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SEXISM

Julia C. Becker
UNIVERSITY OF OSNABRUECK

Chris G. Sibley
UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND

> Coercion is the least efficient means of obtaining order.
> (Ursula K. Le Guin, *The Dispossessed: An Ambiguous Utopia* (1974))

> How do you write women so well?
> I think of a man and I take away reason and accountability.
> (Screenplay by Mark Andrus and James L. Brooks, *As Good as it Gets* (1997))

On first glance, these quotes may seem unusual choices with which to introduce a review of research on sexism. On closer consideration, however, they emphasize two of the critical processes or features that we think underlie sexism and continued gender inequality in many nations. The first quote, by renowned science fiction author Ursula K. Le Guin writing 40 years ago, highlights a key premise underlying contemporary theories of sexism. The premise is: for patriarchy and gender inequality to persist, women need to be provided with subjective benefits that keep them relatively happy and thus make it less likely for them to mobilize as a group and directly challenge the system (Jackman, 1994; Glick & Fiske, 1996). Coercion, in this sense, is the least efficient means of maintaining order because it should only become necessary when those who are disadvantaged are aware of system-wide inequalities, and mobilize to directly challenge it. In other words, if one wants to maintain inequality, far better never to let it get to the point where coercion is needed. Rather, set up a system that offers some subjective benefits, and provides mechanisms for offering appeasement for other inequalities or disadvantages without directly addressing them.

The second quote positions women as "like men" but different in that they lack qualities relating to competence and capability. This is a common theme in stereotypes about what women are like. It is also a recurring theme in many sexist beliefs: that is,

women are less capable than men. If one accepts this premise, then it in turn leads logically (in terms of the internal logic of sexist statements of this nature) to the conclusion that because women are less competent they need men to act for them on their behalf, to protect and provide for them, and to look out for their best interests as they may not be capable of recognizing what these are, and so on. And this in turn brings us back to the quote by Ursula K. Le Guin, because statements and beliefs that imply that women need to be protected, cared for and cherished, *because they are positioned as weaker or less competent than men*, provide a rather excellent form of control that does not require overt coercion. Rather, it can seem caring and protective. We call this sexism.

More broadly, sexism can be defined as the individual's beliefs and behaviors and organizational practices that either harm individuals based upon their gender or contribute to the maintenance of gender inequality in the society at large (see Swim & Hyers, 2009). It is the second part of this definition, that sexism constitutes beliefs, behaviors and practices that contribute to the maintenance of gender inequality in society, which tends to be debated. Or at least, that we think tends to be somewhat misunderstood. The crux here is that if we define sexist beliefs in this way, then statements and beliefs that imply that women need to be protected, cared for and cherished, because they are positioned as weaker or less competent than men, can be defined as sexist *to the extent that they help to systematically maintain inequality between men and women* (Glick & Fiske, 1996; Jackman, 1994). Although sexism can be directed at all genders—and thus also at men (e.g., when men are less likely hired as kindergartner than women), sexism is mostly directed at women, because women are the less powerful group compared to men in all societies around the world (e.g., United Nations, 2012).

In this chapter, we first introduce the foundation of sexist beliefs: gender stereotypes. We then go on with presenting an overview of contemporary forms of sexism—with a strong focus on what are referred to in the research literature as "benevolent sexist beliefs" (or the oft-employed acronym BS) and its negative consequences for women. Furthermore, we elaborate on sexism in romantic relationships in detail with a focus on the trade-off that it seems women may make in endorsing benevolent sexism in their romantic relationships and in broader social contexts (such as in the workplace). Finally, we outline direct and indirect consequences of sexism and introduce research on confronting and reducing sexism.

GENDER STEREOTYPES

From early childhood on (and even before, Rothman, 1988), we learn how women are like, how men are like, how women should behave, how men should behave. Countless stereotypes, particularly promoted by popular media and literature (e.g., books like *Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus*, Gray, 2004) suggest fundamental differences between women and men. The overall stereotype is that women are communal, caring and concerned with others, not independent and tend to be passive. Or, as implied in one of the quotes with which we began this manuscript, as having less reason and accountability than men. Men, in contrast, tend to be characterized by complementary stereotypes, such as being agentic, dominant, non-emotional, rough, ambitious, and self-concerned (Guimond, 2008).

You may wonder whether or not there might be a "kernel of truth"—that is, whether some of these stereotypes might be based on fact. Indeed, Swim (1994) found in a

meta-analysis of the accuracy of gender stereotypes that women and men were quite accurate in their perception of how women vs. men are alike. However, it is important to note that stereotypes can never be accurate, because they are broad generalizations of members of groups that are applied to each single individual in this group. Moreover, other scientific evidence revealed that most of our perceptions of gender differences are overinflated. Janet Hyde (2005) conducted a meta-analysis to test which gender differences are large, medium, small or non-existent (expressed in effect sizes). Against popular assumptions, she found that 78% of all gender differences are small or close to zero (Hyde, 2005). Large gender differences were found in motor behaviors (i.e., throwing distance) and some aspects of sexuality. A moderate gender difference was found in measures of aggression. Thus, according to this meta-analysis, women and men are more alike than different on most psychological variables.

In line with Hyde's gender similarity hypothesis, cross-cultural research revealed that perceived similarities and differences between women and men are not universal, but differ across cultures (e.g., Guimond, 2008). Although typical gender stereotypes can be found in most cultures (Williams & Best, 1986), women and men from individualistic cultures (e.g., North America, Western Europe) are more likely to differ in terms of personality, self-construal, values, and emotions than individuals in collectivistic cultures (e.g., Asia, Africa, Guimond, 2008; Costa, Terracciano & McCrae, 2001; Fischer & Manstead, 2000). On first glance, it seems surprising that individuals in individualistic cultures show greater gender differences than individuals in collectivistic cultures: Social Role Theory (Eagly & Wood, 1999) posits that gender differences have their origin in different social roles that women and men enact in society. Thus, in societies with traditional gender roles (that is, in which men are the breadwinners and women responsible for child-rearing and household-tasks), gender stereotypes should be more likely compared to more egalitarian societies.

In line with this reasoning, research shows that gender stereotypes are activated based on social roles. For instance, two fictitious groups described as "city workers" or "child raisers" activate different stereotypes (Hoffman & Hurst, 1990). Given that people in many African and Asian cultures are more likely to perform traditional gender roles than people from many individualistic cultures, one would expect that individuals in collectivistic cultures should exhibit greater stereotype use. Indeed, supporting this reasoning, students from wealthy, more individualistic countries responded more egalitarian with respect to gender and family roles than students from less wealthy, more collectivist countries (Gibbons, Stiles & Shkodriani, 1991). Likewise, traditional gender roles are more likely endorsed in less wealthy, more collectivistic regions of the world compared to wealthier, individualistic regions of the world (Swim, Becker, Lee & Pruitt, 2009). Thus, although people in collectivistic cultures are more likely to stereotype and to endorse traditional gender roles (Gibbons et al., 1991; Swim et al., 2009), they are paradoxically less likely to show gender differences in self-construal compared to people from individualistic cultures (e.g., Guimond et al., 2007).

How can these contradictory findings be reconciled? First, it is important to note that those who found less egalitarian attitudes in less wealthy, collectivist countries measured *participant's endorsement of beliefs* toward traditional gender roles (Gibbons et al., 1991; Swim et al., 2009). In contrast, those who found greater gender differences in individualistic cultures did not use measures that directly compared women's and men's beliefs about social roles. Instead, they compared women's and men's self-reports on personality

variables, emotions and self-construal (e.g., Costa et al., 2001; Fischer & Manstead, 2000; Guimond et al., 2007). The former (beliefs about gender roles) requires between-group (here: between-gender) comparisons, the latter (self-reports on personality variables, self-construal) do not necessarily require between-group comparisons. Given that individuals from collectivistic cultures are less likely to engage in between group comparisons and self-stereotyping compared to individuals from individualistic cultures (e.g., Yuki, 2003), Guimond et al. (2007) suggested that the absence of these between group-comparisons and self-stereotyping is crucial in explaining why gender differences in self-construals are less pronounced in collectivistic cultures (see also Bornholt, 2000; Guimond, 2008).

In sum, although women and men seem to be more similar than different, gender stereotypes are widespread and can be found around the world. They differ between cultures depending on the measures used, on individual's tendency to engage in between-group comparisons and self-stereotyping and on the extent to which traditional gender roles are enacted in a given society. Gender stereotypes are important to study, because they built the foundation of sexist beliefs and behaviors. In the following, we provide a detailed overview of different forms of contemporary sexist beliefs.

CONTEMPORARY SEXIST BELIEFS

Beliefs such as "Women belong to home and children", or "Women are not as smart as men" reflect old-fashioned sexism (Swim, Aiken, Hall & Hunter, 1995). Old-fashioned sexism is clearly recognized as discriminatory (e.g., Barreto & Ellemers, 2005) and has become less and less accepted in Western societies (e.g., Twenge, 1997). However, rather than appearing in blatant expressions or open endorsement of sexist beliefs, sexism has changed its appearance to more covert and subtle manifestations. These changes in the expression of sexist beliefs are reflected in researchers' development of concepts that mirror contemporary forms of sexism. The most important developments during the last 20 years have been the concepts of modern sexist/neosexist beliefs, and the concept of ambivalent sexist beliefs. In the following, we present the three types of sexism. By doing so, we focus on benevolent sexism for two reasons. First, because this concept represents a particularly novel approach by taking into account that sexism is not ultimately negative (as has been suggested in earlier research) but can also appear under the guise of chivalry. Second, the concept of benevolent sexism has often been misunderstood and has produced the most controversial discussions so far (e.g., "Is it not allowed any more to open a door for a woman?"). We aim to provide an up-to-date overview about research on benevolent sexism and to clarify controversial issues.

Modern Sexism and Neosexism

The concepts of Modern Sexism (Swim et al., 1995) and Neosexism (Tougas, Brown, Beaton & Joly, 1995) were adapted from the concept of Modern Racism and Symbolic Racism (McConahay, 1986; Kinder & Sears, 1981). Modern sexism reflects a denial of discrimination against women and resentment of complaints about sexism and efforts to assist women. That is, modern sexists acknowledge that there is systematic inequality between women and men, but stress that this is not due to any form of disadvantage (e.g., Barreto & Ellemers, 2009). Neosexism is defined as "manifestation of a conflict between egalitarian values and residual negative feelings toward women" (p. 843, Tougas et al.,

1995). Both forms of sexism are perceived as a socially acceptable way of expressing prejudice: People are generally disinclined to identify Modern Sexism as an expression of gender discrimination (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005).

Modern Sexism and Neosexism entail three components: 1) the denial of continued discrimination against women (e.g., "Discrimination against women is no longer a problem in the United States" Swim et al., 1995); 2) negative reactions to complaints about inequality (e.g., "Women's requests in terms of equality between the sexes are simply exaggerated", Tougas et al., 1995); and 3) resistance to efforts addressing sexism ("Over the past few years, women have gotten more from the government than they deserve", Tougas et al., 1995). Although both scales appear to be quite similar, they differ in their operationalization. Whereas the Modern Sexism Scale particularly represents the first component (denial of continued discrimination), the Neosexism Scale primarily measures the last two components (negative reactions to complaints and resistance to efforts addressing sexism).

Modern Sexism and Neosexism are expressions of sexism because they blame women instead of systematic disadvantage for gender inequality and contribute to the maintenance of the unequal gender status quo. For example, modern and neosexists believe that women are fully responsible for not being represented in important decision-making positions. Moreover, the more individuals endorse modern and neosexist beliefs, the more they overestimate the number of women in masculine domains (Swim et al., 1995), the more likely they have negative attitudes toward Affirmative Action (Tougas et al., 1995), the more they evaluate feminists negatively (Campbell, Schellenberg & Senn, 1997), the less their likelihood of judging incidents as sexual harassment (Swim & Cohen, 1997), and the more likely they use sexist language (e.g., Swim, Mallet & Stangor, 2004). Research also indicates that modern sexism directly leads to an inhibition of social protest: Women exposed to modern sexist beliefs were less interested in protest against gender inequality (e.g., Ellemers & Barreto, 2009).

Ambivalent Sexism: The Concept

The idea behind the concept of ambivalent sexism refers to the question how women can be oppressed and loved at the same time (Glick & Fiske, 1996). According to Peter Glick and Susan Fiske, this paradox derives from intimate relationships between women and men, and the interplay of structural power (control over economic, legal and political institutions) and dyadic power (power that stems from dependencies in relationships, (Guttentag & Secord, 1983)). Whereas structural power is concentrated in men's hands within the context of patriarchal structures, dyadic power can be exercised by women and men in intimate relationships (see also Jackman, 1994). The interplay of structural and dyadic power leads to ambivalent sexist attitudes, which are composed of hostile sexism (HS) and benevolent sexism (BS; Glick & Fiske, 1996). Structural power leads to HS—a clearly negative attitude, grounded in the belief that men deserve a higher status—accompanied by the fear that women use feminist ideology or their sexuality in order to obtain control over men. However, Glick and Fiske (1996) argue that even the worst HS, heterosexual man might desire an intimate relationship with a woman and offspring. This dependence of men on women lends women some degree of dyadic power and motivates men to behave in a benevolently sexist manner (see Guttentag & Secord, 1983). Therefore, BS appears to be charming and flattering.

BS is composed of paternalism, complementary gender differentiation and heterosexual intimacy. Paternalism reflects the belief that women should be protected and

financially provided for by men ("In a disaster, women should be rescued before men"). Complementary gender differentiation refers to a characterization of women as "the better sex"—as wonderful, warm, caring and as possessing special qualities that few men possess ("Women, compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility"). Heterosexual intimacy is expressed by an idealization of women as romantic partners. Women are perceived as essential for true happiness in life ("Men are incomplete without women").

On first glance, these beliefs appear to be positive and well intentioned. However, they are patronizing and imply women's inferiority. This has insidious downsides. The belief that women need male protection characterizes women as childlike and as being unable to take care of themselves. The belief that women are warmer and have special qualities that few men possess solely refers to descriptions that fit lower status and conventional gender roles, such as "other-profitable" traits (Peeters & Czapinski, 1990)—in contrast to "self-profitable" traits which include the competence dimension which high-status groups excel on. Finally, the idealization of women as romantic partners puts the concept of heterosexual love as one of the most desired goals people have to accomplish in life. Moreover, as noted above, this belief can be accompanied by the fear that women use their sexuality in order to control men.

It is important to note that benevolent behaviors are simply polite but not sexist as long as they are normative for both genders. For example, imagine a man offers to help a woman who is setting up a computer program. This behavior would not be benevolently sexist, if the man accepts the woman's help in a similar situation. However, it would be benevolently sexist if he believes that setting up a computer program is easier for men to complete and nothing a woman should grapple with. Before we enlarge upon negative aspects of BS, we first present some empirical findings regarding the measurement scales.

Ambivalent Sexism: Empirical Findings

In order to measure HS and BS, Glick and Fiske (1996) developed the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI). Cross-cultural research indicates that HS and BS are positively correlated in at least 19 countries worldwide (Glick et al., 2000). Correlations between HS and BS were higher for women (average $r = .37$) than for men (average $r = .23$). Moreover, they were higher in low sexist nations than in high sexist nations. On a societal level, HS and BS are strongly correlated ($r = .89$), supporting the argument that BS and HS form complementary ideologies, promoting support for and faith in the patriarchal system (e.g., Jackman, 1994). In line with this, research shows that people are most likely to hold similar levels of BS and HS at the same time. Univalent sexism (being only HS or BS) is, in contrast, exceedingly rare: Only 2% of the people in a nationally representative New Zealand sample solely endorse HS but not BS and only 5% endorse BS but not HS (Sibley & Becker, 2012).

Furthermore, BS and HS are related to objective indicators of gender inequality (e.g., the gender empowerment measure or the gender development index), indicating that people are more likely to endorse sexist attitudes in countries with high levels of gender inequality. However, despite the high correlations of BS and HS, it is important to note that both beliefs are not necessarily directed at the same woman, but instead target different subtypes of women. HS is mostly directed at women who do not conform to traditional gender roles (e.g., Glick, Diebold, Bailey-Werner & Zhu, 1997; Viki & Abrams, 2002; Viki, Massey & Masser, 2005). For instance, HS is more likely directed at the non-traditional female subtypes feminists and career women than at women "in general"

(Becker, 2010), and are also more likely directed at the negative sexual subtype of "promiscuous" women than at "chaste" women (Sibley & Wilson, 2004). In contrast, BS is directed at women who conform to traditional gender roles such as breastfeeding women (Forbes, Adams-Curtis, Hamm & White, 2003), or housewives (Becker, 2010; Eckes, 2001; Glick et al., 1997).

This combination of BS directed at women in traditional roles and HS directed at women in non-traditional roles has been nicely illustrated by Hebl, King, Glick, Singletary and Kazama (2007). They conducted a field study in which either a non-pregnant woman or a pregnant woman (the same woman wearing a pregnancy prosthesis) behaved in line with traditional gender roles (being a store customer) or violated traditional gender roles (posed as job applicant). Researchers tested whether participants would "reward" the traditional woman with BS, whereas "punish" the non-traditional woman with hostility. Results confirmed the authors' hypotheses: Store employees were more hostile (e.g., rude) toward a pregnant (vs. non-pregnant) woman who applied for a job (particularly a masculine job). In contrast, they behaved more benevolently (e.g., by touching her, by being overfriendly) toward a pregnant (vs. non-pregnant) woman who was a store customer (Hebl et al., 2007). This field study impressively illustrates how the same woman encounters hostility or benevolence—depending on whether she confirms or disconfirms traditional gender roles. Importantly, this work also illustrates that not only men, but also women respond with hostility toward a pregnant woman applying for a masculine job (Hebl et al., 2007, Study 2).

How can women be sexist against their own gender group? Research shows that women who endorse HS do not direct hostility toward themselves or to women "in general" but to non-traditional subtypes (e.g., feminists), with whom they do not identify (Becker, 2010). Furthermore, in many cultures, women are more likely to endorse BS compared to men. Indeed, BS can appear to be flattering and women can like being cherished and protected by men. This is in line with work showing that women do not only like benevolent sexists more than hostile sexists (Kilianski & Rudman, 1998), but that women even like benevolent sexists more than non-sexists (Bohner, Ahlborn & Steiner, 2010). In Mary Jackman's (1994) words, this exemplifies the ways in which unequal relationships work effectively without the use of force but with consensually shared legitimizing ideologies.

The Dark Side of Chivalry

Although BS appears appealing, it entails harmful consequences for women as individuals (on a "micro" level) and for women as a social category on a societal ("macro") level. With regard to negative effects on the micro level, research shows that BS results in women's assimilation to the stereotypical views implied by BS (e.g., Barreto, Ellemers, Piebinga & Moya, 2010; Dardenne, Dumont & Bollier, 2007). That is, women exposed to BS were more likely to self-define themselves in relational terms and were less likely to describe themselves in task-related terms compared to when they were exposed to HS or no sexism (Barreto et al., 2010).

Moreover, research indicates that exposure to BS reduces women's cognitive performance (Dardenne et al., 2007). In this study, women were randomly assigned to different experimental conditions (exposure to BS, HS, no sexism). In the BS condition they received the following message expressed by a male recruiter as part of training for job interviews:

> Industry is now restricted to choose women instead of men in case of equal performance. You'll work with men only, but don't worry, they will cooperate and help you to get used to the job. They know that the new employee could be a woman, and they agreed to give you time and help.
>
> (Dardenne et al., 2007, p. 767)

Afterwards, the female job applicants completed a problem-solving task. Results show that women exposed to this benevolent sexist message performed worse in this task than those who received an HS message or no sexist message.

Dardenne and colleagues (2007) demonstrated in further studies that although women exposed to BS did not identify the BS statement as being discriminatory, they nevertheless described the context as equally unpleasant as the HS context. In order to explain why BS impaired women's performance further studies revealed that BS elicited mental intrusions (that is, thoughts such as "during the task, I thought that my performance would be poor"), which impedes optimal cognitive performance (Dardenne et al., 2007). As further evidence that BS modifies task-related brain activity, the authors used functional MRI (fMRI) and demonstrated that supplementary brain regions, namely those areas associated with intrusive thought suppression reacted to exposure to BS but neither to HS nor to a neutral control condition during the performance of the task (Dardenne et al., 2013).

As a further example of the harmful effects of BS for individual women, research shows that exposure to BS increases self-objectification: In a study conducted by Calogero and Jost (2011), women were randomly assigned to read either BS statements, or HS statements or non-sexist statements. Compared to the HS and non-sexist condition, women who read BS statements were more likely to rank appearance-based attributes as more important than competence-based attributes (self-objectification), were more worried how they look to other people (self-surveillance) and felt more body shame (Calogero & Jost, 2011). Women who endorse BS do also conform to current beauty ideals and practices. For instance, they report more use of cosmetics (Forbes, Collinsworth, Jobe, Braun & Wise, 2007; Forbes, Jung & Haas, 2006; Franzio, 2001) and higher levels of body dissatisfaction (Forbes et al., 2005). The above reported studies illustrate the pernicious consequences of BS for women on a "micro level." How can BS be harmful for women on the societal level?

On a societal level, BS contributes to the maintenance of gender stereotypes and in turn fosters gender inequality. First and foremost, BS portrays women not only as "wonderful and warm" but reinforces patriarchy by characterizing women as childlike, incompetent and weak and therefore as best suited for low status roles. As noted above, only those women who behave in line with sexist prescriptions for maintaining traditional gender role behavior are "rewarded" with affection; those who challenge men's power are punished with hostility (Glick, Diebold, Bailey-Werner & Zhu, 1997; Hebl et al., 2009).

Second, BS works as a pacifier by decreasing women's resistance against gender discrimination (Becker & Wright, 2011; Jackman, 1994; Moya, Glick, Exposito, de Lemus & Hart, 2007). In her influential book, Mary Jackman (1994) has argued that benevolent behavior (toward Blacks, working-class people and women) works as "the iron fist in the velvet glove"—a subtle tool of oppression, able to win the voluntary acceptance of subordinates and thus exemplifies the ways in which members of low-status groups can be coopted. With regard to the quote by Ursula Le Guin with which we opened this

chapter, Jackman's thesis would imply that coercion is the least efficient means of obtaining order. This is particularly true in gender relations, or other types of intergroup relations where there is a power imbalance and where the dominant group has a vested interest in keeping members of the disadvantaged group happy with their place in the social order.

Consistent with Jackman's (1994) insightful and founding argument, research indicates that BS leads not only to greater acceptance of individual discrimination (see Moya et al., 2007), but undermines direct protest against gender inequality. How can this be explained? System justification theory posits that individuals are motivated to positively evaluate not only themselves and their groups, but also the societal system they belong to (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Research illustrates that if people believe that there is not a single group in society who monopolizes everything "good," but that a group's advantages balance the group's disadvantages, the overall societal system is perceived to be fair (e.g., Jost & Burgess, 2000). If something is perceived to be fair, resistance becomes obsolete. HS and BS can be perceived as an example of such complementary ideologies: Women are not only treated negatively (i.e., via HS) but also ostensibly positively (via BS). Thus, women exposed to BS or complementary ideologies (BS and HS) should be more likely to perceive the gender system (and in extension the societal system) to be fair. This is exactly what research found (Jost & Kay, 2005; see also Sibley, Overall & Duckitt, 2007): After exposure to BS, women were more likely to perceive the general societal system to be fair by endorsing items such as "Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness." Thus, as long as women believe that the gender system is balanced because they might receive benefits from BS behavior, their system justification increases.

Following this logic, researchers also demonstrated that exposure to BS directly undermined women's engagement in collective action in order to change gender inequality (Becker & Wright, 2011). In this study, female students allegedly participated in a memory study. Depending on experimental condition, they learned BS, HS, or neutral sentences and were told that they would complete a memory test later. Before answering the memory test, participants engaged in diverse activities. Results show that participants exposed to BS took less gender-related flyers and were less likely to sign the petition for gender equality when they were exposed to BS (compared to HS and the neutral condition). Mediation analyses suggested that BS undermined collective action, because women found the gender system to be fairer and perceived more advantages of being a woman compared to the HS and neutral condition (Becker & Wright, 2011).

In sum, the above reported studies illustrate the insidious power of BS ideology for women as individuals and as social category: Although BS often goes unnoticed or is not identified as sexist, exposure to BS decreases women's cognitive performance, increases conformity to beauty ideals, promotes traditional gender stereotypes, and portrays women as best fitting into low-status roles. Moreover, BS reduces resistance against individual discrimination as well as engagement in collective action for social change.

Ambivalence toward Men

In order to round out the review about ambivalent sexism, we briefly present the "Ambivalence toward Men Inventory" (Glick & Fiske, 1999). Ambivalent attitudes toward men also consist of hostile and benevolent beliefs. Hostility toward men is reflected in an unfavorable evaluation of men and comprises three components. Resentment of paternalism reflects the beliefs that men will always have a power advantage

("men will always fight to have greater control in society than women"). Second, compensatory gender differentiation is characterized by feelings of contempt regarding men's domestic abilities ("men act like babies when they are sick"). Third, heterosexual intimacy expresses the belief that all men view women as sexual objects ("a man who is sexually attracted to a woman typically has no morals about doing whatever it takes to get her in bed"). Benevolence toward men is expressed in the belief that women need to take care of men in the domestic realm (maternalism: "even if both members of a couple work, the woman ought to be more attentive to taking care of her man at home"), in a positive evaluation of men as being providers and protectors (complementary gender differentiation: "men are more willing to put themselves in danger to protect others"), and in the belief that without a husband a woman's life is not complete (heterosexual intimacy: "every woman ought to have a man she adores"). Hostile and benevolent attitudes toward men are moderately positively related to each other and to HS and BS toward women (as measured by the ASI, Glick & Fiske, 1999).

Hostile and benevolent attitudes toward men neither reflect increased levels of delegitimization of men's greater power nor do they aim to change gender inequality. In contrast, hostility against men is accompanied by the belief that gender relations are not changeable and that men will always remain the powerful group. Benevolence toward men is an example of prejudice in favor of the advantaged group. Casting advantaged groups in a positive light maintains the unequal status quo at least as much as prejudice against the disadvantaged group, because these stereotypes imply that the advantaged group deserves its higher position (Glick & Fiske, 1999; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tajfel, 1981). Thus, women and men holding benevolent attitudes toward men justify the intergroup hierarchy, for instance, by legitimizing the traditional division of labor.

SEXISM IN ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIPS

Sexism and Partner Ideals

Although systemic interpersonal dependency between men and women has been recognized as a critical antecedent of different forms of sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996), our understanding of the role and function of sexism within heterosexual relationships remains surprisingly limited (see Rudman & Glick, 2008). Previous research has consistently shown that men value attractiveness in potential partners more than women do, whereas women value resources in potential partners more than men do (see Fletcher, 2002, for review).

However, while there may be overall effects across men and women, some men value attractiveness more than other men and some women value status more than other women. What predicts this variation? Sibley and Overall (2011) collated and meta-analyzed data from 32 samples on levels of sexism and what people value in a partner, and showed that sexism was a key predictor of how much men and women value these traits in potential romantic partners. Their analysis focused solely on heterosexual relationship ideals. It turns out that women high in BS tend to value status and resources in potential romantic partners, whereas women low in BS place less emphasis on these traits.

What about men? For men, their level of HS is more predictive of what they value in a partner. Men high in HS tend to value having an attractive female partner, whereas for

men low in HS, their partner's attractiveness is less important. For men the desire for a highly attractive female partner tends to be associated with their level of Social Dominance Orientation and HS (Sibley & Overall, 2011). For men, this link probably occurs because HS expresses dominance-motivated negative evaluations of women who refuse to conform to gender roles that compliment men as a marker of status and success in relation to other men (a status marker, or "trophy" motive).

Recent neuroimaging research by Cikara, Eberhardt and Fiske (2011) is consistent with the argument that HS in men leads to a tendency to view women specifically as objects. Cikara et al. (2011) reported that men high in HS showed less activation of specific regions of the brain associated with social cognition and attribution (such as the medial prefrontal cortex) when viewing images of sexualized women. This effect was limited specifically to viewing images of sexualized women rather than images of women not explicitly sexualized in nature. These results indicate that men high in HS show a differential pattern of neural activation when viewing sexualized women. This differential pattern of activation is associated with viewing sexualized women as objects rather than as people, in that men high in HS are making less use of parts of the brain associated with sociocognitive faculties when they view such images. Men high in HS tend to be more likely to view women as objects, at least under certain conditions.

What of women? Sibley and Overall (2011) argued that the underlying reasons for why women prefer partners who can provide resources are similar to why women adopt BS: to gain protection and security. Consistent with this, in a second study, Sibley and Overall (2011) showed that women high in a general threat-driven motive for collective security (indexed by authoritarianism) tended to also value status and power in men—that is, they tended to value traits that would allow them to protect and provide for their female partner. Moreover, the link between this motive and women's status mate preferences was mediated by BS. This suggests that the link between women's BS and their desire for a high-status partner may result from a more general and global concern about security and the level of threat in society. This lends further support to the idea that it is when women tend to perceive societal threat that they tend to perceive BS as a way to promote their being protected and cherished; and part of this is an increase in the desire for a high-status partner capable of doing the protecting and providing.

The desire for a partner high in status and provision also tends to form part of a broader constellation of ideals about the "perfect" partner or "prince charming" archetype who is charming, as well as able to protect and provide (Rudman & Heppen, 2003). However, a woman's desire for an idealized protector also tends to be correlated with other critical outcomes that maintain her reliance and dependence on her partner. Rudman and Heppen (2003) reported that, for women, an implicit romantic fantasy of one's partner as being like (or associated with) concepts such as "Prince Charming," a "white knight," or a "superhero" predicted lower educational goals and less interest in attaining a high-status job. Idealization of the perfect partner in this way is associated with less emphasis on gaining direct access to education, status and resources.

Sexism and Romantic Relationships

There is good evidence that endorsing BS hurts women at the group level. To return to some of examples mentioned earlier: Endorsing BS reduces women's motivation to fight for collective change (Becker & Wright, 2011). Exposure to BS also reduces women's performance on cognitive tests in job-testing situations (Dardenne et al., 2007).

An analysis of data on trends in gender inequality across 57 nations even indicates that levels of sexism predicted increased gender inequality at the national level (Brandt, 2011).

However, BS also provides women with power within specific relational domains (Overall, Sibley & Tan, 2013; Hammond & Overall, 2013). Not only this, but research by Hammond, Sibley and Overall (2014) now suggests that in certain contexts women's BS may increase as a result of the narcissistic-based motivation for personal gain. Hammond et al. (2014) showed that women who are higher in psychological entitlement (a specific component of narcissistic personality) tend to become higher in BS over time. This effect is specific to women; men high in psychological entitlement do not show the same effect. The crux here is that the gains for women associated with BS may be real and of consequence; they are specific to individual women within their romantic relationships. In this sense, there is growing evidence that BS may offer tangible rewards for women within traditional patriarchal relationships, while simultaneously reducing their motivation for group-based social change and collective action (see Becker & Wright, 2011).

These benefits facilitate a 'divide and conquer' strategy, where women may benefit in their individual romantic relationships, but as a group fail to gain equal access to status and resources in other (non-relationship) domains. The access to power within relationships provided by BS is restricted to traditional relational domains. In other respects, women's and men's sexism can have other negative effects that still play out within relationship contexts. For instance, women are more open to accepting restrictions on their behavior outside the home imposed by their partners when those restrictions are framed in terms of benevolence or protective paternalism.

Moya and colleagues (2007) provided a powerful demonstration of this in a lab-based relationship study. Female students majoring in psychology, education or sociology were told as part of a research experiment that they might be eligible to take part in a workshop learning to help counsel men convicted of rape or wife abuse. Their male partners were recruited as confederates during the experiment, and asked to oppose their participation in the workshop. However, the male partners were asked to offer different (pre-prepared and controlled) written reasons for why they opposed their female partner taking part in the workshop. In one condition they offered a protective justification "it would not be safe for her. I think she would find it really stressful." Male partners in another condition offered a more hostile justification "this is not a situation in which a woman, compared to a man, could be effective." In a third condition, other male partners were asked simply to oppose the workshop without offering a specific reason.

Not surprisingly, the women in Moya and colleagues' (2007) study reacted differently depending on the justification that their partner provided for their opposition. However, women's own levels of BS also affected how they responded. Women generally reacted most positively when their partner offered a protective justification for their opposition to a practicum that was presumably highly relevant and seen as a valuable career training opportunity for many of their women in the study (recall that the women were all majoring in subjects potentially relevant to counseling).

The most startling effect, however, is how high and low BS women differed from one another in the way that they reacted when their partner did not offer a justification. In the no-justification condition, women high in BS reported feeling more positive (assessed using the items: protected, cherished, important to their partner and flattered) toward

their partner. Women low in BS, in contrast, felt significantly less positive toward their partner in the no-justification condition. The results of Moya and colleagues' (2007) study suggest that women high in BS may be more open to their partner's attempts to control certain aspects of their lives when the rationale offered by their male partner is ambiguous, and when it relates to control in a non-relationship domain (such as work or career training that is not consistent with traditional roles for women).

Other research, in contrast, suggests that in domains directly related to romantic relationships, BS does quite the opposite, and may provide women with power and control (Hammond & Overall, 2013; Overall, Sibley & Tan, 2011). Power and control, however, that is specific to the relationship domain. Overall et al. (2011) invited couples in ongoing heterosexual relationships into their lab, and then unobtrusively recorded them (with their permission) while they discussed aspects of each other that they wanted to change.

Overall et al. (2011) showed that men who were high in BS behaved more positively when their partner was trying to change them, and were more open to change. Men high in BS, it seems, are more attentive to their partner's requests for change within the relationship domain. For women, however, the pattern differed. Women who were high in BS tended to react to their partners' attempts to change them with more hostility and less openness, *but only when they were with a male partner who was low in BS.* In couples where both partners were high in BS, women tended to react with less hostility and to view their discussions with their partner as more successful. These findings indicate that in situations of relationship conflict, women high in BS tend to react more negatively and with more hostility when their partner does not share their BS values. If one expects to be idealized and cherished as a woman who is "weak but wonderful" within one's romantic relationship, then it might be quite a shock to discover that one's partner has more egalitarian attitudes and views one as an equal who should also be expected to change, rather than being idealized just the way one is.

A series of studies by Hammond and Overall (2013) have expanded on the intriguing suggestion that women high in BS seem to display greater hostility and negativity in their romantic relationships when their partners are not meeting their ideals. Hammond and Overall (2013) measured women's evaluations of their relationship each day using a daily diary. They showed that women high in BS tended to be more affected by their partner's hurtful behavior than low-BS women. On days where their partner was critical or unpleasant toward them, women high in BS showed a more pronounced drop in their levels of relationship satisfaction (e.g., how much they felt loved and cared about in general). Moreover, the reactive effect was most pronounced for women high in BS who had been with their partner for a longer period of time, and who thus presumably had more invested in the relationship.

Hammond and Overall's (2013; Overall et al., 2013) research in this area is important because it speaks to a core point about the costs and benefits of BS, and hence the insidious power of this ideology. Women high in BS tend to invest more heavily in their romantic relationships. They may be more likely to view gender roles as an implicit relational contract where their end of the deal is in adhering to traditional gender roles and being swayed by their partner when it comes to other domains such as career aspirations or taking up on educational opportunities (as shown by Moya et al., 2007). However, the other side of this deal is that they will be idealized, cherished and provided for by their partner, who should act as a "prince charming" (as implied by Rudman & Heppen, 2003). Relationship conflict or disagreements may challenge this implicit

expectation because they signal that one's male partner does not view one as perfect and might desire one to change in some way.

What Hammond and Overall's work demonstrates is that women high in BS are highly attuned to signals of relationship conflict or dissatisfaction from their partner, probably because they have so much more invested in the relationship conforming to traditional gender roles. Under such conditions, BS may empower women, within this specific domain, to challenge their partner, react more negatively toward them, and experience more pronounced declines in relationship satisfaction. This points to one of the core trade-offs made by women who subscribe to BS in their romantic relationships. High BS women may be more likely to be protected and provided for within their relationships (to the extent that they value status and resource provision in their partners; Sibley & Overall, 2011). This is the seductive side of BS, and one that research indicates can seem highly appealing to many women (Kilianski & Rudman, 1998). However, because they have more invested in such relationships, high BS women who enter into such relationship "contracts" will tend to be the ones to react most negatively and experience the sharpest declines in their daily evaluation of their relationship (how loved they feel by their partner, etc.), when their partner does not live up to their ideals.

CONSEQUENCES OF SEXISM

Sexism can affect women directly and indirectly (Stangor et al., 2003; Swim & Hyers, 2009). We first provide a brief overview on direct consequences of sexism by focusing on violence and discrimination against women. Second, we present indirect consequences by introducing stereotype threat, and the consequences of internalizing sexist beliefs (i.e., self-silencing beliefs, self-objectification).

Direct Consequences: Violence and Discrimination

The most extreme form of *direct consequences of sexism* is physical violence against women, including murder, sexual aggression and interpersonal violence. The global prevalence of physical or sexual intimate partner violence among women is 30.0% (WHO, 2013). Moreover, recent data indicates that 35% of women worldwide have experienced either intimate partner violence or non-partner sexual violence in their lifetime.

Another direct consequence of sexism can be seen in the discrimination against women in terms of employment and income. The gender pay gap may be the clearest example illustrating that women get less payment for the same job compared to men (e.g., DeStatis, 2013). Moreover, in one study, it was experimentally examined whether gaining children disadvantages women on the job market more than men (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2004). In this study, participants read a scenario about an associate consultant in an organization. This consultant was either a woman (Kate) or a man (Dan). Furthermore, half of the participants read that Kate and her husband (or Dan and his wife) "recently had their first baby"; the other half of participants did not get information about the consultant's parental status. Afterwards participants completed diverse measures, among other things, discriminatory intentions (e.g., how likely they would be to recommend Kate/Dan for a promotion). Higher scores indicate less discrimination. Results show that the working mom was more discriminated against (i.e., less likely promoted, $M = 4.16$) than the childless working woman ($M = 4.86$). In contrast, gaining a child did not affect discriminatory intentions regarding the male worker: Working dads ($M = 4.81$) and the

childless working man ($M = 4.62$) received equally low scores on the discrimination intention scale (Cuddy et al., 2004).

Indirect Consequences: Stereotype Threat and Internalization of Sexist Beliefs

Indirect effects of sexism occur when a woman perceives that she is discriminated against, which can attenuate but also accentuate the negative consequence of experiencing sexism. According to the well-researched effect of *stereotype threat,* knowing a certain stereotype about one's own group leads to confirming this stereotype in performance situations. For example, most women know the stereotype that women are bad at math. In an experimental study conducted by Spencer, Steele and Quinn (1999) women were either told that a math test produces gender differences (high stereotype threat condition) or not (low stereotype threat condition) and were asked to complete the math test. Results show that women in the high stereotype threat condition performed worse than equally qualified men did, whereas there was no gender difference in the low stereotype threat condition (Spencer et al., 1999). Thus, simply activating the stereotypes about one's ingroup dampens women's cognitive performance.

Moreover, we argue that the indirect effects of sexism also occur when women are influenced in their behavior by having internalized sexist beliefs and gender role expectations. The insidious consequences of BS as one example of internalization have been reported above. In addition to internalized BS beliefs, the internalization of prescriptive gender role expectations in general can be harmful for women. According to a "doing gender" perspective, gender is socially constructed, constituted by interaction and internalized by women and men (West & Zimmerman, 1987). Men are "doing" more dominance and women are "doing" more deference, which reinforces and legitimizes gender inequality. For instance, women are often taken less seriously compared to men because they express themselves in less powerful ways: Women are more likely than men to use unfinished sentences, disclaimers ("I could be wrong, but . . .") and hedges ("hum, ah"), and they are also more likely than men to speak more tentatively and use more tag questions ("It's a nice day, isn't it?"). In conversations, women are more likely to ask questions than make statements (e.g., Carli, 1990; Lakoff, 1975; Reid, Keerie & Palomares, 2003). When men are talking, many women are more likely than men to respond with a smile, attentive listening and nodding (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995). However, if women do not behave in line with these role expectations, but present themselves more assertively, they risk being less liked and described in more negative terms compared to men behaving in the same way (e.g., Rudman & Glick, 1999, 2001).

Moreover, internalized gender roles can contribute to the explanation of the gender pay gap. Women are expected to be warm, caring, selfless and modest. Prescriptive gender stereotypes suggest that a good woman puts others' needs ahead of her own needs. These beliefs are called *self-silencing beliefs* (e.g., Jack & Dill, 1992). Despite some significant changes since the entering of women in the work world, these self-silencing beliefs remain surprisingly up to date. If women are expected to avoid being assertive and demanding, but to be modest and selfless, it is not surprising that women make lower salary requests compared to men in salary negotiations (e.g., Barron, 2003). Evidently, if women request a lower salary, they receive a lower salary. Thus, one reason for the gender pay gap—in addition to structural factors such as male networks and the glass ceiling—can be seen in these role restrictions (e.g., Barron, 2003; Wade, 2001) and internalized norms of social inequality (e.g., the belief that women are entitled to deserve lesser

outcomes, e.g., Major, 1994). Gendered self-silencing beliefs are not only prevalent in work contexts but also in interpersonal relationships. Although self-silencing beliefs are intended to protect harmony in relationships, they are problematic if only women are inclined not to express their thoughts and feelings in interpersonal interactions. Indeed, the more women endorse self-silencing beliefs, the worse their psychological well-being (Jack & Dill, 1992) and the less they confront sexism in their everyday lives (Swim, Eyssell, Quinlivan Murdoch & Ferguson, 2010).

A further example of internalization of sexism is *self-objectification*. Self-objectification means to apply an observer's perspective on one's body and appearance (e.g., Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). Self-objectification leads to a permanent monitoring whether or not one's body fits the cultural standards of appearance. This has a negative impact on women (e.g., Calogero, Pina, Park & Rahemtulla, 2010). Specifically, an experimental manipulation of self-objectification (wearing a swimsuit versus a sweater) increased women's body shame, which in turn predicted restrained eating (Fredrickson, Roberts, Noll, Quinn & Twenge, 1998). Furthermore, self-objectification also undermined women's math performance via depletion of attention resources (Fredrickson et al., 1998).

This section focused on direct and indirect consequences of sexism. Indirect consequences are more ambiguous and more difficult to observe. However, several examples illustrate the insidious danger of internalizing traditional gender role expectations and sexist beliefs. In light of these harmful consequences of sexism for women, it is key to ask how sexism can be changed. One way to break through habitual behaviors is by confronting sexist incidents. The next two paragraphs summarize research on confronting and reducing sexism.

CONFRONTING SEXISM

Confronting sexism is a volitional process that aims at expressing one's dissatisfaction with sexist treatment to the person (or group) responsible for it (Becker, Zawadzki & Shields, 2014; Kaiser & Miller, 2004; Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore & Hill, 2006). Although women are generally inclined to confront sexism when they are asked to imagine a sexist encounter, in reality most women remain silent (Swim & Hyers, 1999; Swim et al., 2010). This might be due to the fact that confronting sexism presents a double-edged sword for women, because confronting can have negative and positive consequences for the confronter.

The negative consequences of confronting refer to social costs: Confronters are often perceived as oversensitive and overreacting troublemakers, as interpersonally cold, or fearful of retaliation (e.g., Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Dodd, Giuliano, Boutell & Moran, 2001; Feagin & Sikes, 1994; Kaiser & Miller, 2001, 2003; Kaiser, Hagiwara, Malahy & Wilkins, 2009). Compared to men confronting sexism, female confronters are at risk to be perceived as self-interested and egoistic (Drury & Kaiser, 2014). Especially low-power targets are reluctant to confront high-power perpetrators (e.g., Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2014).

However, although confronting can entail some negative consequences, it can produce a broad range of positive psychological outcomes: confronting increases an individual's perceived competence, self-esteem, empowerment (Gervais et al., 2010; Swim & Thomas, 2005) and satisfaction (Hyers, 2007). Importantly, confronting prejudice can reduce subsequent stereotype use in perpetrators (Czopp, Monteith & Mark, 2006) and observers (Rasinski & Czopp, 2010). Thus, confronting sexism can prevent future encounters with

sexism by educating the perpetrator (e.g., Hyers, 2007) or more broadly through changing social norms (e.g., Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham & Vaughn, 1994).

When faced with a sexist encounter, individuals have diverse options to respond. Many individuals may ask themselves which ways of confronting are most successful, and may maximize the benefits and minimize the social costs. First evidence suggests that when faced with sexism, observers are more likely to support non-aggressive confrontation (e.g., tactfully addressing the perpetrator) compared to aggressive confrontation (slapping the perpetrator) and no confrontation at all (Becker & Barreto, 2014). Thus, these findings suggest that confronting sexism is preferred over non-confronting by female and male observers. Moreover, confronters are more likely supported when they confront non-aggressively compared to aggressively. However, women highly identified with their gender and men weakly identified with their gender are supportive of aggressive and non-aggressive confrontation compared to no confrontation at all (Becker & Barreto, 2014; see also Kaiser, Hagiwara, Malahy & Wilkins, 2009).

REDUCING SEXISM

Compared to research on reducing other forms of prejudice (e.g., racism), research on interventions to reduce sexism is relatively rare (but see Becker et al., 2014).

One reason for this refers to the fact that intergroup contact as the most successful paradigm to reduce prejudice based on ethnicity, age or disability cannot be applied to reducing sexism. It has been argued that gender is special because of the prescriptive aspects of gender stereotypes, the inherent power asymmetries between women and men, close contact, and the sexual and biological facets of intimate relationships (Fiske & Stevens, 1993). Women and men are in continuous close contact and do not experience intergroup anxiety. Accordingly, mechanisms that are successful in reducing other forms of prejudice (e.g., racism) cannot simply be adapted to sexism research. Thus, in order to reduce sexism, alternative interventions need to be developed.

So far, first interventions have been conducted, in which participants are provided with certain information that aims to change their attitudes. For instance, Shields, Zawadzki and Johnson (2011) introduced the Workshop Activity for Gender Equity Simulation in the Academy (WAGES-Academic), which simulates the cumulative effects of unconscious bias in the academic workplace. By playing WAGES-Academic, participants experientially learn that the accumulation of their minor biases can hinder advancement and results in inequality. Indeed, playing WAGES reduced individual's acceptance of sexism (e.g., Zawadzki, Shields, Danube & Swim, 2013).

Other interventions, for instance the multi-component intervention program to reduce sexism evaluated by de Lemus, Navarro, Velásquez, Ryan and Megías (2014), suggest that it is more challenging to reduce an individual's endorsement of BS than HS. Likewise, research indicated that it is particularly difficult to change men's endorsement of BS. In a diary study, women and men were asked to complete sexism diaries (or stress diaries). Keeping sexism diaries reduced women's but not men's endorsement of BS, modern and neosexist beliefs (Becker & Swim, 2011). How can men's endorsement of sexism be changed? Men reduced their endorsement of modern and neosexism only when they were explicitly asked to increase their empathy by imagining the target's emotions. However, men's endorsement of BS remained unaffected by the diary method (presumably because the men imagined that the target had positive emotions when confronted with

BS). Building on this, further research illustrates that men's endorsement of BS can be reduced by providing information about the harmful effects of BS (Becker & Swim, 2012).

In sum, first intervention studies provide useful information on how different types of sexism can be successfully reduced (for an overview, see Becker et al., 2014). It is important to note, however, that these psychological "micro-level" interventions (such as confronting sexist perpetrators, participating in programs to reduce sexism) present only a first step in changing unequal gender relations. In reality, gender equality can only be achieved by subtracting power from the advantaged group (Jackman, 1994). Obviously, most members of the dominant group do not give up their privileges voluntarily. According to Gramsci's (1971) concept of hegemony, consent between all members of society is produced and transmitted by the civil society (e.g., political parties, political organizations, church, schools, the media or family). Thus, in order to reach actual gender equality, negotiations carried out in all institutions of society and culture are necessary. Moreover, from an intersectionality perspective (e.g., Cole, 2009; Shields, 2008), women and men embody various social identities that conjointly affect our beliefs about and experiences with sexism. In order to sustainably change sexism in society, all kinds of expropriate and unequal relationships between groups need to be taken into account and addressed at different levels.

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