtue: The relative pay of care work. *Social Problems, 49*, 455–473.
- Fisher, B., & Tronto, J. (1990). Toward a feminist theory of caring. In E. K. Abel & M. K. Nelson (Eds.), *Circles of care: Work and identity in women's lives* (pp. 35–62). Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Folbre, N., & Nelson, J. A. (2000). For love or money—Or both? *The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14*, 123–140.
- Folbre, N., & Wright, E. O. (2012). Defining Care. In N. Folbre (Ed.), *For love and money: Care provision in the United States* (pp. 1–20). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Glauber, R. (2007). Marriage and the motherhood wage penalty among African Americans, Hispanics, and Whites. *Journal of Marriage & Family, 69*, 951–961.
- Glenn, E. N. (2010). *Forced to care: Coercion and caregiving in America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Glenn, E. N. (2015). Settler colonialism as structure: A framework for comparative studies of U.S. race and gender formation. *Sociology of Race and Ethnicity, 1*, 52–72.
- Gornick, J. C., Howes, C., & Braslow, L. (2012). The care policy landscape. In N. Folbre (Ed.), *For love and money: Care provision in the United States* (pp. 112–139). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Harrington Meyer, M. (2000). *Care work: Gender, class, and the welfare state*. New York: Routledge.
- Hays, S. (1996). *The cultural contradictions of motherhood*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Hochschild, A. R. (2012). *The managed heart: Commercialization of human feeling*. Berkeley, California, London: University of California Press.
- Hondagneu-Sotelo, P. (2001). *Doméstica: Immigrant workers cleaning and caring in the shadows of affluence*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Laslett, B., & Brenner, J. (1989). Gender and social reproduction: Historical perspectives. *Annual Review of Sociology, 15*, 381–404.
- Little, D. L. (2015). Building a movement of caring selves: Organizing direct care workers. In M. Duffy, A. Armenia, & C. L. Stacey (Eds.), *Caring on the clock: The complexities and contradictions of paid care work*. *Families in Focus* (pp. 251–262). New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.
- Morgan, J. C., & Farrar, B. (2015). Building meaningful career lattices: Direct care workers in long-term care. In M. Duffy, A. Armenia, & C. L. Stacey (Eds.), *Caring on the clock: The complexities and contradictions of paid care work*. *Families in Focus* (pp. 278–286). New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.
- Parreñas, R. S. (2001). *Servants of globalization: Women, migration and domestic work*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- Price-Glynn, K., & Rakovski, C. (2015). The best of both worlds? How direct care workers perceive home health agencies and long-term-care institutions.

- In M. Duffy, A. Armenia, & C. L. Stacey (Eds.), *Caring on the clock: The complexities and contradictions of paid care work*. *Families in Focus* (pp. 31–41). New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.
- Razavi, S. (2007a). *The political and social economy of care in a development context: Conceptual issues, research questions and policy options*. Geneva: UNRISD.
- Razavi, S. (2007b). The return to social policy and the persistent neglect of unpaid care. *Development and Change*, 38, 377–400.
- Razavi, S., & Staab, S. (2010). Underpaid and overworked: A cross-national perspective on care workers. *International Labour Review*, 149, 407–422.
- Stacey, C. L. (2011). *The caring self: The work experiences of home care aides*. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.
- Stacey, C. L., & Ayers, L. L. (2012). Caught between love and money: The experiences of paid family caregivers. *Qualitative Sociology*, 35, 47–64.
- Tronto, J. C. (1993). *Moral boundaries: A political argument for an ethic of care*. New York: Routledge.
- Tronto, J. C. (2013). *Caring democracy markets, equality, and justice*. New York: New York University Press.
- Uttal, L., & Tuominen, M. (1999). Tenuous Relationships: Exploitation, emotion, and racial ethnic significance in paid child care work. *Gender & Society*, 13, 758–80.
- Williams, F., & Brennan, D. (2012). Care, markets and migration in a globalising world: Introduction to the Special Issue. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 22, 355–362.
- Yeates, N. (2004). Global care chains. *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 6, 369–391.
- Zelizer, V. A. (2002). How care counts. *Contemporary Sociology*, 31, 115–119.
- Zelnick, J. (2015). Part of the job? Workplace violence and social services. In M. Duffy, A. Armenia, & C. L. Stacey (Eds.), *Caring on the clock: The complexities and contradictions of paid care work*. *Families in Focus* (pp. 104–116). New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.
- Zinn, M. B. (1994). Feminist rethinking from racial-ethnic families. In M. B. Zinn & B. T. Dill (Eds.), *Women of color in U.S. society*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.



Scientific and Medical Careers: Gender and Diversity

35

Laura E. Hirshfield and Emilie Glass

Abstract

Women students and employees are underrepresented in scientific contexts. Similarly, though the number of women medical students is quickly reaching parity with men, women are still underrepresented in the most lucrative medical specialties and at the top of medical hierarchies. Women's experiences in both of these contexts are very similar, yet scholars rarely explore or describe this similarity. In this chapter, we begin to fill this gap by examining the role of the "leaky pipeline", tokenism, the "chilly climate," and career/family concerns for women in both science and medicine.

Despite the steady increase of women entering the workforce over the past few decades, women's representation in science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) and certain medical fields is still relatively low. This underrep-

resentation has important consequences not only for gendered wage parity and for women's workplace satisfaction, but also for scientific innovation (Beede, Julian, & Langdon, 2011). Overall, women's earnings are only about 80% as much as men's (National Partnership for Women & Families, 2016); their lack of math and science credentials and resulting underrepresentation in STEM careers or in lucrative medical specialties may be one of the leading causes of this wage gap (Boulis & Jacobs, 2008; Davies & Guppy, 1997; Jena, Khullar, Ho, Olenski, & Blumenthal, 2015; Weinberger, 1998). Women, particularly women of color, are underrepresented at the highest levels of academic STEM departments and medical institutions (Committee on Maximizing the Potential of Women in Academic Science and Engineering, 2007; Lautenberger, Dandar, Raezer, & Sloane, 2013; Merchant & Omary, 2010; Nonnemaker, 2000; Valian, 1998), and are evaluated more harshly than their men peers (Basow, Phelan, & Capotosto, 2006; McOwen, Bellini, Guerra, & Shea, 2007). Women also receive substantially less mentoring than men, experience higher rates of gender discrimination and unwanted sexual attention than their men peers and women peers in non-science departments, face higher expectations related to service, and rate their departmental climates most negatively (Hirshfield & Joseph, 2012; Johnsrud, 2002; Martin, 1994; Sonnert & Holton, 1995; Xie & Shauman, 2003).

L. E. Hirshfield (✉)
University of Illinois at Chicago, 808 S. Wood St.
CME 968, Chicago, IL 60612, USA
e-mail: lhirshf@uic.edu

E. Glass
University of Illinois at Chicago, 1007 West
Harrison Street, MC 312, Chicago, IL 60607, USA
e-mail: eglass2@uic.edu

Scholars have used multiple frameworks to explain and understand women's experiences in both STEM and medicine,¹ yet they rarely discuss these contexts together. Indeed, numerous sociologists and scholars of higher education have made a concerted effort to understand the causes and consequences of women's underrepresentation in STEM fields and careers. These efforts are mirrored by scholars within medicine and medical education, yet these two groups of scholars rarely cite each other or work to highlight these similarities. In an effort to bridge these two literatures, in this chapter we focus on several of the (interrelated) models used most frequently in sociological scholarship, namely the "leaky pipeline", tokenism, the "chilly" climate, and career/family balance, to describe women's experiences in both STEM fields and in medicine.²

1 The Leaky Pipeline

One of the most common metaphors used to describe and understand the dearth of women in STEM or medical fields is that of the "leaky pipeline". Scholars argue that women, particularly women of color, "leak out" at various stages by taking fewer math and science courses in their secondary schools, switching out of STEM majors during college, and choosing not to pursue STEM careers post-graduation (Etzkowitz, Kemelgor, & Uzzi, 2000; Xie & Shauman, 2003). While the so-called "leaky pipeline" appears to leak less in medicine, women are less represented in the most powerful and lucrative specialties and positions (Boulis & Jacobs, 2008; Gjerberg, 2002; Ku, 2011; Martin, Arnold, & Parker, 1988). Although some of these "leaks" seem to be related to gendered choices or

preferences, others may be attributed to gender bias in evaluation and promotion (Roth, 2016; West, 1993).

The STEM pipeline begins to "leak" fairly early on, yet while many attribute this leakage to differences in mathematic ability, the overall difference in mathematical ability between boys and girls is small (Hyde, Fennema, & Lamon, 1990). Rather than lacking ability in math and science, girls and women may be underrepresented in STEM fields due to a lack of interest in math and science. Indeed, Eccles and Jacobs (1986) found that social and attitudinal factors (including interest) had a greater influence on grades and enrollment in science/math classes in junior and senior high school than did variations in mathematical ability. Scholars have also demonstrated the effect of "biased self-assessments", or women's lower confidence in their mathematical/scientific abilities, which contributes to their likelihood of entering scientific (and possibly medical) fields (Catsambis, 1994; Correll, 2001). Similarly, students' "professional role confidence", or "confidence in their ability to successfully perform the professional role and confidence in their ability to enjoy and find fulfillment in that role," is significantly predictive of persistence in STEM fields, and women tend to have less professional role confidence (Cech, Rubineau, Silbey, & Seron, 2011, pg. 658).

Regardless of the reason, the gendered gap in STEM course taking has declined very little over the past 50 years or so (Bradley, 2000; Usdansky & Gordon, 2016). That said, these differences in patterns of math/science course taking are not reflected in medical school demographics—the number of women in medical school has increased significantly and they now account for nearly half of medical school graduates (Lautenberger et al., 2013).

On the other hand, though women are enrolled in STEM higher education programs at higher rates than ever before (Xie & Shauman, 2003), there is evidence that women may "leak out" of STEM graduate programs at higher rates than men (Blickenstaff, 2005; Herzig, 2004a). Women's perception of gendered barriers could

¹For an excellent review of these myriad explanations, see Blickenstaff (2005).

²When possible, we include scholarship that specifically focuses on the challenges that women of color in STEM and medicine face. However, these studies are fairly rare (please see Ong (2005) for a wonderful exception).

contribute to these higher attrition rates in grad school; one study found that women self-selected away from academia in response to perceived systemic barriers related to parenthood (van Anders, 2004). Graduate students' feeling of isolation or disconnect between themselves and their advisors is also a considerable predictor of their persistence, particularly for women (Etzkowitz et al., 2000; Herzig, 2004b). Further, women students in traditionally masculine disciplines experience increased gender discrimination and harassment, which is correlated to attrition (Herzig, 2004b; Hirt & Muffo, 1998; Xie & Shauman, 1998). For those women that do receive a STEM degree, there is also no guarantee they will go on to a scientific career: although men and women are equally likely to receive bachelor's and master's degrees in STEM, women remain less likely than men to hold STEM-related jobs post-college (Usdansky & Gordon, 2016).

Similarly, though the number of women in medical school has increased over the past 40 years,³ there are still major differences in the specialties that women choose (Lautenberger et al., 2013). One explanation for these differences is that women are less likely than men to receive encouragement toward so-called "specialist" specialties (e.g., surgery, anesthesiology, radiology, and pathology) and to have mentors in these specialties (Ku, 2011). This lack of encouragement and mentors is reflected in their subsequent specialty choice: men and women are equally likely to profess interest in high-status specialties, but their final specialty choice is more gendered (Gjerberg, 2002; Lautenberger et al., 2013; Riska, 2001). Specifically, women are more likely to choose primary care specialties (e.g., family medicine, pediatrics, and obstetrics/gynecology) than men, who more commonly choose high-status, specialist specialties. One reason that women may choose lower status specialties is that they are less likely

than men to accept standard conceptualizations of the prestige hierarchy in specialties (Hinze, 1999). This, in turn, has important consequences for women's pay, influence, and status within medicine.

Within academic institutions and careers, STEM and medical "leakage" is particularly apparent. The proportion of female tenure track faculty members in STEM departments has not increased at the same rate as in non-STEM fields (Krefting, 2003; Valian, 1998), or with the ratio of women earning doctorates in those fields (Marschke, Laursen, Nielsen, & Rankin, 2007; Valian, 1998). Similarly, though the number of women in medicine has gradually increased, women are still less likely to pursue academic careers and are not well represented in leadership or in the high-prestige, high paying specialties (Ash, Carr, Goldstein, & Friedman, 2004; Carnes, Morrissey, & Geller, 2008; Lautenberger et al., 2013). These differences are partly due to demographic inertia, or the lag between demographic shifts in the incoming population not being immediately reflected in the overall demographics in the workplace (Hargens & Long, 2002; Marschke et al., 2007). However, gender bias in hiring and evaluation also plays a role, and as such, represents another occurrence of "leakage".

Unconscious gender bias causes men's (scientific) curricula vitae to be evaluated much more positively and to be more richly rewarded than comparable women (Steinpreis, Anders, & Ritzke, 1999). Women's work accomplishments are less valued than their men peers, especially within science, a phenomena known as the "Matilda Effect" (Rossiter, 1993), which in turn leads to women's lower promotion rate. Likewise, to be rated as similarly "scientifically competent" to their men peers, women postdoctoral candidates in science had to be roughly 2.5 times more productive (Wenneras & Wold, 1997). Yet, in both science and medicine, women are less likely to be listed as either first or senior author of their published work (Filardo et al., 2016; Jagsi et al., 2006; Sidhu et al., 2009; West, Jacquet, King, Correll, & Bergstrom, 2013). Their work also receives fewer citations, perhaps

³Interestingly, though the number of women medical school applicants and matriculants has increased significantly since the 1970s, in recent years there has been a small decline (Roskovensky, Grbic, & Matthew, 2012).

as a result of women's lower likelihood to self-cite (King et al., 2017). Men also win a disproportionate number of grants or awards for their scholarly work given their representation among nominees (Lincoln, Pincus, Koster, & Leboy, 2012). As a result, women may artificially be viewed as less productive than their men peers, due to fewer grants and publications.

Letters of recommendation, which are central to the hiring process for faculty, also vary markedly between those written for women and for men, and as such, constitute another opportunity for women's leakage from both science and medicine. In medicine, letters written for men faculty members are longer, contain fewer expressions of doubt, and contain more high status words (Trix & Psenka, 2003). Men are also more likely to be framed as researchers, while women are more likely to be framed as teachers, despite research being seen as more valuable and higher status than teaching (ibid). In a similar study conducted regarding faculty candidates in chemistry, Schmader, Whitehead and Wysocki (2007) found that though recommenders did not differ significantly in the positivity of their letters or emphasize teaching for women, they did note that letters written for men were more likely to include "standout" adjectives.

In all, the most commonly-used theory related to women's underrepresentation in STEM and medical fields, the "leaky pipeline", continues to be an apt metaphor. Though more and more women are entering both STEM graduate programs and medical school, they are still less likely to persist in STEM fields, to choose high-status medical specialties, or to be promoted to positions at the top of organizational or institutional hierarchies.

2 Tokenism

The absence of women peers and support systems also impacts women's experiences in STEM and medical fields. Kanter's theory of

tokenism (1977) suggests that "as a group becomes proportionately smaller, members of that group will experience declines in performance, self-esteem, and satisfaction"; by extension, it is often theorized that individuals should benefit from greater same-gender representation within groups (Sax, 1996, p. 390). Indeed, scholars have argued that women's underrepresentation and tokenism within certain STEM and medical fields may lead to increased identity threat, isolation, and pressure to perform "care work" tasks within their fields. Given the even lower number of women of color in these positions, they are often expected to take up considerably larger burden of mentorship, service, and advocacy, as well as to act as role models for minority students (Blackwell, 1988).

The low proportion of women in STEM majors and fields also leads to a shortage of female peers and colleagues, which has varied effects for women scientists. The proportion of women in a major affects women's satisfaction in that major, though it does not affect their grades, self-concepts, or persistence (Rogers & Menaghan, 1991; Sax, 1994). The gender proportion of college majors has no effect on men's likelihood to persist, but fewer women drop out of female-dominated programs than from gender-balanced or male-dominated ones (Mastekaasa & Smeby, 2006).

One of the consequences of low representation in these spaces is that women face identity threat, or the concern that their own actions reflect (poorly) upon their social group and reinforce negative group stereotypes (Major & O'Brien, 2005). In the case of women in science (and perhaps, in medicine),

'[Women] are likely to feel that they must do better than their male counterparts in order to be considered equal; that they must demonstrate their worthiness through superior competence before being accepted or taken seriously; and that their mistakes or inadequacies risk being construed as characteristic of women in general.' (Ware, Steckler, & Leserman, 1985, p. 79)

This identity threat, similar to the related concept of stereotype threat, results in many negative psychological and social consequences, including anxiety, arousal, and excessive caution (Major & O'Brien, 2005). Further, as a result of identity threat, women may self-segregate, or seek out peers who are less likely to judge their behaviors as indicative of their social group in general. In other words, identity threat may lead to gender segregation within STEM departments because women may be more likely to seek out other women to study and collaborate with (Hirshfield, 2010). This, in turn, reproduces negative stereotypes about women in science (because men peers have less positive examples to contradict their stereotypes) and may explain women's overrepresentation in lower-prestige subfields (*ibid*). For women of color in scientific spaces facing negative stereotypes related to women *and* to people of color, this type of threat may be even more extreme (Niemann, 1999; Wingfield, 2010).

As a result of their lower numbers within their departments and universities, women faculty members in science and engineering, especially women of color, also often experience "identity taxation", or extra burdens of formal and informal service responsibilities (Hirshfield & Joseph, 2012; Misra, Lundquist, Holmes, & Agiomavritis, 2011). Identity taxation occurs when faculty members shoulder any labor (physical, mental, emotional) due to their membership in a marginalized group within their department or university (Hirshfield & Joseph, 2012). Just as women academics in STEM tend to shoulder a higher load of teaching and service responsibility (Bellas & Toutkoushian, 1999; Hirshfield & Joseph, 2012; Misra et al., 2011; Nettles, Perna, Bradburn, & Zimble, 2000), women in academic medicine carry a higher burden of teaching and patient care (Kaplan et al., 1996). This, in turn, can impact their research productivity and, as a result, affect their career growth and mobility (*ibid*). Indeed, though women are going to medical school at greater rates than ever and are more likely than men to become academics, they are less likely than their men peers to rise to comparable senior ranks (Nonnemaker, 2000).

Further, when they do experience career advancement, it happens more slowly and is compensated more poorly (Ash et al., 2004).

Increasing the presence of women role models in STEM and medical fields may seem like an appropriate solution to the challenges facing women tokens, but the effect of role models on women students' persistence in scientific college majors is ambiguous. Some studies find little evidence for positive role model effects (Canes & Rosen, 1995; Hackett, Esposito, & O'Halloran, 1989), while others find a significant effect of faculty role-models on students' choice of math/science college majors, probability of attaining advanced degrees, and likelihood of staying in school (Rask & Bailey, 2002; Robst, Keil, & Russo, 1998; Rothstein, 1995). Regardless, increasing the number of female faculty in a department may not be enough to alleviate issues related to tokenism—social networks that isolate women remain in place even when the number of women in a science department increases because workplace structures do not necessarily shift (Etzkowitz et al., 1994). Further, even when there is a critical mass of women in a department,⁴ female faculty are likely to be dispersed in male-dominated workgroups, reducing women's influence and maintaining male-dominated workplace structures (*ibid*). In fact, women tend to cluster in some scientific fields (such as biology, chemistry, and hybrids like biochemistry or astrophysics) more often than others (like physics or math) (Xie & Shauman, 1998). Similarly, within medicine, women medical students disproportionately specialize in obstetrics and gynecology and pediatrics; as a result, they may be less able to change overall conditions in medical workplaces and contexts (Riska, 2001). On the other hand, women benefit from working in this type of gender-segregated specialty, receiving more instrumental and informational support from women within those spaces than their men colleagues (Wallace, 2014).

⁴In this case, critical mass represents the number of women that is theoretically large enough to shift the departmental climate.

While Kanter argued that tokenism (or numeric scarcity) was a primary factor in creating obstacles for the women she studied, subsequent research has shown that token men in the workplace do not experience the same issues that token women do (Williams, 1991; Yoder, 1991). Indeed, some scholars argue that men tokens may be advantaged in the workplace (Williams, 1991; Zimmer, 1988), though men of color may not experience the same advantages (Harvey Wingfield, 2009).⁵ All of these studies illustrate the ways that cultural conceptions of femininity and masculinity are built into the organization of work, or in other words, how organizations are gendered and how gender itself is a structure of inequality (Acker, 1990, 2006; Budig, 2002; Zimmer, 1988). As such, numeric proportion is only part of the story—the underrepresentation of women clearly has important consequences for the women in these fields, but increasing numbers alone will not solve this issue.

3 The Chilly Climate

Even in the absence of tokenism, a “chilly climate” for women in scientific and medical spaces creates yet another challenge to their success in STEM fields. Originally introduced as a way to explain why women were more likely to leave college than their men counterparts, the chilly climate framework focuses on “chilling” practices that professors use (both consciously and unconsciously) that disadvantage women in the classroom (Hall & Sandler, 1982). Scholars have extended the concept to examine sexist and isolating behaviors in the laboratory, in the clinic, in departmental, and in administrative levels, as well as inequities in workload, recognition, and pay (Carr, Szalacha, Barnett, Caswell, & Inui, 2000, 2003; Conefrey, 1997; Ginorio, 1995; Jagsi et al., 2006; Kaplan et al., 1996; Smith & Calasanti, 2005). There is also evidence that

negative departmental climate is a significant predictor in female faculty members’ overall job satisfaction, which may in turn affect their persistence in their careers (August & Waltman, 2004).

Women graduate students are more likely than their men peers to report experiences of sexual harassment, concerns about their personal safety, issues with legitimacy, and financial concerns (Johnsrud, 1995; Schneider, 1987; Wiest, 1999), and this is particularly true for women in STEM graduate programs (Fox, 2001). Women graduate students, particularly in the sciences, also have fewer same-gender mentors and role-models, and, perhaps as a result, receive less mentorship and experience more social and intellectual isolation than their men peers (Johnsrud, 1995; Kuck, Marzabadi, Buckner, & Nolan, 2007; Wiest, 1999). For women students of color, the low number of faculty of color, especially women faculty of color, often intensifies this sort of isolation and lack of role model support (Ong, 2005). Further, women mentors within scientific contexts may themselves not be in the ideal situation for providing guidance or advice; given the extra burden of work that they often experience (i.e., identity taxation), they are more likely to be burned out or to be experiencing challenges related to advancement themselves (Hirshfield & Joseph, 2012; Samble, 2008).

Similarly, women medical students disproportionately experience unfair treatment during their training, as do women clinicians post-training (Carr et al., 2000; Jagsi et al., 2006). Babaria, Abedin, Berg, and Nunez-Smith (2012) note that though the women medical students they studied managed to handle negative interactions with patients, they did not feel as prepared to deal with inappropriate behavior by their men supervisors. The authors also note how worrisome it is that women students so quickly grow resigned to this inequitable treatment (ibid). Likewise, Beagan (2001) found that medical students in the Canadian institution she studied experienced both blatant and implicit discrimination and marginalization. This included patients’ consistent assumption that they were nurses rather than doctors, faculty members’ use

⁵Notably, Budig (2002) found that men not only do not suffer (regarding pay) due to their token status, but that token or not, men are “uniformly advantaged” in terms of pay.

of gendered language, and even inappropriate touching by men faculty. In clinical contexts, women doctors are also treated with less respect and confidence than men doctors and given less help from the nurses (Gjerberg & Kjølørød, 2001).

It is also well-acknowledged that many STEM disciplines and medical specialties tend to have intensely “masculine” cultures. Despite the highly collaborative nature of much scientific research, many STEM departments embrace extremely competitive, macho norms that can make women graduate students and faculty feel isolated or out of place (Ferreira, 2003; Traweek, 1992). Women in science frequently describe scientific culture as aggressively competitive and rife with “macho-ness,” where colleagues try to prove themselves superior to others, are fiercely combative, and ignore other people’s ideas (Schiebinger, 1999). For example, Sallee (2011) found that men in aerospace and mechanical engineering were socialized to be competitive, hierarchical, and to objectify women during the course of their graduate education and in the process are also taught that these masculine norms and values are associated with success in their discipline. Women graduate students within the sciences also view gender as highly salient within these spaces, and cite masculine cultures (as well as subsequent consequences of these cultures) as key to women’s choices and experiences in STEM fields (Ecklund, Lincoln, & Tansey, 2012).

In medical contexts, specialties such as surgery are also described as having highly masculine cultures, valuing stereotypically masculine qualities such as arrogance, aggression, courage, and the ability to think quickly in the moment (Cassell, 1997; Hinze, 1999). Surgery, for example, is so male-dominated both in demographics and in characteristics, that there is an aversion to women and feminine traits. As a result, women are often excluded and even seen as untrustworthy by male colleagues (Cassell, 1997). However, when women surgeons emulate “masculine” behaviors, they are viewed negatively (ibid). As such, women entering such male-dominated fields must work harder to prove

themselves and might be pushed out of the field as a result (Gjerberg, 2002).

Broadly, the chilly climate is yet another example of the gendered nature of organizations described by Acker (1990). Acker’s theory focuses on how organizational structures are gendered and, therefore, directly contribute to marginalizing women. She also describes the gendered nature of organizations as seen through a “hypothetical or universal worker,” which she argues is actually that of a man (ibid). Indeed, men are consistently viewed as the norm in academia (Hirshfield, 2014a), particularly in scientific spaces (Fox, 2006). This, in turn impacts how they are viewed and evaluated by their students and peers. Women scientists feel that they are less likely to be viewed as experts and receive less respect from faculty than their men peers (Fox, 2001; Johnsrud, 1995) and there is evidence that they are held to different standards than their men peers (Benschop & Brouns, 2003). Women graduate students in science also report that they feel that they must perform in ultra-masculine ways to be successful (Hirshfield, 2015; Rhoton, 2011; Sallee, 2011). Notably, the ideal worker expectations described by Acker also have racial undertones, implicitly privileging norms associated with *white* masculinity (Wingfield, 2010).

For faculty, similar to findings from surgery, men STEM faculty whose behaviors generally fit masculine social norms are viewed as ideal advisors and scholars, while women faculty whose behaviors represent either feminine *or* masculine norms are viewed negatively (Hirshfield, 2014b). Gender socialization also impacts interaction styles in ways that negatively impact women’s success within scientific spaces. Women scientists have been found to demonstrate less confidence within laboratory meetings (Fox, 2001; Hirshfield, 2017; Smith-Doerr, Sacco, & Stoutenburgh, 2016) and, perhaps as a result, are less likely to be viewed as content experts within their field (Hirshfield, 2016). Similarly, women faculty, especially women faculty of color, face more challenges to their authority than do men faculty (Ford, 2011; Harlow, 2003).

4 Career/Family Balance

Finally, lifestyle reasons (i.e., issues related to the balance of career and family), may contribute to women's likelihood to enter into or leave graduate programs or medical residencies, as well. Overall, housework and primary care work is still primarily expected to fall on women, despite their increased presence in the workforce and more specifically, in STEM and medicine (Craig, 2007; Hochschild, 1989; Milkie, Raley, & Bianchi, 2007). Women are also more likely to take time off to care for sick children or to handle other essential household tasks as needed, which in turn takes a toll on their wages and opportunities for promotion (Budig & Hodges, 2010; England, Bearak, Budig, & Hodges, 2016; Kahn, García-Mangano, & Bianchi, 2014). Indeed, for women in prestigious careers like those in STEM and medicine, this time out of work can be very costly and can also impact how they are viewed in the workplace (England et al., 2016). For example, in their study exploring the "flexibility stigma", Cech and Blair-Loy (2014) find that STEM faculty view parents as less hardworking and that women are more likely to report experiencing this type of stigma. Furthermore, those that feel the stigma of parenthood and work/life balance are less likely to remain in their current field and predicts lower anticipated peak pay (Cech & Blair-Loy, 2014; Lips & Lawson, 2009).

Similarly, ideal worker norms (discussed above) not only contribute to the chilly climate for women, but also to expectations for faculty in STEM and in medicine regarding job devotion and hours spent at work (Acker, 1990; Hirshfield, 2015). In other words, within both STEM and medicine, expectations for employees often rely on conceptualizations of a hypothetical (male) worker "... whose life centers on his full-time, life-long job, while his wife or another woman takes care of his personal needs and his children" (Acker, 1990, p. 190). Indeed, women often choose not to pursue academic positions more often than men, in part because of their views about what their careers will entail (van Anders, 2004). Specifically, women (correctly) anticipate more systemic barriers to their success within

academic institutions, such as issues related to mobility, academic lifestyle, and family plans and pressures. Women students' desire for flexibility and lower time commitments at work also helps to predict whether or not they will seek male-dominated jobs (such as those in fields like math and science) (Frome, Alfeld, Eccles, & Barber, 2006). Notably, concerns related to family are not restricted to women scientists: men science professors consistently describe the "all-consuming nature of academic science" as in conflict with fatherhood and egalitarian relationships (Damaske, Ecklund, Lincoln, & White, 2014).

Likewise, in an examination of a surgical residency program, Dodson and Webb (2005) found that women were twice as likely to leave their residency, with the majority citing reasons related to lifestyle. The desire to decrease hours at work was not restricted only to women physicians, however: many MDs working full-time, both men and women, would like to switch to part-time work (Heiligers & Hingstman, 2000). However, for women physicians, the likelihood of pursuing a career in a specialty decreased with each additional child they had (Gjerberg, 2003). Women physicians' career choices and aspirations are more likely than men to postpone marriage and/or family (Gjerberg, 2002; Uhlenberg & Cooney, 1990), and these aspirations are also more commonly limited or impacted by their partner's careers (Ku, 2011). Even in situations where both the wife and husband are physicians, the husband tends to work more hours and earn more money, pointing to a tendency to prioritize the husband's career (Uhlenberg & Cooney, 1990). On the other hand, women physicians who are married to other doctors fare better than others due to more egalitarian division of household labor and increased emotional support (Gjerberg, 2003).

5 Conclusion

As we have shown, women are still less likely than their men peers to pursue STEM and medical careers (i.e., to leak out of the pipeline), and,

once in these fields, women still face a number of challenges that their men peers do not. Women physicians and women scientists are paid significantly less than men, even when controlling for rank, specialty/discipline, and productivity, thus demonstrating the widespread bias that still exists for women in the workforce (Kaplan et al., 1996). Likewise, women are more likely than men to experience sexual or gender harassment, to be isolated within their fields, to experience identity threat, to be asked to perform extra labor or identity taxation, to lack mentorship, and to feel family or lifestyle pressures. There is evidence that some of these “leakages” and barriers to success are lessening, yet there are still significant inequities for women in both medicine and the sciences that must be corrected.

In this chapter, we have analytically separated the theoretical and empirical work we reviewed into categories in order to systematically describe the rich scholarship that has been done in this area. However, we think it important to note that many of the explanations we describe above intersect. For example, the leaky pipeline is one of the key reasons that women experience tokenism (and the consequences of women’s underrepresentation) within scientific and medical spaces. Likewise, this underrepresentation is one of the key contributors to the chilly climate for women.

Further, we have described literature related to the concepts of the leaky pipeline, tokenism, the chilly climate, and work/family balance for women in both STEM and medical workplaces. Yet much of this research remains quite siloed—scholars of gender in science rarely cite scholarship about gender in medicine, and vice versa. We suspect that this may be a consequence, in part, of the federal institutions that fund this type of research. Specifically, the National Science Foundation (NSF) has made women’s experience in STEM fields a priority, but has left research on women’s experience in medicine largely to be supported by the National Institutes of Health (NIH). As such, US scholars often choose either STEM or medicine as their focus. This chapter is our attempt to begin to bring these literatures and these scholars together. In the future, we hope that scholarship on women’s experiences within

the sciences and in medicine will merge to incorporate Science, Technology, Engineering, Math, and Medicine (STEMM).

Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank Renad Ramahi and Tiana Stephens for their invaluable research support, as well as the editors of this handbook for their helpful feedback.

References

- Acker, J. (1990). Hierarchies, jobs, bodies: A theory of gendered organizations. *Gender & Society*, 4(2), 139–158.
- Acker, J. (2006). Inequality regimes: Gender, class, and race in organizations. *Gender & Society*, 20(4), 441–464.
- Ash, A. S., Carr, P. L., Goldstein, R., & Friedman, R. H. (2004). Academia and clinic compensation and advancement of women in academic medicine: Is there equity? *Annals of Internal Medicine*, 141, 205–212.
- August, L., & Waltman, J. (2004). Culture, climate, and contribution: Career satisfaction among female faculty. *Research in Higher Education*, 45(2), 177–192.
- Babaria, P., Abedin, S., Berg, D., & Nunez-Smith, M. (2012). ‘I’m too used to it: A longitudinal qualitative study of third year female medical students’ experiences of gendered encounters in medical education. *Social Science and Medicine*, 74(7), 1013–1020.
- Basow, S. A., Phelan, J. E., & Capotosto, L. (2006). Gender patterns in college students’ choices of their best and worst professors. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 30(1), 25–35.
- Beagan, B. (2001). Micro inequities and everyday inequalities: ‘Race’, gender, sexuality and class in medical school. *The Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers canadiens de sociologie*, 26(4), 583–610.
- Beede, D., Julian, T., & Langdon, D. (2011). *Women in STEM: A gender gap to innovation*. Washington, DC.
- Bellas, M. L., & Toutkoushian, R. K. (1999). Faculty time allocations and research productivity: Gender, race, and family effects. *Review of Higher Education*, 22(4), 367–390.
- Benschop, Y., & Brouns, M. (2003). Crumbling ivory towers: Academic organizing and its gender effects. *Gender, Work & Organization*, 10(2), 194–212.
- Blackwell, J. E. (1988). Faculty issues: The impact on minorities. *Review of Higher Education*, 11(4), 417–434.
- Blickenstaff, J. C. (2005). Women and science careers: Leaky pipeline or gender filter? *Gender and Education*, 17(4), 369–386.
- Boulis, A. K., & Jacobs, J. A. (2008). *The changing face of medicine: Women doctors and the evolution of health care in America*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

- Bradley, K. (2000). The incorporation of women into higher education: Paradoxical outcomes? *Sociology of Education*, 73(1), 1–18.
- Budig, M. J. (2002). Male advantage and the gender composition of jobs: Who rides the glass escalator? *Social Problems*, 49(2), 258–277.
- Budig, M. J., & Hodges, M. J. (2010). Differences in disadvantage: Variation in the motherhood penalty across White Women's earnings distribution. *American Sociological Review*, 75(5), 705–728.
- Canes, B. J., & Rosen, H. S. (1995). Following in her footsteps? Faculty gender composition and women's choices of college majors. *ILR Review*, 48(3), 486–504.
- Carnes, M., Morrissey, C., & Geller, S. E. (2008). Women's health and women's leadership in academic medicine: Hitting the same glass ceiling? *Journal of women's health* (2002), 17(9), 1453–1462.
- Carr, P. L., Szalacha, L., Barnett, R., Caswell, C., & Inui, T. (2003). A 'Ton of Feathers': Gender discrimination in academic medical careers and how to manage it. *Journal of Women's Health*, 12(10), 1009–1018.
- Carr, P. L., Ash, A. S., Friedman, R. H., Szalacha, L., Barnett, R. C., Palepu, A., et al. (2000). Faculty perceptions of gender discrimination and sexual harassment in academic medicine. *Annals of Internal Medicine*, 132, 889–896.
- Cassell, J. (1997). Doing gender doing surgery: Women surgeons in a man's profession. *Human Organization*, 56, 47–52.
- Catsambis, S. (1994). The path to math: Gender and racial-ethnic differences in mathematics participation from middle school to high school. *Sociology of Education*, 67(3), 199–215.
- Cech, E. A., & Blair-Loy, M. (2014). Consequences of flexibility stigma among academic scientists and engineers. *Work and Occupations*, 41(1), 86–110.
- Cech, E., Rubineau, B., Silbey, S., & Seron, C. (2011). Professional role confidence and gendered persistence in engineering. *American Sociological Review*, 76(5), 641–666.
- Committee on Maximizing the Potential of Women in Academic Science and Engineering. (2007). *Beyond bias and barriers: Fulfilling the potential of women in academic science and engineering*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
- Conefrey, T. (1997). Gender, culture and authority in a university life sciences laboratory. *Discourse & Society*, 8(3), 313–340.
- Correll, S. J. (2001). Gender and the career choice process: The role of biased self-assessments. *American Journal of Sociology*, 106(6), 1691–1730.
- Craig, L. (2007). Is there really a second shift, and if so, who does it? A time-diary investigation. *Feminist Review*, 86(1), 149–170.
- Damaske, S., Ecklund, E. H., Lincoln, A. E., & White, V. J. (2014). Male scientists' competing devotions to work and family: Changing norms in a male-dominated profession. *Work & Occupations*, 41(4), 477–507.
- Davies, S., & Guppy, N. (1997). Fields of study, college selectivity, and student inequalities in higher education. *Social Forces*, 75(4), 1417–1438.
- Dodson, T. F., & Webb, A. L. B. (2005). Why do residents leave general surgery? The hidden problem in today's programs. *Current Surgery*, 62(1), 128–131.
- Eccles, J. S., & Jacobs, J. E. (1986). Social forces shape math attitudes and performance. *Signs*, 11(2), 367–380.
- Ecklund, E. H., Lincoln, A. E., & Tansey, C. (2012). Gender segregation in Elite academic science. *Gender & Society*, 26(5), 693–717.
- England, P., Bearak, J., Budig, M. J., & Hodges, M. J. (2016). Do highly paid, highly skilled women experience the largest motherhood penalty? *American Sociological Review*, 81(6), 1161–1189.
- Etzkowitz, H., Kemelgor, C., Neuschatz, M., Uzzi, B., & Alonzo, J. (1994). The paradox of critical mass for women in science. *Science*, 266(5182), 5154.
- Etzkowitz, H., Kemelgor, C., & Uzzi, B. (2000). *Athena unbound: The advancement of women in science and technology*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Ferreira, M. (2003). Gender issues related to graduate student attrition in two science departments. *International Journal of Science Education*, 25(8), 969–989.
- Filardo, G., da Graca, B., Sass, D. M., Pollock, B. D., Smith, E. B., Martinez, M. A. M., et al. (2016). Trends and comparison of female first authorship in high impact medical journals: Observational study (1994–2014). *British Medical Journal*, 352, i847.
- Ford, K. A. (2011). Race, gender, and bodily (mis) recognitions: Women of color faculty experiences with white students in the college classroom. *The Journal of Higher Education*, 82(4), 444–478.
- Fox, M. F. (2001). Women, science, and academia: Graduate education and careers. *Gender & Society*, 15(5), 654–666.
- Fox, M. F. (2006). Gender, knowledge, and scientific styles. *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 869(1), 89–93.
- Frome, P. M., Alfeld, C. J., Eccles, J. S., & Barber, B. L. (2006). Why don't they want a male-dominated job? An investigation of young women who changed their occupational aspirations. *Educational Research and Evaluation*, 12(4), 359–372.
- GINORIO, A. B. (1995). *Warming the climate for women in academic science*. Washington DC.
- Gjerberg, E. (2002). Gender similarities in doctors' preferences—And gender differences in final specialisation. *Social Science and Medicine*, 54(4), 591–605.
- Gjerberg, E. (2003). Women doctors in Norway: The challenging balance between career and family life. *Social Science and Medicine*, 57(7), 1327–1341.
- Gjerberg, E., & Kjølørød, L. (2001). The doctor-nurse relationship: How easy is it to be a female doctor co-operating with a female nurse? *Social Science and Medicine*, 52(2), 189–202.

- Hackett, G., Esposito, D., & Sean O'Halloran, M. (1989). The relationship of role model influences to the career salience and educational and career plans of college women. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 35(2), 164–180.
- Hall, R. M., & Sandler, B. R. (1982). *The classroom climate: A chilly one for women?* Washington, DC.
- Hargens, L. L., & Long, J. S. (2002). Demographic inertia and women's representation among faculty in higher education. *The Journal of Higher Education*, 73(4), 494–517.
- Harlow, R. (2003). 'Race doesn't matter, but ...': The effect of race on professors' experiences and emotion management in the undergraduate college classroom. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 66(4), 348–363.
- Harvey Wingfield, A. (2009). Racializing the glass escalator: Reconsidering men's experiences with women's work. *Gender & Society*, 23(1), 5–26.
- Heiligers, P. J. M., & Hingstman, L. (2000). Career preferences and the work-family balance in medicine: Gender differences among medical specialists. *Social Science and Medicine*, 50(9), 1235–1246.
- Herzig, A. H. (2004a). Becoming mathematicians: Women and students of color choosing and leaving doctoral mathematics. *Review of Educational Research*, 74(2), 171–214.
- Herzig, A. H. (2004b). 'Slaughtering this beautiful math': Graduate women choosing and leaving mathematics. *Gender and Education*, 16(3), 379–395.
- Hinze, S. W. (1999). Gender and the body of medicine or at least some body parts: (Re)constructing the prestige hierarchy of medical specialties. *Sociological Quarterly*, 40(2), 217–239.
- Hirshfield, L. E. (2010). 'She won't make me feel dumb': Identity threat in a male-dominated discipline. *International Journal of Gender, Science and Technology*, 2–20.
- Hirshfield, L. E. (2014a). Not the ideal professor: Gender in the academy. In A. Stepnick & K. DeWelde (Eds.), *Disrupting the culture of silence: Women navigating hostility and making change in the academy* (pp. 205–214). Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing.
- Hirshfield, L. E. (2014b). 'She's not good with crying': The effect of gender expectations on graduate students' assessments of their principal investigators. *Gender and Education*, 26(6), 601–617.
- Hirshfield, L. E. (2015). 'I just did everything physically possible to get in there': How men and women chemists enact masculinity differently. *Social Currents*, 2(4), 324–340.
- Hirshfield, L. (2016). Who's the expert? Gendered conceptions and expressions of expertise by chemists-in-training. In E. H. Branch (Ed.), *Pathways, potholes, and the persistence of women in science* (pp. 112–130). Lanham MD: Lexington Books.
- Hirshfield, L. E. (2017). 'I Don't Know Everything, But Ethan Would Know': Interactional Style, Expertise, and the Cultural Mismatch for Women Scientists. *NASPA Journal about Women in Higher Education*, 10(1), 118–137.
- Hirshfield, L. E., & Joseph, T. D. (2012). 'We need a woman, we need a black woman': Gender, race, and identity taxation in the academy. *Gender and Education*, 24(2), 213–227.
- Hirt, J. B., & Muffo, J. A. (1998). Graduate students: Institutional climates and disciplinary cultures. *New Directions for Institutional Research*, (98), 17–33.
- Hochschild, A. (1989). *The second shift: Working parents and the revolution at home*. Penguin (Non-Classics).
- Hyde, J. S., Fennema, E., & Lamon, S. J. (1990). Gender differences in mathematics performance: A meta-analysis. *Psychological Bulletin*, 107(2), 139–155.
- Jagsi, R., Guancial, E. A., Worobey, C. C., Henault, L. E., Chang, Y., Starr, R., et al. (2006). The 'gender Gap' in authorship of academic medical literature—a 35-year perspective. *The New England journal of medicine*, 355(3), 281–287.
- Jena, A. B., Khullar, D., Ho, O., Olenski, A. R., & Blumenthal, D. M. (2015). Sex differences in academic rank in US medical schools in 2014. *JAMA*, 314(11), 1149.
- Johnsrud, L. K. (1995). Women in graduate education: Reviewing the past, looking to the future. *New Directions for Student Services*, 72, 69–80.
- Johnsrud, L. K. (2002). Measuring the quality of faculty and administrative worklife: Implications for college and university campuses. *Research in Higher Education*, 43(3), 379–395.
- Kahn, J. R., García-Manglano, J., & Bianchi, S. M. (2014). The motherhood penalty at midlife: Long-term effects of children on women's careers. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 76(1), 56–72.
- Kanter, R. M. (1977). *Men and women of the corporation*. New York: Basic Books.
- Kaplan, S. H., Sullivan, L. M., Dukes, K. A., Phillips, C. F., Kelch, R. P., & Schaller, J. G. (1996). Sex differences in academic achievement: Results of a national study of pediatricians. *New England Journal of Medicine*, 335(17), 1282–1289.
- King, M. M., Bergstrom, C. T., Correll, S. J., Jacquet, J., & West, J. D. (2017). Men Set Their Own Cites High: Gender and Self-citation across Fields and over Time. *Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World*, 3, 1–22.
- Krefting, L. A. (2003). Intertwined discourses of merit and gender: Evidence from academic employment in the USA. *Gender, Work and Organization*, 10(2), 260–278.
- Ku, M. C. (2011). When does gender matter?: Gender differences in specialty choice among physicians. *Work and Occupations*, 38(2), 221–262.
- Kuck, V. J., Marzabadi, C. H., Buckner, J. P., & Nolan, S. A. (2007). A review and study on graduate training and academic hiring of chemists. *Journal of Chemical Education*, 84(2), 277–284.
- Lautenberger, D. M., Dandar, V. M., Raezer, C. L., & Sloane, R. A. (2013). *The state of women in academic*

- medicine: The pipeline and pathway to leadership 2013–2014*. Washington DC.
- Lincoln, A. E., Pincus, S., Koster, J. B., & Leboy, P. S. (2012). The Matilda effect in science: Awards and prizes in the US, 1990s and 2000s. *Social Studies of Science*, 42(2), 307–320.
- Lips, H., & Lawson, K. (2009). Work values, gender, and expectations about work commitment and pay: Laying the groundwork for the ‘motherhood penalty’? *Sex Roles*, 61(9–10), 667–676.
- Major, B., & O’Brien, L. T. (2005). The social psychology of stigma. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 56, 393–421.
- Marschke, R., Laursen, S., Nielsen, J. M. C., & Rankin, P. (2007). Demographic inertia revisited: An immodest proposal to achieve equitable gender representation among faculty in higher education. *The Journal of Higher Education*, 78(1), 1–26.
- Martin, J. (1994). The organization of exclusion: Institutionalization of sex inequality, gendered faculty jobs and gendered knowledge in organizational theory and research. *Organization*, 1(2), 401–431.
- Martin, S. C., Arnold, R. M., & Parker, R. M. (1988). Gender and medical socialization. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 29(4), 333–343.
- Mastekaasa, A., & Smeby, J. C. (2006). Educational choice and persistence in male-and female-dominated fields. *Higher Education*.
- McOwen, K. S., Bellini, L. S., Guerra, C. E., & Shea, J. A. (2007). Evaluation of clinical faculty: Gender and minority implications. *Academic Medicine: Journal of the Association of American Medical Colleges*, 82(10 Suppl), S94–S96.
- Merchant, J. L., & Bishr Omary, M. (2010). Underrepresentation of underrepresented minorities in academic medicine: The need to enhance the pipeline and the pipe. *Gastroenterology*, 138, 19–26.
- Milkie, M. A., Raley, S. B., & Bianchi, S. M. (2007). Taking on the second shift: Time allocations and time pressures of U. S. parents with preschoolers. *Social Forces*, 88(2), 487–517.
- Misra, J., Lundquist, J., Holmes, E. D., & Agiomavritis, S. (2011). The ivory ceiling of service work. *Academe—Bulletin of the AAUP*, 97(1), 22–26.
- National Partnership for Women & Families. (2016). *America’s women and the wage gap what does the wage gap mean*. Washington DC.
- Nettles, M. T., Perna, L. W., Bradburn, E. M., & Zimble, L. (2000). *Salary, promotion, and tenure status of minority and women faculty in U.S. colleges and universities*. Washington DC.
- Niemann, Y. F. (1999). The making of a token: A case study of stereotype threat, stigma, racism, and tokenism in academe. *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies*, 20(1), 111–134.
- Nonnemaker, L. (2000). Women physicians in academic medicine: New insights from cohort studies. *New England Journal of Medicine*, 342(6), 399–405.
- Ong, M. (2005). Body projects of young women of color in physics: Intersections of gender, race, and science. *Social Problems*, 52(4), 593–617.
- Rask, K. N., & Bailey, E. M. (2002). Are faculty role models? Evidence from major choice in an undergraduate institution. *The Journal of Economic Education*, 33(2), 99–124.
- Rhoton, L. A. (2011). Distancing as a gendered barrier: Understanding women scientists’ gender practices. *Gender & Society*, 25(6), 696–716.
- Riska, E. (2001). Towards gender balance: But will women physicians have an impact on medicine? *Social Science and Medicine*, 52(2), 179–187.
- Robst, J., Keil, J., & Russo, D. (1998). The effect of gender composition of faculty on student retention. *Economics of Education Review*, 17(4), 429–439.
- Rogers, S. J., & Menaghan, E. G. (1991). Women’s persistence in undergraduate majors: The effects of gender-disproportionate representation. *Gender & Society*, 5(4), 549–564.
- Roskovensky, L. B., Grbic, D., & Matthew, D. (2012). *The changing gender composition of US medical school applicants and matriculants*. Washington, DC.
- Rossiter, M. W. (1993). The Matthew Matilda effect in science. *Social Studies of Science*, 23(2), 325–341.
- Roth, L. M. (2016). A doctor’s worth bonus criteria and the gender pay gap among American physicians. *Social Currents*, 3, 3–23.
- Rothstein, D. S. (1995). Do female faculty influence female students’ educational and labor market attainments? *ILR Review*, 48(3), 515–530.
- Sallee, M. W. (2011). Performing masculinity: Considering gender in doctoral student socialization. *Journal of Higher Education*, 82(2), 187–216.
- Samble, J. N. (2008). Female faculty: Challenges and choices in the United States and beyond. *New Directions for Higher Education*, (Fall), 55–62.
- Sax, L. J. (1994). Mathematical self-concept: How college reinforces the gender gap. *Research in Higher Education*, 35(2), 141–166.
- Sax, L. J. (1996). The dynamics of “tokenism”: How college students are affected by the proportion of women in their major. *Research in Higher Education*, 37(4), 389–425.
- Schiebinger, L. (1999). *Has feminism changed science?* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Schmader, T., Whitehead, J., & Wysocki, V. H. (2007). A linguistic comparison of letters of recommendation for male and female chemistry and biochemistry job applicants. *Sex roles*, 57(7–8), 509–514.
- Schneider, B. E. (1987). Graduate women, sexual harassment, and university policy. *The Journal of Higher Education*, 58(1), 46–65.
- Sidhu, R., Rajashekhar, P., Lavin, V. L., Parry, J., Attwood, J., Holdcroft, A., & Sanders, D. S. (2009). The gender imbalance in academic medicine: A study of female authorship in the United Kingdom. *Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine*, 102(8), 337–342.

- Smith, J. W., & Calasanti, T. (2005). The influences of gender, race and ethnicity on workplace experiences of institutional and social isolation: An exploratory study of university faculty. *Sociological Spectrum*, 25(3), 307–334.
- Smith-Doerr, L., Sacco, T., & Stoutenburgh, A. (2016). Crisis of confidence: Young women doing gender and science. In E. H. Branch (Ed.), *Pathways, potholes, and the persistence of women in science* (pp. 95–111). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Sonnert, G., & Holton, G. J. (1995). *Who succeeds in science? The gender dimension*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Steinpreis, R. E., Anders, K. A., & Ritzke, D. (1999). The impact of gender on the review of the curricula vitae of job applicants and tenure candidates: A national empirical study. *Sex Roles*, 41(7/8), 509–528.
- Traweek, S. (1992). *Beamtimes and lifetimes: The world of high energy physicists*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Trix, F., & Psenka, C. (2003). Exploring the color of glass: Letters of recommendation for female and male medical faculty. *Discourse & Society*, 14(2), 191–220.
- Uhlenberg, P., & Cooney, T. M. (1990). Male and female physicians: Family and career comparisons. *Social Science and Medicine*, 30(3), 373–378.
- Usdansky, M. L., & Gordon, R. A. (2016). Is college enough? Gender disparities in the use of science and engineering degrees in the workforce. In E. H. Branch (Ed.), *Pathways, potholes, and the persistence of women in science* (pp. 21–40). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Valian, V. (1998). *Why so slow? The advancement of women*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- van Anders, S. M. (2004). Why the academic pipeline leaks: Fewer men than women perceive barriers to becoming professors. *Sex Roles*, 51(9–10), 511–521.
- Wallace, J. E. (2014). Gender and supportive co-worker relations in the medical profession. *Gender, Work and Organization*, 21(1), 1–17.
- Ware, N. C., Steckler, N. A., & Leserman, J. (1985). Undergraduate women: Who chooses a science major? *The Journal of Higher Education*, 56(1), 73–84.
- Weinberger, C. J. (1998). Race and gender wage gaps in the market for recent college graduates. *Industrial Relations*, 37(1), 67–84.
- Wenneras, C., & Wold, A. (1997). Nepotism and sexism in peer-review. *Nature*, 387, 341–343.
- West, C. (1993). Reconceptualizing gender in physician-patient relationships. *Social Science and Medicine*, 36(1), 57–66.
- West, J. D., Jacquet, J., King, M. M., Correll, S. J., & Bergstrom, C. T. (2013). The role of gender in scholarly authorship. *PLoS One*, 8(7), e66212.
- Wiest, L. R. (1999). Addressing the needs of graduate women. *Contemporary Education*, 70(2), 30–33.
- Williams, C. L. (1991). *Gender differences at work: Women and men in non-traditional occupations*. California: University of California Press.
- Wingfield, A. H. (2010). Are some emotions marked “whites only”? Racialized feeling rules in professional workplaces. *Social Problems*, 57(2), 251–268.
- Xie, Y., & Shauman, K. A. (1998). Sex differences in research productivity: New evidence about an old puzzle. *American Sociological Review*, 63(6), 847.
- Xie, Y., & Shauman, K. A. (2003). *Women in science: Career processes and outcomes*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Yoder, J. D. (1991). Rethinking Tokenism: Looking beyond numbers. *Gender & Society*, 5(2), 178–192.
- Zimmer, L. (1988). Tokenism and women in the workplace: The limits of gender-neutral theory. *Social Problems*, 35(1), 64–77.

Laura E. Hirshfield is an assistant professor of Medical Education and Sociology at the University of Illinois at Chicago. A sociologist by training, Laura’s research centers on gender and other forms of inequality in academic and clinical settings, particularly in the natural sciences and medicine. Specifically, she focuses on the “hidden labor” undertaken by and expected of women, people of color, and other minorities in scientific and medical workplaces. Her recent work has also explored cultural competence (broadly defined) and emotional socialization in medical contexts.

Emilie Glass is a Ph.D. student in Sociology at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Emilie’s research focuses on women’s health and the politics of motherhood. Specifically, she explores how pregnant people work with midwives to create birthing experiences outside of the healthcare system with the (at times unmet) goal of providing themselves with greater freedom. Her future research will investigate how mothers who cannot breastfeed their infants work to attain “good mother” status (a status often reinforced by public health campaigns), using methods that are either unconventional or not accepted by the medical community.



Women on the Move: Stalled Gender Revolution in Global Migration

36

Carolyn Choi, Maria Cecilia Hwang
and Rhacel Salazar Parreñas

Abstract

This chapter examines how structural inequalities of gender including the ideology of female domesticity, non-egalitarian division of household labor, sex-segmented labor market, and a glass ceiling shape the independent migration of women. It empirically traces gendered inequalities in transnational households, labor migration, and educational migration. Questioning the dominant feminist paradigm on gender and migration which assumes that migration is a gender equalizing process, we argue that while women achieve some gains in status and in their interpersonal relations, their experiences remain unequivocally structured by gender inequities resulting in a gender stall in women's global migration.

Women have always constituted a significant number of migrant populations. This reality has been downplayed by the term “feminization of migration” which, as Donato and Gabbacia (2015) argue, suggests that women are nothing more than recent migrants. Yet, as early as 1984, Morokvasic reminded us that “Birds of Passage Are Also Women” and that they have outnumbered male migrants entering the United States since the 1930s. While they primarily migrated in the early 20th century as dependents who followed male family members (Gardner, 2005) they have since entered the United States as independent migrants. Women now migrate to the United States not only as family members (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994) but also as workers (Choy, 2003) and students (Matsui, 1995). Women also outnumber their male counterparts from some of the largest source countries of labor and educational migrants. In Indonesia, we have seen a widening gap in the ratio of male to female migrants with women comprising 56% of labor migrants in 1996, 68% in 2000 and 78% in 2004 and 2007 (International Organization for Migration, 2010: 9). Women from the Philippines likewise outnumber their male counterparts as they comprise approximately 55–60% of the annual flows of labor migrants (Scalabrini Migration Center, 2013). In East Asia, one of the largest sending regions of student migrants, women now surpass the number of men

C. Choi (✉) · R. S. Parreñas
University of Southern California, Los Angeles,
USA
e-mail: carolysc@usc.edu

R. S. Parreñas
e-mail: parrenas@usc.edu

M. C. Hwang
Brown University, Providence, USA
e-mail: maria_cecilia_hwang@brown.edu

engaging in study abroad to Western countries (Y. Kim, 2011a).

In the 1980s, pioneering feminist migration scholars began to question the invisibility of women in mainstream knowledge production of migration (Anthias, 1983; Gabaccia, 1994; Morokvasic, 1984). Earlier scholarship on women's migration called for not just the inclusion of women but also for a gendered perspective in mainstream migration research (Donato et al., 2006; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1999). Subsequent generations of scholars began to use gender as an analytic lens, examining the various ways gender is a constitutive element of migration (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2003) and how "multiplicities of femininities and masculinities are... interconnected, relational and intertwined in relations of class, race-ethnicity, nation and sexualities" (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2013: 233). Scholars in this tradition examine the constitution of gender at the macrostructural level by analyzing the ways in which gender informs the political economy of migration through state policies and neoliberal market forces that promote the formation of international divisions of labor that engender female migration (Chin, 1998; Parreñas, 2001a; Sassen, 1984). A larger crop of scholars has focused the meso level and how migration reshapes gender and accordingly the position of men and women in institutions such as the family (Abrego, 2014; George, 2005; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994; Kibria, 1995). Finally, others examine the micro politics of gender by examining the subjectivity of migrant women, particularly as mothers and cosmopolitan subjects (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994; Hondagneu-Sotelo & Avila, 1997; Le Espiritu, 2003; Madianou, 2016; Parreñas, 2001a).

Since the 1980s, scholars have also begun to increasingly recognize the global scope of women's migration, thereby decentering the United States in empirical investigations (Donato & Gabaccia, 2015; Parreñas, 2008). They show that women migrate as workers, wives, and students not only to North America or Europe but also to Latin America and Asia (Donato & Gabaccia, 2015). Reflecting a more globally diverse pattern of migration, migrant women

workers originate from disparate countries and regions with larger groups coming from Mexico and Central America, Southeast Asia (in particular Indonesia and the Philippines), and Eastern Europe (ibid). As students, women primarily migrate to Australia, United Kingdom, and the United States, pursuing higher education degrees or merely an English language certificate (Ichimoto, 2004; Y. Kim, 2010, 2011a; Matsui, 1995). Finally, they migrate as wives with some marrying co-ethnics (Thai, 2008) and others pursuing pen pal or cyber romances with foreign men (Constable, 2003). Although long-standing destinations in Europe and North America (Constable, 2003) continue to receive a steady flow of marriage migrants from Central Asia and Latin America (Johnson, 2007; Schaeffer, 2012), a large pool of Southeast Asian women now migrate for marriages in Taiwan and South Korea (Bélanger, Linh, & Duong, 2011; Choo, 2016).

In this chapter, we provide an overview of the literature on women's migration and illustrate how scholars have been divided over the question of whether migration is a gender equalizing process, that is, whether women who migrate make gains in relation to men in the labor market, education, and household. On the one side of the debate are scholars who assert that migration can be a liberating experience for women (Gonzalez-Lopez, 2005; Grasmuck & Pessar, 1991; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994; Singer & Gilbertson, 2003). Their assertions are primarily based on the experiences of women from Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and India who make up both professional migrant women such as nurses and low-wage migrant workers such as domestic workers (George, 2005; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994). Scholars of this view assert that "women make greater gains in status, autonomy and resources relative to men" in migration (Singer & Gilbertson, 2003: 375); women's greater income earning power not only leads to their greater economic contributions to the family but also translates into more decision-making authority in the household (Grasmuck & Pessar, 1991). They also argue that migrant women have greater access to the public sphere because of their increased dealings with teachers at schools

and doctors in hospitals than their male counterparts (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994).

Others disagree with this perspective. Menjivar (2003) questions the assertion that “entry into paid work [is] an unqualified indication of empowerment and improved status within the family for women” (2003: 108). Instead, she finds the strong possibility of a gender backlash—when women earn more, men accordingly drink more. Similarly, Le Espiritu (2003) observed that women wage earners in the Filipino American migrant community sacrifice high-paying jobs for lower earnings in order to retain their husband’s status as the primary income earner of their family. This group of scholars acknowledge more nuanced gender processes in migration, insisting that migration does not always involve gender ascendance for women but instead leads to the simultaneous reinforcement and transformation of gender (Gold, 2003; Kibria, 1995). Indeed, women’s greater involvement in school activities could likewise reflect greater reproductive labor responsibilities than men even if such responsibilities extend outside the domestic sphere.

Regardless of these competing perspectives, the dominant perspective among gender and migration scholars holds that women gain more than they lose in gender status and social relations upon migration. However, as we illustrate in this chapter, while women continue to improve access in the public realm as breadwinners, household negotiators and cosmopolitan subjects, they also face another set of gender limitations upon and post-migration. Women confront a sex-segmented labor market, glass ceiling, the ideology of female domesticity, and non-egalitarian divisions of household labor in their home and host countries. We show these inequalities in the concentration of domestic work in the global labor market, transnational households, and global education. Thus, while women achieve some gains in status and in their interpersonal relations with men, the institutions of the labor market, family, and education remain unequivocally structured by gender inequalities resulting in a gender stall for migrant women.

1 Transnational Household

The majority of migrant workers across the globe are unskilled guest workers who in effect are disqualified from sponsoring the migration of their dependents. This is the case for construction and domestic workers in the Middle East; farm workers in Canada, the United States and countries in Europe; and factory workers in South Korea and Taiwan. This results in the salience of transnational households in migrant communities across the globe. Transnational households are a common feature not only among guest workers but also undocumented workers in the United States (see Dreby, 2010).

While transnational households affect both men and women, that is fathers and mothers, the issue of transnational mothering, defined by Hondagneu-Sotelo & Avila, (1997) as the reorganization of motherhood to accommodate the new temporal and spatial separations brought upon migration (548), has engendered greater public concern. We see this in the case of Sri Lanka, which called for the banning of the migration of mothers with children under four years old (Parreñas, 2008). Undergirding the migration of mothers is the ideology of female domesticity, whereby women are idealized as the primary caretakers of their children who must reside with them. The persistence of the ideology of female domesticity in women’s migration demonstrates the salience of gender inequalities in the formation of transnational households and the experiences of transnational mothers in particular.

In contemporary migration, transnational mothering has become a commonplace feature for Ukrainian migrant mothers working as domestic workers in Italy (Solari, 2006); Polish migrant mothers in Germany (Lutz, 2011); Mexican migrant women in the United States (Dreby, 2010) as well Salvadoran (Abrego, 2009) and Honduran migrant mothers (Schmalzbauer, 2005); Indonesian mothers in Hong Kong (Constable, 2007) and Saudi Arabia (Silvey, 2007); and migrant women in the Philippine diaspora (Parreñas, 2005). In the Philippines, for

instance, there are more than an estimated 10 million children growing up with at least one parent working overseas since the early 2000s (Madianou & Miller, 2012). The migration of mothers who leave their own children to take care of their employers' children often leads to what Parreñas calls the "international division of reproductive labor," a chain-linked family care system whereby the extended family network meets childcare needs back in the home country.

The duration of transnational mothering can vary and is largely determined by migration and citizenship regimes. In Austria, transnational mothers from Romania and Slovakia are separated from their children for a short time via a form of "transnational commuting" (Morokvasic, 2004), where mothers circulate between the home country where their families reside and the host country where they work. Because they are permitted to circulate across the European Union without restrictions, Slovaks interchangeably spend two weeks in the home and host country while Romanians spend one month in each site (Bauer, 2013). In contrast, migrant Filipinas spend a longer period being away from their children. For instance, Parreñas (2001a, 2001b, 2015) found that domestic workers who participated in the Labor Certification Program to secure permanent residency, which according to a representative of the nonprofit organization *Damayan* in New York City took an average of ten years, were unable to sponsor their dependent children as their permanent residency did not get approved until their children were already adults. Pratt (2012) likewise found that participants in Canada's "Live-in Caregivers Programme" are separated from their children for 5 to 6 years before their children became qualified to reunite with them in Canada.

Imposing geographical distance between mothers and children, transnational mothering disrupts the ideology of female domesticity and questions the idea that appropriate mothering requires that biological mothers must exclusively raise their children up close. Not only does it expand "definitions of motherhood to encompass breadwinning that may require long-term physical separations" (Hondagneu-Sotelo & Avila,

1997: 562) but also involves mothering from a distance. For instance, telecommunicative advancements allow women to compress time and space and use the Internet, telephone, and postal mail to nurture their children from afar. Regular communication allows mothers to mediate their relationships (Madianou & Miller, 2012) in the form of telephone calls, remittances, letters, voice recordings, emails, SMS messages, or photographs.

In many ways, transnational mothering seems to challenge the traditional gender division of labor in the family. According to Madianou (2012), this often leaves migrant mothers with ambivalent sentiments where women feel liberated from the traditional duties of nurturing their children up close while personally having to adapt to fulfill such duties unconventionally from afar. Regardless of the personal sentiments of women, empirical studies show that transnational mothering simply reconstitutes the performance of mothering from occurring up close to taking place from a distance rather than challenging the definition of care work as women's work (Abrego, 2009; Dreby, 2006; Parreñas, 2005). Although it is understood that there are different personal meanings to the experience of mothering, transnational mothers have not completely shaken off their continued responsibility to care for children. As Parreñas (2005) has argued, advancements in communication technology have enabled the retention of traditional gendered norms by allowing migrant women to perform their nurturing duties from a distance. Dreby's (2006) study of Mexican transnational families also demonstrated that "mothers' relationships with their children in Mexico are highly dependent on expressing emotional intimacy from a distance, whereas fathers' relationships lie in their economic success as migrant workers" (34). Abrego (2009) similarly observed that Salvadoran transnational mothers affirm their caregiving responsibilities from afar through their selfless commitment to their children's well-being. Fathers, Abrego (*ibid*) noted, did not.

Still, children and the society back home might not necessarily accept mothers' individual redefinitions of mothering. The backlash

confronting migrant mothers in various home societies indicates this to be the case. In the Philippines, children of transnational mothers are often popularly portrayed as victims who have been abandoned by their mothers (Parreñas, 2005). Furthermore, nationalist narratives dismiss women's migration as not just bad for the welfare of children but dangerous to the sanctity of the family. In contrast, the public does not blame migrant fathers for leaving their families in the same way as migrant mothers. Rather, the prevailing view in the Philippines is that if a parent must migrate, it is better for the father to do so than the mother (Parreñas, 2005).

Such negative reactions associated with women's migration are not only true in the Asian context, but also in Eastern Europe.¹ For instance, the Polish public labels the children of migrant women as "Euro-orphans," or children who have been abandoned by the outflow of migrant mothers to Western Europe (Urbanksa, 2009). A news article on "Euro-orphans," for instance, reports that Poland's Minister of Education blamed parental migration for failing test scores and growing truancy: "Kids get into trouble with the law, have social problems, behavior and attitude problems in school, and absences" (Goering, 2008). Likewise, an article in the *New York Times* describes the outmigration of Romanian women as a "national tragedy" that has triggered social upheaval in the country. Women's outmigration is not only blamed for the collapse of the Romanian family but also for the abandonment and delinquency of children (Bifelski, 2009). To the contrary, studies do not support the media and popular negative assertions frequently associated with mother's migration. Instead, empirical studies show that the maintenance of transnational families neither results in children's poorer performance in school nor in increased juvenile delinquency (Parreñas, 2005; Urbanksa, 2009).

¹In Poland, the children of domestic workers are commonly referred to as "Euro Orphans," a term suggesting the 'abandonment' of children for the care of families in Western Europe.

Moralistic assertions continue to dominate perceptions of mother's migration as child abandonment. Yet, feminist analyses on nations and nationalism remind that us that national identity is frequently tied to the idea of women as the reproducers of the nation (Yuval-Davis, 1997). Hence, we see the tendency to naturalize mothering as a reaction against the social transformations encouraged by globalization and women's labor outmigration in countries like the Philippines, Poland, and Romania. We can also assume that the family in its traditional sense remains a central institution that defines the cultural identity of nations. The backlash against migrant mothers in countries as disparate as the Philippines and Poland attests to the limits in the gender advancements achieved by transnational mothers. Their efforts to become breadwinners have not eased their nurturing responsibilities in the family but have instead resulted in their vilification as "bad mothers."

2 Global Labor Market and the Concentration of Migrant Women in Domestic Work

According to recent estimates by the International Labour Organization (ILO) (2015), there are approximately 150 million migrant workers worldwide. Women make up 44.3% of the international migrant labor force (ILO, 2015), yet they are concentrated in traditionally female sex-segmented jobs including domestic workers, child care workers, nurses, teachers, and clerical workers. Due to the higher demand, migrant women are concentrated in domestic work (Ehrenreich & Hochschild, 2004) with recent estimates indicating that women account for 73.4% of all migrant domestic workers across the globe (ILO, 2015). From the perspective of major labor sending countries, gender segmentation in the international labor market has become more pronounced. For instance, among Filipinos, who constitute the largest national groups of migrant workers in the world, 185,601 women departed the Philippines as newly hired temporary workers in 2010 with 51% being

domestic workers (POEA, 2010). In this section, we center on the labor migration of domestic workers to illustrate how the concentration of women in care work that are considered “unskilled” shape their migration and labor conditions.

Most migrant domestic workers hail from Southeast Asia, namely the Philippines and Indonesia (Parreñas & Silvey, 2016). Domestic workers from the Philippines now migrate to 160 countries across the globe (Parreñas, 2015), including Italy (Parreñas, 2001a, 2015), Canada (Pratt, 2012; Tungohan et al., 2015), United States (Parreñas, 2001a, 2015), Hong Kong (Constable, 2007, 2014), Israel (Liebelt, 2011), Taiwan (Lan, 2006), Singapore (Yeoh & Huang, 2010), Malaysia (Chin, 1998), and the United Arab Emirates (Parreñas & Silvey, 2016). Likewise, Indonesian women relocate and work in countries including Hong Kong (Constable, 2007), Malaysia (Chin, 1998), and Saudi Arabia (Silvey, 2004). The type of domestic labor performed depends on their destination, with those in Israel (Liebelt, 2011) and Taiwan (Lan, 2007) performing mainly elder care; primarily child care in Canada; and those in Hong Kong (Constable, 2007), Singapore and Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) countries doing an “all around work” that includes cooking, cleaning, and caring for the households (Parreñas & Silvey, 2017).

Recognizing the dependence of families on the labor of migrant domestic workers, many labor importing countries have instituted legal migration channels for domestic workers. Suggesting a cultural shift towards the view of domestic work as “real work” is the approval of the International Labour Organization Convention 189 in 2011, otherwise known as the Domestic Workers Convention, which came into effect after its subsequent ratification by the member states of Uruguay and the Philippines the following year.² This convention led to the enactment of legal reforms for the greater protection of domestic workers in many countries

including, for instance, the migrant destination countries of Singapore and Lebanon, both of which have since instituted a mandatory weekly day off (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Despite the positive effects resulting from this convention, we still see a stall in the recognition of paid domestic work as real work.

Most migrant domestic workers are integrated into destination countries as “partial citizens,” defined by Parreñas (2001b) as the “stunted integration of migrants in receiving nation-states” (1130), which in turn shapes the labor conditions of migrant domestic workers as precarious workers. Considered “unskilled” laborers by states, most migrant domestic workers enter destination countries as “guest workers” and are ineligible for permanent residency. As such, they are easily vulnerable to deportation. This is the case in Hong Kong where, under the “two-week rule,” domestic workers face automatic deportation unless they find a new employer within two weeks of their termination (Constable, 2007). Likewise, in Israel, domestic workers, if employed more than 63 months in the country, face immediate deportation upon the death of their elderly ward (Liebelt, 2011). In Taiwan, the legal residency of migrant domestic workers was previously capped at six years (Lan, 2006), a limit that was extended to twelve years in 2012 (Parreñas, 2015). Domestic workers also face forcible repatriation once they have reached the age limit established by host countries, such as in Singapore where the retirement age for domestic workers is 60 (Parreñas, 2015). Finally, pregnancy is considered grounds for deportation in countries like Singapore (Yeoh et al., 1999) and Malaysia (Chin, 1998).

Further illustrating the non-recognition of domestic work as real work is their status as unfree migrants. In many host countries, domestic workers are denied labor market flexibility and are unable to freely change their employer-sponsor. For instance, in countries like the UAE and Singapore, they cannot change employers without permission from their current employers (Parreñas, 2015). They can only change their employer twice in Canada and thrice in Israel. In Taiwan, they are banned from

²ILO, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEX_PUB:11300:0::NO::P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:2551460. Accessed April 10, 2017.

changing employers. Due to their status as tied workers who are bound to their employers, migrant domestic workers are arguably incorporated as household dependents and not independent workers. This magnifies the non-recognition of domestic work as real work, which in turn reflects the continued perception of this type of work that has been historically designated to women as unpaid labor.

In some cases, domestic workers are not only tied to their citizen sponsor but are also trapped in “debt bondage,” as a result of policies requiring domestic workers to secure overseas employment through state-licensed employment agencies (Constable, 2007; Lan, 2006; Parreñas, 2015). Constable’s (2007) study found that recruitment agencies in Hong Kong charge Indonesian domestic workers as much as the equivalent of seven months’ salary for their training, medical expenses, and travel documents. This amount is then deducted from domestic workers’ salary until it is fully paid; in other cases, employment agencies force Indonesian domestic workers to take out a loan from financial companies upon arrival in Hong Kong to be paid directly to the former. As Constable (2007) argues, situations of indebtedness render domestic workers vulnerable to exploitation, “Rather than lose a job, be sent back home, and go even further into debt because of the late fees and climbing interest rates, workers are more likely to put up with abuses and try to keep working until they begin to save some money” (88).

Domestic workers’ labor conditions are also framed by the paradoxical recognition of their labor for immigration purposes yet non-recognition in employment laws. Notable exceptions include Italy and the United States. Domestic workers in Italy are guaranteed social security provisions, extra month’s pay per year, and a weekly day off (Parreñas, 2015). Likewise, in the United States although most domestic workers do not have a right to collective bargaining and are excluded from overtime pay, they are nevertheless entitled to a minimum wage (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2001). Most host countries however do not consider domestic work as a

legitimate form of labor resulting in low standards of employment (Parreñas, 2015). In Singapore, domestic workers are entitled to a day off on a weekly basis but are exempt from the Employment Act (Parreñas, 2015). Likewise in Taiwan, although the Domestic Workers Protection Act upholds the right of workers to negotiate employment conditions with their employer, they are excluded from the broader Labor Standards Law (Lan, 2006; Parreñas, 2015). In Malaysia they are denied the right to unionize (Chin, 1998) and finally in Hong Kong, although migrant domestic workers are guaranteed minimum wage, this minimum wage is significantly lower than the provision for workers in other industries.

Without formal labor standards, employer-employee relations take a significant role in shaping the labor conditions of migrant domestic workers. Rather than mere passive victims of structural inequalities in the global labor market, domestic workers continuously strive to better their working conditions. They do so by demanding reforms through protest (Constable, 2007), holding on to “good employers” (Parreñas, 2015), enacting “strategic personalism”³ (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2001; Lan, 2006), negotiating the terms of their labor, and in other cases, running away (Lan, 2007; Parreñas & Silvey, 2016). Paradoxically, as Lan (2007) observed, domestic workers who run away from their employers and become undocumented in Taiwan consequentially become “free” workers and are able to negotiate the terms of their labor with non-sponsor employers.

Thus, while overseas employment has afforded migrant women economic mobility in their home countries, freedom from restrictive gender norms back home and an avenue to pursue romantic intimacy (Lan, 2006; Parreñas, 2001a), their concentration in care work, and in particular

³Hondagneu-Sotelo (2001) defines “strategic personalism” as a domestic employer’s selective cultivation of personal or family-like relationships with a domestic worker due the view that cultivating deep personal ties are time consuming. These employers are often women and come from dual earning households.

domestic work, negatively impacts the gender advances they attain upon migration. Considered “unskilled,” they are incorporated as “partial citizens” who are viewed as not doing “real work” and therefore denied the rights to permanent residency and family reunification. All in all, empirical studies of domestic workers show that gender and racial segmentation in the global labor market and migration as well as citizenship regimes work in concert to produce their precarity as migrant women.

3 Educational Migration

Labor migration is not the only migration pathway to economic mobility for women. Beginning in the 1980s and peaking in the 2000s, increasing numbers of unmarried middle class women in their twenties and thirties have been leaving their homes to study, work, and live abroad in Western countries for short or long term (Habu, 2000; Y. Kim, 2011a, 2011b; Ono & Piper, 2004). Growing increasingly discontent with their subordinate gender status in their home country, young, upwardly mobile migrant women seek out advanced degrees and language study overseas not only to escape gendered expectations as daughters at home and as women in their society but also to overcome the barriers of the glass ceiling of their sex segmented workplaces. Documented flows include Chinese women studying in the United States (Matsui, 1995) and the United Kingdom (Bamber, 2014; Y. Kim, 2010, 2011a, Turner, 2006); South Korean women in the United Kingdom (Y. Kim, 2011a; Y. J. Kim, 2010); Japanese women in the United States (Kelsky, 2001; Matsui, 1995; Ono & Piper, 2004), United Kingdom (Habu, 2000; Y. Kim, 2010, 2011a) and Australia (Ichimoto, 2004).

Educational migration provides a lens to women’s negotiation of gender constraints in migration by allowing us to incorporate the experiences of women migrating from advanced capitalist countries as well as women with a higher level of educational attainment. Indeed, contemporary feminist migration scholars have noted a shift in women who now migrate as

independent wage earners, marriage partners, and travelers (Chin, 2013; Constable, 2003; Parreñas, 2001a). While most studies focus the case of women labor migrants, less has been documented on the parallel movement of women from non-Western countries leaving their countries to experience life overseas as students (Y. Kim, 2010). This is despite the fact that the largest sending countries of educational migrants send more women than men to study abroad. For instance, 80% of Japanese studying abroad are women (Kelsky, 2001; Ono & Piper, 2004; Y. Kim, 2010, 2011a), approximately 60% of Koreans studying abroad are women (HESA, 2006; IIE, 2006, cited in Y. Kim, 2010, 2011a), and over half of the Chinese entering universities abroad are women (HESA, Y. Kim, 2010, 2011a).

The larger literature on international education tends to echo dominant perspectives in mainstream migration research the experiences of international students from a gender-neutral or gender-biased perspective (Kenway & Bullen, 2003). As Kenway and Bullen (2003) note, statistical accounts of international students rarely offer gendered breakdowns or analyses regarding the implications of those differences. Studies that do focus on women tend to revolve around the family and relegate women’s roles to wives who follow their husbands’ educational careers or mothers following their children abroad (Chee, 2003; Chew, 2009; Chiang, 2008; De Verthelyi, 1995; Huang & Yeoh, 2005; Jeong et al. 2014; M. Kim, 2010; Lee, 2010; Martens & Grant, 2008; Teshome & Osei-Kofi, 2012; Waters, 2002) While some women following their husbands or vice versa eventually earned advanced degrees (M. Kim, 2010), most of this earlier research tended to discuss women’s experiences as part of the unitary household.

With the increased internationalization of education in the past several decades, studying abroad, especially in Western countries, has become a popular move for many young upwardly mobile women seeking to improve their education and professional careers. Driving their desires for educational migration is women’s stunted career mobility in highly gender-segmented labor markets of home countries. Although many advanced

capitalist countries have implemented equal opportunity labor policies (Matsui, 1995), educated women are still more likely to find themselves working in the lowest-paid sectors of the postindustrial workplace, such as service, hospitality, or other poorly remunerated jobs than men (Bernstein, 2007; Habu, 2000; Kelsky, 2001). This has especially been true for the case of Japanese women studying abroad. Starting in the 1980s, Japanese women working in the *ittpanshoku* or clerical corporate jobs began to study abroad in Western countries in increasing numbers (Habu, 2000; Kelsky, 2001). Popularly known as “office ladies,” these women have been viewed as a highly gendered and expendable workforce with low status and lack of career mobility within Japanese companies (Habu, 2000). The ghettoization of women’s work in the *ittpanshoku* reflects issues of workplace gender discrimination and the under-promotion of women in Japanese firms. The dominant patriarchal assertion is that women do not make “ideal workers” because they would leave their jobs once they marry or have children (Habu, 2000; Kelsky, 2001). Impeded by a glass ceiling in their professional jobs back home, women viewed educational migration as a stepping stone that would help overcome structural employment barriers by investing in prestigious foreign degrees or career development abroad. Unsurprisingly, most educated women undertaking advanced degrees are self-subsidized (Habu, 2000; Ono & Piper, 2004), unlike men who tend to be sponsored by their companies (Ono & Piper, 2004).

While many may return to their home countries with higher levels of education or work experience, many women find that their home professional labor market is often unwilling to recognize their improved educational status. As such, women’s new educational credentials do not convert into high-level positions as it does for men. Scholars studying Japanese women’s migration observe that many mid-career jobs in more traditional Japanese companies are still not open to returning Japanese women with advanced foreign degrees (Kelsky, 2001; Ono & Piper, 2004). Kelsky (2001) explains that female Japanese returnees paradoxically face prospects

of downward career mobility because they are often viewed as having “aged out” of the professional labor market in Japan. Returning Japanese women are not only viewed as “too old” but also overqualified to fill clerical “office lady” positions typically designated for women (Kelsky, 2001). As recourse, some female returnees may obtain jobs working in foreign companies in their home country (Ono & Piper, 2004) or strive to re-migrate to find jobs outside their home country (Turner, 2006). Such studies affirm that the education advancements of migrant women does not necessarily lead to gender ascendance; gender inequalities in the form of the glass ceiling remains pervasive in the gatekeeping of the home country labor market.

A number of studies have focused on women’s desires for personal development during their time studying abroad in the West. Scholars have note how Western educational institutions serve as important contact zones (Y. Kim, 2010), where women start to develop an emancipatory “self-identity” that allows them to escape cultural surveillance and expectations and consequently, explore alternative, cosmopolitan lifestyles (Ichimoto, 2004; Y. Kim, 2010; Turner, 2006). For many women this meant a break (at least temporarily) from pressures to conform to traditional feminine roles in the family and society such as getting married or deferring their careers for family life. Women’s exposure to more “gender egalitarian ideals” in the West (via educational experiences and interactions with non-co-ethnics) combined with the absence of parental and societal monitoring allows them the freedom and space to begin crafting their lives that appeal to their individual interests (Ichimoto, 2004; Kim, 2010). While such encounters show the beginnings of a new feminist subjectivity, women’s aspirations for personal development are often limited by their experiences of social exclusion and alienation in the host country. In Youna Kim’s (2011a, 2011b) study, for example, Asian female students’ experiences with everyday racism and feelings of being a “perpetual foreigner” discourage deep interactions with mainstream Western host society. Women tend to blame themselves over “my English is not good

enough” and other individual faults or weaknesses (Y. Kim, 2011a: 142). Exclusion and feeling of foreignness can also lead to withdrawal into ethnic communities and spaces online or offline (ibid). Women’s aspirations for personal development thus become stymied upon migration due to the exclusion faced as racialized others regardless of social class.

Finally, a minority of researchers have examined how women’s sexuality can be transformed via migration. These studies have discussed how women’s newfound freedom can lead to increased perceptions of their sexual autonomy. Away from parental and cultural control, women can more freely participate in sexual relationships and practices “less” stigmatized in the West including pre-marital sex, cohabitation, divorce, and serial dating and marriage (Matsui, 1995). Conclusions drawn from studies on the intimate lives of women studying abroad reflect the findings of studies on women marriage migrants (Constable, 2003; Schaeffer, 2012); women’s migration to the West is part of a larger resistance against the enduring patriarchal structures of their home country and “old world” men (Kelsky, 2001). Thus, marriage to Western men are also seen as a route toward transnational social upward mobility and “hypergamy” not just among marriage migrants but also students (Constable, 2003; Kelsky, 2001; Schaeffer, 2012). While such discourses show how women’s sexual empowerment can challenge gender norms in their home country, women’s perceived hypergamy with Western men, perhaps even at the expense of career and educational goals, still upholds the heteronormative ideals of social reproduction surrounding gender and sexuality.

Contemporary research on women’s educational migration tends to assume that women have greater freedom by virtue of their educational attainment in the West. Women not only advance in their education but also enjoy personal and sexual freedoms that are more in line with their cosmopolitan identity as an educated class of women. Yet research on women’s study

abroad experiences shows that while women escape patriarchal control in their home country they enter into a system of inequality in the host country, where they are excluded as full societal members based on their race, ethnicity, class and gender. Furthermore, women returning home sometimes face an additional social stigma of being associated with having loose sexual relations or engaging in sex work while abroad. Thus, the pervasiveness of gender inequality at home and racism in their host country combined with the moral hysteria over women’s time abroad, hinders their personal, educational, and career gains.

4 Conclusion

This chapter examined how gender constraints haunt women’s contemporary migration through an empirical analysis of domestic workers in the global labor market, transnational households, and educational migration. Contemporary feminists argue that women’s migration results in the reconfiguration of gender and more egalitarian gender relations between women and men. It has been repeatedly argued that women’s migration has led to their increased control over domestic decisions, access to wage employment, and greater participation in the public sphere (Sassen, 2006). However, such gains continue to be stalled by intersecting structures of the local and global labor market, traditional gender ideologies of the family, and racial and gender inequalities in global education.

We find that under economic globalization the independent migration of women becomes a movement from one system of gender inequality to another. A closer look reveals how structures of gender inequality, often as it intersects with race, operate in women’s everyday experiences abroad and sometimes upon their return. While women’s labor migration may afford them economic mobility, gender and racial segmentation in the global labor market position women as precarious workers. Likewise, we found that the

formation of transnational households has not fully relieved women of their nurturing responsibilities in the family; instead, transnational mothers are increasingly burdened with the dual role of both breadwinning and caring for their families from afar. Finally, women pursue educational migration to alleviate gender discrimination in their home countries' labor market and escape patriarchal structures that limit their subjectivities, only to find themselves as racialized others in host countries in the West. It becomes evident in migrant women's experiences that beyond personal rewards and moments of socioeconomic uplift, intersecting systems of gender and racial domination constrain the advancements enabled by the independent migration of women thereby stalling the gender revolution advanced by the feminization of migration.

Bibliography

- Abrego, L. (2009). Economic well-being in Salvadoran transnational families: How gender affects remittance practices. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 71, 1070–1085.
- Abrego, L. (2014). *Sacrificing families: Navigating laws, labor, and love across borders*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Anthias, F. (1983). Sexual divisions and ethnic adaptation: The case of Greek-Cypriot women. In A. Philzacklea (Ed.) *One way ticket: Migration and female labour* (pp. 73–94). London, UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Bamber, M. (2014). What motivates Chinese women to study in the UK and how do they perceive their experience? *Higher Education*, 68(1), 47–68.
- Bauer, G. (2013, September). Migrant care workers in Austria: Balancing formal and informal care across borders. Paper presented at *Family life in the age of migration and mobility: Theory, policy and practice, Norrköping, Sweden*.
- Bé langer, D., Linh T. G., & Duong, L. B. (2011). Marriage migrants as emigrants: Remittances of marriage migrant women from Vietnam to their natal families. *Asian Population Studies*, 7(2), 89–105.
- Bernstein, E. (2007). Sex work for the middle classes. *Sexualities*, 10(4), 473–488.
- Bifelski, D. (2009, February 14). In Romania, children left behind suffer the strains of migration. *New York Times*. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/15/world/europe/15romania.html>. Accessed June 8, 2009.
- Chee, M. (2003). Migrating for the children: Taiwanese American women in transnational families. In N. Piper and M. Roces (Eds.) *Wife or Worker? Asian Women and Migration* (pp. 137–156). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Chew, P. G.-L. (2009). In pursuit of linguistic gold: mothering in a globalised world. *English Today*, 25(2), 33–39.
- Chiang, L.-H. N. (2008). 'Astronaut families': Transnational lives of middle-class Taiwanese married women in Canada. *Social & Cultural Geography*, 9(5), 505–518.
- Chin, C. (1998). *In service and servitude: Foreign female domestic workers and the Malaysian "modernity" project*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Chin, C. (2013). *Cosmopolitan sex workers: Women and migration in a global city*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Choo, H. Y. (2016). *Decentering citizenship: Gender, labor, and migrant rights in South Korea*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Choy, C. (2003). *Empire of care: Nursing and migration in Filipino American history*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Constable, N. (2003). *Romance on a global stage: Pen pals, virtual ethnography, and "mail order" marriages*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Constable, N. (2007). *Maid to order in Hong Kong: Stories of Filipina workers* (2nd ed.). Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Constable, N. (2014). *Born out of place: Migrant mothers and the politics of international labor*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- De Verthelyi, R. F. (1995). International students' spouses: Invisible sojourners in the culture shock literature. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 19(3), 387–411.
- Donato, K., Gabaccia, D., Holdaway, J., Manalansan IV, M., & Pessar, P. (2006). A Glass half full? Gender in migration studies. *International Migration Review*, 40(1), 3–26.
- Donato, K., & Gabbacia, D. (2015). *Gender and international migration: From the slavery era to the global age*. New York: Russell Sage Press.
- Dreby, J. (2006). Honor and virtue: Mexican parenting in the transnational context. *Gender & Society*, 20(1), 32–60.
- Dreby, J. (2010). *Divided by borders: Mexican migrants and their children*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Ehrenreich, B., & Hochschild, A. R. (2004). *Global woman: Nannies, maids, and sex workers in the new economy*. New York: Macmillan.
- Gabaccia, D. (1994). Worker internationalism and Italian labor migration, 1870–1914. *International Labor and Working-Class History*, 45, 63–79.
- Gardner, M. (2005). *The qualities of a citizen: Women, immigration, and citizenship, 1870–1965*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- George, S. (2005). *When women come first: Gender and class in transnational migration*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Goering, L. (2008, September, 15). *Poland sees host of problems among 'Euro-Orphans.'* Chicago Tribune, September 15. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-09-15/news/0809140333_1_polish-parental-absence-school. Accessed 10 June 2009.
- Gold, S. (2003). Israeli and Russian Jews: Gendered perspectives on settlement and return migration. In P. Hondagneu-Sotelo (Ed.) *Gender and U.S. immigration: Contemporary trends* (pp. 127–147). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Gonzalez-Lopez, G. (2005). *Erotic journeys: Mexican immigrants and their sex lives*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Grasmuck S. & Pessar, P. (1991). *Between two islands: Dominican international migration*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Habu, T. (2000). The irony of globalization: The experience of Japanese women in British higher education. *Higher Education*, 39(1), 43–66.
- HESA. (2006). <http://hesa.ac.uk>.
- Hondagneu-Sotelo, P. (1994). *Gendered transitions: Mexican experiences of immigration*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Hondagneu-Sotelo, P. (1999). Introduction: Gender and contemporary U.S. immigration. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 42(4): 565–576.
- Hondagneu-Sotelo, P. (2001). *Doméstica: Immigrant workers cleaning and caring in the shadows of affluence*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Hondagneu-Sotelo, P. (2003). Gender and immigration: A retrospective and introduction. In P. Hondagneu-Sotelo (Ed.) *Gender and U.S. immigration: Contemporary trends* (pp. 3–19). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Hondagneu-Sotelo, P. (2013). New directions in gender and immigration research. In L. Oso & N. Ribas-Mateos (Eds.), *The international handbook on gender, migration and transnationalism: Global and development perspectives* (pp. 233–245). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Hondagneu-Sotelo, P., & Avila, E. (1997). 'I'm here but I'm there': The meanings of Latina transnational motherhood. *Gender & Society*, 11(5), 548–571.
- Huang, S & Yeoh, B. S. A. (2005). Transnational families and their children's education: China's 'study mothers' in Singapore. *Global Networks*, 5(4), 379–400.
- Human Rights Watch. (2013). *The ILO domestic workers convention: New standards to fight discrimination, exploitation and abuse*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Ichimoto, T. (2004). Ambivalent 'Selves' in transition: A case study of Japanese women studying in Australian universities. *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 25(3), 247–269.
- Institute of International Education (IIE). (2006). Open doors report. <http://opendoors.iienetwork.org>.
- International Labour Organization (ILO). (2015). *ILO global estimates on migrant workers: Research and methodology*. Geneva: Switzerland.
- International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2010). *Labor migration from Indonesia: An overview of Indonesian migration to selected destinations in Asia and the Middle East*. Jakarta: IOM.
- Jeong, Y.-J., You, H.-K. & Kwon, Y. I. (2014). One family in two countries: mothers in Korean transnational families. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 37(9), 1546–1564.
- Johnson, E. (2007). *Dreaming of a mail-order husband: Russian-American internet romance*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Kelsky, K. (2001). *Women on the verge: Japanese women, Western dreams*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Kenway, J., & Bullen, E. (2003). Self-representations of international women postgraduate students in the global university 'contact zone'. *Gender and Education*, 15(1), 5–20.
- Kibria, N. (1995). *Family tightrope: The changing lives of Vietnamese Americans*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kim, M. (2010). Gender politics and global householding in international student/scholar families. *Politics & Gender*, 6(2), 288–295.
- Kim, Y. (2010). Female individualization?: Transnational mobility and media consumption of Asian women. *Media, Culture and Society*, 32(1), 25–43.
- Kim, Y. (2011a). Diasporic nationalism and the media: Asian on the move. *International Journal of Cultural Studies*, 14(2), 133–151.
- Kim, Y. (2011b). Female cosmopolitanism? Media talk and identity of transnational Asian women. *Global Communications*, 21, 279–298.
- Kim, Y. J. (2010). The gendered desire to become cosmopolitan: South Korean women's motivations for migration to the UK. *Women's Studies International Forum*, 33(5), 433–442.
- Lan, P.-C. (2006). *Global cinderellas: Migrant domestics and newly rich employers in Taiwan*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Lan, P.-C. (2007). Legal servitude and free illegality: Migrant 'guest' workers in Taiwan. In R. S. Parreñas & L. C. D. Siu (Eds.), *Asian diasporas: New formations, new conceptions* (pp. 253–277). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Lee, H. (2010). 'I am a kirogi mother': Educational exodus and life transformation among Korean transnational women. *Journal of Language, Identity, and Education*, 9, 250–264.
- Le Espiritu, Y. (2003). *Home bound: Filipino American lives across cultures, communities and countries*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

- Liebelt, C. (2011). *Caring for the "Holy Land": Filipina domestic workers in Israel*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Lutz, H. (2011). *The new maids: Transnational women and the care economy*. London, UK: Zed Books.
- Madianou, M. (2016). Ambient co-presence: Transnational family practices in polymedia environments. *Global Networks*, 16(2), 183–201.
- Madianou, M., & Miller, D. (2012). *Migration and new media: Transnational families and polymedia*. New York: Routledge.
- Martens, V. P., & Grant, P. R. (2008). A needs assessment of international students' wives. *Journal of Studies in International Education*, 12(1), 56–75.
- Matsui, M. (1995). Gender role perceptions of Japanese and Chinese female students in American universities. *Comparative Education Review*, 39(3), 356–378.
- Menjívar, C. (2003). The intersection of work and gender: Central American immigrant women and employment in California. In P. Hondagneu-Sotelo (Ed.) *Gender and the U.S. immigration: contemporary trends* (pp. 101–126). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Morokvasic, M. (1984). Birds of passage are also women. *International Migration Review*, 18(4), 886–907.
- Morokvasic, M. (2004). 'Settled in mobility': Engendering post-wall migration in Europe. *Feminist Review*, 77(1), 7–25.
- Ono, H., & Piper, N. (2004). Japanese women studying abroad, the case of the United States. *Women's Studies International Forum*, 27(2), 101–118.
- Parreñas, R. S. (2001a). *Servants of globalization: Women, migration and domestic work*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Parreñas, R. S. (2001b). Transgressing the nation-state: The partial citizenship and 'imagined (global) community' of migrant Filipina domestic workers. *Signs*, 26(4), 1129–1154.
- Parreñas, R. S. (2005). *Children of global migration: Transnational families and gendered woes*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Parreñas, R. S. (2008). *The forces of domesticity: Filipina migrants and globalization*. New York: New York University.
- Parreñas, R. S. (2015). *Servants of globalization: Migration and domestic work* (2nd ed.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Parreñas, R. S., & Silvey, R. (2016). Domestic workers refusing neo-slavery in the UAE. *Contexts*, 15(3), 36–41.
- Parreñas, R. S., & Silvey, R. (2017). Not one of the family: The tight spaces of migrant domestic workers. *Harvard Design Magazine*. <http://www.harvarddesignmagazine.org/issues/41>. Accessed April 12, 2017.
- Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). (2010). *OFW deployment per skill and country—New hires*. <http://www.poea.gov.ph/ofwstat/depperskill/2010.pdf>. Accessed April 14, 2017.
- Pratt, G. (2012). *Families apart: Migrant mothers and the conflicts of labor and love*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Sassen, S. (1984). Notes on the incorporation of third world women into wage-labor through immigration and offshore production. *International Migration Review*, 18(4), 1144–1167.
- Sassen, S. (2006). *Cities in a world economy* (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
- Scalabrini Migration Center. (2013). *Country migration report from the Philippines 2013*. Makati: IOM.
- Schaeffer, F. (2012). *Love and empire: Cybermarriage and citizenship across the Americas*. New York: New York University Press.
- Silvey, R. (2004). Transnational domestication: State power and Indonesian migrant women in Saudi Arabia. *Political Geography*, 23(3), 245–264.
- Silvey, R. (2007). Mobilizing piety: Gendered morality and Indonesian-Saudi transnational migration. *Mobilities*, 2(2), 219–229.
- Schmalzbauer, L. (2005). *Striving and surviving: A daily life analysis of Honduran transnational families*. New York: Routledge.
- Singer, A., & Gilbertson, G. (2003). The blue passport: Gender and the social process of naturalization among dominican immigrants in New York City. In P. Hondagneu-Sotelo (Ed.), *Gender and US migration: Contemporary trends* (pp. 359–378). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Solari, C. (2006). Professionals and saints: How immigrant careworkers negotiate gendered identities at work. *Gender & Society*, 20, 301–331.
- Thai, H. (2008). *For better or for worse: Vietnamese international marriages in the new global economy*. Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Teshome, Y., & Osei-Kofi, N. (2012). Critical issues in international education: Narratives of spouses of international students. *Journal of Studies in International Education*, 16(1), 62–74.
- Tungohan, E., Banerjee, R., Chu, W., Cleto, P., De Leon, C., Garcia, M., et al. (2015). After the live-in caregiver program: Filipina caregivers' experiences of graduated and uneven citizenship. *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, 47(1), 87–105.
- Turner, Y. (2006). Swinging open or slamming shut? The implications of China's open-door policy for women, educational choice and work. *Journal of Education and Work*, 19(1), 47–65.
- Urbanska, S. (2009). Mothers of the nation as a target of public therapy—Transnational parenting and moral panic in Poland. Paper presented in *Mosaics of*

- Transnational Spaces Workshop*, Krakow, Poland, May 9, 2009.
- Waters, J. (2002). Flexible families? 'Astronaut' households and the experiences of lone mothers in Vancouver, British Columbia. *Social and Cultural Geography*, 3(2), 117–134.
- Yeoh, B. S. A. & Huang, S. (2010). Transnational domestic workers and the negotiation of mobility and work practices in Singapore's home-spaces. *Mobilities*, 5(2): 219-236.
- Yeoh, B. S. A., Huang, S. & Gonzalez III, J. (1999). Migrant female domestic workers: Debating the economic, social, and political impacts in Singapore. *International Migration Review*, 33(1), 114–136.
- Yuval-Davis, N. (1997). *Gender & nation*. London, UK: Sage Publications.
- Carolyn Choi** is a Ph.D. Candidate in Sociology at the University of Southern California. Her research specializes in youth migration, gender, and education in Asia.
- Maria Cecilia Hwang** completed her PhD in American Studies at Brown University. She is currently a Henry Luce Foundation Postdoctoral Fellow in Southeast Asian Studies at the Chao Center for Asian Studies at Rice University. Her areas of research include gender and sexuality, international migration, globalization, and labor.
- Rhacel Salazar Parreñas** teaches Sociology and Gender Studies at the University of Southern California. Her works interrogate questions of gender, labor and migration.

Part VIII

**Feminists Changing the Gender
Structure**

Combating Gender Bias in Modern Workplaces

37

Alison T. Wynn and Shelley J. Correll

Abstract

Widely shared cultural beliefs about gender, as contained in stereotypes, continue to disadvantage women in workplace settings. Stereotypes include beliefs that women are less competent than men in many domains, which lead women to be held to higher performance standards, to face increased scrutiny and shifting criteria when being evaluated, to encounter likeability and motherhood penalties, and to lack access to powerful networks. As a result, women experience disadvantages at work, including biases in hiring, evaluation, and promotion decisions. Such biases often operate outside conscious awareness, in what some scholars term “implicit bias,” “unconscious bias,” or “second-generation bias” (Ibarra et al. in *Harvard Bus Rev*, 91:60–66, 2013). Organizations have engaged in bias-mitigation efforts, such as employee resource groups, unconscious bias training, and broad-scale diversity initiatives. However, such approaches to diversity can either fail or even backfire, exacerbating inequality. While some emerging research

offers solutions for positive change, more research is needed to understand how organizations can decrease the effects of gender bias and achieve lasting equality in workplaces.

Despite many gains in gender equality, women continue to be underrepresented in high-status jobs and leadership positions. Women hold only 14% of executive officer positions, 17% of board seats, 18% of elected congressional offices, and 4.5% of Fortune 500 CEO positions (Catalyst, 2012; Sellers, 2012). In addition to holding fewer positions of power, women and men continue to be segregated into different types of jobs, with higher paying, higher status jobs in fields such as science and technology being more heavily occupied by men and lower paying, lower status jobs such as those involving caregiving being more commonly held by women (England, 2010).

One powerful cause of this continued disadvantage is gender bias. Gender bias occurs when widely held beliefs about gender affect how men and women are evaluated in achievement-oriented contexts such as school and work. As decades worth of research in the status characteristics theory and stereotyping traditions have shown, women are often believed to be less competent than men, particularly in male-dominated domains, leading women’s accomplishments to be devalued relative to men’s

A. T. Wynn (✉) · S. J. Correll
Stanford University, 450 Serra Mall, Building 120,
Stanford, CA 94305-2047, USA
e-mail: atp5@stanford.edu

(e.g. see Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977; Correll & Ridgeway, 2003; Foschi, 1996, 2000; Heilman, 2001). Stereotypes about gender combine with stereotypes about race, class, sexuality, and other characteristics in ways that increase or decrease the amount of bias different types of women and men experience (Correll & Ridgeway, 2003; Galinsky, Hall, & Cuddy, 2013; Livingston, Shelby, & Washington, 2012; Richardson, Phillips, Rudman, & Glick, 2011; Ridgeway & Kricheli-Katz, 2013; Pedulla, 2014). However, substantially more research is needed to analyze how different status characteristics combine to create biased outcomes in the workplace.

This bias in how men and women's accomplishments are evaluated leads to disadvantages in the hiring, evaluation, advancement, and treatment of women in workplace settings (Clayman Institute, 2015). However, in present-day workplaces, such biases against women are often less overt, operating outside of conscious awareness, which makes them more difficult to detect. These biases are often referred to as either "implicit biases," "unconscious biases," or what Ibarra, Ely, and Kolb (2013) have termed "second-generation bias." According to the authors, "second-generation bias does not require an intent to exclude; nor does it necessarily produce direct, immediate harm to any individual. Rather, it creates a context—akin to 'something in the water'—in which women fail to thrive or reach their full potential" (6). Or, as Ridgeway (2011) explains, gender "frames" the interactions of men and women, much like a small weight on a scale, slightly elevating the evaluations of men and depressing the evaluations of women even when their objective performances are identical. While explicit and overt forms of bias certainly still occur in modern workplaces, unconscious biases present a critical problem and can be especially difficult to combat.

As we describe more fully below, gender stereotypes disadvantage women through multiple mechanisms. They lead gatekeepers, such as employers and teachers, to judge women by a harsher standard than men (Foschi, 2000),

scrutinize their accomplishments (Moss-Racusin, Dovidio, Brescoll, Graham, & Handelsman, 2012), shift criteria to justify choosing men over women (Uhlmann & Cohen, 2005), prefer narrow leadership styles that favor men (Correll & Simard, 2016), and apply likeability and motherhood penalties to women (Correll, Benard, & Paik, 2007; Rudman & Glick, 2001). Stereotypes also affect women's access to networks that afford advancement and reward opportunities (Ibarra et al., 2013). Organizations have engaged in a number of efforts to reduce the effect of stereotypes on women's workplace outcomes (Dobbin, Schrage, & Kalev, 2015; Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, 2006). Ultimately, more research is needed designing and testing interventions that successfully mitigate or eliminate gender bias. Further, more research is needed to understand how the intersections of gender, race, class, and other characteristics affect the biases that different groups of women and men experience. In the following sections, we detail the mechanisms through which stereotypes lead to gender bias and discrimination, outline efforts of researchers and organizations to reduce the impact of such bias, and provide recommendations for future research directions.

1 Stereotypes and Unconscious Bias

Stereotypes about gender often include expectations that men are diffusely more competent at most things, as well as specific expectations that men are better at some particular tasks (e.g. technical tasks), while women are better at other tasks (e.g. nurturing tasks) (Conway, Pizzamiglio, & Mount, 1996; Correll & Ridgeway, 2003). People instantly and unconsciously categorize others by sex, and stereotypic expectations of behavior are attached to these unconscious assignments (Ito & Urland, 2003). For example, research using the Implicit Association Test (IAT) finds that individuals more quickly associate men than women with leadership attributes

(Eagly & Carli, 2007). Stereotypic expectations like these can lead to bias in how information is processed, ultimately influencing the evaluations, opportunities, and influence given to others (Ridgeway, 1993). Stereotypes function as cognitive shortcuts in decision-making, particularly when other information is scarce or the criteria are ambiguous (Correll, 2004; Reskin & McBrier, 2000; Ridgeway, 2011; Uhlmann & Cohen, 2005). In workplace settings, stereotypes can influence decisions made during recruitment, hiring, project assignment, day-to-day treatment, evaluations, promotions, compensation, and retention (Clayman Institute, 2015).

Researchers have demonstrated the mechanisms through which stereotypes contribute to bias, and the following sections describe some of these mechanisms.

1.1 Higher Bar and Increased Scrutiny

Stereotypes lead evaluators to scrutinize women's performance more harshly than men's and hold women to a higher standard (Biernat & Fuegan, 2001; Clayman Institute, 2015; Foschi, 1996, 2000; Heilman, 2001; Moss-Racusin et al., 2012; Steinpreis, Anders, & Ritzke, 1999). For example, in one experiment, psychology faculty from the United States were randomly assigned to evaluate one of two identical vitas for a person ostensibly applying for an assistant professor position, differentiated only by the gender of the candidate (Steinpreis et al., 1999). When asked if the candidate would be competitive for a tenure track position in their department, the faculty who evaluated the man's vita responded affirmatively 72% of the time, compared to just 44% for those evaluating the woman's vita. As is common in studies like these, men and women evaluators showed the same amount of bias. The authors also found that evaluators demonstrated extra scrutiny of the woman candidate's accomplishments, providing four times more doubt-raising statements such as, "I would need to see evidence that she had gotten these grants and publications on her own" and "It is

impossible to make such a judgment without teaching evaluations" (page 523).

Similarly, a study of science faculty echoed these findings: stereotypes caused raters to judge women by a harsher standard than men and devalue or ignore their achievements (Moss-Racusin et al., 2012). In this study, science faculty from research-intensive universities rated the application materials of a student for a laboratory manager position. In one condition, the applicant was a man, and in the other condition, the applicant was a woman. Faculty participants rated the man as significantly more competent and hireable than the identical woman applicant, and they also offered a higher starting salary and more career mentoring to the man applicant. Gender of the faculty evaluators did not affect the level of gender bias they exhibited in their choices. Furthermore, the authors demonstrated that competence ratings mediated hiring choices, and preexisting subtle bias against women was associated with less support for the woman candidate but not the man candidate.

As a corollary to the increased scrutiny women face, men tend to encounter a leniency bias, where their skills and abilities are overrated relative to their performance (Steinpreis et al., 1999). Stereotypical gendered expectations negate the recognition of women's accomplishments, through the devaluing of their work and/or attribution of their success to something other than their own skill and ability (Heilman, 2001).

When gender stereotypes are made salient in a workplace or educational setting, they also lead women to hold themselves to a higher standard and experience stereotype threat, or the anxiety of expecting negative judgments (Correll, 2001; Fassiotto et al., 2016). In male-dominated fields, such as mathematics, even when men and women high school students receive equal objective scores on tests of mathematical ability, men tend to rate themselves higher in mathematical ability than women do (Correll, 2001). Furthermore, these self-assessments can shape future career aspirations and decisions (Correll, 2001). Shih, Pittinsky, and Ambady (1999) also demonstrate the contextual nature of stereotype threat. When Asian-American women were primed to think

about their ethnic identity, they performed better on a test of mathematical ability, but when they were primed to think about their gender identity, they performed worse, compared with a control group who had neither identity primed. Identities were primed by having participants complete different versions of a questionnaire about residential life at their university. When Asian stereotypes were salient, performance increased, whereas when gender stereotypes were salient, performance decreased. Thus depending on the identities salient in a given environment, stereotypes can affect performance differently.

1.2 Shifting Criteria

Stereotypes also shift the criteria evaluators use when judging individuals. For example, in an experiment where individuals evaluated a man and a woman candidate for a police chief position, evaluators consistently chose the man over the woman and shifted the criteria they used to justify their hiring decisions (Uhlmann & Cohen, 2005). In the first condition of the experiment, evaluators chose between two resumes that did not convey gender of the applicant, but varied on two dimensions: one applicant had more experience, and the other had more education. In this situation, raters generally preferred the candidate with more education. In other words, education was the more valued criterion when selecting a police chief.

In the second condition of the experiment, the researchers added names to the resumes to convey gender. When the man had more education and the woman had more experience, raters chose the man and justified their choice by noting that their preferred candidate (the man) had more education. However, in the third condition of the study, researchers gave the woman candidate more education and the man more experience. In this case, raters chose to hire the man more often than the woman even though the woman had more education. When asked to justify their decision, raters noted that the man had more experience. In other words, raters shifted the criteria for evaluation so that the man candidate appeared more qualified.

1.3 Preferring a Narrow Leadership Style

Psychologists have shown that stereotypes of leaders overlap with stereotypes of men, but not with stereotypes of women. Even though gender stereotypes vary cross-culturally, individuals in the US, UK, Germany, Japan, and China have been shown to “think manager, think male” (Schein, 2001), associating whatever traits that are associated with masculinity in a particular society with the traits necessary for effective leadership. As a result, decision-makers tend to prefer a narrow leadership style that is defined in terms of male stereotypes. This narrow definition leads men to be judged as more appropriate for leadership roles than women (Schein, 2001).

Research shows that effective leadership includes a wide spectrum of behaviors, involving both agentic and communal traits, and that men and women exhibit similar leadership behaviors (Eagly & Carli, 2007). Yet, in the US and other western societies, evaluators place more value on agentic leadership attributes that are more culturally associated with men, such as assertiveness, dominance, initiative, decisiveness, and independence (Clayman Institute, 2015; Correll & Simard, 2016; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Heilman, 2012; Rudman & Glick, 2001). Indeed, Kanter (1975) noted long ago that the image of top managers is the image of successful, forceful masculinity. Communal traits like collaboration and nurturing are more commonly associated with women, and such traits tend to be devalued in evaluations. By valuing agentic traits over communal ones, raters unconsciously advantage men, who are more likely to be seen as agentic than women.

1.4 Likeability Penalty

These narrow leadership expectations create a double-bind for women: women who conform to such agentic leadership expectations by behaving in dominant or assertive ways face a backlash effect (Rudman, 1998; Rudman & Glick, 2001). Displays of agentic behaviors violate stereotypic

expectations that women be nice, warm, and concerned about others. Yet women who display more feminine traits are judged as nice but less competent and capable (Rudman & Glick, 2001). Men do not face the same double-bind, as acting in agentic ways does not violate masculine stereotypes. Instead, “modest” men encounter backlash for violating expectations of masculine behavior (Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Rudman, 2010).

In her ethnographic study of men and women litigators, Pierce (1996) found that men litigators who displayed forceful, assertive behaviors at work were admired. In contrast, when women litigators displayed the same agentic behaviors, they were vehemently disliked. If women litigators instead conformed to gendered expectations that they be nice, they were more liked by their colleagues and subordinates, but they were seen as less competent as litigators. In other words, gender stereotypes put women in a double-bind, making it hard to be seen as simultaneously competent and likeable. As Rudman (1998) has shown experimentally, men who display agentic, self-promoting behaviors are more likely than more modest men to be recommended for hire, since their agentic behavior leads them to be viewed as both competent and likable. Women who engage in the exact same agentic behaviors are no more likely to be hired than modest women. The former are viewed as less likable and the latter, less competent.

These stereotypes about femininity and masculinity also vary by race and class (Galinsky, Hall, & Cuddy, 2013; Ridgeway & Kricheli-Katz, 2013). In a theoretical paper, Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz (2013) take an intersectional approach to understanding gender biases and review studies consistent with that approach. For example, black women may receive less backlash than white women when demonstrating agentic traits, whereas Asian woman may receive more backlash (Livingston et al., 2012; Richardson et al., 2011; Ridgeway & Kricheli-Katz, 2013). Because Black women are seen as less stereotypically feminine than white or Asian women, they face cultural expectations that may disadvantage them in feminized

workplace contexts and advantage them in assertive or dominant job contexts (Galinsky et al., 2013; Ridgeway & Kricheli-Katz, 2013; Wilkins, Chan, & Kaiser, 2011). In contrast, Asian men may face a disadvantage when being considered for leadership positions (Chen, 1999). Further, in an audit study, Rivera and Tilcsik (2016) found that higher-class men were more likely to be called back for a job than were otherwise equal lower-class men, higher-class women, and lower-class women. In a subsequent survey experiment and interviews with lawyers, they found that while evaluators preferred higher-class men due to their high level of perceived “fit” with the company culture, higher-class women were viewed as less committed to work, and this commitment penalty offset any class-based advantages these applicants would otherwise receive. Each of the above examples illustrates how gender intersects with other status characteristics (race, ethnicity, social class) to create novel expectations for different groups of women—expectations that lead to differences in how different groups of women are evaluated in the workplace. More research is needed to more fully understand how different status characteristics and group identities intersect to influence the amount and type of biases women and men experience.

1.5 Motherhood Penalty

Women who are mothers face additional biases in the workplace. Mothers face a persistent penalty in wages and other organizational rewards compared to fathers and people without children. Mothers earn about 5 percent less per child compared to other workers controlling for demographic, human capital, and occupational variables (Budig & England, 2001). Correll and colleagues (Correll et al., 2007; Benard & Correll, 2010) show that stereotypes about mothers lead to a bias against mothers, which results in fewer organizational rewards. More specifically, stereotypes about mothers include beliefs that mothers are less committed to work than non-mothers. As a result, decision-makers rate

them as less deserving of hire in both lab experiments and audit studies (Correll et al., 2007). In contrast, fathers are not penalized for being a father and sometimes receive higher evaluations than childless men (Correll et al., 2007). If mothers attempt to overcome these stereotypes by making their commitment to work highly visible by working longer hours or being willing to drop other responsibilities whenever a work need arises, they are viewed as selfish and unlikable, which leads decision-makers to rate them as less hireable and promotable (Benard & Correll, 2010). A study based on interviews with female graduate students in four elite science and engineering programs finds evidence that even women without children can face negative evaluations on the basis that they may become mothers in the future (Thébaud & Taylor, 2016).

As research on the likeability penalty and the motherhood penalty makes clear, women cannot overcome biases simply by engaging in behavior stereotypically associated with men and masculinity, since such behaviors result in a backlash. Instead, change must occur at the organizational level, as we discuss below.

1.6 Lack of Access to Networks

Due to inequalities in the organizational roles and daily interactions of men and women, women are often excluded from professional networking relationships considered essential for success (Ibarra, 1997; Ibarra, Carter, & Silva, 2010; Ibarra et al., 2013; Smith-Lovin & McPherson, 1993). Men are more likely than women to possess powerful mentors, and men's networks provide more benefits than women's do (Ibarra et al., 2013). For example, men's networks connect them to important developmental opportunities and sponsorship for promotion (Ibarra et al., 2013). In contrast, women tend to have fewer sponsors willing to advocate for them (Ibarra et al., 2010). Women's weaker network connections act as an important barrier to advancement and influence.

2 Organizational Efforts

Organizations have engaged in numerous efforts to remove gender bias and improve diversity outcomes. Some of the earliest efforts featured the creation of employee resource groups, or volunteer groups based around a common identity, such as gender or race (Thomas & Creary, 2009). Such groups were intended to empower people who were otherwise marginalized in the workplace. Employee resource groups often host trainings, networking events, and other developmental activities intended to benefit the members. The underlying assumption guiding these efforts is that members of these groups lack the skills, social support, or the network connections necessary to advance in the workplace as currently organized.

Eventually, organizations began to discover that employee resource groups, while helpful, were not sufficient. These groups helped women and underrepresented minorities conform to and succeed within existing organizational structures, but existing structures often contain biases built within them (Acker, 1990; Williams, Muller, & Kilanski, 2010). To reduce bias and resulting inequalities, the underlying structural issues also need to be addressed. In addition, employee resource groups tend to emphasize "bonding capital," or within-group solidarity, rather than "bridging capital," or strengthening ties across groups (Putnam, 2000). Without bridging capital, employee resource groups can remain isolated from the rest of the organization (Yoshino & Smith, 2013).

In response to increasing awareness about the role of gender stereotypes in limiting the entry and advancement of women, many companies have begun offering unconscious bias trainings (UBT). Some companies hire consultants or academics to offer these trainings, and others, such as Facebook and Google, have created their own training videos (see videos available on the companies' websites). Such trainings are intended to educate managers and other high-level

employees about their own biases so they can be more vigilant when hiring, evaluating, promoting, and firing their employees. The hope is that, as a result of the training, managers will engage in conscious efforts to block biases from affecting their evaluations of men and women at the point of hire, promotion, and at other points where employees are evaluated.

There is some evidence that, when done right, UBT produces positive outcomes, at least in the short term. At the Stanford School of Medicine, for example, department heads received unconscious bias training and then developed and delivered their own version of the training to faculty in their departments. This training reduced implicit biases about women in science (Fassiotto et al., 2016). Since implicit biases are often harder to change than explicit biases, this result is encouraging. However, what is less clear is whether one-shot, stand-alone trainings can produce sustainable change or whether the effect will simply wear off. Devine, Forscher, Austin, and Cox (2012) argue that such trainings need to be coupled with a multifaceted intervention and show that, with a sample of college students, a multifaceted bias reduction intervention can produce longer-term change.

However, recent experimental research by Duguid and Thomas-Hunt (2015) finds that unconscious bias training can even exacerbate inequality by normalizing bias. At a more macro level, Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly (2006) find that without engagement and buy-in from managers, diversity initiatives fail to achieve their intended outcomes. High levels of resistance to diversity initiatives have been observed among those in power. Diversity messages can feel threatening to majority group members, and feelings of threat can lead to resistance. For example, a recent experiment found that white men college students who were randomly assigned to perform a mock interview for a company that they learned was pro-diversity performed worse on the mock interview and experienced more cardiovascular threat compared with white men assigned to interview with a company that made no mention of its diversity policies (Dover, Major, and Kaiser, 2016). Martin, Phillips, and Sasaki (2016)

similarly find that an emphasis on the benefits of gender differences (a common approach of diversity initiatives) increases men's stereotyping and disrespectful treatment of women.

As the research reviewed above suggests, organizational interventions that are designed to help individual women navigate their careers within existing organizational structures or to help decision-makers be less biased via training are likely necessary but not sufficient for producing sustainable change. Sustainable change will require changing organizations themselves.

3 Creating Sustainable Change

An extensive body of research documents how gender bias operates, and some emerging research demonstrates how conventional approaches to eliminating bias can be short-lived or even backfire. However, we have fewer examples where researchers and/or organizations have intervened successfully in the bias process to produce long-term change.

One example is a study by Goldin and Rouse (2000) analyzing whether the representation of women hired to top orchestras in the U.S. increased when they began putting up a screen during auditions so that judges could not see the musician who was auditioning. Professional orchestras have historically been male-dominated, with men holding approximately 88% of the positions in the top orchestras. Rather than auditioning in front of a team of evaluators, starting in the 1970s and 1980s, orchestras gradually began switching to blind auditions. Applicants began to audition behind a screen, which prevented evaluators from seeing the musicians. This natural experiment allowed researchers to assess whether women are more likely to be hired when their gender is unknown. The researchers found that 25% more women were hired after orchestras switched to gender-blind auditions. When the raters could not see the musician, gender bias in hiring decisions decreased.

While this study is encouraging, it is hardly scalable to every hiring or advancement decision

made in organizations. After all, employees cannot be expected to work exclusively behind screens. However, some technology companies are experimenting with blind auditions at the first stage of their hiring process as a replacement for resume screening. Companies create a problem or set of problems for applicants to solve, and the solutions are sent to hiring managers with no information on the gender, race, or other characteristics of the applicant. One company that administers these blind auditions, called Gap-Jumpers, reports that 60% of the top performers on the technology screening tests are women. (See the company's website for more information). More research is needed to understand whether and how new technologies for screening and evaluating employees can remove biases.

The research reviewed above suggests other targets for organizational change. These include making criteria for evaluation explicit and clear before evaluating individuals, holding decision-makers accountable for their decisions, broadening the definition of success, and reducing the salience of gender in workplaces.

One successful intervention involved changing the definition of success in the local environment to increase the representation of women in male-dominated fields, particularly in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) fields. Carnegie Mellon University increased the percentage of women undergraduate computer science majors from 7 to 42% in just 5 years by broadening the image of a successful computer science student, changing the entry requirements, and emphasizing the real-world impacts of the field (Margolis & Fisher, 2002). Faculty members were encouraged to challenge the pervasive image of computer scientists as narrowly obsessed with computing by highlighting the field's real-world value and connections to other disciplines. Instead of encouraging women to fit existing stereotypes about computer science, the university changed the cultural image of computing.

Similarly, Cheryan, Plaut, Davies, and Steele (2009) found that simply changing the objects in a computer science classroom increased women's interest in the field. By displaying

gender-neutral objects, rather than objects associated with geeky masculinity, the salience of gender was decreased, and women's interest in persisting in computer science increased. Wynn and Correll (2018) also find that when technology companies use more gender-neutral approaches in their recruiting sessions on college campuses, women demonstrate more engagement and ask more questions than when companies use masculine behavior and images. In this way, organizations can change the images in the local environment to reduce the salience of gender and be more welcoming to women.

Scholars also find that organizations can intervene during the decision-making process itself by making evaluative criteria more explicit. When criteria are explicit, individuals are less likely to rely on stereotypes as a cognitive shortcut in their decision-making. For example, in Uhlmann and Cohen's (2005) study of police chief hiring, discussed earlier, the researchers were able to reduce the effect of gender bias by asking raters to commit to the decision criteria *before* evaluating candidates. When they stated that education was their most important criterion up-front, raters consistently chose the candidate with more education whether it was a man or woman. This study suggests that establishing clear criteria before evaluation can reduce the impact of gender bias. Other studies with non-experimental data also find that more formalized procedures to reduce the influence of stereotypes associated with race, gender, and other characteristics generally improve diversity outcomes, such as the percentage of women in management (Bielby, 2000; Dobbin et al., 2015; Reskin, 2000).

In addition, providing raters with more information about candidates can also outweigh biases. For example, in the study by Steinpreis et al. (1999), discussed earlier, gender biases emerged when hiring for an entry-level assistant professor position but not for a more senior tenured faculty position. When raters have more information about candidates, they are less likely to rely on stereotypes as a shortcut. Therefore, organizations can help combat gender bias by increasing the amount of information available to raters and

establishing clear criteria for evaluation in advance of decision-making.

In addition to lab studies, research partnering with actual companies can vastly increase our understanding of how to mitigate gender bias in real-world settings. For example, by partnering with a large private company, Castilla (2015) found that increasing accountability and transparency in performance evaluations reduced “performance reward bias.” Prior to the intervention, men received higher rewards than women even when they had equal performance evaluation scores. The intervention involved appointing a performance-reward committee to monitor reward decisions, training all senior managers how to follow the performance-reward process and use the criteria when making pay decisions, and providing all senior managers and high-level leaders with information about the pay decisions made concerning employees in their work units. By increasing accountability and transparency in the evaluation process, the organization reduced the gender pay gap. While this study was conducted in one organization—a private-sector service company with over 20,000 employees—it has encouraging implications for reducing gender bias in the workplace.

In these ways, researchers have begun to develop and test interventions that address the problem of biases in the workplace. However, more work is needed to help develop robust solutions that combat bias in a variety of contexts. Social scientists have well-charted the causes of bias, but we have more work to do to understand how to eradicate bias and improve diversity outcomes.

4 Future Research Directions

What is needed are studies that develop and evaluate solutions across the life course (e.g. engaging girls and young women, job recruitment, hiring, treatment in the workplace, evaluation, promotion, and retention), in multiple industries and organizational types. How can interventions avoid many of the pitfalls identified in previous research? Future research must also examine how

interventions impact different groups of women and men and apply an intersectional lens to combating gender bias. While interventions may help certain groups of women, they may also exclude other groups on the basis of race, socioeconomic status, gender identity, disability, age, and other dimensions of inequality. For example, emerging research notes that white women and racial minorities tend to respond differently to diversity approaches (Apfelbaum, Stephens, & Reagans, 2016; Martin et al., 2016). Apfelbaum et al. (2016) find that emphasizing differences and awareness of bias reduces attrition among white women, while emphasizing equality and fairness reduces attrition among Black individuals. Emphasizing both approaches risks diluting the message and erasing any positive effects on attrition. At the same time, Martin et al. (2016) warn that emphasizing differences can increase men’s stereotyping and disrespectful treatment of women. Therefore, how should diversity initiatives proceed, given the differential ways the same approach can impact various groups? More research is needed to explore this question.

Scholars of diversity can look to the work-life literature for examples of the kind of research needed. Research conducted within workplaces, like studies by Kelly, Ammons, Chermack, and Moen (2010), Kelly, Moen, and Tranby (2011) and Moen, Kelly, Fan, Lee, Almeida, Kossek, and Buxton, (2016) provide insight into how interventions can practically improve inequality. By designing and testing a work-life initiative in an organization, the researchers established one way of improving work-life conflict while benefiting the organization and its workers. As a result of the initiative, work-life conflict and turnover decreased, employee satisfaction increased, and health outcomes improved. The initiative, Results Only Work Environment (ROWE), aimed to shift the organizational culture so flexibility became the norm rather than the exception. Employees attended interactive sessions designed to teach them a different view of flexibility. The initiative was not billed as a gender initiative, but as one that would benefit all employees by giving them more control over their schedule. And indeed the initiative

benefited all employees, since all employees had been experiencing some work-family conflict. But since women often experience more work-life conflict due to greater family responsibilities, the implications are especially important for women. Diversity scholars could use similar methods to develop and evaluate approaches to decreasing the effects of bias in organizations.

For example, researchers at the Clayman Institute are currently conducting research intervening in companies' performance evaluation process (Correll, 2017). The intervention begins with unconscious bias training to provide a framework for creating change. Then, working with managers involved in evaluating employees' performance, researchers and managers develop a clear list of measurable criteria for assessing performance. By establishing clear criteria ahead of time and involving managers in the process, companies may be able to reduce bias in evaluations leading to promotions, raises, and other organizational rewards.

One interesting debate among those working on organizational changes to improve gender outcomes is whether to label the change effort as a gender intervention (as the Clayman Institute is doing) or not (as in Kelly and Moen's research). The advantage of the latter is that it likely increases buy-in from men managers and decreases their resistance. The advantage of making gender explicit is that doing so potentially provides employees with a framework for ensuring that gender biases do not get imported into the new programs and procedures being developed. Research is needed to assess which approach is ultimately most effective.

By partnering with organizations to develop and evaluate effective interventions, researchers can not only identify the sources of inequality—they can also help organizations successfully intervene in reducing bias.

References

- Acker, J. (1990). Hierarchies, jobs and bodies: A theory of gendered organizations. *Gender & Society, 4*(2), 139–158.
- Apfelbaum, E. P., Stephens, N. M., & Reagans, R. E. (2016). Beyond one-size-fits-all: Tailoring diversity approaches to the representation of social groups. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 111*(4), 547–566.
- Benard, S., & Correll, S. J. (2010). Normative discrimination and the motherhood penalty. *Gender & Society, 24*(5), 616–646.
- Berger, J., Hamit Fisek, M., Norman, R. Z., & Zelditch, M., Jr. (1977). *Status characteristics and social interaction: An expectation-states approach*. New York: Elsevier.
- Bielby, W. T. (2000). Minimizing workplace gender and racial bias. *Contemporary Sociology, 29*(1), 120–129.
- Biernat, M., & Fuegen, K. (2001). Shifting standards and the evaluation of competence: Complexity in gender-based judgment and decision making. *Journal of Social Issues, 57*(4), 707–724.
- Budig, M. J., & England, P. (2001). The wage penalty for motherhood. *American Sociological Review, 66*, 204–225.
- Castilla, E. J. (2015). Accounting for the gap: A firm study manipulating organizational accountability and transparency in pay decisions. *Organization Science, 26*, 311–333.
- Catalyst. (2012). *Catalyst census: Fortune 500 women executive officers and top earners*. (<http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/2012-catalyst-census-fortune-500-women-executive-officers-and-top-earners>).
- Chen, A. S. (1999). Lives at the center of the periphery, lives at the periphery of the center: Chinese American Masculinities and bargaining with hegemony. *Gender & Society, 13*(5), 584–607.
- Cheryan, S., Plaut, V. C., Davies, P. G., & Steele, C. M. (2009). Ambient belonging: How stereotypical cues impact gender participation in computer science. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97*(6), 1045–1060.
- Clayman Institute for Gender Research. (2015). Assessing performance and potential. See *Bias Block Bias Toolkits*. (<https://womensleadership.stanford.edu/tools>).
- Conway, M., Pizzamiglio, M., & Mount, L. (1996). Status, communality, and agency: Implications for stereotypes of gender and other groups. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71*(1), 25–38.

- Correll, S. J. (2001). Gender and the career choice process: The role of biased self-assessments. *American Journal of Sociology*, 106(6), 1691–1730.
- Correll, S. J. (2004). Constraints into preferences: Gender, status, and emerging career aspirations. *American Sociological Review*, 69(1), 93–113.
- Correll, S. J. (2017). SWS 2016 Feminist Lecture: Reducing gender biases in modern workplaces: A small wins approach to organizational change. *Gender & Society*, 31(6), 725–750.
- Correll, S. J., Benard, S., & Paik, I. (2007). Getting a job: Is there a motherhood penalty? *American Journal of Sociology*, 112, 1297–1339.
- Correll, S. J., & Ridgeway, C. L. (2003). Expectation states theory. In J. Delamater (Ed.), *Handbook of social psychology* (pp. 29–51). New York: Kluwer Academic, Plenum Publishers.
- Correll, S., & Simard, C. (2016). Research: Vague feedback is holding women back. *Harvard Business Review*. (<https://hbr.org/2016/04/research-vague-feedback-is-holding-women-back>).
- Devine, P. G., Forscher, P. S., Austin, A. J., & Cox, W. T. L. (2012). Long-term reduction in implicit race bias: A prejudice habit-breaking intervention. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 48(6), 1267–1278.
- Dobbin, F., Schrage, D., & Kalev, A. (2015). Rage against the iron cage: The varied effects of bureaucratic personnel reforms on diversity. *American Sociological Review*, 80(5), 1014–1044.
- Dover, T. L., Major, B., & Kaiser, C. R. (2016). Members of high-status groups are threatened by pro-diversity organizational messages. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 62, 58–67.
- Duguid, M. M., & Thomas-Hunt, M. C. (2015). Condoning stereotypes? How awareness of stereotyping prevalence impacts expression of stereotypes. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 100, 343–359.
- Eagly, A. H., & Carli, L. L. (2007). *Through the Labyrinth: The truth about how women become leaders*. Cambridge: Harvard Business Press.
- Eagly, A. H., & Karau, S. J. (2002). Role congruity theory of prejudice toward female leaders. *Psychological Review*, 109(3), 573–598.
- England, P. (2010). The gender revolution: Uneven and stalled. *Gender & Society*, 24(2), 149–166.
- Fassiotto, M., Hamel, E. O., Ku, M., Correll, S., Grewal, D., Lavori, P. ... Valentine, H. (2016). Women in academic medicine: Measuring stereotype threat among junior faculty. *Journal of Women's Health*, 25(3), 292–298.
- Foschi, M. (1996). Double standards in the evaluation of men and women. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 59(3), 237–254.
- Foschi, M. (2000). Double standards for competence: Theory and research. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26, 21–42.
- Galinsky, A. D., Hall, E. V., & Cuddy, A. J. C. (2013). Gendered races: Implications for interracial marriage, leadership selection, and athletic participation. *Psychological Science*, 24(4), 498–506.
- Goldin, C., & Rouse, C. (2000). Orchestrating impartiality: The impact of 'Blind' auditions on female musicians. *American Economic Review*, 90, 715–741.
- Heilman, M. E. (2001). Description and prescription: How gender stereotypes prevent women's ascent up the organizational ladder. *Journal of Social Issues*, 57(4), 657–674.
- Heilman, M. (2012). Gender stereotypes and workplace bias. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, 32, 113–135.
- Ibarra, H. (1997). Paving an alternative route: Gender differences in managerial networks. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 60(1), 91–102.
- Ibarra, H., Carter, N. M., & Silva, C. (2010, September). Why men still get more promotions than women. *Harvard Business Review*, 88(9), 80–85.
- Ibarra, H., Ely, R. J. & Kolb, D. (2013, September). Women rising: The unseen barriers. *Harvard Business Review*, 91, 60–66.
- Ito, T. A., & Umland, G. R. (2003). Race and gender on the brain. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 85, 616–626.
- Kalev, A., Dobbin, F., & Kelly, E. (2006). Best practices or best guesses? Assessing the efficacy of corporate affirmative action and diversity policies. *American Sociological Review*, 71, 589–617.
- Kanter, R. M. (1975). Women and the structure of organizations: Explorations in theory and behavior. In R. M. Kanter & M. Millman (Eds.), *Another Voice*. New York: Doubleday.
- Kelly, E. L., Ammons, S. K., Chermack, K., & Moen, P. (2010). Gendered challenge, gendered response: Confronting the ideal worker norm in a White-Collar organization. *Gender & Society*, 24(3), 281–303.
- Kelly, E. L., Moen, P., & Tranby, E. (2011). Changing workplaces to reduce work-family conflict: Schedule control in a White-Collar organization. *American Sociological Review*, 76(2), 265–290.
- Livingston, R. W., Shelby, R. A., & Washington, E. F. (2012). Can an agentic black woman get ahead? The impact of race and interpersonal dominance on perceptions of female leaders. *Psychological Science*, 23, 346–353.
- Margolis, J., & Fisher, A. (2002). *Unlocking the clubhouse: Women in computing*. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

- Martin, A. E., Phillips, K. W., & Sasaki, S. J. (2016). *Reducing bias through blindness or awareness: Divergent effects of race and gender ideologies* (Working Paper). Columbia: Columbia Business School.
- Moen, P., Kelly, E. L., Fan, W., Lee, S. R., Almeida, D., Kossek, E. E., et al. (2016). Does a flexibility/support organizational initiative improve high-tech employees' well-being? evidence from the work, family, and health network. *American Sociological Review*, *81*(1), 134–164.
- Moss-Racusin, C. A., Dovidio, J. F., Brescoll, V. L., Graham, M. J., & Handelsman, J. (2012). Science faculty's subtle gender biases favor male students. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, *109*(41), 16474–16479.
- Moss-Racusin, C. A., Phelan, J. E., & Rudman, L. A. (2010). When men break the gender rules: Status incongruity and backlash against modest men. *Psychology of Men & Masculinity*, *11*(2), 140–151.
- Pedula, D. S. (2014). The positive consequences of negative stereotypes: Race, sexual orientation, and the job application process. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *77*(1), 75–94.
- Pierce, J. L. (1996). *Gender trials: Emotional lives in contemporary law firms*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Reskin, B. F. (2000). The proximate causes of employment discrimination. *Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews*, *29*(2), 319–328.
- Reskin, B. F., & McBrier, D. B. (2000). Why not ascription? Organizations' employment of male and female managers. *American Sociological Review*, *65*(2), 210–233.
- Richardson, E. V., Phillips, K. W., Rudman, L. A., & Glick, P. (2011). *Double jeopardy or greater latitude: Do black women escape backlash for dominance displays?* (Working Paper). Evanston: Northwestern University.
- Ridgeway, C. L. (1993). Gender, status and the social psychology of expectations. In P. England (Ed.), *Theory on gender, feminism on theory*. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Ridgeway, C. L. (2011). *Framed by gender: How gender inequality persists in the modern world*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ridgeway, C. L., & Kricheli-Katz, T. (2013). Intersecting cultural beliefs in social relations: Gender, race, and class binds and freedoms. *Gender & Society*, *27*(3), 294–318.
- Rivera, L. A., & Tilcsik, A. (2016). Class advantage, commitment penalty: The gendered effect of social class signals in an elite labor market. *American Sociological Review*, *81*(6), 1097–1131.
- Rudman, L. A. (1998). Self promotion as a risk factor for women: The costs and benefits of counter stereotypical impression management. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *74*, 629–645.
- Rudman, L., & Glick, P. (2001). Prescriptive gender stereotypes and backlash toward agentic women. *Journal of Social Issues*, *57*(4), 743–762.
- Schein, V. E. (2001). A global look at psychological barriers to women's progress in management. *Journal of Social Issues*, *57*(4), 675–688.
- Sellers, P. (2012). Fortune 500 women CEOs hits a milestone. *Fortune*. (<http://fortune.com/2012/11/12/fortune-500-women-ceos-hit-a-milestone/>).
- Shih, M., Pittinsky, T. L., & Ambady, N. (1999). Stereotype susceptibility: Identity salience and shifts in quantitative performance. *Psychological Science*, *10*(1), 80–83.
- Smith-Lovin, L., & McPherson, M. (1993). You are who you know: A network approach to gender. In P. England (Ed.), *Theory on gender, feminism on theory* (pp. 223–251). Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Steinpreis, R. E., Anders, K. A., & Ritzke, D. (1999). The impact of gender on the review of the curricula vitae of job applicants and tenure candidates: A national empirical study. *Sex Roles*, *41*(7), 509–528.
- Thébaud, S., & Taylor, C. J. (2016). *The 'Women Always Fail' thing: The specter of motherhood and its influence on the career aspirations of young scientists and engineers* (Working Paper).
- Thomas, D. A., & Creary, S. J. (2009). *Meeting the diversity challenge at PepsiCo: The Steve Reinemund Era*. Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing.
- Uhlmann, E. L., & Cohen, G. L. (2005). Constructed criteria: Redefining merit to justify discrimination. *Psychological Science*, *16*(6), 474–480.
- Wilkins, C. L., Chan, J. F., & Kaiser, C. R. (2011). Racial stereotypes and interracial attraction: Phenotypic prototypicality and perceived attractiveness of Asians. *Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology*, *17*, 427–431.
- Williams, C. L., Muller, C., & Kilanski, K. (2010). Gendered organizations in the new economy. *Gender & Society*, *26*(4), 549–573.

Wynn, A. T., & Correll, S. J. (2018). Puncturing the pipeline: Do technology companies alienate women in recruiting sessions? *Social Studies of Science*, 48(1), 149–164. <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0306312718756766>.

Yoshino, K., & Smith, C. (2013). Uncovering talent: A new model of inclusion. *Deloitte University Leadership Center for Inclusion*.

Alison T. Wynn is the Diversity & Inclusion Postdoctoral Fellow with the Clayman Institute for Gender Research at Stanford University. She received a PhD in sociology from Stanford University and a BA in English from Duke University. Her research examines organizational policies and practices that may inadvertently create or reinforce inequality. In particular, she studies recruiting practices, perceptions of cultural fit, flexibility programs, and gender equality initiatives

in industries such as technology, management consulting, and academic medicine. Prior to graduate school, Alison worked as a Human Capital Analyst with Deloitte Consulting.

Shelley J. Correll is Professor of Sociology and, by courtesy, Organizational Behavior at Stanford University where she also serves as the Barbara D. Finberg Director of the Clayman Institute for Gender Research. Her current research examines how legal mandates and organizational policies and practices can reduce the effect of status beliefs on workplace gender inequalities and how gender status beliefs produce inequalities in product markets. She is currently conducting research in three technology companies to evaluate a “small wins” model for reducing gender biases by involving organizational actors in the change process.

Bandana Purkayastha

Abstract

Compared to the long lineage of scholarship on women's rights and gendered inequalities, the sociological scholarship on gender and human rights is a relative newcomer. In this chapter I move beyond human rights charters and conventions and focus on the substantive access to rights and the terrains of power, privileges, and inequalities that have to be navigated in the process. The first section of this chapter summarizes the scholarship on the growing power of feminist, anti-racist, and anti-colonial activism that shaped conversations about the conceptualization, policies, and access to human rights globally. The second section presents the scholarship on violence against women (VAW), gender and human rights. While the terrain of human rights literature covers many topics, discussions of violence are woven through an array of conversations about the access to political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights. I draw upon the literature and activism from different parts of the world to highlight the dynamism and continuing conflicts related to gender and human rights.

Compared to the long lineage of scholarship on women's rights and gendered inequalities, the sociological scholarship that focuses explicitly on gender and human rights is a relative newcomer. Even though the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), proclaimed the rights of *all* human beings, irrespective of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other statuses in 1948 (Ishay, 2008), the conversations, practices and activism arising within the broad field of *gender* and human rights became important only over the last twenty five years (Quataert, 2011).

Gender scholars now analyze gender in terms of intersecting structures of privileges and marginalization. Even though the field started with a focus on women, it has moved to an emphasis on complex privileges and marginalization that shape the experiences of women and men who are positioned differently within structures of race/class/gender/sexuality/religion/nationality/age and other salient local and global structures (see Ferree, 1990; Risman & Davis, 2013). The interdisciplinary field of human rights however, has mostly focussed on claims for separate groups: women, racial minorities, indigenous groups and other groups that were not able to access human rights that are enshrined through human rights treatise and conventions (see Baxi, 2002 for a critique). More recently the growth of the human rights and human security literature has prompted new discussions about gender and human rights. Over the years, the conceptualization

B. Purkayastha (✉)
University of Connecticut, Storrs, USA
e-mail: Bandana.Purkayastha@uconn.edu

of gender as well as human rights have changed in response to activism, lobbying and other forms of claims making.

Here I use the human rights enterprise approach that goes beyond a primary focus on charters and conventions to examine the process through which substantive rights are claimed (Armaline, Glasberg, & Purkayastha, 2012, 2015). This sociological approach foregrounds the scholarship that examines substantive access to rights, structural impediments to accessing to human rights, and the power, privileges, and inequalities that have to be navigated in the process. While there is a vast literature on gendered inequalities that occur within nation-states, this chapter focuses mostly on the swath of scholarship that explicitly evokes human rights and gendered inequalities. This discussion is situated within a structural terrain that recognizes intersecting global to local areas of power and marginalization, that shape gendered human rights within and across nations.

The chapter begins with a brief overview of the long road towards ensuring all marginalized human beings, that is, women, racial minorities, indigenous groups, and ethnic minorities, among others, can claim rights. Similar to reclaiming herstories, the first section of this chapter summarizes the scholarship on the growing power of feminist, anti-racist, and anti-colonial activism that shaped conversations about the conceptualization, policies, and access to human rights globally. The second section presents the scholarship on violence against women (VAW), gender and human rights. While the terrain of human rights literature covers many topics, discussions of violence are woven through an array of conversations about the access to political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights. Consequently, this second section summarizes the structural impediments, activist rifts and coalitions, and scholarly debates about gendered/intersectional violence that marginalize groups as they seek lives imbued with rights and dignity. I conclude by highlighting the dynamism and continuing conflicts related to gender and human rights.

1 The Long, Rocky Road to Include All Humans in Institutionalizing Human Rights

As many scholars have documented, the formation of the United Nations (UN) was fraught with many conflicts between colonial powers and the colonized, between powerful and less powerful states, and between states and different lobbies seeking to ensure the rights of smaller groups and less powerful states were not overlooked within the UN (Anderson, 2003; Pearce, 2001; Purkayastha 2012). Of the four women from Brazil, China, Dominican Republic, and the US who were present during the inception of the UN, the representatives from Brazil and the Dominican Republic, Bertha Lutz and Minerva Bernadino, were insistent about the inclusion of women's issues in all deliberations (Falcón, 2016; Synder, 2006). The UN charter which talks about the rights of men and women, reflect these initial efforts to include women instead of subsuming them in the category "man". Then, at the first UN General Assembly meeting, seventeen female delegates lobbied for the formal inclusion of women within the new political terrain. The Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) was formed in 1947 due to these early demands for the recognition of women's rights. CSW was charged with promoting women's rights and equality including formulating international conventions that would address national legislation that was discriminatory towards women (Synder, 2006). However the battle for gender equality had to continue even as the Universal Declaration of Human (UDHR) Rights was being written a year later.

As Arat (2008) has written:

...gender biases prevailed throughout the twentieth century. Even members of the Commission that drafted the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights were willing to employ the word "man" in reference to the holder of the rights...[T]he Commission Chair, Eleanor Roosevelt, defended the wording by arguing: [in English] "When we say 'all men are brothers,' we mean that all human beings are brothers and we are not differentiating between men and women." "Thus, the language

was maintained for some time. The final draft mostly employed the gender-neutral terms of “human being,” “everyone,” and “person;” and the Preamble included a specific reference to the “equal rights of men and women,” thanks largely to the efforts of two female Commission members, Hansa Mehta of India and Minerva Bernardino of the Dominican Republic.

While this inclusive language in UDHR (proclaimed in 1948) represented a significant step forward, the question of women’s actual or substantive access to political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights remained a matter of conflict. During the negotiations over UDHR, powerful nation-states successfully argued that human rights and the security of human beings would be contingent upon national security concerns (see also Anderson, 2003). These reservations effectively made it possible for nation states to use “national security” as a weapon to deny human rights to the groups marginalized within their borders. As countries gained independence from colonial rule, the question of adequate food, shelter, education, health, among other needs, were also raised as critical human rights issues.

The UDHR introduced new thinking about rights including in its purview, political, civil, economic, social, and cultural rights of human beings. It introduced the revolutionary idea that rights were to be available to all human beings irrespective of the political systems in which people lived. Yet the broad outlines did not address how the language, institutionalization, and practices relating to human rights were going to translate to substantive rights for hitherto marginalized groups including women (Baxi, 2002). Despite the presence of the Commission on the Status of Women in the UN from 1947, and the continued claims of organized women’s movements for women’s human rights at the UN, a broader recognition of women’s human rights emerged very slowly, over decades.

It is instructive to trace how the recognition of the structural bases of women’s inequalities and the need to safeguard their rights emerged in the UN. At one level, the changing claims within the UN mirror what was happening in academia as

scholars sought to develop the most effective methodologies (and bodies of research) on women. The academic thinking about gender has moved beyond equating gender to women to considering women and men in terms of their intersectional power, privileges and marginalization. At another level, within the UN, the conceptualization and practices surrounding human rights swung between a continuing insistence upon human rights of women to thinking about gendered human rights. Feminist leaders who were able to access different positions within the UN pushed for women’s agendas and substantive rights within the broad umbrella of human rights. Synder (1995, 2006) has written about the ways in which women’s economic and social rights were addressed through the UN’s “women and development” agendas in the ‘50s, ‘60s, ‘70s and ‘80s. Building on the concerns of newly independent states to address poverty, the initial international development plans targeted women *in* development. The patriarchal/colonial assumption was that women were victims of culture in their societies and only large-scale development and modernization would lead to improvements of women’s lives across the Global South. As the scholarly critiques about this approach grew louder (Kabeer, 1994; Mohanty, 2001) and the practitioners’ and activists’ voices from the Global South grew stronger, the women in development approach was changed to a women and development approach to recognize that women were not simply victims, they also contributed significantly to societies. However, by the 1980s this approach was replaced by a gender and development approach. As Synder (2006) describes, women from the Global South pointed out that equality within homes and access to employment, which were priorities for women in the Global North, were not their top priority especially while the North-dominated global political-economic systems oppressed their own societies. The frame of gender and development addressed some of these concerns. By highlighting the socially constructed nature of gender and recognizing that women and men in different social locations and different countries

are subject to different types of marginalization and privileges, this approach brought the thinking closer to the academic work on intersectionality. Instead of assuming that all women were oppressed relative to men, these development plans began to think of women and men as being affected by marginalization and privileges based on the structures of race/gender/class/sexuality/nationality/religion/age. As Synder has pointed out, “Actually, *women and development* made *gender and development* possible, and the greater individualism made women’s human rights possible” (italics in the original, 2006, 38).

While Synder’s accounts explain the quest for, and impediments to economic and social rights, an excellent account of the lobbying for the whole gamut of human rights is available in Falcón’s (2016) book, *Power Interrupted*. Falcón points out that from the 1960s, splits began to appear among groups that were lobbying for women’s human rights. Part of this conflict is reflective of the ways in which “women” were defined by diverse women’s movements. As I discuss later in this chapter, many of these splits continue today. A series of UN sponsored, CSW organized conferences brought women from different parts of the globe together. As a result, multiple transnational advocacy networks developed. The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), passed in 1979, and now ratified by 189 countries, was an outcome of thirty years of work by the CSW and these networks.

In its preamble, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) explicitly acknowledges that “extensive discrimination against women continues to exist,” and emphasizes that such discrimination “violates the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity”. As defined in Article 1, discrimination is understood as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex...in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field”. The Convention provides positive affirmation to the principle of equality by requiring States parties to take “all appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement of

women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men” (article 3). (CEDAW, 1979) CEDAW identified multiple ways in which women are prevented from fully exercising their political and civil human rights. It highlights the deleterious impact of cultural factors on gender relations and asks state parties to address these factors. In addition, it addresses the inequalities that persist in accessing health, reproductive rights, employment education and related social activities.

While the passage of CEDAW can be seen as a major step towards ensuring women’s human rights, it was not sufficient to eliminate the gendered inequalities that were already identified through scholarship and Gender and Development policy and practices. Falcón (2016) has argued that the process through which the UN units focused on women, such as within the Commission on the Status of Women, reflect the dominant Global North’s notion of a universal woman. “In short, emphasizing differences based on race, culture, sexuality, or acknowledging intra-gender dynamics was not the prevailing discourse or political objective of the 1990s as activists sought to shape international standards. The UN spaces focused on “women’s issues” have gained its traction by precisely promoting an image of the universal woman as de-racialized among other factors. As a result, women who wanted to advocate for an intersectional notion of women and men used a very different space: the conferences on eliminating racism, or the spaces for articulating the rights of migrants or indigenous groups to advocate for themselves.

Since the Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, over the years, 18 core human rights instruments were established to deepen human rights in practice. Because of the early insistence on the term human (within UDHR) many of these conventions address a few aspects of women’s experiences. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) spells out the fundamental human rights. Article 2 of the UDHR partly states that, “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,

without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status". This implies that human rights are universal, inalienable and indivisible, shared equally by everyone (Ishay, 2008). Several conventions codified the principles of UDHR. Broadly, the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights commits parties to respect the civil and political rights of individuals including the right to life, self-determination, and electoral rights, among others. The International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), on the other hand, lists several rights that states should meet to ensure decent lives for their people. These include labor rights, right to social security, health, education, and decent living. Specifically, article 11 recognizes the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living, which includes the right to adequate food, housing, and clothing. Other convention, for instance on refugees and migrants, highlight other rights women and men should be able to access irrespective of their citizenship status.

While human rights were being defined for practice through UN conventions, the global conferences on women organized under the aegis of CSW, like the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, provided a series of platforms for women's rights activists and supporters from across the globe to gather and claim their rights (UN Women, n.d.) Simultaneously, groups worked within their countries and regions to bring human rights language to their legal systems. For instance, the idea of women's human rights has also been incorporated into many formal documents of many former colonial territories (see e.g. Adams, 2006 on the incorporation of gender and human rights thinking on the African continent). Thus the ideas about women's rights as human rights spread across and were shaped by conceptualizations and claims across the globe.

In all of these efforts, the expectation was that governments were mainly responsible for ensuring human rights with the UN and its agencies acting as juries or referees. Even though the principles of human rights do not only hold nation-states accountable for violations—

corporations can be held accountable for human rights violations—the responsibility for assuring rights was primarily the purview of states. However, Molyneux and Razavi (2002) point out that the shifts in conceptualization, policy, and practice on gender and human rights were outflanked, from the 1980s, by the introduction of neoliberal policies that opposed governmental role in the areas that would have provided social and economic human rights. In other words, whereas the assumption of human rights conventions are that governments are responsible for creating the conditions that would allow all human beings to access social, economic and cultural rights, in reality, under the structural changes brought about by neoliberal globalization, governments were forced to retreat from their welfare state regimes, ceding the control of many of these arenas to private for-profit corporations. Many of the services provided by governments—e.g. education, health, retirement benefits—were moved over partially or wholly to the realm of "free" markets and redefined as items for sale and profit. Thus, the rapid expansion of neoliberal structures undermined the basic conditions needed for the fulfillment of human rights: the ability of all people to build and live lives of human dignity, secure from threats to survival and well being. Women were increasingly drawn into labor arenas with few of the protections that economic and social human rights conventions outlined. These changes affected the Global North and South. Without state commitment to a range of human rights, women were left to deal with care work within families and communities as "private" tasks, as governments were forced to or willingly exited their responsibility for providing social rights.

If we reflect on the decades since 1948 when UDHR was declared, among the positive achievements for gender and human rights are the policy formations that keep the cause of women's human rights on multiple international agendas, including the recent steps to insert gender equality into the Sustainable Development Goals for 2030. In a sense, gender and human rights have become normalized at the international policy level. Yet, many of these

policy initiatives continue to focus on *women* in their framing of what needs to be done instead of using an intersectional understanding of structures that impede diverse women's access to human rights differently. Thus, gender, in terms of the focus on structures, has made inadequate progress in the realm of human rights. This tension in conceptualization and framing of claims is evident in the ways in which scholars have conceptualized the role of violence as a key impediment to accessing human rights, as I discuss in the next section.

1.1 Gender and Human Rights: Looking Through the Lens of Violence

The gender and human rights literature that examines people's substantive access to human rights provides us with a glimpse of the rapidly expanding scope of terms such as "gender" and "human rights" in response to activism, scholarly challenges, and sustained pressure within policy-making platforms. Scholarly accounts now highlight the setbacks in eliminating violence in the struggle for human rights because of changing structural conditions including the escalation of large-scale violence since the 20th century (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 2002). As Tripp (2013) has pointed out, violence plays a key role in gendering human rights and violence is itself gendered. I begin with a brief discussion of the institutionalization of Violence Against Women (VAW) as a human rights violation within the UN, and then discuss some of the gaps and inconsistencies in localizing the international mandates. Following this I describe some other important trends of research that interrogate gendered violence and human rights as an approach to ensuring people's survival and well-being.

VAW at the UN: There is a substantial body of feminist scholarship on violence against women (VAW) that has challenged the conventional focus on individual perpetrators and victims of violence within private spheres. While much of this literature does not specifically refer

to human rights, scholars have described and analyzed complex social, economic and political structures that enable and/or instigate violence (e.g. Abraham, 2002; Tastsoglou & Abraham, 2010; Walby, 2005). The shift towards conceptualizing VAW as a violation of *human rights* developed through many sets of overlapping scholarly conversations and activist claims. The first Special Rapporteur—an expert appointed by the UN to examine rights violations and/or progress on specific human rights issues—was appointed in 1994 to look into VAW (Ertürk & Purkayastha, 2012).

Former Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (SRVAW) Ertürk (2005) and Ertürk and Purkayastha (2012) have discussed the process through which VAW and human rights were linked at the international level. The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, passed in 1979, did not include violence as a central factor that negatively affected women (Cook, 1994; Peters & Wolper, 1995). The recognition of the deleterious effects of violence on women, as a human right violation, emerged through struggles, victories, and setbacks within local and global terrains. In 1992, after years of lobbying and advocacy by global women's movements, the expert committee monitoring the Convention adopted General Recommendation 19 (GR 19), defining violence against women as a form of discrimination. The adoption of GR 19 along with the momentum behind the issue of violence provided a strong impetus to consider women's rights as human rights at the 1993 Vienna Human Rights Conference, and again at the 1995 Beijing conference. These pressures led the UN General Assembly to adopt the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVAW) in 1993. DEVAW's comprehensive framework describes VAW as "any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private life". The Declaration made states responsible for elimination of VAW. It was also transformative in identifying many

perpetrators of violence even as it made states responsible for acts of violence by private individuals. DEVAW provided an international impetus for VAW—including domestic violence, marital rape, stalking—to be included into the criminal justice systems. However, according to Ertürk and Purkayastha (2012), as the principles of DEVAW began to filter through selected UN agencies, institutional fragmentation made its progress slow. The office of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (SRVAW) was created by the Commission on Human Rights to investigate state compliance with DEVAW, but the SRVAW's reports were not mandated to be formally included in the Commission on Human Rights' annual agenda till 2009.

As Ertürk and Purkayastha (2012) have pointed out, whether at the international level or locally, no matter the extent to which this mandate advanced the standards, conceptual understanding, and tools for implementation and accountability in relation to VAW, the problem persists because it is inextricably linked to patriarchal hierarchies intersecting with other macro and micro systems of subordination and inequality that create multiple layers of discrimination for marginalized groups, including women. For the most part, VAW continues to be perpetrated with impunity, and as a substantive aspect of human rights, access to justice against VAW is ridden with obstacles and opaque systems of accountability.

VAW and human rights on the ground:

Some of these challenges of translating VAW as a human rights violation have been discussed by scholars such as Bumiller (2013), Lewis (2009), Merry (2005), Ray and Purkayastha (2012), and Richards (2005). Scholars have documented how international mandates, which, most often, get institutionalized based on Western feminist understanding of gender, can fray or weaken within contexts of local politics. These politics are complex. At times, the wording of the international mandates do not fit well with laws against VAW that are already in place (Ray & Purkayastha, 2012), or new international mandates can be coopted by local patriarchal groups to vilify marginalized communities for *their*

treatment of *their* women (Merry's, 2005). Focusing on South Africa, Lewis (2009) has argued that the emergence of the neoliberal gender industry, which are shaped by the older developmental agendas, have, in effect, co-opted and eroded avenues for deep, gendered/intersectional transformations (also see Bajic, 2006; Yuval Davis, 2006). Lewis argued:

[p]hrases such as “gender equality,” “women’s empowerment” and “gender transformation”... permeate public discourse in ways that are remarkably authoritative and also deeply superficial and complacent...the terminology in place consistently stresses the technical and formal dimensions of social dynamics rather than their political and socially transformative repercussions (2009, p. 210).

She discusses how the concept of justice for different groups of people is pushed aside, as a top down process of political and civil rights are pushed as “the” agenda for *all* women.

Another aspect of these human rights challenges has been highlighted by indigenous groups in different countries often in discussions of cultural genocide or culture based struggles. Even though contemporary scholarly conceptualization emphasizes the ways in which intersecting global structures of gender/race/class perpetrate gendered violence within and between members of families, communities, states, and transnational arenas, terms such as gender do not always speak to specific groups. Nor is intersectionality sufficiently transparent in the gender and human rights discourse or policies to enable marginalized groups to use these frameworks in productive ways. Analysing the case of Mapuche women in Chile, Richards (2005), has emphasized that the Mapuche women find the term gender:

objectionable; this term implies for them an adherence to Western ideas that are imposed upon them...it is the collective and cultural aspects of their existence that Mapuche women seek to validate...[they] strongly identify with their people’s struggle against the state. Framing their claims in terms of Mapuche women’s rights, as opposed to gender, allows them to assert their difference from non-Mapuche Chilean women and simultaneously fits within a framework with which Mapuche men also identify (p. 202).

Scholars have made broadly similar cases for other indigenous groups in different continents (for other indigenous accounts see Smith 2012, 2015).

Even as scholars in different countries have been critical about the effects of Western feminist roles in pushing particular patterns of institutionalization of human rights, the Global North is not immune from the deleterious effects of recent shifts and changes in response to neoliberalism. Bumiller (2013) has documented the ways in which, within the U.S., states have retreated from welfare provision at the time when neoliberal regulatory functions have increased exponentially. Thus, the earlier ways of mitigating VAW via shelters and state-support has been replaced by a series of other laws that withhold and place life-time limits on welfare support for women seeking to rebuild their lives after experiencing violence. At the same time, there has been a significant increase in regulating of parents' behaviors through institutionalizing the role of professional groups within the mandate of VAW. Bumiller argues that "criminal justice reforms have increased the power of the state over vulnerable citizens, reduced the autonomy of women, and dampened efforts to provide other solutions to endemic gender violence" (2013, p. 208). Other scholars have pointed out that even though gender (i.e., gendered intersectional structures) are at the heart of many of the emerging mandates, many of the measures and data-gathering efforts continue to proceed according to the assumptions and conceptualizations that marked the older WID approach (i.e., a focus on women as victims; see Winter, Thompson, & Jeffreys, 2002 for some problems with definitions of VAW).

Gender and human rights scholars have also pointed to the rapid growth of the political economy of violence. These are evident through the increase in armed conflicts within and between nation-states (SIPRI, 2013) as well as the growth of global security regimes and prison-industrial complexes that draw large sections of marginalized groups into the ambit of violence even if they are not involved directly in these conflicts (Alexander, 2010; Ertürk &

Purkayastha, 2012; Sheppard, 2008, Sutton, Morgen, & Novokov, 2008). Other scholars such as Fritz, Doering, and Gumru (2011) and Watkin (2004) point out that as the mass production of weapons increased dramatically in the 20th century, and sophisticated weapons escalated the range and costs of war on ordinary people (also see SIPRI 2013a, b). At the least, the costs of supporting wars is often achieved at the price of cutting programs that would support people's social economic, and cultural human rights.

By the end of the 20th century, scholarly conversations and activist efforts, especially in the Global South began to highlight the effect of wars and intra-state conflict, and the escalation of the production and range of sophisticated weapons, as part of a continuum of gendered/raced violence that are perpetrated through colonial and neoliberal global-national-local structures (e.g. Barik, Kumar, & Sarode, 2010). As people who have experienced violence associated with armed conflict between states, the proxy wars of powerful Global North countries that are fought in the Global South, asymmetric warfare, insurgency, and recent historical memories of the violent legacies of colonialisms, scholar-activists from former colonies have interrogated roles of states and other entities in the contemporary political-economy of violence (e.g., Bangura, 2013; Gandhi, 2002; Shiva, 2005; Sutton, Morgen, & Novokov, 2008). They have pointed out that militaries use violence and abuse as weapons of control, symbols of humiliation and threats to local communities, as states claim the need to establish law and order as a rationale for suspending (or repealing) laws that promote political, civil, economic, social or cultural human rights. In areas of conflicts, both states and insurgents glorify violence with masculinist underpinnings of forcing others to do their will (although with different objectives). Consequently, sexual violence, particularly against women and girls, becomes a "normal" currency of conflicts or zones of conflicts. Women's groups and other marginalized groups including those who lobby against racism or advocate for the rights of indigenous communities, have attempted to raise global consciousness about the

gendered nature of such violence, especially sexual violence that women experience as members of their communities (Smith, 2015). UN Resolution 1325, passed in 2000, which attends to sexual violence during conflicts—inter and intrastate conflict—is an outcome of successful lobbying by women’s groups (Sheppard, 2008). The resolution acknowledged that, increasingly, wars targeted civilians, and had an inordinate impact of war on women. It also acknowledged the pivotal role women should and do play in conflict management, conflict resolution, and sustainable peace (Center for Security Studies, 2008; Rehn & Sirleaf, 2002).

Yet, even as passage of 1325 is a step in the right direction, scholars such as Dickenson (2011) have pointed out how other changes undermine these victories. While the human rights mandates mostly focus on formal armies and conflicts, the task of legitimately engaging in violence is increasingly being subcontracted to private entities that are not subject to the same controls to which national (and state) governments are subject. Since the human rights edifice reflects the structures of rights within democracies, it is significantly more difficult to hold these private entities accountable for violation of civil and political rights of citizens of different societies. Thus, marginalized groups remain vulnerable to multiple forms of violence even as their human rights erode.

This interplay between expansion of terrains of violence and the erosion of human rights is also evident in the escalation of everyday forms of routinized violence (Pandey, 2006; Purkayastha 2008). Routine violence is associated with state formation and state operations, and is often made invisible because it is presented as “normal” ways of organizing modern nation states or international relations. Routine violence is also gendered (Purkayastha & Ratliff, 2014). Nation states (and the political-economic systems that support nation states) rely on violence to routinely create and sustain boundaries between groups and maintain stratified citizenships. (e.g. Barik, Kumar, & Sarode, 2010; Glenn, 2002). As states facilitate violence by addressing violence only in limited ways, or promote increased

weaponry for its police forces, a culture of violence prevails, which, in turn, normalizes the escalation of violence in everyday life. Who is safe in their homes when special powers are conferred on armed police or military to enter homes “upon suspicion”? Who is safe to walk around freely and attend to work/family needs in their daily lives? Who looks suspicious? Who is likely to be stopped and interrogated? Who is likely to be shot? While males in areas that are designated as “law and order problem areas” are more likely to be shot or stopped on suspicion, children and women are not immune from such violence. Mehrotra (2009), Banerjee and Chaudhury (2011) and others have discussed the impact of suspension of “normal laws” and the resistances that have emerged in some of the border states of India (Banerji & Chaudhury, 2011; Ford Foundation, 2004). Similar discussions are available in the US (SPLC, 2016; Matthei, 2003; Morales & Bejareno, 2009).

While the tenets of Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women represent a significant step forward in the March towards elimination of VAW, the responsibility of states to ensure human rights, means marginalized groups mostly left with limited access to rights. The case of migrants, who are supposed to be ensured of their human rights before, during, and after migration, starkly illustrate how these objectives are rarely met. Menjivar and Leisy (2012) use the term legal violence to describe the ways in which bringing together criminal justice operations and immigration laws in the U.S. have enhanced the level of violence immigrants face routinely. They define legal violence to include injuries such as loss of livelihood, becoming targets of hate crimes with little or no recourse to avenues of redress, health impacts associated with stigmatization, as well as imprisonment and deportation, all of which are supposed to be protected as human rights (also see Aranda & Vaquera, 2015). Similarly, looking at Pakistan, Yousaf and Purkayastha (2015) show how the growth of the immigration surveillance and criminal justice systems which increasing work together blurring civil violations and criminal acts—also referred to as crimmigration—actually

re-victimizes forced migrants, i.e., those who are trafficked so others can profit from trafficking them for sex, labor, and organs (2015). They emphasize the need to rethink the separation between economic migrants and refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) within in the human rights policy arenas. Nor does fleeing violence bring sustained relief; Njiru and Purkayastha (2015) have described the gendered violence and human rights violations internally displaced persons (IDPs) experience in camps (see also Holzer, 2015, on the experience of refugees).

Scholars and activists have also pointed to the limitations of understanding human rights primarily as matters of political and civil rights. There is a growing literature and activist resistance to violence associated with neoliberalism. These studies foreground economic, social and cultural rights, though the discussions emphasize these rights are inseparable from political and civil rights. They specifically discuss limited and eroding opportunities for accessing living wages, education, shelter, healthcare or access to substantive political rights to organize for better conditions of life as violence becomes normalized (Armaline et al., 2015). Focusing on Argentina, Sutton (2010) has written about the ways in which structural adjustments lead to embodied violence on women and a rapid erosion of economic, political and social rights. Bell (2013) has documented the struggles over water (see also Ciampi, 2013; Shiva, 2016). Anjana (2010), among others, describes how the incursions of state regulations negatively regulate women's access to land in many tribal communities. Armstrong's (2014) study of Dalit women in Haryana, India, showcase the struggle over maintaining common lands as human rights struggles where marginalized communities that rely on the resources of these non-privatized, non-government-designated reserved spaces, find the selves deprived of rights that their communities have accessed, albeit for the purposes of accessing meagre resources that have enabled them to survive over generations. In both of these studies, the struggle, like the struggle of the Mpuche, is often for group-rights as a key to

survival and well being, rather than individual rights, raising questions about the ability of the current human rights perspective to adequately respect these world views.

In order to overcome the challenges identified by scholars and activists in adequately balancing the objectives of human rights with the structures that impede access, a number of scholars have begun to work within a human security approach. A key component of this approach is to re-center the principle that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights sought to establish: the survival of people and their ability to live lives of human dignity free from threats that affect their very survival and well being. Tripp (2013) discussed how the human security approach challenges the rhetoric and moves by states to prioritize state security over human security, and considers the threats to individuals and communities arising from "[e]conomic, food, health, and environmental crises....and violence [experienced by] individuals, communities, and nations...in gender specific ways that intersect with class, race, age, sexuality, and nationality" (p. 9). Tripp, Ferree, and Ewig (2013) and their colleagues foreground violence, emphasize the linkages among different types of insecurities, relate these to long term global social structural inequalities, in order to address many of the critiques in this section. This approach also overlaps with the human rights enterprise approach in emphasizing people's agency and activism as well as the link between macro-structures in shaping substantive access to human rights.

2 Concluding Thoughts

The field of gender and human rights remains dynamic, often rife with controversies and challenges as diverse activist and scholarly approaches clash and or coalesce. On the one hand, this struggle is about accessing existing rights, the key route through which access to resources are enabled. On the other hand, this chapter shows that the struggles are about expanding the purview of rights well beyond states and current conventions and mandates. Using a human rights

enterprise approach I outlined some of the struggles to get marginalized groups included within the purview of human rights, as well as the continuing challenges and gaps in expanding access to substantive human rights.

A key aspect of gender and human rights is the intersections between scholarship and practice. Even as the scholarly trajectory has moved beyond a focus on women to a focus on intersecting structures of marginalization that produce different types of gendered outcomes for individuals and communities, these ideas do not always translate effectively to the policy realms. Even when gender is incorporated into policy arenas, as evident in the attempts to monitor DEVAW write out, some of the provisions increase the vulnerabilities of groups as the language and intent of these mandates are co-opted for other purposes.

So, too, with human rights. The focus on states as arbiters of human rights has faced significant challenges from activists and scholars who have pointed out that our current approach often obscures the ways in which contemporary global political economic systems violate the human rights of individuals and communities. Processes that normalize routine violence within states and the expansion of state and global security regimes expand the terrain of human rights violations. New and emerging forms of extra-state practices continue to erode access to political, civil, economic, social and cultural human rights even as these processes attempt to co-opt the language of human rights for their legitimation. The gender and human security scholarship attempts to address some of these challenges though many gaps and rifts remain.

References

- Abraham, M. (2002). *Speaking the unspeakable*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Adams, M. (2006). Regional women's activism: African women's network and the African Union. In M. M. Ferree & A. M. Tripp (Eds.), *Global feminism: Transnational women's activism, organizing and human rights* (pp. 187–218). New York: New York University Press.
- Alexander, M. (2010). *The new Jim Crow: Mass incarceration in the age of colorblindness*. New York, NY: The New Press.
- Anderson, C. (2003). *Eyes off the prize: The United Nations and the African American struggle for human rights, 1944–1955* (p. 2003). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Anjana. (2010). Customary practices and human rights of tribal women. In B. Barik, P. Kumar, & U. Sarode (Eds.), *Gender and human rights*. Jaipur: Rawat Publications.
- Aranda, E., & Vaquera, E. (2015). Racism, the immigration enforcement regime, and the implications for racial inequality in the lives of undocumented young adults. *Sociology of Race and Ethnicity*, 1, 88–104.
- Arat, Z. (2008). Women's rights as human rights. *UN Chronicle*, VLC(2&3). <https://unchronicle.un.org/article/womens-rights-human-rights>.
- Armeline, W., Glasberg, D. S., & Purkayastha, B. (2015). *The human rights enterprise: The state, resistance, and human rights*. London: Polity Press.
- Armeline, W., Glasberg, D. S., & Purkayastha, B. (2012). *Human rights in our own backyard: Injustice and resistance in the US*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Armstrong, E. (2014). *Gender and neoliberalism: the All India Democratic Women's Association and globalization politics*. New York: Routledge.
- Bajic, A. (2006). Women's organizing in post Yugoslav countries: Talking about donors. In M. M. Ferree, & A. M. Tripp (Eds.), *Global feminism: Transnational women's activism, organizing and human rights* (pp. 141–165). New York: New York University Press.
- Banerjee, P., & Chaudhury, A. B. R. (2011). *Women in Indian Borderlands*. New Delhi: Sage.
- Bangura, Z. (2013). A la une. <http://www.un.org/africarenewal/web-features/take-away-guns-women-tell-un-envoy>. Retrieved October 30, 2013.
- Barik, B., Kumar, P., & Sarode, U. (2010). *Gender and human rights: Narratives on macro-micro realities*. Jaipur: Rawat Publications.
- Baxi, U. (2002). *The future of human rights*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Bell, S. (2013). *Our roots run as deep as ironweed*. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Bumiller, K. (2013). Feminist collaboration with the state in response to sexual violence: Lessons from the American experience. In A. M. Tripp, M. M. Ferree, & C. Ewig (Eds.), *Gender, violence and human security* (pp. 191–213). New York: New York University Press.
- CEDAW. (1979). *An assessment of human rights issues emanating from traditional practices in Liberia*. United Nations Mission in Liberia: <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CEDAW.aspx>. Retrieved December 15, 2016.

- Center for Security Studies. (2008). *The growing importance of Civilians in Armed Conflicts* (Vol. 3, No. 45). www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CSS-Analyses-45.pdf. Retrieved December, 2008.
- Ciampi, M. (2013). 'Water divide' in the global risk society. *International Review of Sociology: Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, 23(1), 243–260.
- Cook, R. (1994). *Human rights of women: National and international perspectives*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Dickenson, L. (2011). *Outsourcing war and peace: Preserving public values in a world of privatized foreign affairs*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Ertürk, Y., & Purkayastha, B. (2012). Linking research, policy and action: A look at the work of the special rapporteur on violence against women. *Current Sociology*, 60, 20–39.
- Ertürk Y. (2005). The UN agenda for women's rights and gender equality. *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, 10(2), 91–113.
- Falcón, S. (2016). *Power interrupted: Antiracist and feminist activism inside the United Nations*. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.
- Ferree, M. M. (1990). Beyond separate spheres. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 52(4), 866–887.
- Fritz, J., Doering, S., & Gumru, F. B. (2011). Women, peace, security and the national action plans. *Journal of Applied Social Science*, 5, 1–23.
- Foundation, F. (2004). *Close to home: Case studies of human rights work in the United States*. New York: Ford Foundation.
- Gandhi, E. (2002). *Interview*. Consulted on December 20, 2007 at <http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/global/egl.html>.
- Gleditsch, N. P., Wallensteen, P., Eriksson, M., Sollenberg, M., & Strand, H. (2002). Armed conflict, 1946–2001: A New Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, 39, 615–637.
- Glenn, E. N. (2002). *Unequal freedom: How race and gender shape American citizenship*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Holzer, E. (2015). *The concerned women of buduburam: Refugee activists and humanitarian dilemmas*. Cornell University Press.
- Kabeer, N. (1994). *Revered realities: Gender hierarchies in development thought*. New Delhi: Kali for Women.
- Ishay, M. R. (2008). *The history of human rights: From ancient times to the globalization era*. University of California Press.
- Lewis, D. (2009). Discursive challenges for African feminism. In A. A. Ampofo & S. Arnfred (Eds.), *African feminist politics of knowledge: Tensions, challenges and possibilities* (pp. 205–221). Nordiska Afrikaintitutet.
- Matthei, W. (2003). *The green belt movement: Sharing the approach and the experience*. New York: Lantern Books.
- Mehrotra, D. (2009). *Burning bright: From Sharmila and the struggle for peace in Manipur*. New Delhi: Penguin Books.
- Menjivar, C., & Leisy, A. (2012). Legal violence: Immigration law and the lives of central American migrants. *American Journal of Sociology*, 117, 1380–1421.
- Merry, S. E. (2005). *Human rights and gender violence*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mohanty, C. T. (2001). Cartographies of struggle: Third world women and the politics of feminism. In C. T. Mohanty, A. Russo, & L. Torres (Eds.), *Third world women and the politics of feminism*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Molyneux, M., & Razavi, S. (2002). *Gender justice. Development and Human Rights*: Oxford University Press.
- Morales, M., & Bejareno, C. (2009). Transnational sexual and gendered violence: An application of border sexual conquest at a Mexico—US border. *Global Networks*, 9(3), 420–439.
- Njiru, R., & Purkayastha, B. (2015). *Voices of internally displaced persons in Kenya: A human rights perspective*. Kolkata and London: Frontpage Publications.
- Pandey, G. (2006). *Routine violence: Nations, fragments, histories*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Pearce, T. (2001). Human rights and sociology: Some observations from Africa. *Social Problems*, 48, 48–56.
- Peters, J., & Wolper, A. (Eds.). (1995). *Women's human rights, human rights: International feminist perspectives*. New York: Routledge.
- Purkayastha, B. (2012). Human rights, global visions. In A. O. Otunnu, B. Purkayastha, & S. Mobilia (Eds.), *Human rights: Voices of world's young activists* (pp. 1–8). London and Kolkata: Frontpage Publications.
- Purkayastha, B., & Ratcliff, K. (2014). Routine violence: Intersectionality at the interstices. In M. Segal & V. Demos (Eds.), *Advances in gender research* (Vol. 18B). London: Emerald Publications.
- Purkayastha, B. (2008). Building and sustaining a fabric of peace: Notes from the field. In G. Caforio, G. Kuemmel, & B. Purkayastha (Eds.), *Armed conflict and conflict resolution: Sociological perspectives* (pp. 393–411). Emerald Group: Bingley, UK.
- Quataert, J. (2011). The circuitous origins of the gender perspective. *Human Rights Advocacy: A Challenge for Transnational Feminisms. Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 31(3), 631–643.
- Ray, R., & Purkayastha, B. (2012). Challenges in localizing global human rights. *Societies Without Borders*, 7, 1–22.
- Rehn, E., & Sirleaf, E. J. (2002). Women, war, peace: The independent experts' assessments on the impact of armed conflict on women and women's role in peace building. *Unifem*. Retrieved August 1, 2013. http://www.unifem.org/materials/item_detail89f.html.
- Richards, P. (2005). The politics of gender, human rights, and being indigenous in Chile. *Gender & Society*, 19, 199–220.
- Risman, B. J., & Davis, G. (2013). From sex roles to gender structure. *Current Sociology Review*, 61(5–6), 733–755.

- Sen, A., & Ogata, S. (2003). Human security. *UNOCHA*. Retrieved on July 30, 2012. <http://www.unocha.org/humansecurity/chs/index.html>.
- Shah, A. (2013). The arms trade is big business. *Global Issues: Social, Political, Economic and Environmental Issues that Affect Us All*. Retrieved August 16, 2013. <http://www.globalissues.org/article/74/the-arms-trade-is-big-business>.
- Sheppard, L. (2008). *Gender, violence security: Discourse as Practice*. London: Zed Books.
- Shiva, V. (2005). *Globalization's new wars. Seeds, water & life forms*. New Delhi: Women Unlimited.
- Shiva, V. (2016). Navdanya, earth democracy. Retrieved December 16, 2016. <http://www.navdanya.org/earth-democracy>.
- Smith, A. (ed.). (2015). *Conquest: Sexual violence and American Indian Genocide*. Duke University Press.
- Smith, L. T. (2012). *Decolonizing methodologies: Research and indigenous peoples*. London: Zed Books.
- Snyder, M. (2006). Unlikely godmother: The UN and global women's movement. In M. M. Ferree & A. M. Tripp (Eds.), *Global feminism: Transnational women's activism, organizing and human rights* (24–50). New York: New York University Press.
- Snyder, M. (1995). *Transforming development: Women, poverty, politics*. London: IT Publications.
- Southern Poverty Law Center. (2016). *New SPLC report uncovers abuse and neglect at immigrant detention centers in the South*. <https://www.splc.org/news/2016/11/21/new-splc-report-uncovers-abuse-and-neglect-immigrant-detention-centers-south>.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2013). *Yearbook*. Retrieved July 31, 2013. <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2013/files/SIPRIYB13Summary.pdf>.
- SIPRI (2013a). http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/production/researchissues/measuring_aProd. Retrieved July 31, 2013.
- SIPRI (2013b). <https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/arms-transfers-and-military-spending/internationalarms-transfers>. Retrieved July 31, 2013.
- Sutton, B. (2010). *Bodies in crisis. Culture, violence and women's resistance in neoliberal Argentina*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Sutton, B., Morgen, S., & Novokov, J. (Eds.). (2008). *Security disarmed: Critical perspectives on gender, race, militarization*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Tastsoglou, E., & Abraham, M. (2010). *Countours of citizenship: Women's diversity and practices of citizenship*. New York: Routledge.
- Tripp, A. M. (2013). Towards a gender perspective on human security. In A. M. Tripp, M. M. Ferree, & C. Ewig (Eds.), *Gender, violence and human Security* (pp. 3–32). New York: New York University Press.
- Tripp, A. M., Ferree, M. M., & Ewig, X. (2013). *Gender, violence and human security: Critical feminist perspectives*. New York: New York University Press.
- UN Women. (2016). Facts and figures: Ending violence against women. Retrieved December 15, 2016. <http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/facts-and-figures>.
- UN Women. (n.d.). World Conferences on Women. Retrieved March 12, 2017. <http://www.unwomen.org/en/how-we-work/intergovernmental-support/world-conferences-on-women>.
- United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner. Core Instruments. (2017). *The core international human rights instruments and their monitoring bodies*. <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx>.
- Walby, S. (2005). Improving the statistics on violence against women. *Statistical Journal of the United Nations (UNECE)*, 22(4), 193–216.
- Watkin, K. (2004). Controlling the use of force: A role for human rights norms in contemporary armed conflict. *The American Journal of International Law*, 98, 1–34.
- Winter, B., Thompson, D., & Jeffreys, S. (2002). The UN approach to harmful traditional practices. *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 4(1), 72–94.
- Yousaf, F. N., & Purkayastha, B. (2015). *Human trafficking amidst interlocking oppressions: A focus on Pakistan*. Kolkata and London: Frontpage Publications.
- Yuval Davis, N. (2006). Human/women's rights and feminist transversal politics. In M. M. Ferree & A. M. Tripp (Eds.), *Global feminism: Transnational women's activism, organizing and human rights* (pp. 275–295). New York: New York University Press.

Bandana Purkayastha Professor of Sociology & Asian American Studies, has published over fifty articles, books, and chapters on transnationalism, migration, violence and peace and human rights. She has been recognized for her teaching, research and leadership through several university, state, and professional awards. She has served in leadership positions in American Sociological Association, International Sociological Association, and Sociologists for Women in Society;. She has served on state, national and international expert committees including World Health Organization's initiative on female migrants. For more, please see sociology.uconn.edu/faculty/purkayastha.



Jo Reger

Abstract

Heeding the call to integrate gender into the study of social movements and drawing on the work of gender and feminist scholars, I argue that there now exists a body of work that views social movements through the lens of intersectionality as well as recognizing gender as a multi-layered social structure and institution. Selecting representative work, I characterize gender in movements as occurring on three levels. The first level focuses on social processes such as gender socialization, interactions, leadership and engagement in activities. Second is the level of organization and community where gender operates in structures, frames, identities and strategies and tactics. Third is the cultural and societal level where gender can act to open up opportunities for activism or as a constraint through dynamics in the environment. I conclude with future directions for the study of gender in movements, including turning a scholarly gaze to dynamics of masculinity, gender neutrality and transgender in shaping movements, and the continued incorporation of intersectionality. In sum, the field of social movement studies is vibrant with gender research but still there is much to do.

Stacey and Thorne (1985) argued that gender was the “missing revolution” in sociology. A few years later, Doug McAdam argued that scholars “have almost totally ignored gender’s impact” on social movements (1992: 1234, see also Taylor 1999). In the three decades since Stacey and Thorne’s call and McAdam’s observation, gender scholarship has grown exponentially in social movement studies. According to Whittier (2007), this progress has come in two waves with the first focused on understanding women’s social movement activism. The second, she argues “began to analyze gender in social movements more broadly,” taking into consideration masculinity and other social identities such as religion, sexuality, nationality, race-ethnicity and social class in combination with gender (2007: 1872).

In these waves, social movement scholars drew on other areas in sociology as well as frameworks articulated in feminist theory to investigate the role of gender in movements. Acker’s work (1990) on organizations allowed scholars to articulate how social movement organizations themselves are gendered. Gerson and Peiss’s (1985) analysis of the levels of gender relations became the foundation for understanding the formation of collective identities detailed by Taylor and Whittier (1992), drawing on the role of gender in this process. Connell’s (1987) work on gender and power opened the door for understanding how gender operates on

J. Reger (✉)
Oakland University, Rochester, MI, USA
e-mail: reger@oakland.edu

multiple levels of privilege and oppression, bringing with it a focus on masculinity. Lorber's (1994) and Risman's (2004) conceptualizations of gender as multi-dimensional allowed for it to be understood as a process and interaction, a core social and cultural structure as well as a stratification system. Crenshaw's (1991) articulation of intersectionality, along with other scholars such as Collins (1990), King (1988) and the Combahee River Collective (1978), gave social movement scholars the ability to conceptualize gender as enmeshed in a web of social identities, all important to understanding social change efforts in a more complex manner.

Because of this interdisciplinary work and flourishing of scholarship, there are a multitude of ways to characterize the research of gender in social movements. In their groundbreaking two-volume special issue in *Gender & Society*, Taylor and Whittier note that gender shapes "political opportunities, organizational processes, interpretive frames, collective identities and discourses," (1998: 623). Taylor later argued that gender shapes movements in a multi-prong approach including social structure, preexisting networks, mobilization frames, organizations, and strategies and outcomes (1999, see also Pelak, Taylor & Whittier, 1999; Taylor, 1996). Einwohner, Hollander and Olson (2000) put forth a typology that extends from gender in participants' demographics to movement goals, tactics, identities and gendered attributions. Whittier (2007) added to these categorizations with her division of the scholarship into emergence and recruitment, collective identities, frames, organizational structures, tactics and strategies, as well external social structure.

Considering their commonalities, differences and overlap, I collapse these different categorizations into three core levels and use them to organize the chapter below. First is how individuals through a variety of *processes* draw on gendered social identities in their engagement in social movements. Second, the focus moves from individuals to *organizations and communities* and the ways in which groups are structured and how they articulate their purpose. The third level considers the ways in which gendered *social and*

cultural forces shape movement opportunities and constraints. At each of these levels, I illustrate how intersectionality illuminates the way in which gender intertwines with other social statuses such as race-ethnicity, social class, sexual identity, religion, nationality and others. In sum, this chapter moves from a micro focus on individuals, to a meso focus on organizations and communities, to a more macro focus on the overall environment that social movements exist in. My goal here is not to describe how some movements are *gendered movements*, (see Chap. 34) but instead to illustrate how gender is a core factor shaping social movements. To that end, I begin by examining the research on individualized and more micro gendered processes in social movements.

1 Gendered Processes in Movements

Scholars have illustrated how gender is "done" through social interactions that teach and hold individuals accountable for their gender performance (West & Zimmerman, 1987). Some of the richest areas of social movement research illustrates how gender socialization, interaction networks, attributions and activities are processes that play in social movements. It is at this level that the ways in which individuals understand themselves and others as gendered beings influences how they experience being in a social movement.

Gender socialization and expectations.

Understandings of what it means to be a gendered person influences how people enter into and engage in social movements. Scholars have documented how men and women often fare very differently in movements. For example, scholars find that for women, motherhood (or expectations of motherhood) can profoundly shape engagement in social movements (Naples 1992, 1998a, 1998b; Pardo, 1998; Reger, 2001). Naples (1992) and Pardo (1998) demonstrate how notions of mothering and motherhood

combine with other social identities creating activist mothering. Activist mothering extends beyond the individual's family and prompts women to see motherhood as being a responsibility to enter into social movement activism. In other words, the need to care for the family transformed into the need to care for a community. Mueller (1987) labeled this form of gender socialization the development of "gender consciousness," a process defining the parameters and rationale of one's engagement in collective action. In sum, gender socialization fosters gender consciousness, a process monitored and shaped through interaction (West & Zimmerman, 1987). McAdam (1992), in his study of the civil rights campaign Freedom Summer, found that expectations of appropriate gender behavior shaped men and women's different experiences at every level of involvement. For example, he found that women, seen as the more vulnerable sex, faced more opposition about joining the campaign from family and movement organizers than men. Once in, gendered expectations shaped women's roles. Women did mostly teaching and clerical work whereas the men did more of the dangerous and exciting community organizing. However, after the campaign, women had higher levels of continued activism. In McAdam's study, it is the societal expectations of gender that are at play (e.g., women are more vulnerable, men are more capable of protecting themselves). However, gender does not only shape perceptions of ability and expectations of appropriate behavior, it affects how individuals perceive themselves and their motivation to participate in social movements.

Gendered interactions and networks. Scholars have illustrated how interaction within movements is also a gendered process (McAdam, 1992; Neuhouser, 1995). Social movement studies have examined how people's gendered (and raced) networks shape recruitment into social movements. In her study of white and Black women in the civil rights movement, Irons (1998) finds that grassroots and religious networks draw Black women into a movement, along with personally experienced oppression. White women were more likely to become active

through national, often religious, organizations. Whereas Irons examines gendered and raced networks social movement participants belong to, Einwohner (1999) notes how class and gender can shape the interactions between activists and their targets. In her analysis of two animal rights campaigns, she argues that there is an "identity interaction" between the activists and their targeted populations. She finds that circus patrons viewed the animal rights activists through a primarily feminine identity and identified them as "caring people," or "very gentle, sweet types" who are "trying to change things for the good of animals" (1999: 69). Whereas hunters viewed activists through a feminine *and* non-working class identity combined. To the hunters, the activists were "overly emotional women attempting to voice an opinion on an issue that they do not understand" and "office workers" (vs. blue collar or manual workers) with no experience in nature (1999: 67). In sum, both Irons and Einwohner illustrate the importance of looking beyond gender in understanding how people negotiate movements, and how interactions within a movement draw on notions of gender and other social statuses.

Overall, this work on socialization, networks and interactions points to the critical role gender plays in bringing individuals into social movement campaigns and how they function once there. One important function in social movements is the job of leader.

Gendered leadership. As McAdam noted, men and women tend to do different things in movements (1988). Leadership is one of these activities often divided by sex. However, scholars argue that it is not so much the activity itself, but how the activity is viewed through a gender lens that is important. In her study of women in the civil rights movement, Barnett (1993) argues that women played vital roles that were not identified by men as leadership. This she argues is due to the triple constraints of gender, race and social class. Later, Robnett (1997) expanded on this observation of women's "invisible leadership" and proposed the concept of "bridge leadership." Bridge leadership was done by women in the civil rights movement who did not have

formal positions within social movement organizations but instead served as vital links between the group and the community. Robnett argues, though undervalued in the movement, bridge leadership was the cornerstone of much of the movement's mobilization and played a role in its successes. Women such as JoAnn Robinson, Septima Poinsette Clark, McCree Harris, Shirley Sherrod, Diane Nash, Johnnie Carr, Thelma Glass, and Georgia Gilmore did important work in the movement but were not recognized because of a focus on a more masculine, status-oriented leadership. While McNair and Robnett's work added new dimensions to the study of gender and leadership, it also drew attention the ways in which social movement theories and scholarship need an intersectional perspective that moves beyond a white, middle class, male focus. While leadership is one activity within a movement, a newer vein of scholarship is tracing out how gendered activities being incorporated.

Gendered Activities. While as McNair, Robnett and others worked to rewrite gendered notions of leadership, other scholars examined how gender can be at the heart of protest actions. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, feminists worked to undo the relationship between femininity/"womanness" and activities such as parenting, and homemaking while critiquing feminine activities such as beauty and make up routines and fashion. In an attempt to recast feminine gendered activities as worthwhile, contemporary feminists have focused on reclaiming of "disparaged girl things" such as fashion, make up and crafting that they feel was discarded and marginalized by earlier feminists. Scholars have examined this reclaiming of gendered activities as political. For example, Beth Ann Pentney in her study of fiber arts and feminism quotes knitting "guru" Debbie Stoller as saying, "valuing the craft of knitting is feminist act in itself ... because the denigration of knitting correlates directly with the denigration of traditionally women-centred activity," (2008: 1). In addition, Kelly (2014, 2015) argues that 21st century feminist knitting communities are a gendered form of activism that can shape

alternative understandings of masculinity and femininity through adopting the feminized practice of knitting as well as through group interactions. It is important to note that knitting is one such activity. I focus on the intersection between gender and protest in the discussion of organizational frames in the following section.

In sum, the way in which society casts gender norms and the ways in which people come to understand themselves has a profound impact on social movements. In particular, how people enter a movement, how they interact with the movement and what they engage in are all processes shaped by gender. I next turn to the ways in which organizations and communities are influenced by gender.

2 Gendered Organizations and Community in Movements

Scholars have focused on the meso level of interaction to study how organizations and communities collectively create understandings of their activist identities, how they disseminate their goals and structure their strategies. The gendering of organizational structures can set up a model that is adopted by other movements, affecting how individuals process gender. Susan Stall and Randy Stoecker argue that within organizations "gender structures produce different social movement experiences for men and women, distinct spheres of action, and distinct activist personalities" (1998: 748–749). For example, Ferree and Martin (1995) note that feminist organizations often take a particular form, shaping the experiences of their members through a focus on empowerment and collectivist decision-making. These organizational structures are replicated, sharing with other movements structures that facilitate decision-making, mobilization, and recruitment. Labelling this process "spillover," Meyer and Whittier (1994) found that gendered structures from the women's movement were replicated in the U.S. peace movement and were evident in the tactics, leadership and anti-hierarchical organizational infrastructure. Relatedly, Hurwitz and Taylor

(forthcoming) found the social movement community around Occupy Wall Street integrated gender in organizational forms that privileged feminist groups and free spaces. Yet, gender influences more than organizational structure, as is evident in the research on gender and protests through an analysis of the frames (i.e., messages) extended to the public, the identities constructed within the space of the organization or community, and the strategies and tactics adopted to make change.

Gendered Frames. Frames are politicized understandings of a social movement's goals that connect activists and potential participants (Hunt, Benford, & Snow, 1994). Einwohner, Hollander and Olson (2000) argue that how an organization genders its framing can shape how legitimate the movement's demands are seen (see Einwohner, 1999). For example, Ferree and Roth (1998) examine the issue of childcare in a West Berlin workers' strike. They argue that an organizational coalition that combined feminist efforts with labor could have extended the need for childcare beyond gender (and race and class). Instead, the different gendered structures within the groups resulted in a frame that kept childcare as a "women's" issue and not a "worker's" and limited its potential for success. Even feminist organizations can frame gender in different ways. In a study of a chapter of the National Organization for Women (NOW), motherhood was seen as interpreted two ways: as a social status with political ramifications, and as the act of caring and taking responsibility for relationships (Reger, 2001). These interpretations were incorporated into frames extended to potential recruits, and as a result constructed distinct feminist identities within one feminist organization. The relationship between gender and identities is another area of flourishing scholarship in social movements.

Gendered Identities. Developing a sense of "we" as a group is an important dynamic of social movement organizations and communities. Taylor and Whittier (1992) argued that the creation of boundaries, the negotiation with the target/enemy, and the development of a politicized consciousness foster the construction social movement identities. Their conceptualization allows for gender, along with race-ethnicity, class, nationality, religion and

other social statuses to be factors in activist identity development. Within spaces such as social movement groups or communities, activists interact forming a shared consciousness on that it means to be in a movement. Group understandings of gender inequality can influence that consciousness, and consequentially the activist identity. For example, part of identifying as a "feminist" is identifying who is a part of a community or organization and who is not, as well as coming to have a shared sense of the change that is sought in society (Reger, 2012). Emotions such as anger as the result of gender inequality can also play a role in the formation of identities (Hercus, 1999). Shared activist or collective identities are more than attributes of the individual but are important elements to the group or community. For example Leila Rupp and Taylor argue that a gendered activist identity helped sustain the women's movement through the "doldrums" before its resurgence in the late 1960s (1987, see Taylor, 1989 also). In sum, gender can play a core role in the construction of an activist identity, shaping the boundaries of the group or community, its continuity and its internal and external interactions.

Along with gender, other social identities also play a role in identity development. The history of the U.S. women's movement is one of activism born out of an intersection of race, class and gender, along with other identities. Much of the historical record of the movement focuses on the race, class and sexual identity of white, middle-class, heterosexual women (Laughlin et al., 2010). However, women of color, working class women, and lesbians created identities and organizations at the same time as white, middle-class heterosexual women, at times working with them and often working separately (Roth, 2002; Thompson, 2002). Working-class women believing that their work and family lives were not addressed by mainstream feminism created organizations such as the Coalition of Labor Union Women in 1974 (Roth, 2008). Women of color also created their own organizations (Roth, 2002; Thompson, 2002). In the 1960s through the 1980s, Black women, along with Chicana and Asian-American women, created organizations such as The National Black

Feminist Organization, the Mexican American Women's National Association, and the Pan Asian American Women. These organizations and groups were the site of the construction of complex identities that integrated more than gender. One such group, the Combahee River Collective wrote that there was a history of Black activists whose "sexual identity combined with their racial identity to make their whole life situation and the focus of their political struggles unique" (Combahee River Collective, 1978, online). In their statement of purpose, they write:

We believe that sexual politics under patriarchy is as pervasive in Black women's lives as are the politics of class and race. We also often find it difficult to separate race from class from sex oppression because in our lives they are most often experienced simultaneously (1978: online).

Almost three decades later, the formation of #BlackLivesMatter, a movement organization with the goal of "ideological and political intervention in a world where Black lives are systematically and intentionally targeted for demise" echoes and adds to the call of the Combahee River Collective. Moving beyond the incorporation of gender, race, sexual identity and class, the founders write, Black Lives Matter affirms the lives of Black queer and trans folks, disabled folks, Black-undocumented folks, folks with records, women and all Black lives along the gender spectrum (Black Lives Matter, online). These two organizations illustrate how applying an intersectional perspective to the construction of social movement identities reveals the complex way that a sense of "we" is created in social movements.

Gendered Strategies and Tactics. As Stall and Stoecker (1998) point out in their study of community organizing models, gender can shape how organizations and communities structure their strategies and goals. Scholars have examined how the strategies (i.e., overall plans to make change) and tactics (i.e., the techniques of making change) can be gendered in focus and action. Organizational names are one indication of gendered strategies and tactics. Analyzing the contemporary anti-war movement, Kutz-Flamenbaum (2007) argued that groups such as Code Pink, Raging Grannies and the Missile Dick

Chicks integrate gender into their tactics ranging from the group names to their protest performances, and overall ideologies. She finds that gender is used in both normative (i.e., women as peacemakers and the use of the feminized color pink) to non-conformative ways (i.e., the use of phallic imagery). In the example of gendered performance as a tactic, the body becomes an important element as evident in the Missile Dick Chicks with their phallic costumes and dances. While Kutz-Flamenbaum focuses on performance, Whittier (2012) argues that lived experiences around gender shape strategies and tactics. In her study of the child sexual abuse movement, she notes how women activists drew on their identities as survivors of child abuse to "come out" and make change through these disclosures. Here gendered identity disclosure becomes a tactic for making change. While these examples illustrate how femininity and the experience of being girls and women influence strategies and tactics, masculinity and the experience of being boys or men have also been examined. Returning to McAdam (1988), Barnett (1993) and Robnett (1997) and their studies of the civil rights movement, it is clear that masculinity is present in the tactics and strategies of movement organizations, often shaped by the sex of the leaders and the gender lens through which they view the world.

By examining the organizational and community level of social movements, it is evident that gender shapes dynamics beyond the individual. Organizational models encompass frames, identities, and strategies and tactics, all influenced by gender. Moving beyond the individual captures the way in which gender is a societal structure reaching into the realm of social movements. I next examine how gender is a force on social movements at the societal and cultural level.

3 Gender and the Social and Cultural Environment

Scholars argue that the external environment can provide opportunities for the development of social movements or it can constrain them. Gender is a key element in society (Lorber, 1994;

Risman, 2004), also plays a role in this dynamic. The gendered opportunities and constraints can occur in two ways. First is when shifts in society influence gender norms and expectations, and facilitate social movement organizing. The second is the gendering of society itself and its effect on social movements.

Gendered opportunities. The dynamics of industrialization and urbanization are examples of how social forces change gender relations in society. Historians have examined how as work and communities changed, so did women's lives. However, U.S. women's movements and campaigns largely did not challenge traditional gender norms at first. Instead, they employed the rhetoric of traditional femininity to increase women's power, arguing that women's (more) moral nature should allow them more access to society through issues such as suffrage (Chafetz, Dworkin & Swanson, 1986; Dubois, 1978). However, the reliance on traditional notions of femininity began to change when women began to experience society differently (Freeman, 1975; Costain, 1992). These societal shifts were evident in the mid-20th century, as (mostly white) women gained more access to education and experienced a rise into a middle class lifestyle. Using men's lives as a reference, women redefined what it meant to be successful and sought rewards and opportunities outside of expected gender norms (Friedan, 1963). Social movement theorists call these societal shifts that facilitated women's activism "political opportunity structures" (Tarrow, 1989; Tilley, 1978).

Coining the term "gendered opportunity structures," McCammon, Campbell, Granberg and Mowrey (2001) focus on the U.S. women's suffrage movement. They investigate how suffragists were able to gain voting rights pre-Nineteenth Amendment through the changing societal notions of gender and gender relations. They write:

Specifically, we posit that shifting gender relations produced a gendered opportunity for women's suffrage by altering attitudes among political decision-makers about the appropriate roles of

women in society. That is, changing gender relations altered expectations about women's participation in the polity, and these changes in gendered expectations increased the willingness of political decision-makers to support suffrage (2001: 51).

McCammon and her colleagues study of U.S. suffrage is just one example of how societal shifts can bring opportunities for activism. However, just as society can be open to gendered challenges; it can also be closed to them.

Gendered Constraints. Drawing on the notion of gender as key part of all social structure, Acker (1990, 2006) detailed how gender regimes, made up of sets of interlocking practices and processes, can create barriers. While Acker focused on work organizations, her concept is also in social movement studies. For example, Bell and Braun (2010) argue that regional industries and environments can serve as gender regimes and facilitate or constrain activism. Studying environmental justice activism, they find that men are outnumbered by women in these movements. They argue that the interaction between men's gender identity and coal as an industry constructs a hegemonic masculinity deters their movement involvement. Women's identity as both "mothers" and "Appalachians," (e.g., regional citizens) allows for easier access to activism. Even when women engage in activism, the gendered political and social environment can have a powerful pull when the organizing stops. Adams (2002) in her study of a Chilean shantytown examines what happens when a movement of women declines in a strongly patriarchal society. As the movement slowed, she found that women activists often returned to the traditionally gendered work and duties expected of them and did not explore new gender norms.

In sum, gender plays a key role in social movement activism that goes beyond the sex of the participant. Instead, the very structure of society can be gendered in its practices and processes and shape the opportunities and constraints that inform the potential for activism.

4 Current Theory and Future Research

Overall, viewing social movements through the lens of gender creates deeper understandings and new concepts. Gender shapes the ways individuals experience social movement interactions, how communities and organizations proceed in their social change efforts, and influences the opportunities and constraints for movement emergence. While adding to the study of gender, this scholarship also advances social movement theory. Much of the work cited was undertaken with the goal of capturing theoretically what was missing in scholarship. For example, many of the works on gendered processes of movements also make an essential contribution to an intersectional perspective. Naples (1992, 1998a, 1998b) examines low income African American and Latina women in New York City and Philadelphia while Pardo (1998) examines Mexican-American women in two dissimilar communities and explores what it means to put women at the center of politics. Einwohner (1999) examines social class and both Barnett (1993) and Robnett (1997) point to the need to see social movement processes beyond a white, male, and middle-class bias. In sum, while these works illustrate the gendered nature of social movement processes, they also advance knowledge of how race-ethnicity, social class and gender intertwine. Because of social movement scholars and their attention to gender, we now have concepts such as “bridge leadership,” “activist mothering,” and “collective identities,” and “gendered opportunity structures” that continue to be employed in research.

However, there is still work to do. Too often, the way gender is explored in social movements continues to be through sex (e.g., male or female participation) and not a more complicated notion of gender (e.g. norms and expectations of femininity and masculinity). Untapped research-wise are movements of mostly men that could use the scrutiny of a gender lens. For example, movements of the 1960s have been explored for how women and gendered notion of femininity of shaped women’s experiences. Women left the

civil rights and anti-war movements because of their treatment by men (Evans, 1979; McAdam, 1988). However, unexamined in these cases are the ways in which men experienced masculinity. What did it mean to be masculine in some of these high-risk movements? How do men police other men’s masculinity? How do less dominant forms of masculinity fare in movements where hegemonic masculinity is prized?

Relatedly, scholars need to continue to look at movements that are not explicitly gendered. The work of Barnett (1993) and Robnett (1997) offers exemplars for the continued examination of gender in mixed-sex movements. So too does Kevin Neuhouser’s research on an urban squatter settlement in Brazil (1995). He finds that the campaigns were not overtly gendered but that gender dynamics shaped participation, strategies and outcomes in a profound manner. This research can be done by selecting aspects of movements and examining them for the gender dynamics. For example, how are micro-mobilization contexts gendered and how does that influence larger movement dynamics such as emergence, mobilization and outcomes?

The increase in transgender visibility also brings an opportunity to open up the definition of gender and gendered organizations and consider non-binary, gender fluidity, transgender, and/or non-confirming gendered participants. Does the struggle for transgender rights take place in organizations that are consciously undoing the gender binary? If gender is a key aspect of all structures in society, what does it mean to organize around the dissolving of the gender binary? Connell (2012) argues that focusing on transgender offers researchers a site to investigate and expand on the gender dynamics of context, space and time. For example, the U.S. women’s movement is one context for the study of transgender activism. Indeed, Snyder (2008) argues that one of the key issues facing the women’s movement is to address how transgender women and men have complicated the category of “woman.” This complication concerns some feminists who are afraid that losing the category of “woman” in a world where women as a group still do not experience equality (Reger, 2012,

see also Stein, 2010). Can feminist or women's movements exist without the idea of 'woman' as a stable and defined category?

As the research on the external environment to a movement illustrates, gender shapes opportunities and constraints in organizing. As more and more activism plays out in the virtual world, there is an increasing need to examine the internet as a space in which movements mobilize and can be subject to gender regimes. Schulte notes (2011) that current scholarship tends to see the internet either as a space for genderless and bodiless liberation or as a male-dominated sphere where gender oppression is reinscribed. Broadening how virtual space is understood is necessary and needs additional theorizing and research. Are there places in the digital world that are feminine, masculine or gender neutral? Are there spaces that are in transition or flux and go beyond the gender binary? How do movement activists experience that space in the processes of movements, the organizational and community structures, and at the societal and cultural levels?

One essential tool for the future of gender and social movement research is the concept of intersectionality. To see people and the movements they construct through a complex, multi-dimensional lens is to capture more adequately the what, why and how of activism. Evidence of the importance of the concept is how contemporary feminists talk about building a movement of diversity and inclusion, drawing on the discourse of intersectionality. While the goal of creating a diverse movement is there, contemporary feminists continue to struggle to make this a reality (Reger, 2012). Future research could delve more deeply into why inclusivity and diversity, particularly around race and class, continues to escape much of contemporary feminism. One additional, and related, lens is the employing of transnational and specifically non-western conceptions of gender. The study of gender in a women's movement in India is different from understanding gender in a U.S. context. The study of gender in movements must incorporate an understanding of how it varies by context, historical period and region. Using only

a western lens to bring gender into movements can potentially drop out some of the most important findings around gender's embeddedness in the interactions, organizations and communities, and structure of society.

In sum, since heeding the call to bring gender into social movements, scholars have accomplished much. Research has flourished examining movements, first for how women have fared, and then using that research to go beyond sex to probe the processes, organizational dynamics and macro level factors that operate within and around social movements and activists. Yet, the call is not completely answered and there is still so much to do.

References

- Acker, J. (1990). Hierarchies, jobs, bodies: A theory of gendered organizations. *Gender & Society*, 4(2), 139–158.
- Acker, J. (2006). Inequality regimes gender, class, and race in organizations. *Gender & Society*, 20(4), 441–464.
- Adams, J. (2002). Gender and social movement decline: Shantytown women and the prodemocracy movement in Pinochet's Chile. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 31(3), 285–322.
- Barnett, B. M. N. (1993). Invisible black southern women leaders in the movement: The triple constraints of gender, race, and class. *Gender & Society*, 7, 162–182.
- Bell, S. E., & Braun, Y. A. (2010). Coal, identity, and the gendering of environmental justice activism in central Appalachia. *Gender & Society*, 24(6), 794–813.
- Black Lives Matter. No date. <http://blacklivesmatter.com/>. Accessed January 3, 2017.
- Chafetz, J. S., Dworkin, A. G., & Swanson, S. (1986). *Female revolt: Women's movements in world and historical perspective*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld.
- Collins, P. H. (1990). *Black feminist thought: Knowledge, consciousness, and the politics of empowerment*. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- Combahee River Collective, The Combahee River Collective statement. copyright © 1978 by Zillah Eisenstein. <http://circuitous.org/scraps/combahee.html>.
- Connell, R. (2012). Transsexual women and feminist thought: Toward new understanding and new politics. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 37(4), 857–881.
- Connell, R. W. (1987). *Gender and power: Society, the person and sexual politics*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

- Costain, A. (1992). *Inviting women's rebellion: A political process interpretation of the women's movement*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Crenshaw, K. (1991). Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color. *Stanford Law Review*, 43(6), 1241–1299.
- DuBois, E. C. (1978). *Feminism and suffrage: The emergence of an independent women's movement in America, 1848–1869*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Einwohner, R. (1999). Gender, class and social movement outcomes: Identity and effectiveness in two animal rights campaigns. *Gender & Society*, 13(1), 56–76.
- Einwohner, R., Hollander, J. A., & Olson, T. (2000). Engendering social movements: Cultural images and movement dynamics. *Gender & Society*, 14(5), 679–699.
- Evans, S. (1979). *Personal politics: The roots of women's liberation in the civil rights movement and the new left*. New York: Alfred Knopf.
- Ferree, M. M., & Martin, P. Y. (1995). *Feminist organizations: Harvest of the new women's movement*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Ferree, M. M., & Roth, S. (1998). Gender, class and the interaction between social movements: A strike of West Berlin day care workers. *Gender & Society*, 12, 626–648.
- Freeman, J. (1975). *The politics of women's liberation: A case study of an emerging social movement and its relation to the policy process*. New York: Longman.
- Friedan, B. (1963). *The feminine mystique*. New York: W. W. Norton & co.
- Gerson, J. M., & Peiss, K. (1985). Boundaries, negotiation, consciousness: Reconceptualizing gender relations. *Social Problems*, 32(4), 317–331.
- Hercus, C. (1999). Identity, emotion, and feminist collective action. *Gender & Society*, 13(1), 34–55.
- Hunt, S. A., Benford, R., & Snow, D. (1994). Identity fields: Framing processes and the social construction of movement identities. In E. Larana, H. Johnston, & J. R. Gusfield (Eds.), *New social movements: From ideology to identity* (pp. 185–208). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Hurwitz, H.M., & Taylor, V. (Forthcoming). Women occupying wall street: Gender conflict and feminist mobilization. In L. Banasak & H. J. McCammon (Eds.), *100 years of the nineteenth amendment: An appraisal of women's political activism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Irons, J. (1998). The shaping of activist recruitment and participation: A study of women in the Mississippi civil rights movement. *Gender & Society*, 12, 692–709.
- Kelly, M. (2014). Knitting as a feminist project? *Women's Studies International Forum*, 44(May–June), 133–144.
- Kelly, M. (2015). Feminist identity, collective action, and individual resistance among contemporary U.S. feminists. *Women's Studies International Forum*, 48(Jan–Feb), 81–92.
- King, D. K. (1988). Multiple jeopardy, multiple consciousness: The context of a black feminist ideology. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 14, 42–72.
- Kutz-Flamenbaum, R. (2007). Code pink, raging grannies, and the missile dick chicks: Feminist performance activism in the contemporary anti-war movement. *NWSA Journal*, 19(1, Spring), 89–105.
- Laughlin, K., Gallagher, J., Cobble, D. S., Boris, E., Nadasen, P., Gilmore, S., & Zarnow, L. (2010). Is it time to jump ship? Historians rethink the waves metaphor. *Feminist Formations*, 22(1, Spring), 76–135.
- Lorber, J. (1994). *Paradoxes of gender*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- McAdam, D. (1988). *Freedom summer*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- McAdam, D. (1992). Gender as mediator of the activist experience: The case of freedom summer. *American Journal of Sociology*, 97(5), 1211–1240.
- McCammon, H. J., Campbell, K., Granberg, E., & Mowrey, C. (2001). How movements win: Gendered opportunity structures and U.S. women's suffrage movements, 1866 to 1919. *American Sociological Review*, 66, 49–70.
- Meyer, D. S., & Whittier, N. (1994). Social movement spillover. *Social Problems*, 4(2), 277–298.
- Mueller, C. (1987). Collective consciousness, identity transformation, and the rise of women in public office in the United States. In M. Katzenstein & C. Mueller (Eds.), *The women's movements of the United States and Western Europe* (pp. 89–108). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Naples, N. (1992). Activist mothering: Cross generational continuity in the community work of women from low-income neighborhoods. *Gender & Society*, 6, 441–463.
- Naples, N. (1998a). *Activist mothering, community work and the war on poverty*. New York: Routledge.
- Naples, N. (1998b). *Grassroots warriors: Activist mothering, community work and the war on poverty*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Neuhouser, K. (1995). “Worse than men”: Gendered mobilization in an urban Brazilian squatter settlement, 1971–1991. *Gender & Society*, 9(1), 38–59.
- Pardo, M. S. (1998). *Mexican American women activists: Identity and resistance in two Los Angeles communities*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Pelak, C., Taylor, V., & Whittier, N. (1999). Gender movements. In J. S. Chafetz (Ed.), *Handbook of the sociology of gender* (pp. 147–175). New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.
- Pentney, B. A. (2008). Feminist activism and knitting: Are fibre arts a viable mode for feminist political action? *Thirdspace: a journal of feminist theory & culture*, 8(1, Summer), Online.
- Reger, J. (2001). Motherhood and the construction of feminist identities: Variations in women's movement organizations. *Sociological Inquiry*, 71, 85–110.
- Reger, J. (2012). *Everywhere and nowhere: Contemporary feminism in the United States*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Risman, B. J. (2004). Gender as a social structure: Theory wrestling with activism. *Gender & Society*, 18(4), 429–450.

- Robnett, B. (1997). *How long? How long? African American women in the struggle for civil rights*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Roth, B. (2002). *Separate roads to feminism: Black, Chicana and white feminist movements in America's second wave*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Roth, S. (2008). Dealing with diversity: The coalition of labor union women. In J. Reger, D. J. Myers, & R. L. Einwohner (Eds.), *Identity work in social movements* (pp. 213–231). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Rupp, L., & Taylor, V. (1987). *Survival in the doldrums: The American women's rights movement, 1945 to the 1960s*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schulte, S. R. (2011). Surfing feminism's online wave: The internet and the future of feminism. *Feminist Studies*, 37(3), 727–744.
- Snyder, R. C. (2008). What is third-wave feminism? A new directions essay. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 34(1), 175–196.
- Stacey, J., & Thorne, B. (1985). The missing feminist revolution in sociology. *Social Problems*, 32(4), 301–316.
- Stall, S., & Stoecker, R. (1998). Community organizing or organizing community? Gender and the crafts of empowerment. *Gender & Society*, 12(6), 729–756.
- Stein, A. (2010). The incredible shrinking lesbian world and other queer conundra. *Sexualities*, 13(1), 21–32.
- Tarrow, S. (1989). *Struggle, politics and reform: Collective action, social movements and cycles of protest*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Taylor, V. (1989). Sources of continuity in social movements: The women's movement in abeyance. *American Sociological Review*, 54, 761–775.
- Taylor, V. (1996). *Rock-a-by-Baby: Feminism, self-help, and postpartum depression*. New York: Routledge.
- Taylor, V. (1999). Gender and social movements: Gender processes in women's self-help movements. *Gender & Society*, 13(1), 8–33.
- Taylor, V., & Whittier, N. (1992). Collective identity in social movement communities: Lesbian feminist mobilization. In A. D. Morris & C. M. C. Mueller (Eds.), *Frontiers in social movement theory* (pp. 104–129). New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Taylor, V., & Whittier, N. (1998). Guest editors' introduction: Special issue on gender and social movements: Part 1. *Gender & Society*, 12(6), 622.
- Thompson, B. (2002). Multiracial feminism: Recasting the chronology of second wave feminism. *Feminist Studies*, 28, 337–366.
- Tilley, C. (1978). *From mobilization to revolution*. New York: Random House.
- West, C., & Zimmerman, D. H. (1987). Doing gender. *Gender & Society*, 1(2), 125–151.
- Whittier, N. (2007). Gender and social movements. In G. Ritzer (Ed.), *The Blackwell encyclopedia of sociology* (Vol. IV, pp. 1872–1875). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Whittier, N. (2012). The politics of coming out: Visibility and identity in activism against child sexual abuse. In G. Maney, R. Kutz-Flamenbaum, D. Rohlinger, J. Goodwin (Eds.), *Strategies for social change* (pp. 145–69). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Jo Reger is professor of Sociology at Oakland University in Michigan. She is the author of *Everywhere and Nowhere: Contemporary Feminism in the United States* (2012, Oxford University Press), the editor of *Different Wavelengths: Studies of Contemporary Feminism in the United States* (2005, Routledge) and a co-editor of *Identity Work in Social Movements* (2008, University of Minnesota Press). Her work on the U.S. women's movements has appeared in a variety of journals including *Gender & Society*, *Qualitative Sociology*, *Feminist Formations*, and the *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*.



Feminists Reshaping Gender

40

Alison Dahl Crossley and Laura K. Nelson

Abstract

The gender order is incredibly durable, and persists relatively unchanged despite major cultural and structural changes. Feminists, however, have collectively mobilized to change some aspects of the gender structure. Over hundreds of years, participants in the U.S. feminist movement have advanced women's position in the workplace, home, and economy. Feminists have challenged social institutions such as the nuclear family, interpersonal relationships privileging men, and the gender binary. Over the years, feminists helped win woman suffrage, they shaped social policy during the New Deal, they helped win the right to birth control and safe and accessible abortion, they raised awareness about the harms of sexual harassment and gendered violence, and helped draft and pass laws around equal pay and access to work, among other wins. Using a range of tactics, from community-based groups, to protest and Internet organizing, feminists have unquestionably improved women's position in soci-

ety. Scholarship about feminist movements has also pushed social movement scholarship in new directions, emphasizing a diversity of targets and tactics, focusing on movement continuity over time, and foregrounding the importance of community-building and other extra-political activities in the maintenance and growth of social movements. Areas for additional research include a deeper empirical and theoretical analysis of the intersectional nature of feminism and more attention to the heterogeneity of women's experiences. Greater methodological diversity in the study of feminist movements would offer a more robust understanding of the movement, including a better grasp of the cultural and discursive outcomes of feminist movements and those like them.

There are few structures more durable than gender. Gendered stereotypes, expectations, and social practices shape nearly every facet of our individual and collective lives. Although gender norms are not identical across cultures, the rigidity of the gender structure is near universal. Social movement participants, particularly those in feminist movements, have confronted and changed the gender structure in an array of social contexts. As one of the longest lasting social movements in modern history, the many successes and challenges of the feminist movement

A. D. Crossley (✉)
Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
e-mail: acrossle@stanford.edu

L. K. Nelson
Northeastern University, Boston, USA
e-mail: l.nelson@northeastern.edu

tell us not only about social movement continuity, but also about the relative malleability and durability of the gender order.

Feminists have successfully reshaped gender in a number of spheres of American life, including in cultural, political, and institutional contexts. They have mobilized to change existing structures, such as increasing gender and racial diversity in the education, employment, and legal sectors. Feminists have successfully reshaped institutions such as healthcare (Sulik, 2010), military (Katzenstein, 1998), unions (Fonow, 2003), motherhood and family (Taylor, 1996), and education (Stomblor & Padavic, 1997). Feminists also create their own institutions and practices. This includes establishing alternative organizations and communities, and offline (Taylor, 1996) and online (Crossley, 2015; McCaughey & Ayers, 2003) support systems. Despite many successes, feminists continue to confront a plethora of barriers. After a period of increasing gender equality in a number of measures, including political representation and the wage gap, advances in gender equality have all but stalled since the mid 1990s resulting in what scholars call the “stalled gender revolution” (England, 2010). Remaining inequalities are too numerous to list here, but feminists continue to target women’s representation in government and policy arenas, gender segregation in educational and occupational spheres, interpersonal and gender-based violence, and the persistent wage gap between men and women. Campaigns that have recently drawn national attention include campus anti-sexual assault activism and the interconnectedness of race and gender in the police brutality epidemic.

The study of how feminists have reshaped gender has pushed the field of social movements in new directions. Because feminists are the least likely of all social movement participants to target the state or use street protest tactics (Van Dyke, Soule, & Taylor, 2004), the breadth of their mobilization requires traditional studies of social movements to deepen. This has included examinations of collective identity, emotions, movement continuity, and extra-institutional organizing (Crossley and Taylor 2015; Reger,

2012; Taylor, 1989; Taylor & Whittier, 1992). By exploring feminist movements, scholars have demonstrated the importance of non-state centered mobilization and of cultural change and tactics more broadly. This includes feminists who target change in family, education, and religion; through interaction, language, and the redefinition of social practices. These analyses indicate that social change happens in everyday interactions, online and off, in community, and through reshaping identity.

In this paper, we summarize the state of theory and research on feminist movements, include a discussion and critique of relevant approaches, and conclude with comments about needed directions for future theoretical and empirical work.

1 Movement Continuity

Modern feminist movements have enjoyed a continuous existence since the early 1800s. The most enduring framework proposed to understand these long-standing movements is the wave framework, first proposed by women involved in the women’s liberation and women’s rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s. These feminists believed they were part of a second “wave” of feminist activism, building on the work done by women in the first wave (DuBois, 1971; Evans, 1980; Firestone, 1968). This early articulation of feminist waves has shaped subsequent analyses, and has persisted in the collective feminist lexicon.

The three central waves of feminism include the first wave woman suffrage movement, the second wave women’s liberation and women’s rights movement, and the third wave intersectional and micro-political movements. The first wave began in the mid-1800s and culminated in the passage of the 19th woman suffrage amendment in 1920. In addition to helping win the right to vote, first wave feminists helped win access to higher education institutions, they formed the first birth control clinics in the United States,

they won property and employment rights for married women, and started a conversation about social and cultural equality for women.

The second wave women's rights and women's liberation movements began in the early 1960s and culminated in a failed attempt to pass the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). While this movement did not win its main demand—the ERA—they did successfully win the right to legal abortion, they pushed the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to take seriously sex-based discrimination, they generated the phrase *sexual harassment* and brought this concept into the mainstream, they challenged the cultural idea of women as sex objects, and they established women's shelters and women's centers in cities across the U.S. (Rosen, 2000).

The third wave began in the 1990s and incorporated a more intersectional and micro-political approach to feminism (Reger, 2005; Walker, 1995). This wave emphasized the heterogeneity of women's experiences, including lesbian and gender-queer women, and they celebrated individual expression as a form of politics (Reger, 2012). Some believe we are currently witnessing a fourth wave, beginning in the late 2000s and persisting today (Baumgardner, 2011). This movement has utilized online spaces to create global conversations about gender discrimination, and is challenging gender-based violence and its intersection with the state and the police.

While these periods were particularly dramatic, with surges of public protests and actions in the name of women's rights, feminist political action existed before and after each of these periods of heightened action. During the supposed "doldrums" in the 1920s–1950s, feminists played an active role in shaping the new deal and other social legislation of this period, organizations like the League of Women Voters kept women and women's issues in the public eye, and organizations like the National Woman's Party worked behind the scenes to keep a feminist identity and community alive (Lemons, 1973; Rupp & Taylor, 1987; Ware, 1987). Working-class feminism and union feminism also peaked during the 1940s, the supposed

between-wave period (Cobble, 2005). After the second wave supposedly subsided, Black feminism surged, peaking in the late 1980s (Roth, 2004). In the post-1990s era, when the feminist movement was declared officially dead, feminist communities and feminist identities remained strong through offline and online communities, music and arts spaces, and institutions such as university women's centers, feminist businesses, and domestic violence shelters (Reger, 2012; Staggenborg, 1996).

As scholars uncover the myriad ways in which feminist movements exist and persist they have concluded, in the words of Jo Reger, that feminism is, and has always been, everywhere (2012). Or, feminism may be best understood as "waveless" (Crossley, 2017). The ubiquity of feminist movements across time, space, and institutions has prompted scholars to shift their attention from the differences between waves to understanding movement continuity and community.

Research on feminist movement continuity has contributed a number of concepts to understand the persistence of social movements in general over time. Rupp and Taylor coined the phrase *abeyance structures* to explain how movements persist through inhospitable political and economic environments (Rupp & Taylor, 1987). These abeyance structures can be organizations, such as the National Woman's Party, formal institutions such as university women's centers, cultural institutions such as feminist bookstores and music festivals, and informal movement discourses kept alive through on and offline activist communities and networks (Staggenborg, 1996; Crossley, 2017). These abeyance structures and those who build them work behind the scenes during politically hostile periods, providing activist networks, goals and tactical choices, and a collective identity to movements as they re-engage the public as the political environment become more open (Taylor, 1989).

Jo Reger uses the phrase *overlapping generations* to summarize both continuity and change within feminist movements over time. At any one moment, multiple generations of feminist activists co-exist and overlap. Early generations

shape and influence later generations, but this co-existence also produces generational conflict that has pushed feminism in new directions (Reger, 2012).

Continuities need not arise from direct connections between waves or overlapping generations of feminists. Social movements draw on implicit, or latent, political models and knowledge as they form new organizations (Armstrong, 2002). Early iterations of movements institutionalize particular ways of understanding the world and ways of intervening and changing social structures. This institutionalized knowledge then shapes subsequent iterations of movements as new actors build their own organizations based on these latent understandings, even in the absence of direct transferal of knowledge (Nelson, 2018).

As political opportunities change over time and create climates that are more or less open to social movements, feminist movements ebb and flow and move in and out of the public eye. Abeyance structures, overlapping generations, and the institutionalization of political knowledge ensure that movements never disappear, but shift and change while also building on the successes of the past, producing overall movement continuity and growth.

2 Organizational Repertoires

The different forms of feminism over the many decades of its existence is much broader than the traditional “organizational repertoire” adopted by social movement organizations in other fields. Because women were historically blocked from formal political institutions feminists have had to be politically innovative, adapting nonpolitical institutions for political purposes, including voluntary organizations such as women’s clubs and the Parent Teacher Association, labor unions, corporations, and institution auxiliaries. Each of these forms interact with existing political institutions in different ways, producing an array of “alternative institutions” that have provided politically-excluded women a way to influence the political process. These alternative

institutions are often consciously structured differently than formal political institutions – for example structures that are explicitly non-hierarchical and more inclusive of those without social and economic power—and have thus provided new models of political organizations, expanding the organizational repertoire available to social movements (Clemens, 1993).

This focus on nonpolitical organizational repertoires extends to a focus on extra-political change. From its first iteration in the 1910s, feminists have used nonpolitical organizational repertoires to focus on challenging gendered discourse, gendered inter-personal relationships, and individual psychologies. Women’s isolation from one another in nuclear families has prevented the types of solidarities, and organizational opportunities, present in other marginalized communities by virtue of living and working together. Feminists have challenged this isolation by forming women-only groups that provide spaces for women to give a political voice to their personal, isolated lives. These spaces allow women to make visible common experiences they face by virtue of their social positions, raising awareness around the issues women collectively face as a social class.

The earliest form of this political tactic was via “background talks” used by the feminist organization Heterodoxy, active in New York City from the 1910s to the early 1940s. During these background talks women would discuss their childhood, early careers, and any challenges they faced growing up. The women as a group would then discuss the common experiences among different women, linking these experiences to larger social structures (Nelson, 2018). Women’s liberationists active in small groups in the 1960s gave this tactic a name: consciousness-raising. Fusing the personal and political is the nucleus of these groups (Cassell, 1977), and they ideally involve four steps: self-revelation, active listening, discussion and linking between individual problems and larger social forces, and connecting their discussions to other theories of oppression (Ferree & Hess, 1995, 71). Personal issues such as intimate relationships, family, work, sexuality, and housework were shared among participants, and the realization of gender oppression in these

groups drove much of the growth of the women's movement. This form of social movement organizing "offers participants the opportunity to reframe their individual biographies in socially and politically meaningful terms" (Taylor, 1996, 104). The goal is to change individual psychologies and in doing so, provide fodder to change institutions. While many consciousness-raising groups had no organizational affiliations, the process of politicization that occurred in these groups often led to organizational affiliations, additional feminist activism, or the maintenance of feminist networks (Cassell, 1977, 55). In the contemporary period, this conversation happens online in a global community, with Twitter hashtags and Facebook groups that transcend geographical boundaries (Crossley 2015).

Formal feminist organizations are also essential to the continuity of the feminist movement and are also a barometer of the vitality of the movement (Ferree & Martin, 1995). Feminism, like most social movements, does not have a central organizational structure or homogenous ideology. Instead, feminism is composed of organizations and communities that are independent and heterogeneous in their structures, tactics, and ideological frameworks. Feminist organizations vary dramatically in their structure and approaches, consistent with the broad range of experiences that women have and bring to feminist movements. Historically, feminist organizations take on two forms: collective and bureaucratic. In the 1960 and 1970s, with a resurgence of the feminist movement more broadly, bureaucratic and hierarchical feminist organizations were a popular form of feminism—with organizations such as the National Organization for Women (NOW) and National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL) becoming for many, the face of the feminist movement (Reger, 2002). Collective organizations such as SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Justice Collective and Older Lesbians Organizing for Change (OLOC) strove to reflect the ideologies of the feminist movement,

and in theory did not reproduce the hierarchical structures that historically silence and marginalize women and people of color. These organizations typically emphasized the importance of sharing personal knowledge and experiences, emotions, and cultivating a distinctive women's culture (Crossley, Taylor, Whittier, & Pelak, 2011; Rupp & Taylor, 1993; Taylor, 1996). Feminists also create groups within larger social movements whose participants' express sexism or racism, such as Occupy Wall Street, maintaining some ideologies of the larger movement while carving out a specific space for feminist and anti-racist principles (Hurwitz and Taylor, 2018).

While collective and bureaucratic feminist principles are important strands of feminist organizations, these organizational structures overlap and are intertwined, as decision making in collective organizations can pose challenges, and feminists even in hierarchical groups bring their feminist principles and beliefs (Crossley et al., 2011; Staggenborg, 1998; Whittier, 1995). These feminist organizations are also central to the creation and nurturing of feminist and women's culture more broadly—and operate within the constellation of feminist community, culture, and organization—furthering feminist collective identities and the movement as a whole (Crossley et al., 2011; Rupp & Taylor, 1993; Staggenborg & Lecomte, 2009; Taylor & Whittier, 1992).

The perspective of feminism as existing and persisting in many different forms, through different organizational models, and via a range of abeyance structures, institutions, and communities, provides an expansive view of feminism and feminist fields. Feminism is not restricted to lobbying governments or marching in the streets. Feminism also, if not predominantly, exists across nonpolitical organizations and institutions throughout society, and it is an ongoing presence, continually challenging gendered social structures through individual change and interpersonal interaction.

3 Feminist Community

Feminists employ cultural tactics and target cultural change, such as emphasizing movement solidarity and community-building, more than participants in other movements (Van Dyke et al., 2004). In her examination of a local women's movement, Staggenborg (1998) develops the theory of "social movement communities," and finds that community is central to propelling a movement over time and through cycles of protest. This perspective adds nuance and a feminist perspective to the traditional political opportunity theory, which focuses on external forces in shaping a social movement. Instead, gender and social movement scholars acknowledge the dynamic relationship between community networks and other forms of mobilization. Communities create deep feminist ties that not only nourish the participants, but then also establish critical networks so participants are ready for mobilization when a spurious event or grievance occurs. Write Staggenborg and Taylor (2005, 44): "When political campaigns mobilize, they draw on the emotional bases and the cultural and institutional mobilizing structures of the movement community." An example of this is the feminist mobilization after the murders in Isla Vista, CA, during which a young man killed a number of young people stating that women were never attracted to him. Immediately following this event, participants in on- and offline feminist networks mobilized in Isla Vista and around the world to demand attention to the persistence of sexism and violence against women. Pre-existing feminist communities allowed for a rapid organized response.

Staggenborg and other scholars highlight how the cultural elements of movements and interpersonal dynamics of their participants can reveal previously overlooked elements of the life of a social movement (Ray, 1999; Reger, 2012; Staggenborg, 1998). Feminist communities are a tactic to further feminist goals, insofar as they provide a space for the planning of feminist mobilization and an opportunity to build networks. Feminist communities are also a movement outcome in and of themselves, insofar as

they advance feminist solidarity in creating spaces for women outside mainstream social structures.

Recent research has built upon the frameworks of offline community and analyzed online feminist communities, such as on those facilitated on social media and feminist blogs (Earl & Kimport, 2011; Nip, 2004). Similar to offline feminist activism, a study of an Australian feminist blog network (Shaw, 2012) found that the blog network "functions to critique the ideology of mainstream discourses at least partly in order to change them, and participation in this community can be understood as discursive activism" (42). Scholarship has also found that online activism is capable of fostering the types of interpersonal networks and communities that are central to mobilization and movement continuity (Crossley, 2015), providing fora for dissemination for feminist ideologies and connections to other feminists regardless of geographical distance. Duncan (2005) found an online discussion board fostered strong community ties: "Online networking ... provides feminists with a home place, a protected space to return to and build a community after working toward activist goals" (162).

As women and feminists have less access than men to formal political change and opportunities, community has been critical to the movement. An emphasis on community and cultural change has made feminist mobilizations less visible than movements engaging in street protest (Staggenborg & Taylor, 2005), resulting in the sometimes overlooking or underestimating of the movement and its continued vibrancy (Crossley, 2017; Reger, 2012).

4 Institutions and Feminism

Because power is reproduced in multiple institutional arenas (Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008), social movement actors target a variety of institutions and non-state entities (Crossley, 2015). Although it is true that social movements generally target states and governments (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001), scholars have recently

begun to analyze the dynamics of social movements inside institutions (Banaszak-Holl, Levitsky, & Zald, 2010; Katzenstein, 1998; Raeburn, 2004; Rojas, 2007). Particularly during periods when the state is non-responsive to social movement mobilization, participants may direct their claims-making to other institutional contexts or “habitats” (Katzenstein, 1998). Feminists have had a number of successes in mobilizing to change religious denominations, universities and their administrations, and health care institutions, to name a few (Van Dyke et al., 2004). The opportunities afforded by these contexts vary over time and place, however (Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008).

Feminism within institutions of higher education has been critical to the continuity of the movement, and educational institutions have created numerous opportunities for feminist contention and mobilization. This takes the form of women’s studies departments, women’s centers, women-friendly policies, and feminist student organizations. It is indicative of movement success, because access to education was a major goal of the women’s movement (Gelb & Palley, 1996). Institutional embeddedness has important consequences for the transmission of feminist knowledge and ideas, particularly evident with student activism. Student identities and networks foster camaraderie, energetic mobilization, and tactical innovation unique to the student experience, as separate from established political institutions. In large part, scholars attribute the persistence of student mobilization to their biographical availability, or free time and flexible schedules (McAdam, 1988; Snow et al., 1980). However, as students face rising tuition and fees, many of them are also employed, complicating the biographical availability approach (Crossley, 2017). Student activism has typically been synonymous with mobilization by men, and recent attention to feminist student organizations has shed light on them as important sites of leadership skills and the teaching and learning of feminist ideologies (Crossley, 2017), as well as the connection between academic curricula and activist networks (Taylor & de Laat, 2013). Just as feminism varies by context, so does campus

feminist activism (Reger, 2012), for example some educational institutions and their administrators nourish a feminist culture while others attempt to stymie mobilization and community.

5 Diversity with Feminist Activism and Research

Feminism means many things to many people. While feminist movements have always been diverse, inequalities between women and the strength of social structures that prop up those inequalities has meant that a certain type of feminism dominates public coverage of the movement, and subsequently much research. This well-covered feminism is one that is composed predominantly of white and middle-to-upper class women, and one that assumes gender universalism and the idea that all women experience gendered oppression the same way. To counter this hegemony, and to protest the inequalities among women this form of feminism reinforces, some activists actively avoid the feminist label or modify their feminism with additional terms such as “woman of color feminist” or “intersectional feminist” (Crossley, 2017). Women of color, for example, proposed the term “womanist” in the 1980s as an alternative to the term feminist, to emphasize the alienation they felt from mainstream, white feminism (Walker, 2003). “White feminism” has also not fully recognized the complexity of feminism in developing countries (Mohanty, 1984), or within gender queer and transgender communities (Stryker, 2007). Unfortunately, feminisms within these different communities, and across geographic and social boundaries, often develop in isolation from one another.

Research on feminist movements needs to better recognize the complexity of the feminism label, how mainstream, often white-dominated, feminism interacts with marginalized communities, as well as how feminism coming out of these marginalized communities challenges and complicates accepted feminist discourses (Mohanty, Russo, & Torres, 1991; Moraga & Anzaldúa, 1984). Recognizing the complexity of

feminism and its meaning in different communities will require scholars to re-think the definition of feminism and what a feminist movement entails. Moreover, research on feminism could do a better job of incorporating intersectional concerns and taking into consideration the heterogeneity of women's experiences. Theoretically, social movement scholars can benefit from a deeper engagement with critical gender, critical race, postcolonial, and queer theory, as well as a more global approach to feminist movements. Steps toward this is research that brings a global and neoliberal lens to feminist movements (e.g., Armstrong, 2013), and research that employs a trans-rights lens (e.g., Stryker, 2007).

Addressing these issues will also require methodological pluralism. Research on feminist movements typically consists of ethnographies of one or two movements or communities (e.g., Reger, 2012; Staggenborg, 1996), qualitatively following a few organizations over time (e.g., Rupp & Taylor, 1987), and quantitatively tracking single issues, such as suffrage or the jury movement (e.g., McCammon, 2012). This research has provided empirical knowledge and theoretical concepts to better understand feminism as a social movement and has contributed valuable concepts and theories to social movement scholarship. These methodological approaches have limited the ability to understand the full diversity of feminisms and feminist activism, the relationship between feminism and other social movements, outcomes of feminist movements, and the relationship between feminism and the gender order as a whole. Feminist scholars should also embrace new methodological advances in Bayesian statistics, computational and big data methods (Bail, 2014; Nelson, 2017), lab experiments, simulations and agent-based modeling, and large-N qualitative studies (e.g. McAdam & Boudet, 2012). Embracing methodological pluralism will provide a more complete picture of feminism and feminist activism.

6 Future Research

Substantively, outcomes of feminist movements, the diffusion of feminism and feminist fields, and the influence of feminism on other social movements, are all areas needing future attention. Because feminism focuses on social, cultural, and individual change, future research should focus on ways to operationalize and measure these types of outcomes, and the direct or indirect influence the feminist movement has on effecting this change. This could be done through large-scale, longitudinal discourse analysis and longitudinal analyses of images, relating changes in the wider, societal discourse to claims made by feminists. The methods and computing power needed to analyze discourse on a large scale exist. The challenge is collecting longitudinal data that can track wide-spread changes. Scholars should focus on creating open-source, expansive, digital repositories containing feminist literature and movement documents, as well as more general cultural artifacts that span histories, countries, and communities, to begin to document these changes.

Feminists also attempt to change individual psychologies and the way men and women view themselves and their relationships to one another. Lab experiments can identify how feminist tactics may change individual psychologies and individuals' understandings of gender and inter-personal relationships, as well as inter-personal practices. Larger-scale experiments done through platforms such as Volunteer Science and Mechanical Turk could supplement smaller, more focused, lab experiments. Large-scale experimental framing studies could further identify how different types of movement claims illicit different responses (e.g. Bloemraad, Silva, & Voss, 2016). This type of methodological pluralism will better capture discursively-based movement outcomes.

Another outcome of feminism is its effects on other social movements. Social movement spillover has captured one aspect of this (Meyer &

Whittier, 1994), but future research could expand on this concept. Organized feminism today is perhaps most evident within other social movements. The Black Lives Matter movement was started, and is led by women, and Black Lives Matter maintains a strong program of gender equality. Feminism has also flourished within the Occupy Wall Street movement (Hurwitz and Taylor, 2018). This suggests that we may even need to abandon the idea of feminism as a movement that can be analytically, conceptually, and empirically separated from other issues and movements. Social movement scholars in general who study indigenous movements, labor movements, racial and ethnic movements, and others, should incorporate a feminist lens into their analyses, to better understand how feminism directly and indirectly shapes these movements, while scholars of feminist movements should recognize that new forms of feminism come directly from these other social movements. This research should intentionally blur the boundaries between known social movement communities to recognize the inter-penetration within. Doing so will incorporate a much more diverse set of actors into research on feminist movements.

The research on feminism as a social movement has shown that feminism is everywhere (Reger, 2012). This ubiquity is a sign of its impact, but also makes it difficult to measure and empirically study. Increased conversation between scholars of feminist movements, social movement scholars, race scholars and post-colonial theorists, and gender scholars will enable us to better address issues of outcomes, including individual, cultural, and inter-personal change, as well as cross-movement influence. How do we understand the role of feminist women in contemporary Black movements? Indigenous movements? Post-colonial movements? What does this mean for our understanding of feminism? How does the ubiquity of feminist identities challenge our understanding of gendered socialization? Unconscious bias? Gendered social structures? These questions require a holistic conversation among multiple strands of sociological theory and methods.

References

- Armstrong, E. A. (2002). *Forging gay identities: Organizing sexuality in san francisco, 1950–1994*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Armstrong, E. A. (2013). *Gender and neoliberalism: The all india democratic women's association and globalization politics*. New York City: Routledge.
- Armstrong, E. A., & Bernstein, M. (2008). Culture, power, and institutions: A multi-institutional politics approach to social movements. *Sociological Theory*, 26, 74–99.
- Bail, C. A. (2014). The cultural environment: Measuring culture with big data. *Theory and Society*, 43(3–4), 465–482.
- Banaszak-Holl, J., Levitsky, S. R., & Zald, M. N. (2010). *Social movements and the transformation of American health care*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Baumgardner, J. (2011). *F 'Em!: Goo goo, gaga, and some thoughts on balls*. Berkeley, CA: Seal Press.
- Bloemraad, I., Silva, F., & Voss, K. (2016). Rights, economics, or family? Frame resonance, political ideology, and the immigrant rights movement. *Social Forces* (January, sov123). <https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/sov123>.
- Cassell, J. (1977). *A group called women: Sisterhood and symbolism in the feminist movement*. New York: David McKay.
- Clemens, E. S. (1993). Organizational repertoires and institutional change: Women's groups and the transformation of U.S. politics, 1890–1920. *American Journal of Sociology*, 98(4), 755–798.
- Cobble, D. S. (2005). *The other women's movement: Workplace justice and social rights in modern America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Crossley, Alison Dahl. (2015). Facebook feminism: Social media, blogs, and new technologies of contemporary U.S. feminism. *Mobilization*, 20(2), 253–269.
- Crossley, A. D., & Taylor, V. (2015). *Abeyance cycles in social movements*. In movements in times of democratic transition. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Crossley, A. D. (2017). *Finding feminism: Millennial activists and the unfinished gender revolution*. New York: New York University Press.
- Crossley, A. D., Taylor, V., Whittier, N., & Pelak, C. (2011). Forever feminism: Contemporary US feminism from 1960–2011. In V. Taylor, L. J. Rupp, & N. Whittier (Eds.), *Feminist frontiers* (9th ed., pp. 498–516). New York: McGraw Hill.
- DuBois, E. C. (1971). Feminism old wave and new wave. *CWLU Herstory Project*. www.cwluherstory.org/feminism-old-wave-and-new-wave.html.
- Duncan, B. (2005). Searching for a home place: Online in the third wave. In J. Reger (Ed.), *Different wavelengths: Studies of the contemporary women's movement* (pp. 161–178). Routledge: New York.

- Earl, J., & Kimport, K. (2011). *Digitally enabled social change: Activism in the internet age*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- England, P. (2010). The gender revolution: Uneven and stalled. *Gender and Society*, 24(2), 149–166.
- Evans, S. (1980). *Personal politics: The roots of women's liberation in the civil rights movement and the new left*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Ferree, M. M., & Hess, B. B. (1995). *Controversy and coalition: The new feminist movement across four decades of change*. New York: Routledge.
- Ferree, M. M., & Martin, P. Y. (Eds.). (1995). *Feminist organizations: Harvest of the new women's movement*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Fonow, M. M. (2003). *Union women: Forging feminism in the united steelworkers of America*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Firestone, S. (1968). *The women's rights movement in the U.S.A: New view*. Notes from the First Year. (pp. 1–11) New York: The New York Radical Women.
- Gelb, J., & Palley, M. L. (1996). *Women and public policies: Reassessing gender politics*. Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia.
- Hurwitz, H. M. K., & Taylor, V. (2018). Women occupying wall street: Gender conflict and feminist mobilization. In L. A. Banaszak & H. J. McCammon (Eds.), *100 years of the nineteenth amendment: An appraisal of women's political activism*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Katzenstein, M. (1998). *Faithful and fearless: Moving feminist protest inside the church and military*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Lemons, J. S. (1973). *The woman citizen: Social feminism in the 1920s*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- McAdam, D. (1988). *Freedom summer*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., & Tilly, C. (2001). *Dynamics of contention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McAdam, D., & Boudet, H. (2012). *Putting social movements in their place: Explaining opposition to energy projects in the United States, 2000–2005*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- McCammon, H. J. (2012). Explaining frame variation: More moderate and radical demands for women's citizenship in the U.S. women's jury movements. *Social Problems*, 59(1), 43–69.
- McCaughy, M., & Ayers, M. D. (2003). *Cyberactivism: On-line activism in theory and practice*. New York: Routledge.
- Meyer, D. A., & Whittier, N. (1994). Social movement spillover. *Social Problems*, 41(2), 277–298.
- Mohanty, C. T. (1984). Under western eyes: Feminist scholarship and colonial discourses. *Boundary 2*, 12(3), 333–358.
- Mohanty, C. T., Russo, A., & Torres, L. (1991). *Third world women and the politics of feminism*. Indiana University Press.
- Moraga, C., & Anzaldúa, G. (Eds.). (1984). *This bridge called my back: Writings by radical women of color* (2nd ed.). New York: Kitchen Table/Women of Color Press.
- Nelson, L. K. (2017). Computational grounded theory: A Methodological Framework. *Sociological Methods & Research*. <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0049124117729703>.
- Nelson, L. K. (2018). Feminism means more than a changed world ... it means the creation of a new consciousness in women: Feminism, consciousness-raising, and continuity between the waves. In L. A. Banaszak & H. J. McCammon (Eds.), *100 Years of the nineteenth amendment: An appraisal of women's political activism*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nip, J. Y. M. (2004). The queer sisters and its electronic bulletin board: A study of the internet for social movement mobilization. *Information, Communication and Society*, 7, 23–49.
- Raeburn, N. C. (2004). *Changing corporate America from inside out: Lesbian and gay workplace rights*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Ray, R. (1999). *Fields of protest: Women's movements in India*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Reger, J. (2002). Organizational dynamics and the construction of multiple feminist identities in the national organization for women. *Gender & Society*, 16(5), 710–727.
- Reger, J. (Ed.). (2005). *Different wavelengths: Studies of the contemporary women's movement*. New York: Routledge.
- Reger, J. (2012). *Everywhere and nowhere: Contemporary feminism in the United States*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rojas, F. (2007). *From black power to black studies: How a radical social movement became an academic discipline*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Rosen, R. (2000). *The world split open: How the modern women's movement changed America*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Roth, B. (2004). *Separate roads to feminism: Black, chicana, and white feminist movements in America's second wave*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Rupp, L. J., & Taylor, V. (1987). *Survival in the doldrums: The American women's rights movement, 1945–the 1960s*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rupp, L. J., & Taylor, V. (1993). Women's culture and lesbian feminist activism: A reconsideration of cultural feminism. *Signs*, 19(1), 32–61.
- Shaw, F. (2012). 'HOTTEST 100 WOMEN' Cross-platform discursive activism in feminist blogging networks. *Australian Feminist Studies*, 27(74), 373–387.
- Snow, D. A., Zurcher L. A., Eklund-Olson, S. (1980). Social networks and social movements: A Microstructural Approach to Differential Recruitment. *American Sociological Review*, 45(5):787.
- Staggengborg, S. (1996). The survival of the women's movement: Turnover and continuity in bloomington,

- Indiana. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 1 (2), 143–158.
- Staggenborg, S. (1998). Social movement communities and cycles of protest: The emergence and maintenance of a local women's movement. *Social Problems*, 45 (2), 180–204.
- Staggenborg, S., & Taylor, V. (2005). Whatever happened to the women's movement? *Mobilization*, 10 (1), 37–52.
- Staggenborg, S., & Lecomte, J. (2009). Social movement campaigns: Mobilization and outcomes in the montreal women's movement. *Mobilization*, 14(2), 405–422.
- Stomblor, M., & Padavic, I. (1997). Sister acts: Resisting men's domination in black and white fraternity little sister programs. *Social Problems*, 44, 257–275.
- Stryker, S. (2007). Transgender feminism. In S. Gillis, G. Howie, & R. Munford (Eds.), *Third wave feminism* (pp. 59–70). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sulik, G. (2010). *Pink ribbon blues: How breast cancer culture undermines women's health*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Taylor, V. (1989). Social movement continuity: The Women's Movement in Abeyance. *American Sociological Review*, 54(5):761.
- Taylor, J., & de Laat, K. (2013). Feminist internships and the depression of political imagination: Implications for women's studies. *Feminist Formations*, 25(1), 84–110.
- Taylor, V. (1996). *Rock-a-by baby: Feminism, self-help, and postpartum depression*. New York: Routledge.
- Taylor, V., & Whittier, N. (1992). Collective identity in social movement communities: Lesbian feminist mobilization. In A. D. Morris & C. M. C Mueller (Eds.), *Frontiers in social movement theory* (pp. 104–129). New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Van Dyke, N., Soule, S. A., & Taylor, V. (2004). The targets of social movements: Beyond a focus on the state. In D. J. Meyers & D. M. Cress (Eds.), *Authority in contention, volume 25 of research in social movements, conflict and change* (pp. 27–51). Oxford: JAI Press.
- Walker, R. (1995). *To be real: Telling the truth and changing the face of feminism*. New York: Anchor Books.
- Walker, A. (2003). *In search of our mothers' gardens: Womanist prose* (Reprint ed.). Orlando: Mariner Books.
- Ware, S. (1987). *Beyond suffrage: Women in the new deal*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Whittier, N. (1995). *Feminist generations: The persistence of the radical women's movement*. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Temple University Press.
- Alison Dahl Crossley** is the Associate Director of the Michelle R. Clayman Institute for Gender Research at Stanford University. Crossley is the author of *Finding Feminism: Millennial Activists and the Unfinished Gender Revolution* (NYU Press, 2017), and she received her Ph.D. in Sociology with an emphasis in Feminist Studies from the University of California, Santa Barbara.
- Laura K. Nelson** is an assistant professor of sociology at Northeastern University, where she is also on the Executive Committee for the Women's, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Program and is core faculty at the NULab for texts, maps, and networks. She received her Ph.D. in sociology from the University of California, Berkeley, and has held postdoctoral fellow positions at the Berkeley Institute for Data Science, Digital Humanities @ Berkeley, the Northwestern Institute on Complex Systems, and Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University.