

## Democracies of pleasure: thoughts on the goals of radical sexual politics

R. W. Connell

in *Nicholsen & Sedgwick (eds.)  
Social Postmodernism*

### Sexual liberation

The idea of sexual liberation that emerged from the new left of the 1960s (with sources going back to avant-garde intellectuals at the turn of the century) has been heavily criticized, sometimes for good reasons and sometimes for bad. It has, however, continued to influence the radical politics and social movements that have emerged since: women's liberation, gay liberation, a variety of countercultural and youth movements, the movement for "safe sex" in response to AIDS, queer politics, and others. As Marcuse (1969) suggested a quarter-century ago, these issues are a measure of the depth of the radical project.

Some currents of radicalism have remained in the trap into which Marcuse's own theorizing fell, a trap contained even in the language of "sexual liberation." Marcuse was seduced by Freud's scientific poetry, by the reification of desire in psychoanalytic theory. ("The id" in English translations is "das Es" in German, literally "the it," virtually "The Thing" from the Black Lagoon of the unconscious. One imagines the Instincts writhing and weaving in the depths, waiting to be free.)

Sartre's (1958) critique of the reification of libido in psychoanalytic theory is devastating. The conception of libido in need of release is based on a category-mistake about human action. We act sexually, we become sexual, but we are not constituted from the start as sexual beings. We are not driven, and we cannot act so as to liberate what is in process of being constituted. The goal of radical politics, therefore, cannot be the "liberation of sexuality" from social constraint. We can no more liberate libido than we can liberate the square root of minus one. There is no Thing there to liberate.

But in that case, what is radical about radical sexual politics? Reiche

(1970), in the German student movement of the 1960s, observed how a politics of sexual freedom by itself amounted to a "perpetual puberty." The women of the new left came to see how the unconditional claim for sexual freedom privileged the sexuality of the most powerful, i.e., heterosexual men; and that was a founding moment of contemporary feminism (Segal 1983).

It seems that a similar problem is emerging in contemporary radical theory in the rich capitalist countries. The emphasis on sexuality as performance, on the adoption of shifting sexual identities, on the multiplicity of positions in discourse and possibilities of signification, defines sexual politics as a kind of play. This approach is stimulating for the players, and it does involve a certain personal risk to simulate being queer in the streets, if the streets are patrolled by homophobes.

It does not necessarily involve much more – in the sense of a politics capable of getting rid of the homophobia. Indeed, absorption in the game, on the part of players who are greatly privileged in global terms, might be considered the semiotic equivalent of what Marcuse (1964) called "repressive desublimation" – as we might now call it, getting lost in sexual cyberspace.

Contemporary sexual politics does have radical potential, and radical achievement. For instance, the remaking of sexual culture in urban gay communities in the face of AIDS is a remarkable example of collective self-management in the face of oppression (for documentation of this process, see Kippax et al. 1993). To sustain and widen that kind of achievement, it is important to find ways of reformulating the radical potential of sexual politics and thus rethinking its goals. Tools for the job can be found in debates about the nature of sexuality, and especially in the emerging analysis of structure in sexual social relations.

### Sexual social relations

Sexuality, in something like its modern sense, became an issue for the European intelligentsia through the work of Darwin, whose evolutionary theory both naturalized an issue formerly the domain of theology and morals, and problematized it. The early texts of sexology accepted the premise of the biological constitution of sexuality and applied it to humans. The twentieth-century landmarks of sexology, the work of Kinsey and Masters and Johnson, fall in this tradition but also mark its exhaustion (the story is told in Connell and Dowsett 1993).

The scientific discourse of sexology was often scandalous – Kinsey was abused as violently as Freud had been – but in truth its assumptions

were widely shared. Conservative ideology typically places sex at the boundary of the social, representing what is irrational or animal in human life. Readings of sexuality as natural, or at any rate beyond the social, have also been made by the left, providing a theoretical base for resistance from homophile politics at the turn of the century to cultural feminism in the 1970s.

The intellectual program of nativist sexology has nevertheless been exhausted, and since the 1970s the cutting edge of sexology has been in research on the social construction of sexuality. North American research, epitomized by Gagnon and Simon (1974), emphasized that sexual behavior was learned behavior, and set out to trace the cultural scripts by which its learning was guided. European research, epitomized by Foucault (1980), emphasized the cultural processes involved in the definition of sexuality itself and in the constitution of sexual categories.

Social constructionism has displaced scientific nativism, not as an alternative explanation of exactly the same object, but because it has brought into view a wider object of knowledge. This includes the social practices and relations in which bodily processes occur, mostly written out of positivist sexology. Social constructionism insists that sexuality is historical, and this idea has been scandalous to people who correctly take sexuality to be about bodies, but wrongly assume bodies to be outside history. Bodily processes are drawn into social relations. A sociology of the body has now developed (Turner 1984, Glassner 1988) which explores the wide variety of ways in which this happens: through fashion, sport, body culture, etc. The bodily processes of sexuality are thus shaped by social relations which occur in history.

This principle was accepted by critical theorists from Reich and Marcuse to Foucault, but only in connection with social relations constituted outside of sexuality – specifically, class relations. Here Foucault remained on the same ground as the Marxism he rejected. The power active in power/knowledge, in the discursive constitution of “sexuality,” is precisely a class power, the power of a professional and property-owning bourgeoisie. Foucault is right in thinking class power does invest sexuality; but there is more to the social process than that.

Here we run up against one limit of social theories of sexuality. Another concerns the way in which social constructionism paradoxically relies on biology to define that-which-is-being-constructed. Treating the body as an object of social process makes it difficult to distinguish the construction of sexuality from any other process of social scripting or control. As Vance puts it:

to the extent that social construction theory grants that sexual acts, identities and even desire are mediated by cultural and historical factors, the object of the study – sexuality – becomes evanescent and threatens to disappear. (1989, 22)

Understandably, the result is likely to be an appeal back to nativism. Hence, in part, the revival of “essentialist” views in lesbian and gay studies (Stein 1990).

The logical limit of the social constructionist tendency is a purely semiotic view of sexuality, concerning itself only with discourse and subject positions in discourse. Here, indeed, the problem disappears. Bodies are present as surfaces on which discursive meanings are inscribed (the language, if taken literally, is reminiscent of the machine in Kafka's (1961) story “In the Penal Settlement”). The politics of sexuality consists of the contestation of meanings and representations.

This definition evacuates, rather than resolves, problems about bodies; which are certainly surfaces to be written on, but are also busy growing, aging, reproducing, getting sick, feeding well or badly, getting aroused or turned off, and so on. All these are social processes, and all are hard to separate from sexual practice and sexual signification.

To take good account of bodily experience and bodily process we do not need to retreat from social analyses of sexuality. Rather we need an advance to a more thorough and comprehensive social analysis. The bases of such a theory are readily to hand. The new left, feminism, and gay liberation between them opened up a range of issues not just about the social construction of sexuality but also about the sexual construction of society, about the relations constituted through sexual practice.

I will call these “sexual social relations,” following the pioneering analysis of personal life and its structural contexts by the British group that called itself the Red Collective (1978). As the Red Collective argued, there are systematic relationships between the sexual relationships between people. That is to say, there is a social structure in sexuality. In this structure personal practice encounters organized limits and organized enablements. Of the many ways in which this could be illustrated, perhaps the most striking is the ordering of sexuality through the gender of object choice – heterosexuality and homosexuality, considered not as opposites but as a couple.

As the hegemonic position of heterosexuality illustrates, the structuring of sexuality may make the enablement of some groups' practice the condition of limitation on others'. In this case the structure requires inequality and gives rise to oppression, as Rubin (1984) argues. This defines a sexual politics, not reducible to any other

form of politics, arising within a specific structure of social relations.

To name "sexual social relations" is not to imagine a separate sphere of life which one enters like walking through a door. It is to identify a logic of practice, a course which social action may take in any of the settings in which practice does occur. Research on the sexual dimension of life in offices and factories, which Hearn and Parkin (1987) call "organization sexuality," together with the political mobilization around sexual harassment, make it abundantly clear that sexual politics is not confined to special settings.

Several logically different forms of politics are generated within contemporary sexual social relations. The first is the kind explored by Rubin, arising from the "speciation" of sexualities within a hierarchy of power or legitimacy. A legitimate form of sexuality is defined, and other forms are declared to be perverted, deviant, sinful, degenerate, etc. Those people who engage in stigmatized sexual practice are oppressed through the hierarchy of sexualities, whatever their social position in other respects. Oppression of gays by straights, and resistance through the formation of a sexual subculture, is the paradigm for this kind of politics. A striking feature of current sexual politics is the way other stigmatized groups are now following this path.

Second is the constitution of inequalities through sexual practice itself. The most familiar cases are within heterosexuality, where the gendered object-choice brings into play the structure of gender inequalities. Research on marital rape (Russell 1982), for instance, shows sexual violence by husbands occurring in a continuum of coercion, intimidation, claims of ownership, claims of right, claims of need, economic pressure, persuasion, and customary interpretations of marriage.

In both kinds of politics the relations of power extend beyond particular families or neighborhoods. The institutions that define sexual ideology on a society-wide scale are involved in the struggle of interests: the church, the mass media, the school system.

The state is also deeply involved. Governments attempt population policies directly regulating sexuality, and public health measures which often bear on sexual practice. A current example is the attempt to change sexual practice through AIDS-prevention advertising campaigns. The "regulation of desire," as Kinsman (1987) put it in his Canadian study, is a persistent feature of state policy.

Beyond this again are global processes that regulate and reconstruct sexual practice. If we look at them historically their political character is inescapable: violent appropriation of bodies, social disruption, and

indeed mass death. Colonial occupation commonly meant the taking of indigenous women for the sexual service of settlers, the occupation force being mainly men. In Australia, as in the United States, aboriginal children were liable to be seized from their parents to be "civilized" in missions, boarding schools, or white foster homes. Venereal disease followed the flag: European sailors were the vector for the spread of syphilis as well as Christianity around the globe.

The coercive sexuality of the colonial frontier is now eerily replayed in the postcolonial global market, with the growth of sex tourism. An extreme disparity of wealth allows businessmen and tourists visiting destinations like Thailand to command sexual services hard to get elsewhere, the most important being condom-free penetration. The current result is a high level of sexually transmitted disease in the prostitute workforce and a looming AIDS disaster (Bonacci 1992).

The third dimension of sexual politics concerns how the practice of one person or group becomes constraint and enablement for another. In Sartre's analysis of this problem (1976), the underlying condition for structural antagonism is material scarcity – not natural scarcity but historically produced scarcity.

The argument seems apt for sexuality, where scarcity is a familiar condition and is socially produced. A compound of prohibitions, the incest taboo, was central in Freud's analysis of the making of personalities. A sense of their total weight fueled both Freud's and Reich's critiques of modern civilization. And this sense was eventually taken over into the agenda of "sexual liberation."

As the politics of liberation implied, scarcity is not inherent in sexual practice. Indeed one of the most striking things about sexuality is its social amplification, the way in which an increase of pleasure for one partner need not decrease, but may increase the pleasure of the other. Stepping outside the Western discourse of sexuality, Ram (1991) notes how the very language in which sexual matters are spoken of among the Mukkuvar people of south India makes women's sexuality inseparable from questions of auspiciousness and fertility. The denial of plenitude marks the operation of repressive power in sexual intercourse, where one partner "takes" pleasure from the other.

There is, then, a contradiction between the social production of plenitude and the social denials of its possibility. In this sense sexual politics, while taking quite specific forms, is not fundamentally different from the other kinds of politics which shape human possibilities and the creation of collective futures.



### Democracies of pleasure

To understand sexuality neither as nature nor discourse, but as a sphere of social practices that constitute social relations, helps clarify the goal of sexual politics. As I have argued, the goal cannot be the "liberation of sexuality" from social constraint. The only thing that can be liberated is people. It is meaningful to speak of "sexual liberation" where oppression is accomplished in the sexual social relations between groups of people. What "liberation" then means is that the oppressed gain power over their own lives, power that was formerly exercised by other groups. Where there is a deeply entrenched, long-established pattern of power and control, its overthrow is a revolutionary process. Literally, not metaphorically, revolutionary. It requires the overthrow of institutions, it depends on mass action, and it points to a profoundly altered social order.

That a real revolution is involved was perfectly clear to women's liberation and gay liberation activists and theorists around 1970, and is exactly what has been lost in the evolution of theory since. The early formulas of sexual liberation, which drew their model of power and revolution from a bookish Marxism, were implausible. But they had a sound understanding of the depth of change involved.

The goal of this process is not the abolition of the social structuring of sexuality, but the democratization of the social relations involved – in the terms I have been using, the democratization of sexual social relations. This means a search for equality and empowerment across the whole social terrain of body-reflexive practices relating to erotic pleasure and reproduction.

As we have seen, these social relations have a macro-structure, and are the field of operation of large-scale institutions. The goal of democratization necessarily embraces these, as well as the face-to-face interactions more normally thought of as the sites of sexuality. The agenda must address states, markets, media. To reapply Abraham Lincoln's principle, we cannot settle for a sexual world half-slave and half-free.

Democratizing the social relations of sexuality is, in principle, no more mysterious than democratizing any other complex of social relations and social practices. It involves equalizing resources, creating means of shared decision making, and making sure the process continues into the future.

"Equalizing resources" is a mild phrase for an enormous project. In much of the world, sexual social relations are constructed in conditions

of dire inequality, from the Jakarta prostitutes interviewed by Murray (1991) to the London teenagers interviewed by Lees (1986). In both these cases their disempowerment as women, and the social empowerment of men, is fundamental in the making of sexuality.

Empowerment requires not only material equality, but cultural resources, notably knowledge and social respect. The lack of respect, for Lees's adolescent girls, shapes their sexuality under the threat of discrediting as "slags" – and behind that, the threat of violence. Contesting violence against women (Dobash and Dobash 1992), and violence against gays (McMaster 1991), is an essential part of a democratic agenda in sexuality.

To speak of "shared decision making" is to invoke the classical conception of democracy, direct rule by the citizens – not its contemporary caricature, parliamentary plutocracy. It is necessary to have organized ways of taking control over the social processes constituting sexuality, as a joint project of all those affected by them – the "citizens" of the sexual republic concerned.

This project may sound abstruse, but is concrete enough in a situation like AIDS prevention or contraception. Making decisions about someone else's life by fucking them is a process that has to be under their control, through disclosure and negotiation. Everything Habermas has said about power producing systematically distorted communication (Pusey 1987) becomes relevant here. Truth matters; and truthfulness can only be tested in a process under democratic control.

"Making sure the process continues" is part of what distinguishes a democratic enterprise from a personal claim. Action in the present involves caring for others, including others still to come. This argument gets into sticky issues about claims to represent other people and their interests, a prime target in postmodern criticism of the traditional left. The criticism of vanguard claims to represent the common interest is perfectly valid – it goes back before postmodernism (Bakunin 1971 [1872]). It does not imply, however, that everyone should shrink back and make claims only about themselves. To make any claim about oppression or exclusion is to make a claim of justice, which requires consideration of the impersonal structure of power, and the interests of the least advantaged whoever they are.

For these interests to be served over the long term requires an educational agenda, only the haziest beginnings of which are visible in sex education in the schools and adult education for AIDS prevention. Both enterprises operate under severe constraint; a considerable

struggle would be required to turn them into resources for a democratic reconstruction of sexuality.

It is also necessary to think about what kinds of political organization might have the continuity to be a resource for others beyond the immediate participants. We cannot depend on commercial mass media to hand down political experience to new generations. (They do that, of course — in their own fashion, as entertainment and cautionary tales.)

### Some difficulties

What replaced the rhetoric of revolution, as the new left faded from the scene, was the idea of individual rights to sexual expression or sexual pleasure. In the United States especially this became the language of mainstream feminism in campaigns for the Equal Rights Amendment, abortion rights, equal opportunity in employment, the right to be free of pornography and sexual harassment, etc. It also became the language of gay activism, in campaigns for civil rights and antidiscrimination laws.

The idea of an individual right to choose one's sexual partners and practices fits easily into the structure of US law and political discourse, and certain protections have been won this way. The 1993 struggle over the right of gays to serve in the US military is a striking illustration of how far this shift has gone. The last thing that the gay liberationists of 1970 wanted was to be part of imperialism's apparatus of violence.

But to treat one's body as a private possession (the basis of the discourse of sexual rights within a capitalist society) is to refuse the issue of inequality between owners. The arguments work as if the body were everyone's only possession, so far as sexual practices are concerned.

But this assertion is patently untrue. Major inequalities impinge on sexuality: hence prostitution, straight and gay; hence the economic pressure on women to marry. The scale of these inequalities can be seen in the dynamics of sex tourism, and in the statistics of men's and women's income. Claims of rights are vulnerable to counterclaims of rights based on other people's possession of their bodies. It is difficult to see that a sexual politics based on concepts of individual rights can be more than defensive in the long run. Yet this is the leading form that sexual politics currently takes.

A politics of rights has, even in defensive mode, provided some protection for the growth of sexual subcultures, and this poses the

second difficulty I want to raise. What happens when the sexual practice itself centers on power?

It is a striking feature of sexuality that erotic interest can attach to the structure that governs sexual practice. The distinction of femininity from masculinity is itself cathected, which is why the ambiguities in gender-bending are disturbing and culturally powerful (Garber 1992), not just muddy. Power relations too can be cathected, and often are, judging from how frequently sexual fantasies include force — either coercing or being coerced.

The political issue is sharply posed by the "leatherfolk" (Thompson 1991) who go beyond fantasy to practice: whose sexual pleasure is sado-masochistic and whose sexual practice involves enacting master/slave relationships and deploying symbols of power and domination — whips, boots, black leather, body piercing, chains. Not much democracy in view. And these are the "sexual outlaws" who, more than anyone else, have kept alive the radical rejection of convention, the demand for pleasure and expression on one's own terms, that marked the impulse towards sexual liberation.

SM theorists, themselves bothered about this issue, have developed the idea that the leather community's practice involves an exchange of power. Someone who is "top" in one interaction may be "bottom" in the next; the bottom in any case sets the parameters of a sexual scene and conditionally entrusts the top with power. Thus, though power is celebrated, it also circulates.

This argument works for the immediate relationship, but does not deal with the wider significance of the power symbolism. Sexual subcultures are not hermetically sealed; playing games with slavery and swastikas, for instance, is not an innocent pursuit in terms of race. Nor is the circulation free and equal, either in SM fantasy or in practice.

At the same time, the subculture's theorists have a strong point that what matters most is not what formulas sexual practice starts with, but what it makes of them. Human practice is transformative; the materials of a patriarchal culture can be transformed by being used in new ways. There are feminist reappropriations of fashion (Chapkis 1986), gay reworkings of masculine styles (Humphries 1985), and so on.

Sexuality, always refractory, bounces off the conventions of the social order that is being rejected. The argument that transgressive sexuality is inherently subversive is not convincing. But transgressive sexuality can be a component of the move "towards a more colorful revolution" if,

as Chapkis argues for the politics of appearance, it is embedded in a vigorous politics of equality.

### In conclusion

To treat sexuality as a realm of democratic social politics feels awkward. We do not have a comfortable, familiar, or even fashionable language for doing this. We have to push against some well-established habits of thought and some familiar radical positions, as I have indicated in the case of "rights."

The notion that there should be some kind of collective responsibility in sexual practice has been established in gay community action in response to AIDS, but does not exist at all as a project in heterosexual. What exists instead is a repressive discourse of "community standards," a demand for respectability not responsibility – and a radical impulse toward transgression.

The massive irresponsibility in the dominant ideology is shown by the dismal state of AIDS education in schools. Real respect for the interests of children in the face of a lethal epidemic would by now have produced – ten years after public recognition of the epidemic – a vigorous, explicit, no-holds-barred curriculum on sexuality as a universal part of schooling.

The cultural authority of hegemonic heterosexuality remains the limit to radical sexual politics at present. Hegemonic heterosexuality is not a static system of sexual practice. Its repertoire expands (e.g., the addition of oral-genital sex), and new contexts of practice are created (e.g., new forms of prostitution). Hegemonic heterosexuality is capable of being modernized and absorbing some of the impulses of sexual radicalism.

A striking example can be found as early as the mid-1970s in Marabel Morgan's book *The Total Woman*. Within a framework of evangelical religion and self-help psychology, the author advises an audience of middle-class housewives about how to spice up their marriages and hold onto their husbands by eroticizing everyday life. Bubble baths, make-up, candlelight, and perfume figure heavily. Some of the techniques are things of beauty:

For an experiment I put on pink baby-doll pajamas and white boots after my bubble-bath. I must admit that I looked foolish and felt even more so. When I opened the door that night to greet Charlie, I was unprepared for his reaction. My quiet, reserved, nonexcitable husband took one look, dropped his briefcase on the doorstep, and chased me around the dining-room table.

(Morgan 1975, 94)

Morgan draws on the sexual enthusiasm of the liberation movements, but utterly reverses the social message: assuming, indeed promoting, complete dependence of the wife on the husband's earnings, and subordination to the husband's authority. The wife becomes an erotic doormat. According to the publisher, two million copies circulated.

Comedy, doubtless; but two million is a lot. Hegemonic heterosexuality can be reinforced by eroticism as well as contested. It is the program of social equality that defines the radicalism of sexual politics.

### References

- Bakunin, Michael. 1971 [1872]. "The International and Karl Marx." In *Bakunin on Anarchy*, ed. S. Dolgoff, 287–320. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Bonacci, Mark A. 1992. *Senseless Casualties: The AIDS Crisis in Asia*. Washington D.C.: International Voluntary Services/Asia Resource Center.
- Chapkis, Wendy. 1986. *Beauty Secrets: Women and the Politics of Appearance*. Boston: South End Press.
- Connell, R. W., and G. W. Dowsett. 1993. "The Unclean Motion of the Generative Parts: Frameworks in Western Thought on Sexuality." In *Rethinking Sex*, ed. R. W. Connell and G. W. Dowsett, 49–75. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Dobash, R. Emerson, and Russell P. Dobash. 1992. *Women, Violence and Social Change*. London: Routledge.
- Foucault, Michel. 1980. *The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1. An Introduction*. New York: Vintage.
- Gagnon, John H., and William Simon. 1974. *Sexual Conduct: The Social Sources of Human Sexuality*. London: Hutchinson.
- Garber, Marjorie. 1992. *Vested Interests: Cross-Dressing and Cultural Anxiety*. New York: Routledge.
- Glassner, Barry. 1988. *Bodies: Why We Look the Way We Do (And How We Feel About It)*. New York: Putnam.
- Hearn, Jeff, and Wendy Parkin. 1987. "Sex" at "Work". *The Power and Paradox of Organization Sexuality*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf.
- Humphries, Martin. 1985. "Gay Machismo." In *The Sexuality of Men*, ed. Andy Metcalf and Martin Humphries, 70–85. London: Pluto.
- Kafka, Franz. 1961. "In the Penal Settlement." In *Metamorphosis and Other Stories*, 167–99. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Kinsman, Gary. 1987. *The Regulation of Desire: Sexuality in Canada*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.

- Kippax, Susan, R. W. Connell, G. W. Dowsett, and June Crawford. 1993. *Sustaining Safe Sex: Gay Communities Respond to AIDS*. London: Falmer.
- Lees, Sue. 1986. *Losing Out: Sexuality and Adolescent Girls*. London: Hutchinson.
- McMaster, David. 1991. *One Does Not Stir Without the "Other": Homophobia, Masculinity, and Intention*. Honors Research Essay, Macquarie University, Sydney.
- Marcuse, Herbert. 1964. *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*. Boston: Beacon Press.
1969. *An Essay on Liberation*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Morgan, Marabel. 1975. *The Total Woman*. London: Hodder and Stoughton [first published 1973].
- Murray, Alison J. 1991. *No Money, No Honey: A Study of Street Traders and Prostitutes in Jakarta*. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
- Pusey, Michael. 1987. *Jürgen Habermas*. Chichester and London: Ellis Horwood/Tavistock.
- Ram, Kalpana. 1991. *Muktavar Women: Gender, Hegemony, and Capitalist Transformation in a South Indian Fishing Community*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
- Red Collective. 1978. *The Politics of Sexuality in Capitalism*. London: Red Collective/Publications Distribution Cooperative.
- Reiche, Reimut. 1970. *Sexuality and Class Struggle*. London: NLB.
- Rubin, Gayle. 1984. "Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality." In *Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality*, ed. Carole S. Vance, 267-319. Melbourne: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Russell, Diana E. H. 1982. *Rape in Marriage*. New York: Macmillan.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1958. *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*. London: Methuen.
1976. *Critique of Dialectical Reason: Vol. 1, Theory of Practical Ensembles*. London: NLB.
- Segal, Lynne. 1983. "Smash the Family? Recalling the 1960s." In *What Is To Be Done about the Family?*, ed. Lynne Segal, 25-64. London: Penguin/Socialist Society.
- Stein, Edward, ed. 1990. *Forms of Desire: Sexual Orientation and the Social Constructionist Controversy*. New York: Garland.
- Thompson, Mark, ed. 1991. *Leatherfolk: Radical Sex, People, Politics, and Practice*. Boston: Alyson.
- Turner, Bryan S. 1984. *The Body and Society*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

- Vance, Carole S. 1989. "Social Construction Theory: Problems in the History of Sexuality." In *Homosexuality, Which Homosexuality?* ed. Dennis Altman, et al., 13-34. London: GMP and Amsterdam: Uitgeverij An Dekker/Schorer.